P. v. Castaneda CA6

Filed 10/5/26 P. v. Castaneda CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H053582
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2400011)

v.

RUANI CASTANEDA,

Defendant and Appellant.

Defendant Ruani Castaneda pleaded no contest to stalking by repeated following
or malicious harassing (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (a))1 and inflicting corporal injury on
the mother of his child (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) in exchange for placement on probation. The
trial court imposed probation conditions requiring Castaneda to consent to search and
seizure of his electronic devices, and to refrain from possessing or using certain
electronic programs and applications. Castaneda appeals, arguing those conditions are
unconstitutionally overbroad.
As we will explain, we conclude the conditions are sufficiently tailored to the
circumstances of Castaneda’s offenses and will therefore affirm the order of probation.

1
Further unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
I. TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS
Castaneda was charged with stalking by repeated following or malicious harassing
(§ 646.9, subd. (a); count 1), misdemeanor contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); count
2), misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a); count 3), two counts of inflicting corporal
injury on the mother of his child (§ 273.5, subd. (a); counts 4 & 6), false imprisonment
(§ 236; count 5), dissuading a witness (§ 136.1, subd. (a)(1); count 7), and assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 8). Most of the offenses were alleged to have
been committed against M.A., his former romantic partner.2
A. PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY
At a preliminary hearing, M.A. testified that Castaneda was living with her and her
family in December 2022. In the preceding months, Castaneda had regularly slapped
M.A. and accused her of cheating on him. During an argument in which Castaneda again
accused M.A. of cheating, Castaneda punched M.A. in the head while she was holding
their infant daughter. M.A.’s head “hit the doorway,” injuring her.
In October 2023, Castaneda was no longer living with M.A.; he had been “kicked
out” after M.A.’s family learned he was posting “sexual videos” of M.A. on social media,
including Facebook and Instagram. M.A. was still interested in reconciling with
Castaneda, so she stayed with him at a hotel. One morning, during an argument at
Castaneda’s workplace, Castaneda threw “a backpack full of large metal tools,” including
a carjack, at M.A.’s face. That night, Castaneda held M.A. in the hotel room against her
will for “at least five or six hours” and burned her back with “a hot meth pipe.”
Following the hotel incident, M.A. “attempted to cut ties” with Castaneda. After
she did so, her “phone was getting blown up constantly” and her “location was constantly
being pinged.” Between October and December of 2023, M.A. was receiving “between
40 and 60” text messages per day. The messages were sent from “multiple phone

