Filed 6/30/26; certified for partial publication 7/28/26 (order attached)
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E084273
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF2003935)
STEVEN DANIEL CARRILLO, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Jerry C. Yang, Judge.
Affirmed with directions.
Joshua L. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Daniel Rodgers, A. Natasha Cortina and Alan L. Amann, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
A jury convicted Steven Daniel Carrillo of first degree premeditated murder and
attempted premeditated murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189, subd. (a), 664; unlabeled
statutory citations refer to this code.) The jury also found true a number of enhancement
allegations and special circumstance allegations, including a hate-crime special
circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(16).) Carrillo argues that the People’s gang expert
violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 (RJA) by using racially discriminatory
language about Carrillo’s race, ethnicity, or national origin and exhibiting bias or animus
towards Carrillo because of his race, ethnicity, or national origin. (§ 745, subd. (a)(1),
(2); Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1.) He also argues that the trial court (1) admitted improper
opinion testimony about a victim’s honesty and (2) erroneously instructed the jury on the
motive element of the hate-crime special circumstance. He lastly argues that the abstract
of judgment and the sentencing minute order do not accurately reflect the court’s oral
pronouncement of judgment. We direct the court to correct the abstract of judgment and
the sentencing minute order, but we otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Trial evidence
The shooting underlying Carrillo’s convictions took place in October 2020. The
murder victim was Derrion Thomas, and the attempted murder victim was Isaiah S.
Isaiah and Thomas were best friends.
A. History of gang and racial violence in the area of the shooting
East Side Riva is a Hispanic street gang in Riverside, California with roughly 500
active members. There are a number of cliques within East Side Riva, including Clique
2
Los Primos, which is also known as CLPS or Primos. Carrillo is a member of East Side
Riva and CLPS. 1 His gang moniker is Wino.
The Mexican Mafia is a Hispanic prison gang founded in the 1950’s. The prison
gang acts as a parent organization and exerts control over all Hispanic street gangs in
Southern California. The Mexican Mafia forces the street gangs to pay taxes and
disciplines their members when they are incarcerated. East Side Riva pays taxes to the
Mexican Mafia.
The 1200 Block East Coast Crips (1200 Block) is an African-American street gang
in Riverside, California. Georgia Street Mob, or GSM, is a clique within 1200 Block.
East Side Riva and 1200 Block occupy or claim the same territory. According to the
People’s gang expert, Detective Trevor Childers, the area has a history of racial violence
that grew out of a “beef” between East Side Riva and 1200 Block in 1991. At the time,
East Side Riva and 1200 Block were cooperating to target rival gangs in other
neighborhoods of Riverside. The Mexican Mafia learned of East Side Riva’s alliance
with 1200 Block, and the Mexican Mafia was not happy, because the gang did not
cooperate with African Americans. The Mexican Mafia punished East Side Riva by
“put[ting] a greenlight” on the gangs’ members, so East Side Riva members were being
assaulted in jails. The Mexican Mafia directed East Side Riva not to cooperate with
African Americans ever again. In the years that followed, the violence between East Side
1 Consistent with his membership in a Hispanic gang, the probation report identifies
Carrillo’s race as Hispanic.
3
Riva and 1200 Block became “astronomical.” East Side Riva and 1200 Block became
“mortal enemies.”
During a wiretap operation in 2018, officers learned that East Side Riva members
were calling 1200 Block members “snails,” which is a derogatory term or a “dis name.”
It was East Side Riva’s way of calling 1200 Block members “the ‘N’ word” without
using the word. East Side Riva started using the term to describe African Americans
more generally, regardless of whether a person was a 1200 Block member. There were
also several high-profile murders committed by East Side Riva members in which the
victims were African American but not gang members. Nongang members were being
shot merely for being the “wrong race on the wrong street.” According to the People’s
gang expert: “It’s to the point now, that if you investigate a crime in the east side
Riverside neighborhood, and the victim is Mexican, you assume you’re looking for a
black suspect and vice versa.”
B. The shooting
Isaiah testified at trial, and many of the events were captured on surveillance video
at a Motel 6. Isaiah and Thomas did not live in Riverside but were in town to visit
Isaiah’s grandmother. She was staying at the Motel 6. Isaiah and Thomas, both African
Americans, were driving Isaiah’s car. Isaiah was carrying a nine-millimeter
semiautomatic gun that belonged to Thomas, and Thomas was carrying a .45-caliber gun.
The two men were not gang members. But Thomas was once found in the company of
gang members during an encounter with investigators in Rialto, California.
4
Isaiah was born in Riverside, and he had heard of East Side Riva. He knew that
the gang “didn’t mess with black people,” meaning that the gang members did not
associate with and did not like African Americans.
When Isaiah and Thomas arrived at the Motel 6, Isaiah’s grandmother was upset
about something that had happened earlier. 2 She was animated and yelling about the
incident that had upset her. As Isaiah, his grandmother, and Thomas were leaving to get
food, his grandmother pointed out the people involved in the upsetting incident; they
were in a black Jaguar that was driving through the parking lot. Carrillo was a registered
guest at the motel and was driving the Jaguar. He had three other individuals with him.
Someone in the Jaguar said something to Isaiah’s group, but Isaiah could not hear
what the speaker said. Carrillo also made some sort of hand gesture consistent with
“throwing a hand sign.” The Jaguar circled around the motel and eventually returned to
the area where Isaiah, his grandmother, and Thomas were getting into Isaiah’s car.
