Filed 6/26/26 P. v. Caneitzep CA1/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A174536
v.
WILLIAM ANIBAL CANEITZEP, (San Mateo County
Super. Ct. No. 24-NF-007632-A)
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant William Anibal Caneitzep appeals from a judgment entered
after sentence was imposed upon his violation of probation. His appellate
counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436
(Wende), asking this court to conduct an independent review to determine
whether there are any arguable issues. Defendant filed a supplemental brief.
Having reviewed defendant’s arguments and finding no arguable issues, we
affirm.
BACKGROUND
San Mateo County Sherriff’s deputies responded to a report of a trailer
on fire. Upon arrival at the scene, deputies observed a trailer, which was
attached to a jeep, “engulfed in flames.” The victim, who lived in the trailer,
was not inside at the time. After retrieving video footage of the area,
deputies were able to identify defendant. Deputies located defendant, who
was driving a vehicle, and they conducted a traffic enforcement stop. After
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reading defendant his Miranda rights,1 defendant confessed to starting the
fire in “retaliation for a money dispute.”
The San Mateo County District Attorney filed an information alleging
one count of arson of an inhabited structure (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (b)—
count 1), misdemeanor driving when privilege suspended for a driving under
the influence conviction (Veh. Code, § 14601.2, subd. (a)—count 2); and
misdemeanor driving when privilege suspended for failing a blood-alcohol
test (id., § 14601.5, subd. (a)—count 3). The information further alleged
count 1 was a serious felony (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c)) and was
aggravated (id., § 451.1, subds. (a)–(c)) and as to counts 2 and 3 that
defendant had suffered a prior conviction of Vehicle Code sections 14601.2,
subdivision (a) and 14601.5, subdivision (d)(2).
Defendant pleaded no contest to count 1 (arson) and admitted it was a
serious felony. The remaining counts were dismissed and allegations
stricken. The court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant
on two years’ probation subject to several terms and conditions, including
that defendant “participate in substance abuse related alcohol assessment as
directed by probation,” abstain from alcohol and controlled substances, and
submit to chemical testing. The court minutes, in turn, stated, as part of his
probation, defendant “shall abstain from the use or possession” of alcohol and
controlled substances; “submit to chemical testing for detection of any alcohol
or controlled substances”; and “[p]articipate in treatment or counseling as
directed . . . by the Probation officer,” among other conditions. A Spanish-
language interpreter interpreted the plea form and assisted at the change of
plea and sentencing hearings.
1 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436.
2
The following year, the probation department filed an affidavit of
probation violation, alleging 22 violations for failing to abstain from drugs
and alcohol and failing to complete an outpatient treatment program as he
had been directed.
In preparation for the violation hearing, the probation department filed
a probation violation memorandum recommending revocation of probation.
The probation officer explained defendant’s probation conditions included
that he abstain from alcohol and drug use, submit to chemical testing, and
that he “participate in treatment or counseling as directed.” In December
2024, the probation officer directed defendant to enroll and complete an
outpatient treatment program.
Defendant enrolled in a treatment program but was discharged in early
February 2025 for lack of attendance, participation, and failing to submit
urine analysis samples. When asked why he was not attending the
outpatient program, defendant stated it was not covered by insurance.
Defendant reenrolled in late February, and in March, the probation officer
confirmed defendant was enrolled and the program was covered by insurance.
In May, after a positive test for several substances, and defendant’s own
admission that he had been drinking and “smoking ‘meth,’ ” the probation
officer directed defendant to continue with outpatient treatment. In June,
defendant was “counseled about his inconsistency . . . with outpatient
treatment” and referred to complete an assessment “to evaluate the
appropriate level of care.” That assessment determined outpatient treatment
was the appropriate level of care and that defendant “was not interested in
residential treatment.” The probation officer directed defendant to follow the
recommendation provided by the assessment and reenroll in outpatient
treatment by July 1. When the officer met with defendant on July 17, he
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reminded defendant that he was supposed to be enrolled by July 1, that the
treatment center informed the officer defendant had rescheduled his
enrollment appointment, and that defendant had failed to show up at the
rescheduled appointment. Defendant maintained he was on the waitlist, and
the officer confirmed he was reenrolled in treatment the following day.
However, at the end of July, defendant’s probation officer was contacted by
the treatment program and informed defendant had missed his individual
meeting. Defendant was arrested at the beginning of August.
The probation department noted although defendant had “enrolled in
outpatient treatment multiple times, he has failed to complete the treatment
and [continues to] test positive for controlled substances.” Further, despite
“numerous opportunities to address his substance abuse issues,” defendant
had “demonstrated he has not taking [sic] probation seriously” and he had
“increased levels of controlled substances.” For those reasons, the
department recommended termination of probation.
At the probation violation arraignment, the court noted an interpreter
was no longer required.2 At the violation hearing, the court began by
informing defendant of the sentence—three years in state prison with 197
days’ credit—if he admitted the violation. The court asked defendant, “Is
that what you would like to do?” Defendant replied, “Yes.” The court then
noted, “If you want to admit the violation, you will not have a hearing.” The
court informed defendant of the rights he would be giving up and asked, “Do
you understand that, by admitting this violation, you are waiving those
rights?” Defendant replied, “Yes, your Honor.” The court followed up by
asking, “And you do so freely and voluntarily without being threatened or
given any additional promises?” Defendant again replied, “Yes, Your Honor.”