2
We refer to M.A. by her initials consistent with rule 8.90 of the California Rules
of Court.
2
numbers,” but M.A. believed they were all from Castaneda because only he and M.A.’s
mother knew M.A.’s phone number. M.A. explained that during their relationship,
Castaneda had isolated her and prevented her from communicating with other people.
Some of the text messages M.A. received threatened her with physical harm.
M.A. believed her mother had also received threatening messages. During the same time
period, Castaneda “showed up outside” M.A.’s house on “almost a nightly basis” and
threw “at least 100 rocks” at the house, breaking M.A.’s bedroom window and the
windows of her mother’s car. The threatening messages and property damage stopped
after Castaneda was arrested in December 2023.
N.C., a friend of M.A.’s cousin, testified that she was driving home from M.A.’s
house on December 23, 2023, when Castaneda “blocked the road” with “a white U-Haul
pickup truck” and threw a tire iron at her car. M.A. reported Castaneda to police on
December 28, 2023, and he was arrested later that day. Although an emergency
protective order was issued, Castaneda called M.A. “at least ten” times from jail. He also
sent M.A. a bouquet of flowers with a note reading, “ ‘Too much talky talky. No
talking.’ ”
B. ORDER OF PROBATION
After mental health diversion was terminated and criminal proceedings reinstated,
Castaneda pleaded no contest on counts 1 and 4 in exchange for a term of probation and
dismissal of the remaining counts. He also pleaded no contest in a separate case to
disobeying a court order. (§ 273.6.) The trial court suspended imposition of sentence
and placed Castaneda on probation for a period of three years.
The recommended conditions of probation included provisions concerning
Castaneda’s use of electronic devices and online applications. One of those conditions
(referred to in the record as “ES001”) provided: “The defendant shall as a condition of
probation or mandatory supervision, give specific consent as that term is defined in Penal
Code Section 1546 to any Peace Officer or any law enforcement agency to seize and
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search all electronic devices (including but not limited to cellular telephones, computers
or notepads) in his/her possession or under his/her control to a search of any text
messages, voicemail messages, call logs, photographs, e-mail accounts, social media
accounts (including but not limited to Facebook, Instagram, ‘X’ (formerly Twitter),
Snapchat, TikTok, or any other site which the Probation Officer informs him/her of),
and/or applications (‘apps’) pertaining to said accounts at any time with or without a
warrant.” A second electronic search condition (referred to in the record as “ES002”)
provided: “The defendant shall further agree and specifically consent to provide all
passwords necessary to access or search such electronic devices (including but not
limited to cellular telephones, computers or notepads) and understand that refusal to
provide the password will constitute a violation of the terms of his/her probation or
mandatory supervision.”
Another recommended condition concerned Castaneda’s possession and use of
data encryption or “ ‘burner’ ” tools, providing: “The defendant shall not knowingly
possess or use any data encryption technique program, device or ‘burner’ applications,
including but not limited to TextFree, Burner, Hushed, or other applications as advised by
the Probation Officer.”
Castaneda opposed these three conditions as unconstitutionally overbroad,
proposing an alternative under which warrantless searches of his electronic devices
would be allowed only if M.A. made “an accusation” that she had been “contacted
impermissibly” via “phone or other electronic device.” The prosecutor argued
Castaneda’s conduct “would warrant” the recommended conditions, but indicated she
“would be amenable to” Castaneda’s proposed alternative if the court were inclined to
adopt it.
The trial court imposed the recommended conditions of probation without the
limitation proposed by Castaneda, stating in part: “Mr. Castaneda has been convicted
because of his plea here of stalking, all right, the victim, and of violating court orders,
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specifically through and included through the use of electronic devices and encrypted
applications or burner phones or Burner applications.” The court continued: “Mr.
Castaneda is stalking a victim, harassing the victim, which also involves harassing and
stalking the victim’s family, which is why he’s using these burner devices, these
encryption devices, because he thinks that they’re not going to be able to be tracked back
to him, which makes it even more reasonable and more narrowly tailored and reasonably
related to have Mr. Castaneda with the search conditions so that he is reminded that he
should never try to violate a court order that prohibits him from contacting the victim
either directly or indirectly, whether that’s through the victim, again, directly as through
text messages or cell phone messages or email messages or any other electronic means,
or contacting the victim’s family, which is an indirect communication to the victim
herself. [¶] So to make it crystal clear to Mr. Castaneda, he’s going to have these search
conditions.” The court also imposed a protective order as a condition of probation
prohibiting Castaneda from, inter alia, contacting M.A. by telephone or through
electronic means.
II. DISCUSSION
Focusing on the electronic search and other conditions limiting his use of
messaging encryption applications, Castaneda’s sole contention on appeal is that the trial
court imposed unconstitutionally overbroad conditions of probation.
A probation condition that limits constitutional rights must be closely tailored to
the condition’s purpose to avoid being invalidated as unconstitutionally overbroad. (In re
Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 890; accord, In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th
896, 902 (Malik J.) [“ ‘conditions of probation that impinge on constitutional rights must
be tailored carefully and reasonably related to the compelling state interest in reformation
and rehabilitation’ ”].) “The essential question in an overbreadth challenge is the
closeness of the fit between the legitimate purpose of the restriction and the burden it
imposes on the defendant’s constitutional rights—bearing in mind, of course, that
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perfection in such matters is impossible, and that practical necessity will justify some
infringement.” (In re E.O. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1153.) While we generally
review the imposition of probation conditions for abuse of discretion, we review
constitutional challenges to probation conditions de novo. (In re Shaun R. (2010)
188 Cal.App.4th 1129, 1143.)
“It is well established that individuals retain a constitutionally protected
expectation of privacy in the contents of their own computers” and other electronic
devices, including cell phones. (People v. Appleton (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 717, 724
(Appleton).) Indeed, cell phones are not just a “ ‘technological convenience;’ ” for many,
these devices contain “ ‘ “the privacies of life.” ’ ” (Malik J., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at
p. 902, citing Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 403.) Users of social media
websites or applications also have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of
posts and communications intended for limited audiences. (Malik J., at p. 903 [remotely
stored information on a social networking website “may also implicate the privacy
interests of third parties who are not otherwise subject to search or court supervision”].)
The conditions imposed here, all of which relate to Castaneda’s personal electronic
devices and his use of social media websites and applications, thus implicate Castaneda’s
