Filed 8/3/26 P. v. Campbell CA2/6
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B334456
(Super. Ct. No. TA058243)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)
v. OPINION FOLLOWING
ORDER VACATING PRIOR
SIDNEY CAMPBELL, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2003, Sidney Campbell was convicted by jury of second
degree murder after he and his brother shot and killed a 15-year-
old boy. The jury was not instructed on felony murder or natural
and probable consequences. In 2022, appellant filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6. The trial
court summarily denied the petition at the prima facie stage,
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
finding appellant “is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of
law.”
On appeal, appellant argued the trial court erred in
summarily denying his petition because, pursuant to People v.
Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi), People v. Powell (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 689 (Powell), and People v. Maldonado (2023) 87
Cal.App.5th 1257 (Maldonado), decisions that identified potential
ambiguities in the aiding and abetting and murder instructions,
he may have been convicted of second degree murder on an
imputed malice theory.
In an unpublished opinion, we affirmed the trial court’s
summary denial of appellant’s petition for resentencing. (People
v. Campbell (Dec. 11, 2024, B334456 [nonpub. opn.] (Campbell
II).) In so doing, we considered several recent cases, namely
People v. Berry-Vierwinden (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 921 (Berry-
Vierwinden), People v. Burns (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 862, and
People v. Flores (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1164 (Flores),2 which
disagreed with Maldonado and Langi to the extent they had
allowed an “instructional error [to] be asserted as a basis for
section 1172.6 relief—even if the alleged error could have been
raised on direct appeal under then-existing law . . . .” (Berry-
Vierwinden, at p. 936.) We agreed with Berry-Vierwinden and its
progeny that a petitioner may not raise a claim on a section
1172.6 petition that could have been raised on direct appeal.
(Campbell II, supra, B334456.)
Our Supreme Court granted review and transferred the
matter back to us with directions to vacate our decision and
2 People v. Berry-Vierwinden/People v. Burns/People v.
Flores, all three cases disapproved by People v. Lopez (2026) 19
Cal.5th 639 (Lopez).
2
reconsider the cause in light of Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th 639,
which “disapprove[d] the Burns-Flores/Berry-Vierwinden line of
cases” and held that “ ‘[t]he mere fact that a petitioner could have
raised an analogous . . . claim of instructional error at trial or in
his original appeal does not render him categorically ineligible for
relief under section 1172.6 . . . .’ ” (Lopez, at p. 658.) In this
opinion, we have followed the Supreme Court’s directions. We
will affirm.
Factual Background3
In 1999, appellant and his brother, Christopher Campbell,
shot and killed 15-year-old Kenneth Colter. Earlier that day,
Colter and another boy, 15-year-old Damien Culpepper, were
“horse playing” and bent the bicycle tire rim of nine-year-old
“Little Chris” Campbell. Little Chris went home and told his
father, Christopher, what had happened. Christopher, along
with his brother Clinton, angrily confronted Colter and
Culpepper. After Christopher and Clinton left, Colter and
Culpepper went to Culpepper’s garage to get a replacement rim.
Sometime later, Christopher returned, this time with appellant.
A witness, Gerrina Hawes, saw Christopher and Colter arguing
and went to get Colter. Appellant, who was standing in the area
and appeared to be angry, told Hawes to mind her own business
and leave.
Hawes saw Colter backing away from Christopher. She
saw appellant take out a gun, motion for Colter to come to him,
and start shooting. Culpepper, who was inside his house at the
time, looked out his bedroom window and saw that appellant,
3 These facts are summarized from our prior opinion in
appellant’s direct appeal. (People v. Campbell (Jan. 5, 2005,
B170224) [nonpub. opn.] (Campbell I).)
3
Christopher, and Colter all had guns and were shooting them.
Colter ran away from the scene but was shot in the neck and
arm. He died from the gunshot wound to his neck.
In 2003, appellant was convicted by jury of second degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)). The jury found true the special
allegations that appellant personally used and discharged a
firearm in the commission of the offense (§ 12022.53, subds. (b),
(c)). The jury found not true the allegation that appellant
intentionally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or
death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). Appellant was sentenced to an
aggregate term of 35 years to life.
