Filed 7/21/26 P. v. Canseco CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
THE PEOPLE, C102136
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. STK-CR-FE-
v. 2010-0006980)
EDGAR JOSE CANSECO,
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2012, a jury convicted defendant Edgar Jose Canseco of the first degree murder
and attempted robbery of Kevin Prater with enhancements that the murder was
committed during an attempted robbery and for the benefit of a criminal street gang. The
trial court imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole plus eight years,
and we upheld this judgment on appeal. (People v. Mendoza et al. (June 3, 2014,
C071775) [nonpub. opn.].)
In July 2023, Canseco petitioned for resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.6.1 The trial court denied his request following an evidentiary hearing (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)) because the court found Canseco was still guilty of felony murder (§ 189, subd.
(e)(3)). Canseco challenges the court’s reckless indifference finding. We will affirm.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In accordance with the standard of review, we recite the facts underlying
Canseco’s convictions in the light most favorable to the judgment. (See People v.
Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715.)
This case originated when Canseco, age 19, and his friend Prater saw B.H. (also
known as Taz) and Taz’s younger brother G.H. (collectively, the brothers) walking home
at approximately 2:00 a.m. Canseco and Prater decided to rob the brothers at gunpoint.
Because the brothers had nothing of value, Canseco and Prater took their clothes and
made them walk home in only their socks. Canseco and Prater often robbed people
together. It does not appear that Prater was a gang member, but Canseco and the brothers
belonged to the Norteño street gang. Canseco did not know the brothers’ gang affiliation
at the time he took their clothes. A gang expert testified that Norteño gang members are
known to engage in shootings, robbery, assault, and automobile theft. Engaging in this
kind of conduct enhances the reputation of the gang. Norteño gang members in the
relevant geographical area were also known to shoot people to obtain watches, grills, or
other jewelry.
The brothers discovered Canseco’s identity and lured Canseco to a party where
Taz confronted him. Canseco fled, recruited help, and returned later armed with guns,
but he was unable to locate the brothers because they hid in a closet. Sometime
thereafter, Canseco, G.H., and a well-respected Norteño gang member known as Pea Boy
met to resolve the dispute arising from the robbery. Canseco agreed to repay the cost of
the stolen clothes. He also agreed to help Taz rob Prater in retaliation for robbing the
brothers. Taz also planned to punch Prater in the face. If Canseco had not agreed, Taz
would have robbed Canseco in retribution, and the dispute would have continued.
Pea Boy and Taz introduced Canseco to Emmanuel Mendoza and James
Stancampiano, who were also Norteño gang members. Canseco, Taz, Mendoza, and
Stancampiano planned and coordinated the retaliation robbery. Canseco gave Taz his
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loaded .17-caliber rifle2 and agreed to lure Prater to the robbery location. According to
Canseco, Taz was supposed to look Prater in the eye before punching him as “tit for tat.”
Canseco denied the group planned to kill Prater.
The retaliatory robbery occurred in September 2010. Prater was with his
girlfriend, K.A., watching television at Prater’s mother’s home. Canseco repeatedly
called Prater that evening, and while initially ignoring the calls, Prater eventually
answered and told K.A. they were going to get Canseco. Prater and K.A. left around 7:15
p.m. Prater drove, while K.A. sat in the front passenger seat. Prater wore various items
of value including a watch, diamond ring, diamond earrings, diamond tennis bracelet, and
gold grill worn over his teeth.
Prater picked Canseco up at a cul-de-sac in a Norteño gang stronghold by some
train tracks. He was dressed in a red hat, red shirt, and black hooded sweatshirt. Canseco
asked Prater to take him to another address, and Canseco briefly went inside. Canseco
sat behind Prater in the rear passenger area. The group then drove to a grocery store, and
K.A. went in to buy snacks. Canseco texted on his phone as they drove around.3 They
then returned to where Prater originally picked up Canseco.
