Filed 6/29/26 P. v. Castillo CA1/4
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
Respondent, A172129
v. (Solano County
IAN ALBERT ALINEA Super. Ct. No. VCR240317)
CASTILLO,
Defendant and
Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant Ian Castillo of first degree
murder. In this appeal, Castillo argues that the jury instructions
on provocation and voluntary manslaughter by imperfect self-
defense violated due process by requiring him to prove that he
acted in imperfect self-defense. He also argues that the trial
court abused its discretion under Penal Code1 section 1385,
subdivision (c) (section 1385(c)) by refusing to strike an
enhancement for personal use of a deadly or dangerous weapon
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)). We find no error and affirm the judgment.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
BACKGROUND
The People filed an information charging Castillo with the
murder of David A. (§ 187, subd. (a).) The information alleged
that Castillo personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon
within the meaning of section 12022, subdivision (b)(1) (section
12022(b)(1)).
Trial Testimony
Deanna B. and her adult son, David A., lived in separate
apartments in the same building. Deanna B. was a good work
friend of Castillo’s mother. Two to three months before the
charged offense, Deanna B. helped Castillo find an apartment in
the building where she and her son lived.
Many witnesses testified that David A. had serious mental
health issues, and a psychiatrist testified that David A. had been
diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder. At some point in time,
David A. told Deanna B. that he thought Castillo was a
pedophile, but Deanna B. had no reason to believe that was true.
David A. also told Deanna B. that his second-story window was
broken, and, after an incident on September 6, 2022 (the
September 6 incident), David A. told Deanna B. that he thought
Castillo had entered his apartment without taking anything and
fixed the window.
The September 6 Incident
At approximately 7:27 p.m., Ross M., who lived in the same
apartment building as David A. and Castillo, heard a commotion
and looked out of his apartment window. He saw David A.
pursuing Castillo, who was “running, and he was trying to use
2
his little tiny little pepper spray to keep [David A.] away from
him as he was running around the car.” In Ross M.’s opinion,
David A. appeared angry and “it was pretty clear that he wanted
to put hands on [Castillo].” Ross M. called Ronnie F., the
building manager, who worked nearby. Ross M. said that
Castillo seemed shocked after the incident, but not angry. Ross
M. did not see the interactions between David A. and Castillo
prior to seeing the two run around the car, and he saw nothing
after they disappeared around a corner.
Ronnie F. arrived at the apartment building to find “there
was like a fight going on . . . between” Castillo and David A.
Ronnie F. “didn’t see any fighting, just mostly yelling.” Castillo
had a knot on his forehead. David A. was yelling, he was “pretty
angry,” and he told Castillo, “I’ll beat your ass again.” Castillo
did not say anything, but he appeared to be frightened and had a
knot the size of a tennis ball on his forehead. Shortly thereafter,
Castillo’s mother arrived. Ronnie F. told Castillo to calm down
and let it go, and Castillo said to his mother, “Can’t let it go.”
Deanna B. testified that she came out of the apartment
building to find that Castillo and David A. had an altercation, but
she did not see the incident. Ronnie F. and Castillo’s mother
were already there. Deanna B. went over to Castillo to apologize
for her son’s behavior, and Castillo said, “I’m sorry, Miss Deanna.
It’s not over.” Deanna B. testified that David A. apologized to
Castillo, although David A. did not say what he was apologizing
for. She could not recall Castillo’s response, but David A. said,
“That’s why I whooped your ass.” Deanna B. told police that
3
David A. told her he had asked Castillo if he was “messing with
kids.”
David A.’s ex-wife, Jennifer A., testified that David A.
called her on the night of September 6, 2022, and said that he got
into a fight with someone in his building. David A. said that this
person threatened his life and his son’s life. He described things
as being fine while he and this person smoked and talked, then at
some point in the conversation things turned, David A. was
pepper sprayed, there was a physical altercation, and this person
threatened the lives of David A. and his children. David A. told
Jennifer A. that he had been attacked during the incident.
