P. v. Chambers CA2/8

Filed 9/14/26 P. v. Chambers CA2/8
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B346262

Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24CMCF00928
v.

RAVEN CHAMBERS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Craig E. Veals, Judge. Affirmed.
Laura R. Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Nicholas J. Webster and Amanda V. Lopez,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________
A jury convicted defendant Raven Chambers of robbery
(Pen. Code, § 211), vehicle taking or driving without consent
(Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), and three counts of resisting
arrest (Pen. Code § 148, subd. (a)(1)). Defendant timely appeals,
but challenges only the Vehicle Code conviction. Sufficient
evidence shows defendant lacked consent to use the vehicle at
issue. Additionally, trial counsel was not ineffective when cross
examining the detective who took a stolen vehicle report. We
therefore affirm.
I.
At trial, jurors heard evidence about a supermarket
robbery. Jurors heard from Sean Do, the owner of the getaway
car defendant drove, Elizabeth Lopez, the detective who
investigated the car’s disappearance, and several witnesses to the
robbery and its aftermath.
Do testified first.
Sean Do put his 2015 Nissan Sentra up for rent on the Turo
car rental platform. His average rental rate was about $35 per
day. The Sentra was in “normal,” “working condition” with “no
damage.” Do rented the Sentra to Keisha Chambers from March
13 to May 13 of 2024. Keisha (we use her first name for clarity)
did not add an additional driver to the rental and she was,
therefore, not supposed to let anyone else use the vehicle.
Although Do did not recollect Keisha’s last name, defense
counsel, when cross examining Do, made a point of eliciting that
Chambers was the renter’s last name on the rental documents.
The prosecution, outside the jury’s presence, objected that this
testimony would let jurors speculate that Keisha and defendant
were related when they were, in fact, separated and holding

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themselves out as former spouses. The court ruled the parties
should refer to the renter, at that point, as only Keisha.
When Keisha did not return the Sentra at the end of the
rental period, Do reported the car unreturned to Turo. Some
days later, the police informed Do his car had been impounded
and he collected it. The car had suffered inside and out. The
inside appeared trashed and lived in, and there was the odor of
urine. The outside front, back, and sides were damaged.
Lopez testified next.
Keisha contacted Lopez about the Sentra on May 14, 2024,
the day after her Turo rental ended. Keisha, whom Lopez
characterized as defendant’s ex-wife, informed Lopez that
defendant did not have consent to use the Sentra and Keisha
gave Lopez defendant’s contact information. Lopez called
defendant. He identified himself as Raven Chambers. Lopez
identified herself as a police officer and asked defendant about
the Sentra. Defendant said he had the vehicle, had gotten it from
his ex-wife, and had not stolen it.
During Lopez’s direct testimony, Lopez stated that she told
defendant, “if he would come to the station with the vehicle, a
report would not be taken for the vehicle being stolen because he
didn’t have consent to have the vehicle.” The defense objected.
The trial court asked Lopez if she told defendant these things
because her understanding was defendant lacked consent. Lopez
said yes. The defense objected again. The trial court then
instructed the jury that “the witness is not offering that for the
truth of the matter asserted. In other words, that the defendant,
in fact, did not have consent. She’s only explaining why she took
this action. So it should be viewed and considered only in that
regard. Does everyone understand?”

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Lopez’s examination continued. Lopez said she told
defendant “if you drop off the vehicle at the station right now and
return it to the individual who had it before [you], everything
would be okay. And he understood that.”
On cross examination, defense counsel confirmed with
Lopez that “a Keisha Chambers . . . came to the station on May
14th” and “reported . . . that the vehicle had been stolen.” Then,
the prosecutor objected on hearsay grounds and a sidebar
followed. The trial court and counsel discussed the relationship
between Keisha and defendant. The prosecutor had tried to keep
Lopez from mentioning Keisha being defendant’s ex-wife.
Defense counsel viewed Lopez’s assertion of the relationship and
of what Keisha said as hearsay, but since “ex-wife” was before the
jury, wanted to elicit that Keisha was not an ex-wife, but a
current wife who might have been able to bestow defendant with
consent. Defense counsel also noted Keisha was not testifying
and raised her belief that without Keisha, the prosecution’s case
was weak. The prosecution responded that they would call
Keisha, though they had been hoping to avoid that because of the
murkiness of the relationship. The prosecution then recounted
what body worn video could show of Lopez’s conversation with
Keisha. Keisha said she and defendant were getting divorced.
Keisha said, with respect to the Sentra, that she realized the car
was taken off her driveway and that sometime around that time
she had dinner with defendant and believed he took the Sentra’s
keys out of her purse.
Returning from the sidebar, defense counsel later
confirmed with Lopez that “when Keisha came in to report the
car stolen, before you filled out the report, you first made the call
to Raven Chambers. Correct?” Lopez also testified on cross