2 The transcript from this hearing is not in the record before us.
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The court then took defendant’s admission that he “violated [his] probation
by not doing the out-patient program.” Defense counsel concurred in the
admission, joined in the waivers, and stipulated to the factual basis for the
violation. The court found defendant had “made a knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary waiver of his statutory and constitutional rights” and accepted
admission of the violation of probation.
The court sentenced defendant to the low term of three years for the
arson conviction.
DISCUSSION
“No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from . . . a revocation of
probation following an admission of violation,” except where the trial court
has signed a signed certificate of probable cause. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5; Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.304(b)(2) [certificate of probable cause is required after
admission of probation violation].)
Here, defendant requested a certificate of probable cause claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel, which the trial court denied. In his
supplemental letter brief, defendant again claims he received ineffective
assistance of counsel. He maintains his attorney provided “Bad legal
representation,” “threaten[ed] me with extra jail time if I don’t do what he
says,” and “promis[ed] me extra credits, 8 months of incarceration if I do
what he says.”
We have no authority to waive any of the requirements for issuance of a
certificate of probable cause. (People v. Thurman (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 36,
42.) Having failed to obtain a certificate, defendant may not circumvent the
requirement through a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (See In re
Chavez (2003) 30 Cal.4th 643, 651 [“A defendant who challenges the validity
of such a plea on the ground that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance
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[of counsel] in advance regarding the plea may not circumvent the
requirements of [Penal Code] section 1237.5.”]; People v. Stubbs (1998)
61 Cal.App.4th 243, 244–245 [defendant required to obtain a certificate of
probable cause in order to raise claim he received ineffective assistance of
counsel prior to his plea].)
Defendant’s remedy for the trial court’s denial of the certificate of
probable cause was to file a petition for writ relief. “[W]here, as here, a
certificate of probable cause has been denied, the appeal is not operative and
the denial of the certificate must be reviewed by writ of mandate. . . . [¶] . . .
‘When an appellate court considers an appeal on its merits in spite of the
appellant’s noncompliance with [Penal Code] section 1237.5 and [California
Rules of Court,] rule [8.304(b)(2)], it arrogates to itself the screening which
should have taken place at the county level.’ ” (People v. Castelan (1995)
32 Cal.App.4th 1185, 1188, italics omitted.)
Additionally, defendant contends he lacked a translator or interpreter,
and that he did not “understand what is happening because I don’t speak
English.”3
“A person unable to understand English who is charged with a crime
has a right to an interpreter throughout the proceedings.” (Cal. Const. art. I,
§ 14.) “The prerequisite to an appointment of an interpreter is . . . that the
person charged with a crime be ‘unable to understand English.’ ” (In re
Raymundo B. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1447, 1453.)
3 In his request for a certificate of probable cause, defendant does not
mention an inability to understand the proceedings. That request is written
in English and signed by defendant, although it is not clear if defendant
himself wrote the request. Defendant’s supplemental letter brief, which is
not signed by defendant, is written in Spanish. At this court’s order,
appointed counsel provided the court with a copy of the letter translated into
English.
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To obtain an interpreter, “an affirmative showing of need is required.”
(In re Raymundo B., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 1453.) The defendant bears
the “burden of showing he [does] not understand English.” (Id. at p. 1456.)
An interpreter will be appointed upon a “ ‘finding of necessity by the trial
court.’ ” (Id. at p. 1453.) When a defendant complains on appeal that he was
denied the right to an interpreter, “ ‘ “ ‘error is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively shown.’ ” ’ ” (Id. at p. 1452.) The defendant bears the burden of
showing error, and any uncertainty in the record will be resolved against
him. (Ibid.)
Although, a year earlier, defendant had a Spanish-language interpreter
at some of his court appearances, a year later, at the probation violation
arraignment the court noted an interpreter was no longer needed. Although
the transcript of that hearing is not in the record before us, we presume the
trial court knew and followed the law. (In re Raymundo B., supra,
203 Cal.Cal.App.3d at p. 1452 [“ ‘ “ ‘error is never presumed, but must be
affirmatively shown’ ” ’ ”]; People v. Ramirez (2021) 10 Cal.5th 983, 1042
[“Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume that the trial court knew the
law and followed it.”].) Additionally, nothing in the record before us shows
defendant made a showing that he needed or requested an interpreter at the
probation violation hearing.
We also note, in the same letter in which he states that he does not
understand English, defendant also details a conversation between him and
his attorney, only pointing out one instance where his attorney used Spanish.
Moreover, and more importantly, during the probation violation hearing,
defendant engaged in a lengthy dialogue with the court. Speaking in
English, the trial court informed defendant of the sentence and any credits he
would receive, and asked defendant if that was what he would like to do; the
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court advised defendant of the many rights he would be giving up, and asked
defendant if he understood he would be waiving those rights; the court asked
defendant if he did so “freely and voluntarily without being threatened or
given any additional promises”; and the court asked defendant if he admitted
the violation. Defendant responded, “Yes,” or “Yes, your Honor” to each
question. At no point during the dialogue did defendant claim an inability to
understand what the trial court was saying or request an interpreter, and at
no point in the dialogue did defendant speak in Spanish. On this record, it
appears defendant was in fact able to understand English as of the time of
the probation violation proceedings, and he was therefore not denied the
right to an interpreter.
Defendant makes no challenge to the sentence or any other matters
occurring after the plea that do not affect the validity of the plea. We have
independently reviewed the record pursuant to Wende to determine the
existence of any arguable factual or legal issues, and we have found none.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________
Banke, J.
We concur:
_________________________
Humes, P. J.
_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.
A174536, People v. Caneitzep
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