After Castillo was arrested, he told police that David A.
accused him of breaking into David A.’s apartment as they
smoked on the street in front of a store, and David A. asked if
Castillo went to church. When Castillo tried to leave, David A.
became aggressive and raised his voice. David A. said something
that “kinda escalated [Castillo].” Castillo “got threatened,” and
he was walking with David A. following. Castillo could not
remember what David A. was saying at that point, and Castillo
was telling David A. not to “mess with” him; Castillo said he was
“about to walk inside,” but he ended up going to his car to get
pepper spray. Castillo told David A. he would pepper spray him,
David A. pushed Castillo, and Castillo pepper sprayed David A.
David A. “got mad” after being pepper sprayed and started
clenching his fists. Castillo continued, “So, uh, I end up, you
know, following [David A.]” David A. either pushed Castillo or
4
Castillo tripped, and David A. began punching Castillo. Castillo’s
trial testimony was similar.
Video surveillance recorded the beginning of the incident
and showed David A. and Castillo having a conversation, then an
argument started. Video showed Castillo pepper spraying David
A., after which the two went around the corner for a couple of
minutes; their interaction while they were around the corner was
not recorded.
The Murder
On September 8, 2022, at approximately 6:45 a.m., Deanna
B. went to David A.’s apartment. She found several ripped Bible
pages in front of the door and noticed blood spatter on the pages;
she thought that David A. may have had a mental breakdown.
She retrieved her spare key and attempted to enter the
apartment. Deanna B. was only able to open the door “6 to 8
inches and then the door hit David [A.], something.” She reached
in and touched his leg, but he did not react and his leg was cold.
Deanna B. then knocked on Ronnie F.’s door across the hall.
Ronnie F. and Deanna B. entered David A.’s apartment, where
they found his body.
The police were dispatched to David A.’s apartment.
Officer Samaniego observed blood spatter outside David A.’s
apartment and in the hallway across from the door. Samaniego
found David A. lying on his back unresponsive in a pool of blood,
with blood all over the walkway leading to where David A. was
positioned in the apartment.
5
Detective Callison observed a large stab wound in David
A.’s chest. Based on the position of the body and the presence of
blood spatter in the hallway, Callison concluded that the person
who stabbed David A. was most likely standing immediately
outside the front door to David A.’s apartment in the hallway
when the stabbing occurred. Callison received information
regarding Castillo’s possible involvement at some point, and he
observed blood outside the door to Castillo’s apartment. Police
later recovered a chef’s knife and two steak knives from Castillo’s
apartment.
A forensic pathologist testified that David A. died from a
sharp object that cut through two ribs and pierced the right
ventricle of his heart. He testified that, “in general it takes quite
a bit of force” to cut through a rib.
David A.’s apartment building had both exterior and
interior surveillance cameras. Surveillance video showed that
Castillo walked into the front door of the apartment building
carrying a glass beer bottle at approximately 12:13 a.m. on
September 8, 2022. Castillo walked down the hall, took a drink
from the bottle, then poured beer on the floor in front of David
A.’s apartment door.
Castillo reappeared approximately six minutes later. He
walked down the hallway and stopped in front of David A.’s
apartment. He leaned towards the apartment door with his ear
close to the door and stood there for about seven seconds.
At approximately 12:29 a.m., Castillo approached David
A.’s apartment holding pages and a cover from a Bible. He placed
6
the pages and Bible cover on the ground in front of the door and
started walking away. After taking a few steps, Castillo paused,
turned around, and quickly moved back towards the apartment.
He made a single stabbing motion toward the door and then
walked away. Surveillance video showed Castillo exiting the
apartment building holding a knife. At 12:33 a.m., Castillo drove
away in a green BMW.
The Police Interview and Trial Testimony
Police detained and interviewed Castillo after David A.’s
death, and a video recording of this interview was introduced at
trial.
On September 7, 2022, Castillo finished his shift at a
restaurant between 10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. and bought beer
and cigarettes before returning to his apartment. Castillo denied
seeing David A. that night.