Isaiah’s grandmother paused and stared at the Jaguar, and Isaiah and Thomas motioned to
her and encouraged her to get into the car. Isaiah testified that there was nothing about
the situation that he was “trying to get away from,” and he was not scared or intimidated;
he told his grandmother to get in the car because he was ready to go.
Meanwhile, Carrillo stopped his Jaguar in the middle of the parking lot, went
upstairs to his motel room for a short period, and returned to the Jaguar. As he got back
into the car, he appeared to pull a gun from his waistband.
2 Isaiah’s grandmother died before Carrillo’s trial. Her death was unconnected to
this case. Like Isaiah, his grandmother was African American.
5
While Carrillo was upstairs, the Jaguar was blocking the exit to the right of
Isaiah’s parking spot. Isaiah instead drove left, in the opposite direction of the Jaguar,
which was “the fastest way out” of the motel parking lot. There was no reason to drive
toward the Jaguar. When a detective interviewed Isaiah at the hospital right after the
shooting, Isaiah said that he was initially going to drive toward the Jaguar, but he took
“the other way” out of the parking lot because he did not want any conflict.
Isaiah turned right out of the parking lot and waited at a red light before making a
left turn onto University Avenue. Thomas was in the front passenger seat, and Isaiah’s
grandmother was in the back seat. Carrillo’s Jaguar pulled out of the motel parking lot
just as Isaiah was turning left onto University Avenue. By the time Carrillo got to the
intersection, the light was red again, but he ran the red light to make a left turn, following
Isaiah.
Carrillo caught up to Isaiah as Isaiah was waiting to turn left at another red light
on University Avenue. The Jaguar pulled up to Isaiah’s passenger side. The window of
the Jaguar rolled down, and the person in the Jaguar yelled something at Isaiah’s group.
Isaiah could not recall exactly what the person said, but Isaiah’s group was being
“gangbanged on.” Isaiah saw the person in the Jaguar cock a gun, and Isaiah’s group
“started getting shot at.” 3
Isaiah’s gun was in his pocket. He took the gun out of his pocket “after things
were said” and held it next to his hip, but he did not shoot at the Jaguar. He was scared
3 Isaiah has never identified the person in the Jaguar.
6
and worried about getting out of the situation. He did not know whether Thomas shot at
the Jaguar. But Isaiah turned left to flee from the situation, and he crashed his car. He
and Thomas got out of the car and sought help. Isaiah had a gunshot wound on his leg
near his groin, and Thomas was shot twice.
When officers arrived at the scene, Isaiah was cooperative. He asked for help and
surrendered his gun. An officer removed the gun from Isaiah’s front pants pocket. Isaiah
insisted that he never fired the gun, but he acknowledged that it was possible that the gun
went off accidentally in his pocket. There were bullet holes in Isaiah’s pants pocket and
the bottom of his sweatshirt, indicating that the gun went off in his pocket and that he
inflicted the gunshot wound on himself.
Thomas died of a gunshot wound to his torso. The bullet entered in the area of his
right armpit and traveled left, hitting both lungs and causing him to bleed out internally.
It was more likely than not that Thomas’s arm was in a raised position when the bullet
entered his body.
Officers found Thomas’s .45-caliber gun between the door and the front passenger
seat in Isaiah’s car. They also found ten .45-caliber shell casings at the intersection
where the shooting occurred.
C. Investigation of Carrillo
Childers, the People’s gang expert, was one of the detectives who investigated the
shooting. When he arrived at the scene, he learned that the suspect vehicle was a black
Jaguar. Childers was familiar with Carrillo from a prior investigation and knew that
Carrillo drove a black Jaguar. The prior investigation occurred months before the
7
shooting, and Childers had searched Carrillo’s cell phone as part of that prior
investigation. The cell phone contained a number of images indicating that Carrillo was
a CLPS member. In one photo, Carrillo was holding a shotgun, and the caption stated,
“‘Cruising with a snail gauge. Ready for the funk.’” “Funk” meant “fight.” Another
photo showed a shirt that stated, “‘Choppa in the trunk’” and “‘I’ll leave a snail
missing.’” “Choppa” referred to a gun. There was also a photo of Carrillo with the
caption, “‘Georgia Street Mob killer.’”
The prosecutor asked Childers if, after hearing the description of the suspect
vehicle, he did anything to determine whether Carrillo was involved in the shooting. The
detective replied: “I already immediately upon hearing black Jaguar, I already suspected
Mr. Carrillo. Like I said earlier, I kind of talked about how the gang issues on the east
side, if you have black victims, then you’re looking for [a] Hispanic suspect. With a
couple of pieces, it led me to Mr. Carrillo. The fact that I knew he drove a black Jaguar,
the fact that my victims were black, I suspected it was him immediately. So I started
looking for law enforcement contacts for him specifically and was able to find a traffic
stop where he’d been detained, and I think issued a citation with another passenger in the
car, … in the black Jaguar, and that’s how I got the license plate.” Childers then obtained
the surveillance video from the motel and confirmed that the suspect vehicle indeed
belonged to Carrillo.
Childers also identified the three individuals shown with Carrillo in the
surveillance video, whom he knew to be CLPS associates. They were actively trying to
earn membership in the gang.
8
Carrillo went to Tijuana, Mexico right after the shooting and then to Las Vegas,
Nevada. He was eventually arrested at his mother’s home. After his arrest, officers
searched his room at the house. There were gang “indicia” written all over the walls of
his room, and there was a backpack containing “a massive amount of notes.” Graffiti in
Carrillo’s room stated, “Fuck Snails” and “1200,” with a “K” after the “1200.” The “K”
stood for “killer,” so the graffiti meant “1200 killer.” Other graffiti stated, “GSM” with a
“K” after it, referring to the GSM clique within the 1200 Block gang.
