Filed 10/21/26 P. v. Camp CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085627
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. SCD299561)
v.
JONATHAN ROBERT CAMP,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Eugenia Eyherabide, Judge. Affirmed as modified.
Robert L. Hernandez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
A jury found Jonathan Robert Camp guilty of one count of first degree
murder (Pen. Code,1 §§ 187, subd. (a), 189, subd. (a)), with a true finding that
he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1);
count 1); and one count of attempting to dissuade a witness from reporting a
crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1); count 2). The trial court imposed a prison
sentence of 26 years to life.
Camp contends that insufficient evidence supports the verdict in
count 2. According to Camp, the evidence compels a finding that, due to
voluntary intoxication, he was unable to form the specific intent to dissuade a
witness from reporting a crime. We conclude that Camp’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence lacks merit.
Camp further contends, and the People agree, that the trial court erred
in imposing a restitution fine of $25,000 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), and a
corresponding parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount
(§ 1202.45, subd. (a)), because those amounts exceed the maximum of $10,000
specified by statute. We concur with the parties that each of the fines must
be reduced to the amount of $10,000.
Accordingly, we modify the restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)) and the
parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45) to the amount of $10,000 each.
As so modified, we affirm the judgment.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In early 2023, Camp moved into a two-bedroom apartment occupied by
his father (Father) and Father’s roommate, John. Camp slept on the sofa in
the living room. It was understood that Camp would stay in the apartment
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
on a short-term basis only. John had physical limitations, which made it
difficult for him to get around without a walker, a wheelchair or a motorized
scooter.
After a few months, tension started to develop between Camp and
John, as John would complain that Camp was too loud and that the living
room was too cluttered. Eventually, John started suggesting that it was time
for Camp to move out of the apartment.
On July 2, 2023, Camp and John were arguing throughout the
afternoon and evening. Camp consumed some alcohol that day, but Camp
could not remember how much he had consumed or at what time. Videos
recorded in the hallway of the apartment building at 10:11 p.m., depict Camp
acting as if he may be intoxicated, although the defense’s expert witness on
the effects of alcohol consumption testified that it is “hard to determine how
much impairment someone has by observing them.”
Father went into his bedroom to try to sleep around 7:30 p.m. Later
that evening, according to Father, Camp came into Father’s bedroom, holding
two knives. Camp stated, “I’m going to kill him,” referring to John. Father
spoke with Camp for a while, and Camp then left the bedroom. Later that
night, Camp killed John in his bedroom by stabbing him 17 times with a
knife, including 11 stab wounds to John’s chest.
According to Father, after stabbing John, Camp came into Father’s
bedroom and calmly said that he had killed someone. A few minutes later, at
11:24 p.m., Father used a cell phone to call 911. As Father testified, Camp
slapped the cell phone out of Father’s hand after Father initiated the call, but
before Father was able to give any substantive information. When slapping
the phone out of Father’s hand, Camp said, “Why you doing that?” As Father
described the situation, “I guess he didn’t want me to call the police.” Father
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testified, “I can’t think of another reason he would slap the phone out of my
hand.” Surveillance video from the apartment lobby shows that Camp left
the apartment four minutes later, at 11:28 p.m.
Father could not find the cell phone that Camp slapped out of his hand,
but he found a different cell phone in a drawer and, after charging it, used
that cell phone to call 911 at 11:54 p.m. Father told the 911 dispatcher,
referring to Camp, “No, he wasn’t drunk. . . . He’s just angry.” When police
arrived at the apartment, John was lying dead in his bed, surrounded by
blood.
At approximately 4:00 a.m., Camp approached a police officer outside
the apartment building and turned himself in. During his trial testimony,
Camp claimed to have no memory of what he did for the four and a half hours
before he returned to the apartment, other than “walking.” When he
returned to the apartment building, Camp had his wallet with him, which
contained $89. At 8:52 a.m., Camp’s blood alcohol level was .268 percent.