When they arrived, Mendoza got in the car, sitting behind K.A. Less than a
minute later, Stancampiano came up to the driver’s side window with a long gun and
aggressively demanded, “ ‘give me everything you got.’ ” The shooter pointed the gun at
Prater’s chest through the partially open window. Prater accused Canseco of setting him
up and refused to comply. Instead, Prater grabbed the gun, and a struggle ensued.
2 Canseco claimed he had removed the clip from the rifle prior to giving it to Taz,
but conceded the clip loaded with ammunition was in the gun during the attempted
robbery. Bullets that went to the gun were recovered from Canseco’s home.
3 Text messages later recovered by police showed Canseco coordinating with the
other would-be robbers leading up to the retaliation robbery.
3
Canseco and Mendoza grabbed Prater from the back seat, putting him in a headlock.
Neither Canseco nor Mendoza said anything.
In the interim, K.A. fled the car to hide in some bushes. While she was exiting,
she heard a gunshot, and Prater drove away, but crashed into a nearby fence. Another
motorist called 911. Responding authorities noted Prater was nonresponsive with a weak
pulse. He died of a single gunshot wound to the chest.
Canseco fled the scene with Mendoza, Stancampiano, and Taz (who had been
hiding in the bushes). After the shooting, the group made statements suggesting they
always intended to shoot Prater, but Canseco denied that had been part of the plan.
Thereafter, Taz disposed of the gun.
The People’s February 2012 amended information charged Canseco with first
degree murder (§ 187; count 1) and attempted robbery (§§ 664/211; count 2). The
information also alleged the murder occurred during the commission of a robbery
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)). Finally, the information alleged that during counts 1 and 2 a
principal was armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)) and that these counts were
committed for the benefit of a street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). The jury found
Canseco guilty of all charges and found all enhancements true. The trial court sentenced
Canseco to life without the possibility of parole plus eight years. We upheld this
judgment in an unpublished decision. (People v. Mendoza et al., supra, C071775.)
In 2023, Canseco filed a section 1172.6 petition for resentencing. The People
conceded the prima face showing and opposed Canseco’s petition on the merits, arguing
he was still guilty of murder as a major participant who acted with reckless indifference
to human life. While the People agreed Canseco’s youth was relevant to this
determination, they asserted his youth was not determinative given the facts of the case.
At the August 2024 merits hearing (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)), the parties stipulated the
court could consider the preliminary hearing testimony in Stancampiano’s case, wherein
4
Canseco testified.4 The court also considered recorded statements Canseco made to a
detective in 2018. The People asserted this evidence established Canseco planned the
robbery, supplied the murder weapon, lured the victim to a remote location for gang
members to rob him, and communicated with those individuals leading up to the crime.
Canseco’s youth, while relevant, was not determinative given that he was not
significantly younger than the other participants and may have been older than some of
them. Canseco disagreed, arguing Prater’s death was the result of a “ridiculous youthful
escapade,” and while Canseco was a major participant, his “recklessness [was] mitigated
by his youthfulness.”
The court took the matter under submission and later issued a written decision
denying Canseco’s resentencing petition. The court concluded beyond a reasonable
doubt that Canseco was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to
human life. Canseco timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Effective January 1, 2019, “the Legislature significantly narrowed the scope of the
felony-murder rule in Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) . . . (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 3). A felony-murder conviction may no longer rest on the mere commission of
and intent to commit an underlying felony. If a defendant was not the actual killer or an
aider and abettor acting with intent to kill, the statute now requires that the defendant be a
major participant in the felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Pen.
Code, § 189, subd. (e)(3).) With the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, the Legislature
also created a vehicle for defendants previously convicted of murder under the broader
4 Because the People did not submit a copy of Canseco’s appellate record as
evidence at the hearing, they ask this court to take judicial notice thereof. We treat the
People’s request as one to incorporate Canseco’s original appellate record by reference,
and as such, grant the request.