Some of the notes in the backpack concerned getting rid of a cell phone or
removing the “chip” from the cell phone. There was also an itinerary for fleeing the
country, including details about obtaining cash, packing clothing, going to the airport,
and leaving phones behind. Similarly, another note concerned “‘going into hiding’” and
stated, ‘“No phones. No physical contact.’” Other notes stated, “‘1200 Block killer’”
and “‘Georgia Street Mob Killer.’” Another note appeared to be Carrillo giving himself
high marks for a “‘shootout’” with “‘some snails’” on “‘Day 1.’” The note said, “‘Wino,
three out of three, A plus, 1200K.’” He appeared to believe that the three victims (Isaiah,
his grandmother, and Thomas) were associated with 1200 Block, even though they were
not. The note continued, “‘Snails will never take a real one down. I’m too much of a
killa. I’m a warrior. Primos.’” The note then said, “‘Day 2, I’m on the run LOL.’”
After Carrillo’s arrest, law enforcement conducted a “Perkins operation” in which
9
Carrillo was placed in a cell with undercover agents. 4 The operation was audio and video
recorded. Carrillo introduced himself to the undercover agents as “Wino from Eastside
Riva Primos gang.” Detectives came to the cell and told Carrillo that they knew he was
involved in the shooting. They confronted him with some evidence and said that they
were waiting for an interview room. The officers then left, and Carrillo told the
undercover agents that “they shot at me first.” According to Carrillo, the shooters pulled
up next to him, and he was looking at the stoplight when he heard, “pop, pop, pop.” He
reached for his gun—a .40-caliber Glock—and exchanged fire with the shooters. He
described it as “justifiable homicide.” One of the undercover agents asked, “Why’d you
guys get into it, though? Like, what the fuck started it?” Carrillo responded, “’Cause
they were some n*****s, and shit.” He also said that some “black bitch” at the motel
was next to his car, but he “wasn’t even arguing with her”; he merely told her to “back up
bitch.”
Detectives collected Carrillo from the cell and interviewed him. He told the
detectives that two days before the shooting, he had “a very small confrontation” with an
African-American woman at the motel, because she was standing too close to his car and
“being really weird.” He told the woman to get away from his car, and she began
“yelling and saying all this stuff.” On the day of the shooting, the same thing
happened—she was too close to his car, and he told her to get away from it. Later that
4 Illinois v. Perkins (1990) 496 U.S. 292 held that an undercover officer posing as a
fellow inmate need not give warnings under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436
“before asking questions that may elicit an incriminating response.” (Perkins, at p. 300.)
10
day, Carrillo saw the woman come out of her room with two men. The two men looked
like gang members and were staring at Carrillo and his friends. One of the men pulled up
his shirt and “flashed the strap” at Carrillo.
The woman and the two men left, and Carrillo and his friends were about to leave
as well. But Carrillo remembered that he had forgotten his “blunts,” so he went upstairs
to get them before leaving. Carrillo drove down the street and was stopped at a light
when the men from the motel pulled up on his left. They were “mad doggin’ [and]
saying some stuff.” Carrillo rolled down his window and said, “what’s up,” but the men
looked away and did not reply. Carrillo rolled his window up and turned back to the
stoplight, and “outta nowhere” he heard gunshots. The men were shooting at his car, so
he grabbed a gun that was under his seat and fired back two to three times. He fled,
running a red light to get away. Carrillo insisted that the men shot at him first and that he
and his friends “all would’ve died” if he had not returned fire.
After Carrillo told the detectives what had happened, they said that the
surveillance video did not show the man at the motel motioning to his waistband or
flashing a gun at Carrillo. They also told Carrillo that the video showed him running
upstairs and pulling a gun out of his pocket as he reentered his car. Carrillo then admitted
that he ran upstairs to get the gun. He said that he did so because he was nervous, and
“they were kinda staring at us.” He further explained that in Riverside, “Mexicans and
blacks they don’t get along.” He said that was the case whether “they’re gang bangin’ or
11
not.” 5 He also acknowledged that he “racked” his gun in view of the window. Carrillo
said that he threw his gun out of the car when he was driving, but he did not remember
where. His car was at his mechanic’s shop, but he did not know where that was either.
Law enforcement found Carrillo’s Jaguar one and one-half months after the
shooting. There were roughly 10 bullet holes on the driver’s side of the car. There were
two .40-caliber shell casings inside the Jaguar but none found at the scene of the
shooting. The driver’s side window appeared to have been shot, but it was unclear if the
bullet came from inside or outside the car. The window could have been rolled all the
way up or only partially up when the bullet struck. Investigators never found Carrillo’s
gun.
II. Verdict and sentencing
The jurors found Carrillo guilty of first degree premeditated murder and attempted
premeditated murder, but they acquitted him on a third count charging attempted murder
of Isaiah’s grandmother. (§§ 187, 189, subd. (a), 664.) With respect to the murder count,
the jury found true a gang-murder special circumstance, a hate-crime special
circumstance, and a drive-by shooting special circumstance. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(16),
(a)(21), (a)(22).) With respect to the murder and attempted murder counts, the jury found
that Carrillo personally and intentionally discharged a firearm (causing death in the case
of the murder count). (§ 12022.53, subds. (c), (d).) On the People’s motion, the court
5 One of the law enforcement witnesses explained that the term “gangbanging”
referred to gang members trying to intimidate others.