We affirmed appellant’s conviction in a nonpublished
opinion. (Campbell I, supra, B170224.)
Section 1172.6 Petition
In 2022, appellant filed a form petition for resentencing.
He declared he could not presently be convicted of murder
“because of changes made to [sections] 188 and 189, effective
January 1, 2019.” The trial court appointed counsel and accepted
briefing. In his briefing, appellant argued that even though the
jury was not instructed on felony murder and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, he “may . . . have been convicted
on a theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely
on his participation in a crime” and ambiguous language in the
jury instructions for aider and abettor liability.
Trial Court’s Ruling
The trial court conducted a hearing on whether appellant
had made a prima facie case for relief.
After reviewing the briefs, the jury instructions, and the
prior appellate opinion, the trial court denied the petition. It
explained that the jury was not instructed on CALJIC No. 8.31,
4
the second degree implied malice murder instruction, the jurors
“determined that Mr. Campbell was in fact a shooter who fired a
weapon,” and “the People’s theory of liability for second-degree
murder was based solely on aiding and abetting.” The trial court
concluded, “for those reasons, Mr. Campbell is not entitled to
resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.”
Discussion
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) amended the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, “to ensure that murder liability
is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act
with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to life.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).)
To that end, Senate Bill 1437 amended section 188 by
adding a requirement that, when the felony-murder rule does not
apply, a principal in the crime of murder “shall act with malice
aforethought” and “[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person
based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.
(a)(3).)
Senate Bill 1437 also enacted section 1172.6, which created
a procedural mechanism for defendants who could not be
convicted of murder or attempted murder under the amended
laws to seek retroactive relief. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3); People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).)
Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section
1172.6 to expand eligibility for resentencing to include not only
those “convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine,” but also those convicted of
murder under any “other theory which malice is imputed to a
5
person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.” (§
1172.6, subd. (a), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
In deciding whether a petitioner has made a prima facie
showing for relief, “ ‘ “the court takes petitioner’s factual
allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved. . . .” ’ ” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 971.) In making this determination, courts may
examine portions of the record of conviction but may not engage
in “ ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise
of discretion’ ” or make “credibility determinations.” (Id., at pp.
971, 974.) “At this preliminary stage, denial of a section 1172.6
petition is proper only ‘[i]f the petition and record in the case
establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief.’ ”
(Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 658; see People v. Antonelli (2025)
17 Cal.5th 719, 731 [“In assessing section 1172.6 petitions from
individuals convicted following jury trials, the jury instructions
will be critical”].)
We independently review a trial court’s determination on
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
Appellant is Ineligible for Relief as a Matter of Law
Appellant makes several arguments as to why the trial
court erred in summarily denying his petition for resentencing.
Appellant first contends the trial court engaged in “judicial
factfinding” at the prima facie stage. It did not. The trial court
examined the record of conviction to determine if that record
conclusively established that appellant was ineligible for relief as
a matter of law. This did not require the trial court to make
“evidentiary findings” and was entirely permissible under Lewis,
6
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970-972. Any reference to the appellate
opinion and the undisputed factual summary therein was
harmless based on the jury’s findings in this case.
Appellant next contends, “contrary to the People’s
argument and the superior court’s ruling,” the jury was
instructed on implied malice. The People agree that the jury was
instructed on implied malice, which remains a valid theory, and
was not instructed on imputed malice. Relying on Langi, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th 972, appellant contends he “may have been
convicted on an imputed malice theory” given the ambiguity in
the prior standard instructions regarding aiding and abetting a
second degree implied malice murder.
In his supplemental brief, appellant notes that the
Supreme Court in Lopez “endorsed” the potential ambiguity that
was first recognized in Powell, which later gave rise to both Langi
and Maldonado. (Citing Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 655.)