Detective Callison showed Castillo a photo from the
surveillance video, and Castillo then admitted that he dropped a
Bible in front of David A.’s apartment because David A. had been
talking about God. Castillo said that David A. opened his door at
that moment, and Castillo ran away. Callison explained that the
full surveillance video showed otherwise, and Castillo admitted
that he “dashed towards” David A. to spook him with a beer in
his hand, but nothing else.
Detective Callison told Castillo he had something other
than a beer in his hand, and Castillo admitted that he held a
chef’s knife. He said he tried to scare David A., but he didn’t
intend to kill him. Castillo initially acknowledged that he
7
“technically” stabbed David A., but said he just meant to push
him away and the knife slipped. Castillo then provided another
account of how David A. died: “Grab two beers. Went out, uh,
back to my place, drank. Uh, so basically drink and smoke. Uh,
ripped up the Bible in my apartment, uh, threw it in front of his
door. And, um, within five seconds after that he opens his door.
Um, uh, I had a knife on me. And I basically stabbed him, uh,
and then, um, ran away.” Castillo claimed he had the knife to cut
chicken wings he had planned to go buy, but he also later said he
was going to use the knife on a burger.
Detective Callison asked Castillo how he felt about killing
David A., and Castillo said that he felt vindicated and
“surprisingly okay.” He analogized the stabbing to a decisive
move in a game of chess: “You know, like for example if you
know, um, there’s a strong piece that’s playing aggressive if you
don’t eliminate that problem, that problem will checkmate you at
the end.”
At trial, Castillo testified that, when he walked by David
A.’s apartment on the night of the murder, he could hear David
A. aggressively ranting about the Bible inside the apartment.
Castillo splashed beer on the front door to signify that David A.
needed to “cool down.” He said the following about why he left
ripped Bible pages in front of the apartment door: “I basically
wanted to let him know whatever you’re talking about, this is it I
guess. And, you know, I’m hearing you, you know.”
As Castillo walked away, David A. opened his apartment
door and said, “What the fuck is this.” Castillo “felt timid and
8
like scared or I had to keep my guard up.” He turned around and
saw David A. had a silver pointy object in his hand. David A. was
advancing closer to the door, and Castillo recalled that David A.
had threatened him on two previous occasions and beat him up.
He became afraid that David A. would kill him or inflict great
bodily injury, and he believed that the only way to protect himself
was to use his knife on David A. He did not know his knife could
cut through ribs and had no idea that he had stabbed David A. in
the heart.
Castillo acknowledged that he had given the police multiple
versions of the events leading to David A.’s death because he had
been “discombobulated” at the time. Castillo also explained that
at the time of the stabbing, he was carrying a 10-inch chef’s knife
to cut the burgers he had planned to order.
The jury convicted Castillo of first degree murder and
found the section 12022(b)(1) allegation to be true. The court
sentenced him to prison for an indeterminate term of 25 years to
life on the murder count, plus one year on the enhancement, and
Castillo filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. The Jury Instruction Challenge
A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
Castillo contends that the trial court’s homicide
instructions — specifically, CALCRIM Nos. 522 and 571 —
misstated the law and did not require the People to prove malice
and the absence of imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable
doubt to convict him of murder. We review questions of law and
9
the instructions de novo (People v. Howard (2024)
104 Cal.App.5th 625, 661), and we disagree.
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being . . . with
malice aforethought.” (§ 187, subd. (a).) “Manslaughter is the
unlawful killing of a human being without malice.” (§ 192, italics
added.) “Thus, the ‘distinguishing feature [between the two
offenses] is that murder includes, but manslaughter lacks, the
element of malice.’ [Citation.] Malice exists when ‘an unlawful
homicide was committed with the “intention unlawfully to take
away the life of a fellow creature” [citation], or with awareness of
the danger and a conscious disregard for life.’ ” (People v.
Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 252.)