Camp was charged with one count of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)),
including an allegation that he personally used a deadly and dangerous
weapon (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1); count 1); and one count of attempting to
dissuade a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (b)(1); count 2).
When Camp testified at trial, he did not deny that he killed John, but
he claimed that he did so after giving John a knife and inviting him to
participate in a knife fight. During closing argument, defense counsel
argued, among other things, that the jury should not convict Camp of first
degree murder, as there was evidence that Camp was intoxicated during the
killing, which would impact his ability to deliberate and premeditate a
murder. Regarding the charge in count 2 that Camp attempted to dissuade a
witness from reporting a crime, defense counsel pointed out that in
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considering whether Camp had the specific intent to dissuade a witness, the
jury could consider the fact that Camp was intoxicated. In rebuttal, the
prosecutor did not dispute that Camp was at least somewhat intoxicated
during the killing, but she argued that the evidence did not show that Camp
was “so intoxicated that he couldn’t form intent.”
The jury convicted Camp on both counts, finding that the murder was
in the first degree, and making a true finding on the weapon allegation.
Camp was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 26 years to life,
including a concurrent two-year determinate term for count 2.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Camp’s Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support His
Conviction for Dissuading a Witness From Reporting a Crime
We first consider Camp’s contention that insufficient evidence supports
his conviction for dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1,
subd. (b)(1)).
In evaluating Camp’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “we
must ‘ “review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment,” ’
and then determine whether it contains ‘ “evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value” ’ such that a reasonable jury could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . [¶] We must ‘ “presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably
have deduced from the evidence . . . ‘ . . . for it is the exclusive province of the
trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or
falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Ware
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 151, 167, citations omitted].)
“Section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1) targets prearrest efforts to prevent a
crime from being reported to the authorities.” (People v. Navarro (2013)
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212 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1347 (Navarro).) Specifically, section 136.1,
subdivision (b) states that it is a crime for a person to “attempt[ ] to prevent
or dissuade another person who has been the victim of a crime or who is
witness to a crime from . . . (1) Making a report of that victimization to a
peace officer, a state or local law enforcement officer, a probation, parole or
correctional officer, a prosecuting agency, or a judge.”2
“[T]o ‘prove a violation of section 136.1, subdivision (b)(1), the
prosecution must show (1) the defendant has attempted to prevent or
dissuade a person (2) who is a victim or witness to a crime (3) from making
any report of [their] victimization to any peace officer or other designated
officials.’ [Citation.] The prosecution must also prove the defendant
specifically intended that his acts would prevent or dissuade the victim or
witness from making the report.’ ” (People v. Cook (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 586,
590 (Cook), italics added.) “In other words, ‘section 136.1 is a specific intent
crime.’ ” (Navarro, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1347.)
With respect to the crime charged in count 2, the jury was instructed
that it was permitted to consider evidence of Camp’s voluntary intoxication
“in deciding whether the defendant knew he was trying to prevent or
discourage [Father] from making a report that someone else was a victim of a
crime to local law enforcement and intended to do so.” (See § 29.4, subd. (b)
[stating that “[e]vidence of voluntary intoxication is admissible solely on the
issue of whether or not the defendant actually formed a required specific
intent”].) The jury was further instructed that it was the People’s burden to
prove Camp’s knowledge and intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
2 We quote from the current text of section 136.1, subdivision (b). The
relevant statutory language at the time of Camp’s offense and trial differed in
nonsubstantive ways. (See Stats. 2025, ch. 373, § 1.)
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Relying on evidence that he was intoxicated when he slapped the cell
phone out of Father’s hand, Camp argues that “the evidence of intoxication
presented in this case leads to no conclusion other than that [Camp] was too
intoxicated to form the specific intent to dissuade [Father] from reporting the
crime.” According to Camp, the only conclusion permitted by the evidence
was that “a very drunk man who was not in complete control of his thoughts
or actions unthinkingly knocked a phone out of [Father’s] hands and then
left. He did not know exactly what he was doing.”