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examination that she was unsure if defendant “was aware that
he didn’t have consent to have the car” so she “explained to him
that” Keisha had “come to the station and said he did not have
consent.”
Other witnesses then described how two days later, on May
16, 2024, defendant robbed a supermarket, made off in the
Sentra, and resisted arrest when police located him at a nearby
convenience store. There is testimony and video evidence that
defendant drove the car from the supermarket. When police
encountered defendant, he said his name was “Trent Chambers,”
a name with no match in California’s DMV database. Police ran
the license plate on the vehicle and learned it had been reported
stolen.
II.
Defendant’s conviction for taking or driving a vehicle
without consent is supported by substantial evidence.
A.
First, there was substantial evidence of lack of consent.
“Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her
own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent
either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of
his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or
without intent to steal the vehicle . . . is guilty of a public offense
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by imprisonment
in a county jail for not more than one year or pursuant to
subdivision (h) of Section 1170 of the Penal Code or by a fine of
not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or by both the fine
and imprisonment.” (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a); see People v.
O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574 (O’Dell).)

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According to defendant, “[t]he prosecution’s failure to call
Keisha Chambers as a witness, combined with the trial court’s
limiting instruction that Detective Lopez’s testimony about
Keisha’s statements could not be considered for their truth, left
the jury without any admissible evidence” establishing defendant
lacked consent.
But even if Lopez’s repetition at trial of Keisha’s statement
that defendant lacked consent was hearsay and inadmissible on
its own to prove whether defendant had consent (see Evid. Code,
§ 1200, subd. (a)), other unchallenged evidence supported lack of
Keisha’s consent, assuming she could have bestowed it. (And
there is no dispute that Do did not give consent.) Keisha came to
Lopez, a police detective, to report the Sentra as stolen. Keisha
previously had lawful possession of the Sentra, but her rental
agreement had expired. When Lopez contacted defendant with
Keisha’s assistance, defendant said he knew about the Sentra,
which he had obtained from Keisha. Lopez warned defendant
that Keisha had said she had not given him permission to use the
Sentra and that a stolen vehicle police report would follow if he
did not return the car. Defendant said he understood. When
later apprehended with the Sentra after the supermarket
robbery, defendant gave a false name.
Keisha’s actions, putting her statements aside, in going to
the police and prompting a stolen vehicle investigation targeting
defendant combined with defendant’s reactions to Lopez and the
apprehending police officers are substantial evidence that
defendant did not have Keisha’s consent to use the Sentra and
knew it. Keisha’s testimony might have offered further evidence,
but its absence does not undermine the evidence presented. (See
People v. Moses (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1245, 1251 [“Since direct

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evidence of defendant’s knowledge rarely exists, circumstantial
evidence often comes from ‘possession of stolen property
accompanied by no explanation or unsatisfactory explanation, or
by suspicious circumstances’ ”].)
B.
There is no reversible error arising from missing evidence
of a “taking” violation of the Vehicle Code provision, as opposed to
a “driving” violation. (See Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)
[prohibiting both unlawful driving and taking].)
The charging document, jury instructions, and the
prosecution’s closing argument permitted a conviction under
either an unlawful driving or taking theory. And the jury’s
verdict found defendant guilty of “driving or taking.”
Defendant contends a felony conviction for Vehicle Code
section 10851 based on a taking theory cannot stand absent proof
that the taken car had a value over $950. He argues the
prosecution did not offer substantial evidence of value. And
indeed, “a violation of Vehicle Code section 10851, subdivision (a)
may be deemed a felony only if (1) it was based on nontheft
driving or (2) it was based on theft of a vehicle worth more than
$950.” (In re J.R. (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 805, 819; see People v.
Page (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1175, 1183 (Page).)
But even if we assume the testimony that the Sentra was a
nine-year old vehicle rented in “normal” condition for an average
of $35 per day did not adequately establish a value greater than
$950, any evidentiary shortcoming on the felony taking theory
would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The rules governing “alternative-theory” errors apply. A
species of alternative-theory error occurs when a jury is
presented with multiple theories of guilt and “the reviewing court