“However, California law recognizes two circumstances
where ‘a finding of malice may be precluded, and the offense
limited to manslaughter, even when an unlawful homicide was
committed with intent to kill’ [citation]: (1) when a person kills
‘ “ ‘in a “sudden quarrel or heat of passion” [citation], or . . . [(2)
when a person] kills in “unreasonable self-defense”—the
unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense
[citations].’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘These mitigating circumstances reduce
an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to voluntary
manslaughter “by negating the element of malice that otherwise
inheres in such a homicide.” ’ ” (People v. Schuller, supra,
15 Cal.5th at p. 252.) “[W]hen imperfect self-defense [or sudden
quarrel/heat of passion] is at issue in a murder case, the People
must prove the absence of that circumstance ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt . . . to establish the . . . element of malice.’ ”
10
(Schuller, at p. 253; accord, Mullaney v. Wilbur (1975) 421 U.S.
684, 704.) California’s standard jury instructions on voluntary
manslaughter (CALCRIM Nos. 570, 571) properly include this
requirement. (Schuller, at p. 254.)
“ ‘The trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury
on the essential elements of the charged offense.’ ” (People v.
Howard, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 660.) “ ‘[O]nce a trial court
undertakes to instruct on a legal point, it must do so correctly.’ ”
(Ibid.) But a trial court has no sua sponte duty to revise an
accurate statement of the law. (Ibid.)
“ ‘ “A claim of instructional error is reviewed de novo.
[Citation.] An appellate court reviews the wording of a jury
instruction de novo and assesses whether the instruction
accurately states the law.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “The challenged
instruction is considered ‘in the context of the instructions as a
whole and the trial record to determine whether there is a
reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in an
impermissible manner.’ ” [Citation.] “We of course presume ‘that
jurors understand and follow the court’s instructions.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Howard, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 661.)
B. The Jury Instructions
The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 500
(“Homicide: General Principles”); CALCRIM No. 505 (“Justifiable
Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another”); CALCRIM
No. 520 (“First or Second Degree Murder With Malice
Aforethought”); CALCRIM No. 521 (“First Degree Murder”);
CALCRIM No. 522 (“Provocation: Effect on Degree of Murder”);
11
and a version of CALCRIM No. 571 (“Voluntary Manslaughter:
Imperfect Self-Defense or Imperfect Defense of Another — Lesser
Included Offense”).
Read together, the latter two instructions informed the jury
that a killing that would otherwise be murder is “reduced” to
manslaughter when a person kills by acting in imperfect self-
defense. (CALCRIM No. 522 [“Provocation may reduce a murder
from first degree to second degree and may reduce a murder to
manslaughter”]; CALCRIM No. 571 [“A killing that would
otherwise be murder is reduced to voluntary manslaughter if the
defendant killed a person because he acted in imperfect self
defense”].) CALCRIM No. 571 concludes by stating, “The People
have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was not acting in imperfect self defense. If the People
have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty
of murder.” The court also instructed the jury to pay careful
attention to its instructions and to consider the instructions
together.
Castillo did not object to the above instructions.
C. Analysis
Castillo maintains that CALCRIM Nos. 522 and 571
misstate the law and relieve the prosecution of its burden of proof
to prove murder by indicating that murder is “reduced” to
manslaughter, which Castillo maintains told the jury to look to
him “to disprove malice and prove a theory of manslaughter.”
Castillo contends that, by focusing on reduction and setting out
the requirements for imperfect self-defense, these instructions
12
improperly “set murder as the default, and place[ ] the burden
squarely on the defense to shift the needle downward.”
Notwithstanding Castillo’s failure to object to the jury
instructions, we reach the merits of Castillo’s claim of error
(People v. Howard, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at p. 661), and we
reject his claim for the reasons set forth post.