12
dismissed a bifurcated gang enhancement attached to the attempted murder count.
(§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
The court sentenced Carrillo to life in prison without the possibility of parole on
the murder count, plus 25 years to life for the associated firearm enhancement. On the
attempted murder count, the court sentenced Carrillo to a concurrent term of seven years
to life, plus 20 years for the associated firearm enhancement.
DISCUSSION
I. Racial Justice Act
Carrillo argues that certain testimony by Childers violated the RJA and Carrillo’s
due process rights. We conclude that Carrillo forfeited the RJA and due process
challenges and that defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by failing to
raise the RJA claim.
Carrillo bases his argument on two of Childers’s statements. First, when the
detective described the history of racial violence in the area, he stated: “It’s to the point
now, that if you investigate a crime in the east side Riverside neighborhood, and the
victim is Mexican, you assume you’re looking for a black suspect and vice versa.”
Second, when the prosecutor asked if the detective did anything to determine whether
Carrillo was involved in the shooting, the detective stated: “I already immediately upon
hearing black Jaguar, I already suspected Mr. Carrillo. Like I said earlier, I kind of talked
about how the gang issues on the east side, if you have black victims, then you’re looking
for [a] Hispanic suspect. With a couple of pieces, it led me to Mr. Carrillo. The fact that
13
I knew he drove a black Jaguar, the fact that my victims were black, I suspected it was
him immediately.”
“The Legislature passed the RJA in 2020 with a stated aim ‘to eliminate racial bias
from California’s criminal justice system’ and ‘to ensure that race plays no role at all in
seeking or obtaining convictions or in sentencing.’ [Citation.] To that end, the RJA
prohibits the state from seeking or obtaining a criminal conviction, or seeking, obtaining,
or imposing a sentence, on the basis of race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (People v.
Wilson (2024) 16 Cal.5th 874, 944-945.) As relevant here, the defendant may establish a
violation of the RJA by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that a law
enforcement officer or expert witness “exhibited bias or animus towards the defendant
because of the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin” or “used racially
discriminatory language about the defendant’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.” (§ 745,
subd. (a)(1), (2).) “The defendant does not need to prove intentional discrimination.”
(Id., subd. (c)(2).) “‘Racially discriminatory language’ means language that, to an
objective observer, explicitly or implicitly appeals to racial bias, including, but not
limited to, racially charged or racially coded language, language that compares the
defendant to an animal, or language that references the defendant’s physical appearance,
culture, ethnicity, or national origin.” (Id., subd. (h)(4).) Courts “must carefully consider
context when determining whether particular statements violate the RJA.” (People v.
Bankston (June 1, 2026, S044739) __ Cal.5th __ [2026 Cal. Lexis 3006, p. *140]
(Bankston).) If the defendant files an RJA motion in the trial court and makes a prima
facie showing of a violation, then the court shall hold a hearing. (§ 745, subd. (b).) “A
14
motion made at trial shall be made as soon as practicable upon the defendant learning of
the alleged violation. A motion that is not timely may be deemed waived, in the
discretion of the court.” (Id., subd. (c).) For claims based on the trial record, the
defendant may raise the RJA claim on direct appeal from the judgment. (§ 745, subd.
(b).)
Carrillo forfeited his RJA and due process claims by not raising them in the trial
court. (People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 731; People v. Gomez (2026) 118
Cal.App.5th 384, 391-392; People v. Wagstaff (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 1207, 1219.)
Section 745 states that RJA claims based on the trial record may be raised on direct
appeal, but the statute does not provide that they may be raised “for the first time” on
direct appeal. (People v. Lashon (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 804, 812, italics omitted.)
Rather, an RJA claim, “like any other appellate claim, is subject to the general appellate
rules of preservation and forfeiture of claims that could have been but were not made in
the trial court.” (Lashon, at p. 812.) “It makes little sense for the Legislature to prescribe
a comprehensive procedure for making and adjudicating [an RJA] motion at the trial
level (including a specific waiver provision for untimely motions), only to allow
defendants who could have but did not use that procedure (thereby preserving their claim
for review) to bypass that procedure and pursue an [RJA] claim for the first time on direct
appeal.” (Id. at p. 813.)
Carrillo argues that if he forfeited his RJA claim, then defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to bring an RJA motion in the trial court. But any such
motion would have been meritless. Defense counsel did not perform deficiently by
15
failing to bring a meritless RJA motion. (People v. Quintero (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
1060, 1078; People v. Singh (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 76, 117-119.)
Childers testified about the history of racial violence between East Side Riva and
1200 Block, and he explained that members of both gangs had come to target victims
because of their race, regardless of whether the victims were gang members. Carrillo
acknowledges that “it may have been proper” for Childers to provide a historic account of
the conflict between the African-American and Hispanic gangs in the area. He also
appears to acknowledge that evidence of his and his gang’s racial animus toward African
Americans was relevant to show his motive, intent to kill, and the necessary intent or
motive for the gang-murder and hate-crime special circumstances. But Carrillo asserts
that Childers “went too far” by “admitting that he and other investigators in Riverside
commonly use the race or ethnicity of a crime victim to make racist assumptions about
the identity of the perpetrator.”
The record demonstrates, however, that Childers’s statements were not based on
racist assumptions. Rather, they were based on the undisputed evidence of longstanding
racial violence and animus in the area. Childers’s statements must be read in context of
that evidence and not in isolation. (See Bankston, supra, Cal. Lexis 3006 at pp. *130-
*131 [“Considering the context, an objective observer would not have understood” the
gang expert’s “description of the organizational culture and activities of ‘Black gangs’ as
an appeal to implicit racial bias, but instead as a way of conveying his knowledge of the
organizational culture and activities of the group of gangs to which” the defendant
belonged].)