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and now invalidated felony-murder rule to petition for resentencing.” (People v.
Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 875, fn. omitted (Emanuel).) When a defendant makes a
prima facie showing demonstrating eligibility for resentencing under section 1172.6, the
court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing, unless the
parties waive the hearing and stipulate to vacate the challenged convictions. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (c)-(d).) At the hearing, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant is guilty of murder under current law. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1) & (3).)
We review a finding that a defendant was a major participant in an underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life for substantial evidence.
(Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885; People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988.)
Substantial evidence is “ ‘ “reasonable, credible, and of solid value” ’ [sufficient] to
support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt.” (People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788,
804 (Banks).) “ ‘Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any
reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.’ ” (People v. Brooks (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1,
57.) When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask “ ‘whether,
after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.’ ” (People v. Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 715.) In so doing, this court does
not revisit credibility determinations or evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Zamudio (2008)
43 Cal.4th 327, 357.) Rather, a defendant must show that under no hypothesis is there
substantial evidence supporting the factfinder’s judgment. (Ibid.)
I
Major Participant
“[A] ‘major participant’ in a robbery is someone whose ‘personal involvement’ is
‘substantial’ and ‘greater than the actions of an ordinary aider and abettor,’ ” but a major
participant “ ‘need not be the ringleader.’ ” (In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 450,
459.) Our Supreme Court has provided a nonexhaustive list of factors to determine
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whether a defendant was a major participant, including the defendant’s: (1) degree of
planning; (2) use or provision of a gun; (3) awareness of particular dangers posed by the
nature of the crime, the weapons used, or another participant’s past violent behavior;
(4) proximity to the killing and ability to prevent it; and (5) reaction to the use of lethal
force. (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) None of these factors are necessary or
sufficient on their own, and “all must be weighed in determining the ultimate question of
‘whether the defendant’s participation “in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk
of death” [citation] was sufficiently significant to be considered “major.” ’ ” (Harper, at
p. 459.)
Canseco does not challenge the trial court’s determination that he was a major
participant. We nonetheless briefly discuss his role in the botched attempted robbery
because showing his degree of participation is relevant to whether he acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 614-615 (Clark).)
Here, Canseco supplied a loaded rifle to Taz and then worked with the group to
plan the retaliatory robbery. Canseco texted the group updates on the day of the robbery,
tricked Prater into giving him a ride to the robbery location, and then held Prater in a
headlock from the back seat when Prater attempted to resist. Following Prater’s
shooting, Canseco did not render first aid or call police. Instead, he fled with the others.
This evidence amply showed Canseco was a major participant in the retaliatory robbery.
(Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.)
II
Reckless Indifference
Recklessness has a subjective and objective component. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 617.) Subjectively, “ ‘ “[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly involved in
the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,” and [the defendant]
must consciously disregard “the significant risk of death [the defendant’s] actions
create.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 992.) “Objectively,
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recklessness is determined by ‘what “a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation,” ’ that is, whether [the] defendant’s conduct ‘ “involve[d] a gross deviation
from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s
situation.” ’ ” (People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 478 (Oliver).)
Factors for determining when a defendant acts with reckless indifference to human
life include: (1) awareness and use of weapons; (2) “physical presence at the crime and
opportunities to restrain the crime and/or aid the victim”; (3) the duration of the felony;
(4) “knowledge of [a] cohort’s likelihood of killing”; and (5) “efforts to minimize the
risks of the violence during the felony.” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623,
capitalization omitted.)
These factors significantly overlap with the major participant factors, meaning the
greater the degree of “ ‘participation in the felony murder, the more likely [the defendant]
acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615.)