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holds the evidence insufficient to support the conviction on [one]
ground.” (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 70.) We note,
however, that we view any shortcoming in the prosecution’s proof
of value alongside the problem that the jurors were not instructed
that a felony taking violation required proof of any particular
value. Yet even under the more stringent rules applying to
jurors’ potential adoption of a “legally” invalid alternative theory,
any shortcomings or errors here were harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Aledamat (2019) 8 Cal.5th 1, 7–8, 13
(Aledamat).)
“ ‘To determine harmlessness under Aledamat, a reviewing
court essentially asks whether any rational juror who made the
findings reflected in the verdict and heard the evidence at trial
could have had reasonable doubt regarding the findings
necessary to convict the defendant on a valid theory. “The
reviewing court examines what the jury necessarily did find and
asks whether it would be impossible, on the evidence, for the jury
to find that without also finding the missing fact as well.” ’ ”
(People v. Lewis (2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 901.)
If a juror relied on the presumed invalid taking theory, that
juror nonetheless found defendant took the Sentra, lacked
consent, and intended to deprive the owner of possession. (See
O’Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.) The video and
testimonial evidence shows beyond all doubt that defendant was
driving the car two days after the warnings from detective Lopez.
Indeed, defendant notes in his opening brief the key dispute is
not whether he “was driving the vehicle” but whether “he was
driving without consent.” Defendant, moreover, does not explain
why any rational juror that convicted defendant of taking alone
would not also have convicted him of driving. (See People v.

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Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387, 403 [“the evidence
overwhelmingly supported the conclusion that even if defendant
was in fact the car thief, his driving of the car” five hours later
“was an act separate and distinct from its taking”]; cf. Page,
supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1188 [“Where the trial testimony or factual
basis documentation for a negotiated plea (see Pen. Code,
§ 1192.5) shows posttheft driving — that is, driving the vehicle
following a ‘substantial break’ after the vehicle had initially been
stolen — the defendant cannot establish eligibility under section
1170.18 by declaring or testifying that he or she also stole the
vehicle: such testimony would not prove the conviction was based
on theft rather than on posttheft driving, and therefore would fail
to establish that the defendant would only have been guilty of a
misdemeanor”]; People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1138
[failure to instruct jury that driving must be posttheft was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt when driving undisputedly
occurred six or seven days afterward].)
III.
Counsel was not ineffective for cross examining Lopez on
asserted hearsay matters.
During direct examination of Lopez, as noted, the trial
court sustained a defense objection and instructed jurors they
could not consider Lopez’s statements about Keisha’s lack of
consent for their truth about consent, but only for how Lopez
responded. On cross examination, defense counsel occasionally
confirmed with Lopez that she took actions upon Keisha
reporting the vehicle as stolen. Defendant argues his trial
counsel’s cross-examination — “eliciting testimony that Keisha
Chambers reported the vehicle stolen” and failing to object to

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these statements to the extent they were inadmissible hearsay —
deprived defendant of effective assistance.
“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing
professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was
prejudicial.” (People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1211;
Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) Courts defer
to an attorney’s reasonable tactical decisions. (People v. Mai
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) On direct appeal, an attorney’s
performance will be found deficient “only if (1) the record
affirmatively discloses counsel had no rational tactical purpose
for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a
reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no
satisfactory explanation.” (Ibid.)
Defendant’s ineffective assistance claim falters because
trial counsel appears to have pursued a rational tactical purpose.
First, trial counsel’s cross examination was not presenting
hearsay as truth, but asking Lopez to explain her reactions to
Keisha’s reports, reports already in evidence subject to the court’s
limiting instruction. Counsel may have preferred, as she did, to
mention Keisha’s reports briefly on cross to facilitate questioning
and to emphasize their hearsay nature during closing. Second,
by referencing Keisha’s involvement, counsel was following
through on her stated strategy of having jurors question whether
there could really be a lack of consent if some kind of marital
relationship existed. Keisha’s “ex-wife” descriptor could have led
jurors to wonder if this was a family dispute the Vehicle Code
should not intrude upon. Third, objecting further to Lopez’s
testimony as hearsay might have nudged the prosecution to call

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Keisha as a witness with Lopez’s seemingly devastating body
worn video as impeachment evidence if need be. Given this
potential scenario, given the other evidence of lack of consent,
given Keisha’s reports were admissible to show Lopez’s actions in
any event, and given the court’s limiting instruction, prejudice
from any ineffective assistance also appears to be lacking.
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.

SCHERB, J.

We concur:

STRATTON, P. J.

WILEY, J.

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