16
Carrillo relies primarily on People v. Stubblefield (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 896
(Stubblefield), disapproved on another ground by Bankston, supra, Cal. Lexis 3006 at
p. *169, fn. 15, to show that Childers’s statements constituted an RJA violation, but
Stubblefield is inapposite. The prosecutor in that case mentioned the defendant’s race in
closing argument when the prosecutor was attempting to explain why the police failed to
search the defendant’s house. (Id. at pp. 918-919.) He told the jurors that there was no
search because the victim had not identified the defendant, the defendant was famous,
and the defendant was African American. (Ibid.) The prosecutor argued that a search
under those circumstances would “‘open up a storm of controversy’” and stated, “‘Can
you imagine in Morgan Hill when they search an African-American—,’” before defense
counsel objected. (Id. at p. 919, italics omitted.)
Closing arguments in the case took place in July 2020, “eight weeks after a white
police officer murdered George Floyd, setting off weeks of massive protests and
nationwide social unrest.” (Stubblefield, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 903.) There was
no evidence in the record regarding “Floyd’s killing or the post-Floyd conflict,” but the
Stubblefield court took judicial notice of those facts under Evidence Code sections 451
and 459. (Stubblefield, at pp. 914-915.)
The Stubblefield court held that the prosecutor’s argument explicitly or implicitly
appealed to racial bias and constituted racially discriminatory language within the
meaning of the RJA, reasoning: “The prosecution explicitly asserted Stubblefield’s race
was a factor in law enforcement’s decision not to search his house. The statement
implied the house might have been searched and a gun found had Stubblefield not been
17
Black, and that Stubblefield therefore gained an undeserved advantage at trial because he
was a Black man. Second, the claim that a search would ‘open up a storm of
controversy’ implicitly referenced the events that followed George Floyd’s then-recent
killing, appealing to racially biased perceptions of those events and associating
Stubblefield with them based on his race.” (Stubblefield, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at
p. 903; id. at pp. 919-920.) The court further observed that there was no evidence that the
defendant’s race played any role in law enforcement’s decision not to search the house,
that the search would have opened up a storm of controversy, or that the police
contemplated that possibility. (Id. at p. 919.) “But even if there had been evidence to
support those claims, the argument served no valid or permissible legal purpose or theory
of relevance.” (Ibid.)
Unlike Stubblefield, this is not a case in which the defendant’s race was entirely
irrelevant or in which mention of his race served no proper purpose. (Stubblefield, supra,
107 Cal.App.5th at p. 919.) As already explained, Carrillo’s race and the race of the
victims were relevant to elements of the charged offenses or special circumstances. Their
respective races were also relevant to Carrillo’s theory of self-defense. For instance,
Carrillo told officers that he ran upstairs to get a gun from his motel room because Isaiah
and Thomas were staring at him, he was nervous, and “Mexicans and blacks” in
Riverside “don’t get along.” In other words, Carrillo claimed to be nervous and in need
of a deadly weapon because of the victims’ race and the conflict between the races in east
Riverside. In this context, Childers’s statements that he considered Carrillo’s race was an
appeal to evidence properly before the jury, not an appeal to racial bias or an exhibition
18
of racial bias. The RJA does not prohibit any and all references to the defendant’s race or
ethnicity by an expert witness or law enforcement officer involved in the case. Indeed,
the act expressly states that it “shall not prevent the prosecution of hate crimes” (§ 745,
subd. (g)), recognizing that there are cases in which the defendant’s race or the race of the
victims will be relevant and may be considered without violating the RJA. In order to
constitute a violation of the RJA, the challenged statements must “exhibit[] bias or
animus” toward the defendant because of their race or ethnicity (§ 745, subd. (a)(1), (2))
or “explicitly or implicitly appeal[] to racial bias” (id., subd. (h)(4)). (See Bankston,
supra, Cal. Lexis 3006 at pp. *139-*140 [the RJA states that racially discriminatory
language includes language comparing the defendant to an animal, but animal imagery
that does not “‘explicitly or implicitly appeal[] to racial bias’” is not prohibited by the
RJA].) That was not the case with Childers’s statements.
In sum, Carrillo forfeited his RJA and due process claims, and defense counsel did
not render ineffective assistance by failing to raise the meritless RJA claim.
II. Testimony regarding Isaiah’s honesty
The prosecutor asked the detective who interviewed Isaiah at the hospital whether
he felt “as though [Isaiah] was being honest and trustworthy” during the interview. The
detective replied in the affirmative. Carrillo argues that the court prejudicially erred and
violated his right to due process by admitting improper opinion testimony regarding
Isaiah’s honesty. We conclude that Carrillo forfeited the argument. In addition, defense
counsel’s failure to preserve the argument did not constitute ineffective assistance.
19
In general, “a lay witness may not express an opinion about the veracity of another
person’s statement because the statement’s veracity is for the jury to decide.” (People v.
Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1221.) Thus, “[l]ay opinion about the veracity of
particular statements by another is inadmissible on that issue.” (People v. Melton (1988)
44 Cal.3d 713, 744.) “With limited exceptions, the fact finder, not the witnesses, must
draw the ultimate inferences from the evidence.” (Ibid.)
“‘“[Q]uestions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on
appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground
sought to be urged on appeal.”’” (People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 620.)
Accordingly, failure to preserve the specific claim of evidentiary error forfeits the
challenge on appeal. (People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 831.)