Appellant contends, consistent with those decisions, this case
should be remanded with directions for the superior court to issue
an order to show cause and conduct further proceedings pursuant
to section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
The People respond that Lopez has no impact on the this
case, and given the instructions as a whole, it was not reasonably
likely that the jury would have construed the instructions as
allowing for imputation of malice. (Citing People v. Estrada
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 947-948 (Estrada); see Lopez, supra,
19 Cal.5th at p. 670 [declining to address the “reasonably likely
standard” as outside the scope of the question presented].) The
People contend that Langi is distinguishable, in any event. We
agree.
7
In Langi, the defendant was convicted of second degree
murder as an aider and abettor after he and three other men beat
and robbed the victim, who died after a punch caused him to fall
and hit his head. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 975-977.)
On appeal from the summary denial of Langi’s section 1172.6
petition, the appellate court considered whether a petitioner
convicted of second degree murder established a prima facie case
for relief based on the jury instructions given in that case. For
example, the jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 3.00, setting
forth that each principal in a crime, “ ‘regardless of the extent or
manner of participation[,] is equally guilty.’ ” (Langi, at p. 981,
fn. 8.) The jury was also instructed with CALJIC Nos. 3.01
(aiding and abetting) and 8.31 (second degree murder).4 (Langi,
at pp. at pp. 980-982.)
The Court of Appeal concluded that Langi was not
categorically ineligible for relief pursuant to section 1172.6 based
on the facts of that case. Relying on Powell, supra, 63
4 CALJIC No. 3.01 provides: “A person aids and abets the
commission of a crime when he, [¶] (1) with knowledge of the
unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and [¶] (2) with the intent or
purpose of committing or encouraging or facilitating the
commission of the crime, and [¶] (3) by act or advice aids,
promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime.”
CALJIC No. 8.31 provides: “Murder of the second degree is
also the unlawful killing of a human being when: [¶] 1. The
killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶] 2. The natural
consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and [¶] 3.
The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger
to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. [¶] When the
killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary to
prove that the defendant intended that the act would result in
the death of a human being.”
8
Cal.App.5th at pp. 712-714, a direct appeal case, the Langi court
reasoned that “the standard aiding-and-abetting instructions are
ill suited to the crime of second degree murder.” (Langi, supra,
73 Cal.App.5th at 982.) As the Powell court had determined,
when standard aiding and abetting instructions are combined
with second degree murder instructions and are not tailored to
the facts of a specific case, a jury must find “the perpetrator
intended to commit the crime, the aider and abettor intending to
aid and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime, and that,
by words or conduct, the aider and abettor in fact aided the
perpetrator's commission of the crime.” (Powell, at p. 714.)
Powell concluded this creates a potential ambiguity because the
actus reus and mens rea requirements for aiding and abetting a
second degree murder do not turn on aiding in an underlying
crime but aiding in the commission of the life-endangering act.
(Ibid.; see also People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 990–992
[approving Powell’s reasoning that for aiding and abetting
murder liability, “ ‘[t]he relevant act is the act that proximately
causes death’ ”]; Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 654 [so noting].)
Applying Powell’s logic, the Langi court agreed with the
petitioner that “under the instructions that were given, the jury
was entitled to conclude that, to be guilty as an aider and abettor
of second degree murder, [Langi] need only have intended to
encourage the perpetrator’s intentional act—in this case,
punching [the victim]—whether or not [Langi] intended to aid or
encourage [the victim’s] killing, and whether or not he personally
knew of and disregarded the risk of such a killing. ¶ The
instructions should have explained that, to be guilty as a direct
aider and abettor of second degree murder, an accomplice must
9
have acted with the mental state of implied malice.” (Langi,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 983.)
Langi was followed by Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th
1257. Maldonado was convicted of first degree murder and the
jury was not instructed on the natural and probable
consequences or felony-murder doctrines. (Id., at p. 1259.)
Maldonado sought resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6,
arguing that he could have been convicted on a theory under
which malice was imputed to him based solely on his
participation in a crime. (Ibid.) In so arguing, he relied on “the
jury instructions for aiding and abetting, implied malice, and
lying-in-wait murder, and on the analysis in People v. Langi . . . .”