In People v. Parker (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1 (Parker), the
defendant presented an argument similar to Castillo’s. As is
relevant here, the defendant in Parker challenged CALJIC
No. 8.42 (heat of passion), which stated that an unlawful killing
can be “ ‘reduce[d]. . . from murder to manslaughter upon the
ground of sudden quarrel or heat of passion’ ” and defined legally
adequate provocation based on heat of passion. (Parker, at p. 70
& fn. 22.) In a separate jury instruction, CALJIC No. 8.502, the
jury was told that the prosecution bore the burden of proving that
2 CALJIC No. 850 states in full: “The distinction between
murder [other than felony-murder] and manslaughter is that
murder [other than felony-murder] requires malice while
manslaughter does not. [¶] When the act causing the death,
though unlawful, is done [in the heat of passion or is excited by a
sudden quarrel that amounts to adequate provocation,] [or] [in
the actual but unreasonable belief in the necessity to defend
against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury,] the offense
is manslaughter. In that case, even if an intent to kill exists, the
law is that malice, which is an essential element of murder, is
absent. [¶] To establish that a killing is murder [other than
felony-murder] and not manslaughter, the burden is on the
People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements
of murder and that the act which caused the death was not done
[in the heat of passion or upon a sudden quarrel] [or] [in the
actual, even though unreasonable, belief in the necessity to
defend against imminent peril to life or great bodily injury].”
13
the killing was not committed in the heat of passion. (Parker, at
p. 70.) Echoing Castillo’s claim, the defendant in Parker asserted
that CALJIC No. 8.42 “improperly permitted jurors to presume
murder was the default offense and could be reduced or excused
by certain mental states, the presence of which were defendant’s
burden to prove.” (Parker, at p. 70.) Our Supreme Court
disagreed. The court observed that it had previously “upheld the
propriety” of CALJIC No. 8.42, and it found that the instructions
as a whole explained that the prosecution bore the burden of
proof to disprove heat of passion, and jurors are presumed to
follow the given instructions. (Parker, at p. 71.)
In Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th 237, our Supreme Court held
that the erroneous failure to give an imperfect self-defense
instruction amounted to an incomplete instruction on the
elements of murder subject to the “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ ”
standard of error under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18, 24. (Schuller, at pp. 243, 254.) In doing so, our high court
reviewed Mullaney v. Wilbur, supra, 421 U.S. 684, which held
that the government must prove the absence of heat of passion
beyond a reasonable doubt and a jury instruction that placed the
burden of proving heat of passion on the defendant was
unconstitutional. (Mullaney, at pp. 702–704.) This same rule
applies to imperfect self-defense (Schuller, at p. 253), and
Schuller observed that California’s standard jury instructions
(CALCRIM Nos. 570 & 571) properly include the requirement
that the prosecution disprove sudden quarrel, heat of passion,
14
and imperfect self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. (Schuller,
at p. 254.)
Next, in Howard, supra, 104 Cal.App.5th at page 661, our
colleagues in the Sixth District rejected an argument akin to
Castillo’s — that California’s standard homicide jury instructions
(including CALCRIM Nos. 500, 520, 521, 522, 570, & 571)
“omitted an element of murder or misstated the burden of proof
on heat of passion and imperfect self-defense.” To the contrary,
Howard recognized that CALCRIM No. 520 accurately instructed
the jury on malice, and the statements in CALCRIM Nos. 570
and 571 that murder was “reduced” to manslaughter were
accurate statements of the law. (Howard, at pp. 661–662.)
Likewise, these instructions correctly informed the jury that the
People bore the burden of proving the absence of imperfect self-
defense and heat of passion. (Id. at p. 662.) And the court told
jurors to “ ‘[p]ay careful attention to all of [its] instructions and
consider them together.’ ” (Ibid.)
Considering the above authorities and the jury instructions
here, we conclude there was no error. The standard jury
instruction on murder (CALCRIM No. 520) stated that, to find a
defendant guilty of murder, the People had to prove that Castillo
acted with malice aforethought. And the imperfect self-defense
jury instruction (CALCRIM No. 571) clearly instructed that the
People had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Castillo did
not kill as the result of imperfect self-defense, concluding, “If the
People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not
guilty of murder.” (See Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 254
15
[persuasive dicta stating California’s standard jury instructions
properly include requirement that People disprove imperfect self-
defense beyond reasonable doubt].)