“Where evidence of intoxication was presented to the jury and . . . the
jury was permitted to consider the evidence for the purpose of determining
whether the defendant had the intent to commit the crime charged, the
verdict and judgment will not be disturbed if the facts are sufficient to
support the implied finding that the defendant had the specific intent.”
(People v. Coleman (1942) 20 Cal.2d 399, 409, overruled in part on other
grounds by People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330, 355; see also People v. Cain
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 40 [inquiring whether “the only rational conclusion a jury
could have reached was defendant was incapable of forming a specific
intent . . . due to his voluntary intoxication”].) Here, as we will explain,
although Camp undoubtedly consumed some alcohol on the day of the killing,
the evidence was nevertheless sufficient to support a finding that Camp was
able to form the specific intent to dissuade Father from reporting the killing
to the police.
As an initial matter, if intoxication were not an issue in this case,
Camp’s words and actions would unquestionably support a reasonable
inference that Camp intended to prevent Father from reporting the killing.
Camp does not attempt to argue otherwise. The inference of Camp’s intent is
supported by Camp’s act of knocking the phone from Father’s hand as he
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began to give information to the 911 dispatcher, while asking Father, “Why
you doing that?” Further supporting an inference of Camp’s specific intent,
Father, who was present during the incident and observed Camp’s demeanor,
concluded from the situation that Camp “didn’t want me to call the police.”
Evidence of Camp’s intoxication does not compel a contrary inference.
“Whether the state of intoxication is such as to render one incapable of
entertaining the requisite knowledge or specific intent necessary to commit a
crime is for the trier of fact to determine; and its finding upon conflicting
evidence will not be disturbed on appeal.” (People v. Morga (1969) 273
Cal.App.2d 200, 209.) Significantly, Father made conflicting statements
about the level of intoxication that he perceived in Camp around the time of
the killing. As we have noted, when speaking to the 911 dispatcher, Father
stated that “No, he wasn’t drunk. . . . He’s just angry.” At trial, on direct
examination, Father testified that he was telling the truth to the 911
dispatcher. Father also answered affirmatively when the prosecutor asked,
“At the time your son came into your room and said I killed someone, within
an hour before this 911 call was placed, it was your opinion your son was not
drunk?” In contrast, on cross-examination, Father testified Camp did appear
intoxicated after the killing. However, on redirect by the prosecutor, Father
agreed that his memory was better when he was speaking to the 911
dispatcher. Father also agreed that he wanted to help Camp’s defense.
The jurors were entitled to decide which part of Father’s testimony they
found to be credible. According to Father’s testimony on direct examination,
even if Camp was intoxicated at the time of the killing, that intoxication was
not significant enough for Father to even notice it. As a result, a reasonable
juror could infer that Camp’s intoxication was also not significant enough to
prevent him from knowing what he was doing when he slapped the phone
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from Father’s hand and from forming the specific intent to prevent a report to
the police.
Moreover, even if, as Father stated on cross-examination, Camp was
noticeably intoxicated after the killing, nothing that Father said provided any
indication that Camp was so intoxicated that he could not possibly have
known what he was doing and could not possibly have formed a specific
intent. Indeed, as Father testified, he inferred that Camp “didn’t want me to
call the police.” Father did not testify to any doubt about that conclusion
based on Camp’s possible intoxication. If Camp intends to argue that he was
so intoxicated he did not even realize Father was on the phone with a 911
dispatcher when he slapped the phone from Father’s hand, that contention is
not supported by the evidence. Camp testified that he knew Father had
called 911 while he was present in the apartment, as he admitted that fact to
a detective during a post-arrest interview.