Like the major participant factors, the Clark factors are nonexhaustive. (Id. at p. 618;
People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546, 558.) For example, courts may also consider
gang membership as a factor supporting reckless indifference. (See Banks, supra,
61 Cal.4th at pp. 810-811; People v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 990.) Further,
a defendant’s youth is also relevant to the reckless indifference analysis. (Keel, at
p. 558.) Indeed, it is now well recognized that minors and young adults are generally less
mature and responsible than older adults because they often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to
them. (Ibid.) Therefore, the defendant’s youthfulness must also be considered when
determining whether he or she acted with reckless indifference to the victim’s life.
(Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 487-488.) No one factor is required or dispositive.
(Clark, at p. 618.) Rather, “ ‘the totality of the circumstances’ must be analyzed to
determine whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference.” (Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 885.)
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Here, the trial court found “1.) [Canseco] planned the robbery with fellow
Norte[ñ]o gang members, most notably ‘Taz,’ wherein the likelihood of violence was
readily apparent; 2.) [Canseco] lured the victim to the scene, precisely as planned;
3.) [Canseco] provided the firearm/ammo for the planned robbery; 4.) During the crime,
[Canseco] actively held/restrained the victim to facilitate the planned robbery and
5.) [Canseco] rendered virtually no aid after the victim was shot, but instead fled the
scene through the same fence as his confederates.” Moreover, the court rejected
Canseco’s youthfulness argument that characterized Prater’s death “as a tragically
misguided escapade of the young and foolish,” instead noting, “why round-up three other
gang members and supply a firearm/ammo for a misguided prank of a
friend/acquaintance victim? Rather, [Canseco’s] actions demonstrate a callous individual
who continually acted as a major participant with reckless indifference to the life of the
victim, Mr. Prater.” We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding
that Canseco acted with reckless indifference to human life.5
A. Awareness of Weapons and Knowledge of Propensity for Violence
While Canseco did not personally use a weapon during the retaliation robbery, he
supplied the loaded rifle used to kill Prater. Further, although Canseco argues that the
plan was only to rob and punch Prater and that he did not know of Stancampiano’s
inclination for violence until after the shooting, we conclude the circumstances showed
an enhanced risk of violence.
During the original robbery, Canseco and Prater took Taz’s and his brother’s
clothing at gunpoint, making them walk home naked except for their socks. Canseco and
5 We review the result, not the rationale behind the trial court’s reckless indifference
finding such that we find it unnecessary to address whether substantial evidence supports
the trial court’s suggestion that Canseco rounded up three other gang members to commit
the retaliation robbery. (People v. Turner (2020) 10 Cal.5th 786, 807.)
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Prater took the brothers’ clothes because they did not have anything valuable to steal.
While Prater was not a gang member, Canseco and the brothers belonged to different
subgroups of the Norteño street gang. Norteño gang members in the relevant
geographical area were known to engage in shootings, robbery, assault, and automobile
theft. They also shot people to obtain watches, grills, and other jewelry.
The brothers discovered Canseco’s identity and confronted him at a house party
where approximately 30 individuals stood ready to fight. Canseco fled, recruited help,
and then returned armed with guns but he was unable to locate the brothers. The brothers
and Canseco met again with a respected gang member to mediate the issue arising from
the robbery. Canseco knew that if he did not agree to assist in the retaliation robbery, the
dispute would continue.
Despite Canseco’s representations otherwise, we conclude these circumstances
support that the retaliation robbery presented a grave risk of violence up to and including
shooting Prater. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 885.) Such action served to avenge
the deep disrespect of stripping the brothers in public, enhance the reputation of the gang,
and punish Canseco for his earlier misdeeds. This weighs in favor of a reckless
indifference finding.
B. Duration of the Crime and Efforts to Minimize the Risk of Violence
The duration of the retaliation robbery resulting in Prater’s death was short,
weighing against a reckless indifference finding. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 886.)
However, we conclude Canseco failed to take efforts to minimize the risks presented by
the retaliation robbery. (Id. at pp. 887-888.) Canseco instead collectively planned an
armed robbery with other gang members, supplied the loaded rifle, and arguably relying
on his familiarity with Prater, lured Prater deep into Norteño gang territory at night. On
the whole, this factor weighs in favor of a reckless indifference finding. (Ibid.)
