Filed 9/16/26 P. v. Campbell CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE, H053959
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. Nos. B1577257,
B1685118, C1652328)
v.
LARON DESEAN CAMPBELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
Before this court for the third time, appellant Laron Desean Campbell appeals
from the trial court’s judgment sentencing him to an aggregate term of 18 years 8 months
in prison for multiple offenses in three criminal cases. In each of his two prior appeals
(case Nos. H044517 and H050890), this court reversed the judgment and remanded for
resentencing. In this third appeal, Campbell’s counsel has filed a brief which states the
case but raises no issues, asking this court to conduct an independent review under
People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. We advised Campbell of his right to submit
written argument on his own behalf within 30 days, and he has not done so. Finding no
arguable issues in our independent review of the record, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
A. The Convictions and Appeal in Case Number H044517
Campbell was originally sentenced to an aggregate term of 49 years for three
cases, case numbers B1577257, B1685118, and C1652328.
Case number B1577257 was tried before a jury and involved two home invasion
robberies in August and November 2014. Campbell was convicted in that case of four
counts of first degree robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 211–212.5, subd. (a); counts 1, 2, 8, and
9),1 four counts of false imprisonment (§§ 236–237; counts 3, 4, 10, and 11), one count
of disconnecting a telephone line (§ 591; count 5), and four counts of criminal threats
(§ 422; counts 6, 7, 12, and 13). The jury found true as to all four robbery convictions
that Campbell had personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and Campbell
admitted that he had served two prior prison terms (former § 667.5, subd. (b)) and had a
prior conviction that was both a strike (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i); 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d))
and a serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
Campbell was sentenced to a total term of 46 years and 4 months for these
offenses as follows: 22 years for count 1 (the upper term of six years, doubled due to
Campbell’s prior strike, and another 10 years for the firearm enhancement); three
consecutive six-year terms for counts 2, 8, and 9 (one-third the middle term of four years,
doubled due to Campbell’s prior strike); a consecutive term of 16 months for count 5
(one-third the middle term of two years, doubled); and a consecutive term of five years
for the prior serious felony enhancement. The trial court imposed but stayed sentences
for counts 3, 4, 6, 7, and 10 through 13; the court also struck the punishment for the prior
prison term enhancements.
At the same hearing, Campbell was also sentenced in two criminal cases in which
he pleaded no contest, case numbers B1685118 and C1652328. In case number
B1685118, Campbell pleaded no contest to a charge of attempted first degree burglary
(§§ 664, 459–460, subd. (a)) and admitted the allegation that he had a prior strike
conviction (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12). Campbell was sentenced to a consecutive
16-month term for the attempted burglary (one-third the middle term, doubled).
1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
In case number C1652328, Campbell pleaded no contest to escape from jail after a
conviction (§ 4532, subd. (b)(1); count 1) and destroying jail property (§ 4600, subd. (a);
count 2) and admitted that he had three prior strike convictions (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i),
1170.12) and had served two prior prison terms (former § 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial
court imposed a consecutive 16-month term for count 1 (one-third the middle term,
doubled) and a concurrent 32-month term for count 2 (the low term, doubled), striking
the punishment for the prior prison term enhancement under former section 667.5,
subdivision (b).
Campbell appealed the judgment in case number H044517. A different panel of
this court reversed because ameliorative sentencing legislation retroactively applied to
Campbell’s nonfinal judgment: (1) Senate Bill No. 620 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) had
amended section 12022.53, subdivision (h) to empower the trial court to dismiss a
firearm enhancement in furtherance of justice under section 1385, (2) Senate Bill
No. 1393 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) had amended sections 667 and 1385 to empower the
trial court to strike serious felony enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a), and
(3) Senate Bill No. 136 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) had limited former section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancements to certain sexually violent offenses, requiring reversal of
Campbell’s prior prison term enhancements.
On remand, the trial court imposed an aggregate term of 30 years in prison (a
reduction of 19 years from the original judgment), derived in part from the following
sentencing choices made in case number B1577257: (1) a sentence of eight years for
count 1 (the middle term of four years, doubled due to the prior strike, rather than the
upper term of six years); (2) striking the firearm enhancements for counts 2, 8, and 9; and
(3) striking the five-year punishment for the serious felony enhancement imposed under
section 667, subdivision (a). At resentencing, the trial court ruled that the section 667.5,
subdivision (b) allegations “are reversed and those enhancement allegations are stricken.”