Nor, as Castillo argues, did the jury instructions shift the
burden of proof to the defendant because they use the word
“reduce.” Here, Parker’s reasoning is instructive. In Parker,
CALJIC No. 8.42 informed the jury, in part: “To reduce an
unlawful killing from murder to manslaughter upon the ground
of sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation must be of
the character and degree as naturally would excite and arouse
the passion, and the assailant must act under the influence of
that sudden quarrel or heat of passion.” (Parker, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 70, fn. 22.) Although the instruction spoke of
reducing murder to manslaughter, our high court rejected the
defendant’s argument that CALJIC No. 8.42 suggested to the
jury that murder was the “default offense and could be reduced or
excused by certain mental states, the presence of which were
defendant’s burden to prove.” (Parker, at p. 70.) Instead, read as
a whole, the instructions properly instructed the jury that the
People had the burden to disprove heat of passion, with
“[n]othing in CALJIC No[.] 8.42 alter[ing]” this mandate.
(Parker, at pp. 70–71.) Similarly here, while CALCRIM Nos. 522
and 571 use the term “reduce,” the jury was properly instructed
that the People had the burden to prove malice and disprove
imperfect self-defense. And the jury was instructed that the
People’s failure to disprove imperfect self-defense required jurors
to acquit Castillo of murder.
16
In sum, we agree with Howard and find the jury
instructions given were consistent with the law, did not omit an
element of murder, and did not misstate the burden of proof on
malice or imperfect self-defense. (Howard, supra,
104 Cal.App.5th at pp. 661–662.) It is not reasonably likely that
the jury believed the defense bore the burden to prove that
Castillo acted in imperfect self-defense. (Ibid.)
II. The Section 12022(b)(1) Enhancement
Castillo argues that the court abused its discretion by
declining to dismiss the section 12022(b)(1) enhancement.
Specifically, he contends that the court failed to afford “great
weight” (§ 1385(c)) to two purportedly applicable mitigating
circumstances — that “application of an enhancement could
result in a sentence over 20 years” and that the current offense
was connected to “prior victimization” (§ 1385(c)(2)(C), (E)). For
the reasons set forth post, we conclude the court did not err by
finding these mitigating factors inapplicable.
A. Additional Background
In his sentencing memorandum, Castillo requested
probation and that the court strike the section 12022(b)(1)
enhancement under section 1385(c)(2)(C) and (E). Castillo
argued that “application of this enhancement would guarantee a
sentence of over 20 years, as Mr. Castillo is already facing a
minimum of 25 years in state prison.” And he argued that the
offense was connected with prior victimization because allegedly
uncontroverted trial testimony established that David A.
attacked Castillo the night before he died.
17
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor argued that the
court could take into account aggravating factors under
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421 for purposes of Castillo’s
requests for probation and to strike the section 12022(b)(1)
enhancement. The prosecutor argued that the crime involved
great violence and planning under California Rules of Court, rule
4.421(a), and Castillo’s violent conduct indicated a serious danger
to society under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b). In
addition, the prosecutor urged the court to consider Castillo’s less
than truthful testimony and statements to the police, his blaming
the victim for the situation, and his lack of remorse and failure to
take responsibility.
Defense counsel argued that Castillo had minimal prior
criminal history, with no strikes or “real violent offenses[.]”
Counsel submitted on that argument and the arguments he made
in Castillo’s sentencing memorandum. Castillo also briefly spoke
and urged the court to recognize that he was innocent and acted
in self-defense.
The court ruled, “Well, this is a sad case. Obviously[,] this
murder resulted in great loss to the victim and the victim’s
family, all the people that have been touched by this. With that,
having reviewed the sentencing memorandum on both sides and
the probation report, although the defendant is technically
eligible for probation, the Court denies probation. [The] Court
finds the aggravating factors listed in the probation report
outweigh the mitigating factors. There are no unusual
circumstances. The Court finds this was a particularly brutal
18
and vicious murder. The victim was vulnerable at the time as he
was surprised, and the defendant has shown no remorse that I
can see. So because of those factors I don’t find any unusual
circumstances, nor if I had the discretion would I grant probation
in this case. I don’t think it’s appropriate given the facts.