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C. Physical Presence and Opportunity to Restrain Violence or Aid Victim
Here, Canseco was present in the back seat of Prater’s car during the retaliation
robbery. Rather than attempting to help Prater, Canseco physically restrained Prater from
behind by putting him in a headlock and preventing Prater from fleeing or fighting back
prior to the shooting. These facts favor a reckless indifference finding. (Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th at pp. 889-890.)
Canseco argues that had he known there was a possibility of lethal force, he never
would have placed himself behind Prater in the line of fire. But whether the evidence
might support this inference is inapposite to whether substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s determination. (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.)
Moreover, Canseco fled with the others rather than providing aid to Prater
following the shooting. The possible negative inferences to be drawn from this flight are
lessened by Prater’s girlfriend’s presence at the scene, and possibility that Canseco relied
upon her to call for help while he fled to avoid capture. (See, e.g., Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th at pp. 893-894 [possible negative inferences to be drawn from the defendant’s
flight are less forceful where others are in the area and may offer assistance].)
Nonetheless, on the whole, this factor weighs in favor of a reckless indifference finding.
D. Canseco’s Youthfulness
Canseco argues he was only 19 years old and pressured by peers to commit the
retaliation robbery.6 We acknowledge Canseco’s relative youth as lessening his likely
appreciation of the risks involved. (Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 488.) However,
the retaliatory robbery did not have the hallmarks of divergence between immature and
mature brains. (See id. at p. 489 [identifying impulsivity and susceptibility to peer
6 Canseco’s argument concerning the trial court’s use of the term a “misguided
prank” ignores that the trial court’s use of this language was in direct response to
Canseco’s argument and rejected that sentiment.
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pressure].) The retaliation robbery was not impulsive; rather, it was a well-planned event
done at the behest of Canseco’s gang to cure the disrespect the original robbery caused
other gang members.7 (Oliver, at p. 489.)
We likewise reject Canseco’s contention that he failed to appreciate the risks
involved because he was operating under “peer pressure.” (Oliver, supra,
90 Cal.App.5th at p. 489.) Canseco has not shown he was pressured by older individuals.
The only information in the record concerning the ages of the participants reflects that
Canseco was older than at least one of his coparticipants. Moreover, while we
acknowledge that Canseco participated to lessen the risk to himself given his affront to
the brothers and the Norteño gang at large, we do not view this as the kind of “peer
pressure” that would lessen the likelihood that Canseco understood the risks associated
with his actions. On the contrary, this underscores the risks involved.
E. The Totality of the Circumstances
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we find substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s determination that Canseco acted with reckless indifference to
human life. He was a major participant in the retaliation robbery, planned that robbery
with other gang members, provided the loaded rifle used to kill Prater, lured Prater deep
into gang territory at night, restrained Prater during the attack, and fled the scene rather
than attempting to render aid. Although Canseco was 19 years old, the retaliation
robbery was not impulsive, and the pressure exerted by Canseco’s fellow gang members
underscored rather than excused the risks. (Oliver, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at pp. 488-
489.) These circumstances show an elevated risk of death beyond that inherent in any
garden variety robbery. (Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th
at p. 623.)
7 In contrast, the robbery of the brothers was a spur of the moment decision.
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To the extent Canseco asserts he only understood Prater was at risk of being
robbed and punched, we are not in a position to reconsider competing inferences from the
evidence offered below. (People v. Zamudio, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 357.) Accordingly,
because substantial evidence establishes Canseco’s subjective awareness and conscious
disregard of the grave risk of death created by his actions and that his actions were a
gross deviation from what a law-abiding citizen would have done in his situation
(Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 883-884; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 616-617), we
must affirm.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
EARL, P. J.
We concur:
/s/
RENNER, J.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.*
* Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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