In all other respects, the trial court made the same sentencing choices it had originally.
3
B. The Second Appeal in Case Number H050890 and Subsequent Resentencing
Campbell appealed from the judgment on remand. As to his convictions in case
number B1577257, Campbell argued that the trial court abused its discretion by declining
to strike under section 1385 his 10-year firearm enhancement as to count 1, the trial court
abused its discretion in selecting the middle term for count 1 despite his history of
childhood trauma (see § 1170, subd. (b)(6)), and the trial court should have stayed his
sentence on count 5 under section 654. This court agreed that reversal was required for
the trial court to properly consider whether to strike the firearm enhancement and that on
remand, Campbell could raise his other claims of sentencing error.
Upon issuance of the remittitur, Campbell filed a sentencing memorandum
requesting that in case number B1577257, the trial court (1) impose the lower term for
count 1, based on Campbell’s youth at the time of the offenses and his history of
childhood trauma (see § 1170, subd. (b)(6)); (2) dismiss the associated 10-year firearm
enhancement based on mitigating factors under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2); (3) stay
the sentence on count 5 under section 654, because the act of cutting the telephone line
was committed with the same criminal intent as the robbery; and (4) dismiss the prior
strike allegation under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497
(Romero). Campbell proposed that the trial court resentence him to a term of either
14 years 8 months or 16 years 8 months in prison.
In support of his requested sentence, Campbell submitted a psychological
evaluation that discussed the effect of his childhood trauma and youth on his criminality.
The psychological evaluation concluded that Campbell “does not present as a risk of
violence based on his lack of aggressive behaviors or fights over the past nine years.”
Campbell also documented his rehabilitation in prison, including certificates of
completed educational and vocational programs, as well as letters of recommendation
from correctional officers, family members, and community members.
4
The People opposed any reduction in Campbell’s sentence, arguing that the issues
raised in the current resentencing were largely the same as the ones raised in the prior
resentencing, with the only difference being that Campbell had been recently charged
with possession of marijuana.2
After considering the parties’ arguments, the trial court resentenced Campbell to a
total term of 18 years 8 months in prison—a reduction of 11 years 4 months. The
reduction in Campbell’s sentence resulted from the following changes in the court’s
sentencing choices with respect to the convictions in case number B1577257:
First, the trial court struck the 10-year firearm enhancement imposed for count 1,
reasoning that the enhancement, if imposed, would result in a sentence of over 20 years
(§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(C)), that the current offenses were connected to Campbell’s
childhood victimization and trauma (id., subd. (c)(2)(E)), and that striking the
enhancement would serve the interests of justice given the totality of the circumstances
including Campbell’s rehabilitative efforts.
Second, the trial court imposed a middle term of four years for count 5 but stayed
the sentence under section 654. The trial court acknowledged the “paucity of evidence”
presented at Campbell’s trial about the disconnection of the telephone line during the
home-invasion robbery. The court thus concluded that there was insufficient evidence
that count 5 had a separate intent and objective from the charged robberies in counts 1
and 2.
The trial court otherwise made the same sentencing choices as to the remaining
counts in case number B1577257 and for the convictions in case numbers B1685118 and
C1652328. In again selecting the middle term for count 1 in case number B1577257, the
2 At the resentencing hearing, Campbell’s counsel represented that this charge
stemmed from an incident where marijuana was found in Campbell’s jail cell and that
“despite [this] setback, [Campbell] forthrightly admitted his offense,” demonstrating his
maturity.
5
trial court found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances such that imposition of the lower term would not be in the interests of
justice. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(A) & (B) [presumption of lower term if certain factors,
i.e., childhood trauma or youthfulness, contributed to the commission of the offense
unless aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances].)
The trial court also denied Campbell’s Romero motion. The trial court determined
that considering the “circumstances of Mr. Campbell’s multiple crimes, the
circumstances of his strike prior, his background, his character, his prospect for the
future” and even considering Campbell’s “post-sentencing rehabilitative work in the state
prison,” Campbell still fell “squarely within the intent of the Three Strike[s] sentencing
scheme.”
Campbell timely appealed from the consolidated judgment.
Having independently reviewed the record under Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, we
find no arguable issues. We affirm the judgment.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
6
LIE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
WILSON, J.
BROMBERG, J.
People v. Campbell
H053959