Defense counsel objected to the prosecutor’s question about Isaiah’s honesty on
the ground that it called for speculation, and the court overruled that objection. But
counsel did not raise an improper opinion objection or a due process objection. Carrillo
therefore forfeited the challenges. (People v. Oyler, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 831 [the
defendant forfeited relevance, undue prejudice, and improper character evidence
challenges by raising only a hearsay objection in the trial court].)
Carrillo argues that to the extent that he forfeited the challenges, defense counsel
rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise the specific objections. “To
demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, [the defendant] ‘must show that counsel’s
performance was deficient, and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense.’” (People v.
Johnsen (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1116, 1165.) Counsel’s deficient performance is prejudicial if
20
“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failings, the result would have
been more favorable to the defendant.” (People v. Sepulveda (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 291,
301.)
The People concede that the detective’s testimony regarding Isaiah’s honesty was
improper opinion testimony, and we agree. (People v. Houston, supra, 54 Cal.4th at
p. 1221.) Nevertheless, any deficient performance by failing to raise the improper
opinion objection was not prejudicial. It is not reasonably probable that Carrillo would
have obtained a more favorable result absent the challenged testimony.
The court admitted only 38 seconds of Isaiah’s recorded interview at the hospital.
In those 38 seconds, Isaiah said that when he was leaving the motel parking lot, he was
going to drive toward the stopped Jaguar, but he took the other exit because he did not
want any conflict. Carrillo contends that the statement was inconsistent with Isaiah’s trial
testimony—Isaiah testified that he took his exit route because it was the fastest, and there
was no reason to go the other way. Carrillo argues that Isaiah’s interview statement
about avoiding conflict gave rise to an inference that Isaiah felt threatened by Carrillo.
And after the detective testified that he believed Isaiah’s statements to be honest and
trustworthy, the jurors were likely to conclude that Isaiah did feel threatened and to reject
Carrillo’s self-defense theory on that basis.
But the evidence that Carrillo was not acting in lawful self-defense was strong,
regardless of Isaiah’s reasons for choosing his exit route. First, the evidence of Carrillo’s
animus toward African Americans and his willingness to use violence against them was
overwhelming. For instance, he referred to himself as a killer of 1200 Block, the Georgia
21
Street Mob clique, or “snails” (a derogatory term for 1200 Block and African Americans
more generally). He called a shotgun a “‘snail gauge’” and said that he was ready for a
fight. He used a racial slur when talking about Isaiah and Thomas to the undercover
agents, saying that he got “into it” with the victims because of their race. Notes found in
his backpack after the shooting referred to the shootout with “snails,” and he gave
himself high marks for it. All of that evidence shows that Carrillo targeted the victims
and intended to kill them because of his animus toward them, not because he believed
that his life was in danger.
Second, Carrillo’s claim that the victims were trying to intimidate him or threaten
him is not supported by the video evidence. Carrillo said that one of them lifted his shirt
and flashed a gun at Carrillo, but the video shows no such conduct. He also claimed that
they followed him and pulled up to his car at the stoplight. But the video shows that
Isaiah left first, Carrillo ran a red light to catch up, and Carrillo pulled up to Isaiah’s car.
The video further shows that before following Isaiah, Carrillo retrieved a gun from his
room.
Carrillo emphasizes that Isaiah never said that Carrillo shot first, whereas Carrillo
told the undercover agents and the interviewing officers that the victims shot first.
However, the jurors could reasonably infer from the evidence that Carrillo shot at the
victims first. Isaiah testified that the person in the Jaguar “gangbanged” on his group and
cocked a gun, and then he and his companions “started getting shot at.” And even if
Thomas shot at Carrillo first, Carrillo acknowledged that he “racked” his gun in view of
the car window, just as Isaiah said. The court instructed the jurors that the right to self-
22
defense may not be contrived (CALCRIM No. 3472)—that is, self-defense “may not be
invoked by a defendant who, through his own wrongful conduct (e.g., the initiation of a
physical attack or the commission of a felony), has created circumstances under which
his adversary’s attack or pursuit is legally justified.” (People v. Enraca (2012) 53 Cal.4th
735, 761.) The prosecutor accordingly argued in her closing argument: “Let’s say
hypothetically [Thomas] did shoot first, so what. You don’t get to create your own
scenario where then you get to claim self-defense, and that makes sense.” Similarly, she
argued in rebuttal: “And although the defendant wants you to believe that he shot
second, and therefore, is entitled to self-defense, that’s not the law. That’s not the law.
The law, in fact, is if you create the circumstances that then require you to use deadly
force, right, you don’t get to set up your own set of circumstances. That makes sense.”
In light of the evidence that Carrillo provoked Thomas to use deadly force, we are
not persuaded that the evidence that Thomas shot first rendered the case close. The
evidence that Carrillo was not acting in lawful self-defense was strong, regardless of
Isaiah’s reasons for choosing his exit route. Indeed, the prosecutor did not mention in her
closing or rebuttal argument that Isaiah chose his exit route to avoid conflict.
On this record, the admission of the detective’s testimony regarding Isaiah’s
honesty was harmless. It is not reasonably probable that absent the testimony, the jurors
would have concluded the People failed to prove that Carrillo was not acting in lawful
self-defense. Carrillo therefore has not established that defense counsel rendered
ineffective assistance by failing to raise an improper opinion objection.
