Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

P. v. Contreras CA2/2

Filed 9/30/26 P. v. Contreras CA2/2
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 9/30/26 P. v. Contreras CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B348773

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23SFCF00065)
v.

JOSE JUAN CONTRERAS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael Terrell, Judge. Affirmed.
John F. Schuck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Gary A. Lieberman,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Defendant Jose Juan Contreras moved under Penal Code1
section 1538.5 to suppress evidence discovered by police during a
warrantless detention. Following the trial court’s denial of the
motion, Contreras pled no contest to possession of a controlled
substance with a firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1,
subd. (a)). On appeal, Contreras argues the court erred in
denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On November 22, 2023, at approximately 8:35 p.m., Los
Angeles Police Department Officers Kenneth Morales and David
Cervantes were on patrol. While driving by a house known as a
“crash pad” for Vineland Boys gang members, Officer Morales
observed a Chevy Equinox backing out of that driveway. As the
officers approached, the Chevy “spontaneously accelerated back
into” the driveway. According to Officer Morales, the Chevy was
10 to 15 feet from the patrol vehicle when it went back into the
driveway.
Officer Morales thought the Chevy’s movement was
suspicious and believed the occupants were attempting to avoid
police. Officer Morales parked his patrol car at the edge of
driveway of the residence, and both officers exited the car to
investigate. According to Officer Cervantes, the way the patrol
car was parked gave enough space for another car to pull in or
out of the driveway.
As Officer Morales walked toward the front passenger side
of the Chevy, Contreras exited the front passenger seat, while the
driver also exited on the other side of the car. Officer Morales
greeted Contreras, and Contreras responded something to the
effect of “We’re good” or “We’re okay.” According to Officer

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
Morales, at that point, he was attempting to initiate a consensual
encounter to verify whether there was enough reasonable
suspicion to detain Contreras.
Contreras and the driver of the Chevy then walked away
from the officers and toward the front door of the residence.
Contreras made a furtive movement toward the front of his
waistband. Using his flashlight, Officer Morales looked in the
front passenger side of the Chevy and saw a methamphetamine
pipe in the center console area. Officer Morales then told
Contreras to stop, but Contreras continued to walk toward the
front door.
Meanwhile, Officer Cervantes saw an “L-shaped bulge” in
the right pocket of Contreras’s sweater. According to Officer
Cervantes, the bulge “was heavy because it was weighing down
[Contreras’s] sweater pocket.” Recognizing the object as a
firearm, Officer Cervantes also told Contreras to stop. When
Contreras refused to stop and continued to walk toward the front
door, Officer Cervantes physically detained him. Officer
Cervantes removed a loaded .40-caliber pistol from Contreras’s
right sweater pocket, methamphetamine from his right pants
pocket, and heroin from his left pants pocket.
At the May 21, 2024 preliminary hearing, Contreras
brought a section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence. After
hearing the testimony of Officers Morales and Cervantes and
reviewing footage from Officer Morales’s body-worn camera,2 the
magistrate denied the motion.

2 Contreras submitted footage of Officer Morales’s body-worn
camera as an exhibit to his first motion to suppress. The footage
has been lodged with this court, and we have reviewed it to
assess whether the officers violated Contreras’s Fourth
Amendment rights.

3
An information charged Contreras, among other things,
with possession of a controlled substance with a firearm (Health
& Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)). The information also alleged
Contreras had one prior strike conviction within the meaning of
the “Three Strikes” law (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12,
subd. (b)).
On June 17, 2024, Contreras filed a second section 1538.5
motion to suppress evidence. On July 29, 2024, the trial court
heard the motion and denied it.
After the trial court denied the second motion to suppress,
Contreras pled no contest to possession of a controlled substance
with a firearm and admitted the prior strike. On September 2,
2025, in conformity with the plea agreement, the court sentenced
Contreras to six years in prison.
Contreras timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Contreras contends the trial court erred by denying his
second section 1538.5 motion because Officers Morales and
Cervantes detained and searched him without reasonable
suspicion. We disagree.
“Where, as here, a suppression motion is made before a
magistrate in conjunction with a preliminary hearing and no new
evidence is presented in superior court, we are ‘concerned solely
with the findings of the [magistrate].’ [Citation.] We defer to the
magistrate’s express and implied findings of fact if supported by
substantial evidence. [Citations.] We independently assess
whether the challenged search or seizure violates the Fourth
Amendment, applying federal constitutional standards.” (People
v. Tacardon (2022) 14 Cal.5th 235, 242 (Tacardon).)
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free of
unreasonable searches and seizures by law enforcement. (U.S.
Const., 4th Amend.; Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 8–9.)