Similarly[,] I would deny striking the 12022 (b)(1) enhancement.
Again, I don’t find any of the factors lend towards using my
discretion to strike that. So I would deny that as well, so for the
conviction for a violation of [s]ection 187, murder in the first
degree, the defendant will serve [an] indeterminate term of 25
years to life, consecutive to that a determinant [sic] term of one
year pursuant to [section] 12022 (b)(1).”
B. Governing Law
Under section 1385, except if dismissal is prohibited by an
initiative statute, a trial court “shall dismiss an enhancement if it
is in the furtherance of justice to do so.” (§ 1385(c)(1).) In
making this determination, “the court shall consider and afford
great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove that
any of the mitigating circumstances” listed in the statute apply.
(§ 1385(c)(2).) “Proof of the presence of one or more of these
[mitigating] circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing
the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety. ‘Endanger public
safety’ means there is a likelihood that the dismissal of the
enhancement would result in physical injury or other serious
danger to others.” (§ 1385(c)(2).)
19
In People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1029 (Walker),
our high court resolved a disagreement between lower courts as
to whether subdivision (c)(2) of section 1385 created a rebuttable
presumption in favor of striking an enhancement when a
mitigating circumstance in subparagraphs (A) to (I) was proven.
(Walker, at pp. 1028–1029, 1031 [describing disagreement].)
Walker clarified that if a defendant proves a mitigating
circumstance identified in subparagraphs (A) to (I) of
subdivision (c)(2) “the plain language of section 1385(c)(2) does
not erect a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal that can
only be overcome by a finding that dismissal endangers public
safety.” (Walker, at p. 1033, italics added.) Instead, “absent a
finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court
retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements
provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated
mitigating circumstances when they are present. [Citation.] In
other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would
endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating
circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an
enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial,
credible evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless
neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance,
such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of
justice.’ ” (Id. at p. 1029.)
We review a trial court’s decision regarding whether to
strike or reduce an enhancement under section 1385 for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 371.)
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“ ‘ “[T]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly
show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.
[Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is
presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing
objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a
particular sentence will not be set aside on review.” ’ ” (Id. at
pp. 376–377.) But “ ‘an abuse of discretion arises if the trial court
based its decision on impermissible factors . . . or on an incorrect
legal standard.’ ” (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215,
225.)
C. Analysis
Whether the mitigating circumstance under section
1385(c)(2)(C) applies where Castillo would be given a 25-years-to-
life sentence (§ 190, subd. (a)) is a matter of statutory
interpretation that we review de novo. (People v. Torres (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 88, 93 (Torres).) Our colleagues in the Third
District recently concluded that section 1385(c)(2)(C) does not
apply where the defendant will receive a 25-years-to-life sentence
for first degree murder (Torres, at p. 93), and we agree.
Section 1385(c)(2)(C) is triggered when “the application of
the enhancement ‘could result’ in a sentence of over 20 years.”
(Ibid.) Looking to dictionary definitions (Walker, supra,
16 Cal.5th at p. 1035; Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 93),
the verb “result” means: “to proceed or arise as a consequence,
effect, or conclusion.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/result> [as of June
29, 2026].) “Application” means “an act of putting something to
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use.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2026)
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/application> [as of
June 29, 2026].) Under the statute’s plain language then, the
sentence that exceeds 20 years must arise from “[t]he
application,” or imposition, of the enhancement. (§ 1385(c)(2)(C).)
This did not occur here, as Castillo’s first degree murder sentence
itself exceeded 20 years. (Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 92–93.)