23
Moreover, Carrillo fails to establish that defense counsel rendered ineffective
assistance by failing to raise a due process objection. “[T]he admission of evidence, even
if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial
fundamentally unfair.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439.) The trial was not
rendered fundamentally unfair by admission of the challenged testimony, particularly in
light of both the strong evidence that Carrillo was not acting in lawful self-defense and
the relative insignificance of Isaiah’s statement that he wanted to avoid conflict. A due
process objection therefore would have been meritless, so defense counsel did not
perform deficiently by failing to raise it. (People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 463
[“Representation does not become deficient for failing to make meritless objections”].)
In sum, Carrillo forfeited his challenge to the detective’s testimony regarding
Isaiah’s honesty, and defense counsel’s failure to preserve the challenge did not
constitute ineffective assistance.
III. Instruction regarding the hate-crime special circumstance
Carrillo argues that the court erroneously instructed the jury on the motive element
of the hate-crime special circumstance by giving conflicting instructions on motive. He
contends that the error violated his right to due process. We agree, but the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. Relevant background
The court gave the jurors the pattern jury instruction on motive, CALCRIM No.
370. In relevant part, the instruction stated: “The People are not required to prove that
the defendant had a motive to commit any of the crimes charged, allegations alleged, or
24
special circumstances alleged. In reaching your verdict you may, however, consider
whether the defendant had a motive.”
With respect to the special circumstances generally, the court instructed the jurors
pursuant to CALCRIM No. 705 that “the People must prove not only that the defendant
did the acts charged, but also that he acted with a particular intent or mental state.” And
the instruction for the hate-crime special circumstance (CALCRIM No. 729) stated: “To
prove that this special circumstance is true, the People must prove that the defendant
intended to kill because of the deceased person’s race, color, religion, or nationality. [¶]
If the defendant had more than one reason to commit the murder, the deceased person’s
race, color, or nationality must have been a substantial factor motivating the defendant’s
conduct. A substantial factor is more than a trivial or remote factor, but it does not need
to be the only factor that motivated the defendant.”
B. Analysis
“Motive is not generally an element of a criminal offense. But when it is an
element, the trial court errs by giving an unmodified version of CALCRIM No. 370, an
optional instruction that tells the jury the prosecutor need not prove the defendant’s
motive to commit the charged crimes.” (People v. Valenti (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th 1140,
1165 (Valenti).) When the court correctly instructs the jury regarding the motive element
in one instruction and also gives the unmodified version of CALCRIM No. 370, then “we
have ‘no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied
in reaching their verdict.’” (Valenti, at p. 1165.) The conflicting instructions effectively
remove the motive element from the jury’s consideration. (Ibid.) Consequently, the
25
bench notes for CALCRIM No. 370 state that the court should “[m]odify this instruction
as needed if motive is an element of some, but not all, of the crimes or special
circumstances charged or enhancements alleged.”
The error removing the motive element from the jury’s consideration constitutes a
violation of the defendant’s constitutional right to due process (Valenti, supra, 243
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1164-1165), so the error is prejudicial unless the People prove that it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Id. at pp. 1165-1666; Chapman v. California
(1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24; accord, People v. Schuller (2023) 15 Cal.5th 237, 257 (Schuller)
[Chapman standard applies to instructional errors “that omit an element of the offense,
but also to instructions that provide an incomplete or misleading description of what is
necessary to establish an element of the offense”].)
As a preliminary matter, although defense counsel did not object to the conflicting
instructions on motive, the People concede that Carrillo did not forfeit the challenge. We
agree. Carrillo claims that the instructional error affected his “substantial rights” because
it removed an element of the special circumstance from the jury’s consideration.
(§ 1259.) The “claim therefore is not of the type that must be preserved by objection.”6
(People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 976, fn. 7.)
The court erred by giving the unmodified version of CALCRIM No. 370, which
instructed the jurors that the People were not required to prove that Carrillo had a motive
6 Given our conclusion that Carrillo did not forfeit the challenge, we need not
address his alternative argument that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to object to the conflicting motive instructions.
26
to commit any of the special circumstances alleged. The hate-crime special circumstance
required proof of a motive, namely, that the defendant intentionally killed the victim
“because of his or her race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin.” (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(16).) The defendant’s “‘bias motivation must be a cause in fact of the
offense.’” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 38.) If “multiple concurrent motives
exist, the prohibited bias must be a substantial factor in bringing about the crime.” (Ibid.)
We nevertheless conclude that the instructional error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. Reversal is required unless we conclude that no “rational juror who
made the findings reflected in the verdict and heard the evidence at trial could have had
reasonable doubt regarding the” required finding, absent the instructional error.
(Schuller, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 244.) We do not ask whether a reasonable jury could
have found that the defendant acted with the requisite motive, “but rather, ‘whether any
rational fact finder could have come to the opposite conclusion.” (Valenti, supra, 243
Cal.App.4th at p. 1166.)
The People argue that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because
the evidence that Thomas’s race was a substantial factor motivating Carrillo “was not just
overwhelming, but ironclad.” The People point to the evidence of Carrillo’s membership
in the gang; the cross-racial gang violence; Carrillo’s repeated references to African
Americans and the victims as “snails,” a derogatory term for their race; and Carrillo’s
statement that the conflict started because the victims “were some n*****s, and shit.”
No rational fact finder who heard the foregoing evidence and made the findings
reflected in the verdict could have had reasonable doubt that Thomas’s race was a
27
substantial factor motivating Carrillo. The evidence cited by the People indeed is
overwhelming. As for evidence supporting the contrary conclusion, Carrillo asserts that
he consistently explained that he shot at the victims because they shot at him first. He
also contends that there was evidence that the conflict arose because Isaiah’s
grandmother got too close to Carrillo’s car.