4
“Officers may conduct an investigatory detention if they have an
objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” (People v.
Jackson (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 730, 738.) “[A] reasonable
suspicion justifying a detention is ‘simply . . . “a particularized
and objective basis” for suspecting the person stopped of criminal
activity.’ [Citation.] So long as the facts known to the officer
reasonably cause him or her to suspect the person he or she
intends to detain might be or has been involved in criminal
activity, the detention is lawful.” (People v. Flores (2019)
38 Cal.App.5th 617, 628.)
To review the reasonableness of Contreras’s detention, we
must first determine the point at which he was “seized” for
Fourth Amendment purposes. “A person is seized by the police
and thus entitled to challenge the government’s action under the
Fourth Amendment when the officer, ‘ “by means of physical force
or show of authority,” ’ terminates or restrains his freedom of
movement . . . .” (Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254
(Brendlin).) A seizure through a show of authority occurs when a
reasonable person would have believed they were not free to
leave or to decline an officer’s request. (People v. Zamudio (2008)
43 Cal.4th 327, 341 (Zamudio).) Importantly, although a police
officer may effect a seizure by a show of authority and without
physical force, “there is no seizure without actual submission;
otherwise, there is at most an attempted seizure, so far as the
Fourth Amendment is concerned.” (Brendlin, at p. 254.)
The United States Supreme Court’s opinion in California v.
Hodari D. (1991) 499 U.S. 621 (Hodari D.), is instructive. There,
a number of youths, including Hodari, were huddled around a car
late at night in a “high-crime area.” (Id. at p. 622.) They fled
when they saw an unmarked police car approaching. (Id. at
p. 623.) While fleeing, Hodari discarded a small object that
turned out to be crack cocaine before being tackled by a police

5
officer and arrested. (Ibid.) In attempting to suppress the
evidence of the crack cocaine, Hodari argued he was seized for
Fourth Amendment purposes at the moment he saw the police
officer running toward him. (Ibid.) The Supreme Court assumed
for the purposes of its opinion that the officer’s pursuit
constituted a show of authority “enjoining Hodari to halt.” (Id. at
p. 629.) But because Hodari fled and did not submit to the show
of authority, the court concluded he “was not seized until he was
tackled.” (Ibid.; see also Tacardon, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 241 [a
person is seized only if they actually submit to the show of
authority].)
Here, Officers Morales and Cervantes began to make a
show of authority and thus attempted to seize Contreras when
they told him to stop walking toward the house, because a
reasonable person would have believed they were not free to
leave or to decline the order to stop. (Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th
at p. 341.) Contreras, however, did walk away, and therefore was
not detained until Officer Cervantes apprehended and
handcuffed him seconds later. (Hodari D., supra, 499 U.S. at
p. 629.)
Turning to the reasonableness of the detention, moments
before both officers ordered Contreras to stop, Officer Morales
saw a methamphetamine pipe in the center console area of the
Chevy and Officer Cervantes saw an “L-shaped bulge,” which he
believed to be a gun, in Contreras’s sweater. These observations
provided the officers with reasonable suspicion to detain
Contreras. (See Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a) [“It is
unlawful to possess an opium pipe or any device, contrivance,
instrument, or paraphernalia used for unlawfully injecting or
smoking . . . a controlled substance”]; Pen. Code, § 25400,
subd. (a)(2) [“A person is guilty of carrying a concealed firearm
when the person . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [c]arries concealed upon the

6
person any pistol, revolver, or other firearm capable of being
concealed upon the person”].)
Contreras argues Officers Morales and Cervantes actually
seized him earlier when they stopped their patrol car in the
driveway and caused him to abandon his journey away from the
house. The record does not support this. The patrol car stopped at
the edge of the driveway only after the Chevy pulled back in, thus
Contreras had already abandoned his journey before the police
stopped. The officers had made no show of authority when the
Chevy was backing out, and the Chevy’s occupants calmly headed
back into the house of their own volition after the police walked
up. Moreover, the patrol car did not prevent egress from the
driveway. When the officers attempted to talk to Contreras on
the driveway, he walked away. After Officer Morales saw the
drug paraphernalia and Officer Cervantes saw the L-shaped
bulge and commanded Contreras to stop, he ignored them and
continued walking. Thus, prior to Officer Cervantes physically
detaining him, Contreras had not yet been “seized” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. (Brendlin, supra, 551 U.S. at
p. 254.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

RICHARDSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

LUI, P. J.

GOORVITCH, J.

7

← Back to CA Unpub Decisions · Knowledge Base
Lean view · served in 4 ms · full site view