(Ibid.) The Maldonado court remanded the matter for an
evidentiary hearing after concluding that the jury instructions
created an ambiguity, similar to Langi and Powell, such that the
defendant could have been convicted on a theory of imputed
malice. (Id. at pp. 1264-1267, 1269.)
But the ambiguity identified in Powell, Langi and
Maldonado is not present in this case. The only offense charged
here was murder—there was no other crime alleged (e.g., battery)
and no theory under which malice was not a requirement. The
jury was instructed with CALJIC Nos. 3.00 (principals-defined),
3.01 (aiding and abetting), 8.10 (murder-defined), 8.11 (malice
aforethought-defined),5 CALJIC No. 8.20 (deliberate and
5 CALJIC No. 8.11 is substantively similar to CALJIC No.
8.31 and provides: “‘Malice’ may be either express or implied. ¶
[Malice is express when there is manifested an intention
unlawfully to kill a human being.] ¶ [Malice is implied when: ¶ 1.
The killing resulted from an intentional act; ¶ 2. The natural
consequences of the act are dangerous to human life; and ¶ 3. The
act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to,
10
premeditated murder), and 8.30 (unpremeditated murder of the
second degree). To find appellant guilty of murder, the jury had
to find he personally harbored malice either as the perpetrator or
as a direct aider and abettor. The jury rejected the first degree
murder option and convicted appellant of second degree murder.
As instructed, the jury could not have found appellant guilty of
second degree murder without finding he personally harbored a
malicious mental state.
The People also argue that Langi was wrongly decided
because it did not apply the “reasonable likelihood” standard—
that is, whether there is a reasonable likelihood the jury
understood the instructions to support a conviction on a now-
invalid theory of murder, an argument that has not been
disturbed by Lopez. (See Lopez, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 670;
Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370, 380.)
We conclude that as a matter of law, the jury instructions
did not allow the jurors to convict appellant based on imputed
knowledge. Moreover, it is not “reasonably likely” the jurors
construed the instructions in that matter. (See, e.g., People v.
Allen (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 389, 397; Estrada, supra, 77
Cal.App.5th at pp. 947-948; People v. Ervin (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th
and with conscious disregard for, human life.] ¶ When it is shown
that a killing resulted from the intentional doing of an act with
express or implied malice, no other mental state need be shown
to establish the mental state of malice aforethought.] ¶ The
mental state constituting malice aforethought does not
necessarily require any ill will or hatred of the person killed. ¶
The word ‘aforethought’ does not imply deliberation or the lapse
of considerable time. It only means that the required mental
state must precede rather than follow the act.”
11
90, 107-109; Maldonado, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1267-1269;
but see Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 984 [evidentiary
hearing is required when the record “does not conclusively negate
the possibility” that the jury found petitioner guilty based on
imputed malice].
Based on the foregoing, appellant’s contention that he “may
have been convicted on an imputed malice theory” fails.
Finally, appellant contends the trial court erred in relying
on the jury’s true findings on the firearm use and discharge
allegations at the prima facie stage because those findings did
not require a finding of malice aforethought. (Citing People v.
Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 597-599.) Although it is true
Offley held that “an enhancement under section 12022.53,
subdivision (d) does not in itself preclude a petitioner from
obtaining relief,” (id., at p. 592, italics added), the trial court here
did not rely exclusively on the firearm findings as dispositive
proof of appellant’s ineligibility for relief. Moreover, Offley is
distinguishable because the jury there received an instruction on
the natural and probable consequences doctrine. (Id. at p. 593.)
Having reconsidered the matter in light of Lopez, supra, 19
Cal.5th 639, we conclude appellant is not entitled to resentencing
pursuant to section 1172.6 as a matter of law.
Disposition
The order summarily denying appellant’s section 1172.6
petition for resentencing is affirmed.
12
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:
BALTODANO, J.
CODY, J.
13
Laura R. Walton, Judge
Superior Court County of Los Angeles
_____________________________
Eric R. Larson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Lindsay Boyd, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.