First, evidence that Carrillo may have had other reasons for committing the
murder did not preclude the jury from finding that Thomas’s race was a substantial factor
motivating the murder. (People v. Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 38.) Second, the
evidence that Thomas shot first does not persuade us that the instructional error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The jurors rejected Carrillo’s lawful self-defense
theory when they convicted him of premeditated and deliberate murder, meaning that
they found that the People had proven that Carrillo was not acting in lawful self-defense.
(People v. Saavedra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 561, 571 [“the prosecution has the burden to
prove a defendant did not act in self-defense, because self-defense negates an element of
the offense”].) We assume for purposes of the prejudice analysis that the jurors credited
the evidence that Thomas shot first. To both credit the evidence that Thomas shot first
and reject the self-defense theory, the jurors would have to conclude that Carrillo did not
have the right to invoke self-defense, because Carrillo provoked the gunfight “with the
intent to create an excuse to use force.” 7 (CALCRIM No. 3472.) No rational juror who
7 The contrived self-defense instruction (CALCRIM No. 3472) that the court gave
stated in its entirety: “A person does not have the right to self-defense if he provokes a
fight or quarrel with the intent to create an excuse to use force. [¶] However, if the
defendant used only non-deadly force, and the opponent responded with such sudden and
28
(1) found that Carrillo provoked the gunfight intending to create an excuse to use force,
(2) found that he intended to kill Thomas, (3) found that he killed Thomas with
premeditation and deliberation, and (4) heard the extensive evidence of Carrillo’s racial
animus could have had reasonable doubt that Thomas’s race was a substantial factor
motivating Carrillo.
Third, the evidence that Carrillo was upset because Isaiah’s grandmother got too
close to the Jaguar could explain his reasons for confronting her earlier in the day or the
day before the shooting. But Carrillo never said that he shot Thomas because of the
grandmother’s earlier actions. And his statement about that incident provided further
evidence of his racial bias—he called her the “black bitch” when talking to the
undercover agents. The evidence does not persuade us that a rational juror would have
concluded that the People failed to prove that racial bias motivated the murder.
For these reasons, we conclude that the court erroneously instructed the jury
concerning the motive element of the hate-crime special circumstance, but the error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.8
deadly force that the defendant could not withdraw from the fight, then the defendant had
the right to defend himself with deadly force and was not required to try to stop fighting.”
8 Carrillo argues that even if no error was prejudicial alone, the cumulative effect of
the asserted errors rendered his trial fundamentally unfair, requiring reversal of his
convictions. We have concluded that there were two errors—admission of the improper
opinion testimony regarding Isaiah’s honesty, and the erroneous instruction on the motive
element of the hate-crime special circumstance. The cumulative effect of those two
errors does not warrant reversal of Carrillo’s convictions. (People v. Woodruff (2018) 5
Cal.5th 697, 783; People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 567-568.)
29
IV. Correction of clerical errors concerning sentencing
The parties point out that the sentencing minute order and the abstract of judgment
do not accurately reflect the court’s oral pronouncement of Carrillo’s sentence. We
agree, so we direct the court to correct the minute order and the abstract of judgment.
(People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.)
The court ordered concurrent sentences for the murder (count 1) and the attempted
murder (count 2). On count 1, the court ordered a sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole, plus 25 years to life for the associated firearm enhancement. On
count 2, the court ordered a sentence of seven years to life, plus 20 years for the
associated firearm enhancement.
The sentencing minute order erroneously states that the sentences on the two
counts are consecutive, so the trial court should correct that on remand. The minute order
states the correct sentences on each count but then also states: “Sentenced to State Prison
for a total Indeterminate sentence of 37 Years TO LIFE. [¶] Sentenced to State Prison
for a determinate sentence of 20 yrs 0 mos plus indeterminate sentence of LIFE without
the possibility of parole.” Carrillo’s sentence does include a determinate term of 20 years
(for the firearm enhancement in count 2) and an indeterminate term of life without the
possibility of parole (for the count 1 offense), but the statement that he had a total
indeterminate term of 37 years to life is incorrect. On remand, the court should also
correct that statement in the minute order.
In addition, the abstract of judgment for Carrillo’s indeterminate terms also
contains a clerical error. The form states that the sentence on count 1 is concurrent to the
30
sentence on count 2, but it fails to state Carrillo’s sentence for murder on count 1.
Specifically, the form contains a check box next to “life without the possibility of parole”
(section four) that is empty. (Capitalization omitted.) The court should also correct the
abstract of judgment on remand.
DISPOSITION
The trial court is directed to prepare a corrected sentencing minute order to reflect
that (1) the sentences on counts 1 and 2 are concurrent and (2) the court did not impose a
total indeterminate term of 37 years to life. The court is also directed to prepare a
corrected abstract of judgment for Carrillo’s indeterminate terms to reflect his sentence of
life without the possibility of parole on count 1. The court shall forward certified copies
of the corrected documents to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. In all
other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
MENETREZ
J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
J.
31
Filed 7/28/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
COURT OF APPEAL -- STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, E084273
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super.Ct.No. RIF2003935)
v.
STEVEN DANIEL CARRILLO, The County of Riverside
Defendant and Appellant.
ORDER GRANTING
PARTIAL PUBLICATION
_______________________________________
We partially GRANT the requests to publish the opinion filed in this case, which
meets the standard for publication in California Rules of Court, rule 8.1105(c). The court
orders the opinion filed on June 30, 2026, certified for publication except for parts II
through IV of the Discussion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1110.)
MENETREZ
J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
J.