constitutional rights and must be narrowly tailored to their intended purpose.
Castaneda asserts the conditions are not sufficiently tailored and analogizes this
case to Malik J., in which a broad electronic search condition was imposed based on the
juvenile probationer’s “history of robbing people of their cell phones and his claim that
he [did] not himself own a cell phone.” (Malik J., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 902.)
The Malik J. court considered it reasonable based on the juvenile’s conduct to require
him “to provide passwords for electronics found in his custody and control” but modified
the condition to remove a requirement that he “turn over passwords to social media sites”
because “identifying whether an electronic device is stolen has no relationship to
accessing the content of his social media accounts.” (Id. at pp. 902, 904.)
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This case presents different circumstances. Castaneda was convicted not of theft
but rather of stalking and inflicting corporal injury on M.A., his former romantic partner
and the mother of his child. Preliminary hearing evidence established that he repeatedly
sent dozens of threatening text messages to M.A. and regularly changed or masked his
phone number using a digital tool in order to avoid having his messages blocked.
Although Castaneda argues he “contacted [M.A.] and her mother only by text message”
and not through social media, the evidence showed that he not only attempted to disguise
the source of his messages but also persisted in attempting to communicate with M.A. by
altering the manner in which his messages were sent, including through a flower delivery.
Additionally, there was evidence that Castaneda posted “sexual videos” of M.A. on social
media. The conditions allowing for searches of specified electronic materials—
photographs, text messages, e-mail accounts, and social media applications—accessible
on or through his electronic devices are thus directly related and closely tailored to the
conduct underlying the offenses. The conditions also properly address Castaneda’s
demonstrated tendency to modify his communication strategy in an effort to circumvent
barriers intended to prevent the delivery of his messages, and further the state’s interest in
monitoring whether Castaneda has violated the protective order or has used social media
to continue harassing M.A. (See People v. Jungers (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 698, 704
[“elimination of domestic violence is a compelling state interest”].) Accordingly, this
case is unlike Malik J. or other cases involving only “ ‘an abstract or hypothetical
relationship between the probation condition and preventing future criminality.’ ”
(People v. Cota (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 786, 790, quoting In re Ricardo P. (2019)
7 Cal.5th 1113, 1121.)
Similar probation conditions have been upheld against constitutional challenges in
other cases, like this one, involving more direct relationships between the probationers’
use of electronic devices or social media websites and the offenses committed. In People
v. Ebertowski (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1170, 1172–1175, electronic search conditions,
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including a social media search condition, were properly imposed where the probationer
was an admitted gang member who had used social media to promote his gang. In In re
Q.R. (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 696, 698–699 (Q.R.), a condition permitting the search of
“all electronic devices” was properly imposed where the juvenile probationer admitted
possessing images on his cell phone of the minor victim engaging in consensual sex and
using the images to extort her. And in Appleton, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at pp. 719–720,
a probationer was convicted of falsely imprisoning a minor victim he had met through a
social media application. The Appleton court struck an overbroad electronic search
condition providing without apparent limitation that the probationer’s “computers and
electronic devices shall be subject to search for material prohibited by law,” but
suggested the trial court could instead “impose the narrower condition approved in
Ebertowski, whereby defendant must provide his social media accounts and passwords to
his probation officer for monitoring” or “could impose a condition restricting defendant’s
use of or access to social media Web sites and applications without prior approval of his
probation officer.” (Id. at pp. 719, 727.)
Although Castaneda cites Appleton in support of his overbreadth argument, the
conditions imposed here are significantly narrower than the overbroad condition struck
down in Appleton. The portion of the conditions allowing for searches of messaging and
social media applications on Castaneda’s electronic devices more closely resembles the
“narrower condition approved in Ebertowski,” which the Appleton court proposed as one
permissible alternative. (Appleton, supra, 245 Cal.App.4th at p. 727.) The provision
allowing for searches of photographs on Castaneda’s devices resembles the condition
approved in Q.R., where (as here) there was evidence of the probationer using sexual
imagery of the victim for an improper purpose. (Q.R., supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at pp. 698–
699.) And the condition prohibiting Castaneda from using or possessing “any data
encryption technique program, device or ‘burner’ applications,” which prospectively
limits Castaneda’s access to electronic tools associated with his criminal conduct,
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resembles another condition discussed favorably in Appleton: “a condition restricting
defendant’s use of or access to social media Web sites and applications without prior
approval of his probation officer.” (Appleton, at p. 727.) We see no overbreadth from
the inclusion of the word “encryption” given that the condition specifically identifies
examples of covered programs and applications. Although Castaneda asserts that
“encryption” does not accurately describe his conduct, he does not appear to dispute there
is a logical connection between the specified programs and his prior use of tools designed
to conceal his identity.
Nor do we agree with Castaneda that the trial court was required to adopt his
proposed limitation on the electronic search conditions because the prosecutor was
“amenable” to his proposal. Castaneda emphasizes that if “available alternative means
exist which are less violative of the constitutional right and are narrowly drawn so as to
correlate more closely with the purposes contemplated, those alternatives should be used”
instead of the conditions imposed. (In re White (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 141, 150.) But he
has not shown that his proposed alternative, under which warrantless searches of his
electronic devices would be allowed only if M.A. made an allegation of improper contact,
would fully serve the intended purpose of the imposed conditions. To the contrary,
preliminary hearing evidence established that the alternative would not adequately
promote that purpose since M.A. testified that she at times delayed reporting Castaneda’s
behavior to police due to the nature of their relationship. As such, requiring a report from
M.A. as a precursor to a search of Castaneda’s electronic devices or social medial
accounts could allow him to circumvent the protective order until M.A. was capable of
reporting any violations.
In sum, we hold on this record that the challenged probation conditions are not
unconstitutionally overbroad.

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III. DISPOSITION
The order of probation is affirmed.

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______________________________________
Adams, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
Danner, Acting P. J.

____________________________________
Bromberg, J.

H053582
People v. Castaneda