Castillo argues Torres was wrongly decided because
“ ‘[r]esult’ ” also means ‘conclusion,’ which encompasses
situations . . . where the over-20-year sentence without the
enhancement becomes even longer following imposition of the
enhancement.” The defendant in Torres made a similarly
unconvincing argument. (Torres, supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 92–93.) Using the dictionary definitions of the relevant
terms, the “conclusion” at issue is the sentence over 20 years,
and, under the statutory language, this “conclusion” arises from
the act of using (or imposing) the enhancement. Thus, Castillo’s
argument is not supported by the plain language of the statute.
Castillo alternatively contends that the legislative history
suggests that this statutory factor applies in any case where the
sentence would be longer than 20 years. He acknowledges,
however, that our role in interpreting a statute ends where, as
here, the plain language is clear. We agree with Torres that,
under section 1385(c)(2)(C)’s plain language, a sentence
exceeding 20 years does not “result” from the application of the
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enhancement when the sentence already exceeds 20 years
without the enhancement. (Torres, at p. 93.)
Next, Castillo has not established that the court abused its
discretion in concluding that section 1385(c)(2)(E) did not “lend
towards using” the court’s discretion to strike the section
12022(b)(1) enhancement. For section 1385(c)(2)(E) to apply, the
court had to conclude that “prior victimization or childhood
trauma” “is connected” to the current offense. (Ibid.) “ ‘Prior
victimization’ means the person was a victim of intimate partner
violence, sexual violence, or human trafficking, or the person has
experienced psychological or physical trauma, including, but not
limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. A
court may conclude that a defendant’s prior victimization was
connected to the offense if, after reviewing any relevant and
credible evidence, including, but not limited to, police reports,
preliminary hearing transcripts, witness statements, medical
records, or records or reports by qualified medical experts, the
court concludes that the defendant’s prior victimization
substantially contributed to the defendant’s involvement in the
commission of the offense.” (§1385(c)(6)(B).)
Here, the court could have reasonably found that Castillo
did not prove that he “experienced . . . physical trauma” that
“substantially contributed to [his] involvement in the commission
of the offense.”3 (§ 1385(c)(2)(E).) Without discussing the
3 Castillo does not contend that he was a victim of intimate
partner violence, sexual violence, human trafficking, or
psychological trauma.
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statutory text, Castillo highlights that he received a large lump
on his forehead from David A. during the September 6 incident.
The statute, however, requires “prior victimization.”
(§ 1385(c)(2)(E) & (B).) The first three categories of persons who
fall within the statutory definition are people who were “victim[s]
of intimate partner violence, sexual violence, or human
trafficking.” (§ 1385(c)(6)(B).) And the ensuing statutory
examples of the types of physical or psychological trauma that
constitute “prior victimization” include “abuse, neglect,
exploitation, or sexual violence.” (§ 1385(c)(6)(B).) Thus, the
statutory text requires that the defendant be the victim of
another’s acts, not the aggressor.
The evidence did not compel the court to conclude that
David A. had victimized Castillo. Even accepting that David A.
hit Castillo during the September 6 incident, Castillo’s testimony
that David A. attacked him after the two went around the corner
was not so credible that the court was required to believe him.
Some circumstantial evidence supports Castillo’s version of
events — for example, Ross M. testified that David A. looked
angry when he was chasing Castillo, and Deanna B. testified that
David A. apologized to Castillo. On the other hand, David A. did
not state why he apologized to Castillo and Castillo pepper
sprayed David A. Jennifer A. testified that David A. said he was
attacked, pepper sprayed, and Castillo threatened his life; and
David A. told his mother that he tried to run away from the
confrontation, but Castillo pursued him. Castillo admitted that
he followed David A. around the corner before David A. hit
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Castillo, and the surveillance video admitted as an exhibit at
trial showed Castillo following David A. around the corner. On
this record, the court could reasonably have determined that
section 1385(c)(2)(E) did not apply because the evidence did not
show whether David A. was the aggressor in the physical
confrontation around the corner or whether he acted defensively
at that point in response to Castillo’s pursuit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BROWN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
STREETER, J.
GOLDMAN, J.
People v. Castillo (A172129)
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