Further, regardless of whether Camp was noticeably intoxicated, a
reasonable juror could find it significant that only four minutes after slapping
the cell phone out of Father’s hand at 11:24 p.m., Camp left the apartment
at 11:28 p.m., before the police were able to respond. The fact that Camp left
the apartment after Father tried to call 911 supports a rational inference
that he slapped the phone out of Father’s hand for the same reason he
promptly left the scene after Father’s attempted call to authorities: because
he intended to avoid contact with the police after the killing. In addition, a
surveillance video from the apartment lobby at 11:28 p.m., which shows
Camp’s exit from the building, does not depict Camp with any obvious signs
of extreme intoxication, such as stumbling or unsteadiness. A reasonable
juror could rely on that evidence to conclude that Camp was not so
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intoxicated that he could not form a specific intent just four minutes earlier
when he slapped the cell phone from Father’s hand.
Camp relies on the fact that his blood alcohol level was .268 percent
at 8:52 a.m. the next morning. Based on that evidence, Camp argues that he
must have been extremely intoxicated at the time of the killing, which would
have prevented him from forming a specific intent. However, a reasonable
juror could conclude that information about Camp’s blood alcohol level on the
morning after the killing was not probative of Camp’s level of intoxication
around the time of the killing. Camp was away from the apartment for four
and a half hours after the killing, between 11:28 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. He had
money with him during those four and a half hours and therefore could have
bought and consumed alcohol. If Camp consumed alcohol during the four and
a half hour time period, Camp’s blood alcohol level at 8:52 a.m. the next
morning would be irrelevant in proving Camp’s level of intoxication when he
slapped the phone out of Father’s hand.
In sum, we conclude that despite evidence that Camp may have been
somewhat intoxicated when he slapped the cell phone out of Father’s hand,
substantial evidence supports a finding that, in so doing, he “specifically
intended that his act[ ] would prevent or dissuade [Father] from making the
report’ ” to authorities. (Cook, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 590.)
B. Because the Restitution Fine and Parole Revocation Restitution Fine
Exceeded the Amount Permitted by Statute, They Must Be Modified
Downward
In pronouncing sentence, the trial court followed the recommendation
in the probation officer’s report and set the restitution fine identified in
section 1202.4, subdivision (b) in the amount of $25,000. The trial court also
set the parole revocation restitution fine (§ 1202.45) in the same amount,
which it stayed unless parole was revoked.
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Camp contends, and the People agree, that the imposition of a $25,000
fine in both instances exceeds the amount permitted by statute. The parties
also agree that the amount of the fines should be reduced to $10,000 each. As
we will explain, we concur with the parties.
Section 1202.4, subdivision (b) states, “In every case where a person is
convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional
restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not
doing so and states those reasons on the record. [¶] (1) The restitution fine
shall be set at the discretion of the court and commensurate with the
seriousness of the offense. If the person is convicted of a felony, the fine shall
not be less than three hundred dollars ($300) and not more than ten
thousand dollars ($10,000).” (§ 1202.4, subd. (b).) Thus, the “ ‘maximum
[restitution] fine that may be imposed in a criminal prosecution is $10,000
“regardless of the number of victims or counts involved.” ’ ” (People v.
Blackburn (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1520, 1534 (Blackburn).) The parole
revocation restitution fine in section 1202.45, subdivision (a) is required to be
“in the same amount as that imposed pursuant to subdivision (b) of
Section 1202.4.” (§ 1202.45, subd. (a); see also People v. Smith (2001)
24 Cal.4th 849, 853 (Smith) [“Under section 1202.45, a trial court has no
choice and must impose a parole revocation restitution fine equal to the
restitution fine whenever the ‘sentence includes a period of parole.’ ”].)
Here, because the statute caps the amount of the restitution fine at
$10,000 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)), the trial court erred in setting it at $25,000. We
will therefore modify the judgment to reduce the restitution fine to the
maximum amount of $10,000 allowed by statute. (See Blackburn, supra,
72 Cal.App.4th at p. 1534 [modifying the restitution fine from $20,000 to
$10,000]; see also Smith, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 854 [the appellate court may
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correct an error in the amount of the parole revocation fine without
remanding for further proceedings in the trial court].) Because the amount of
the parole revocation restitution fine must match the amount of the
restitution fine (§ 1202.45, subd. (a)), we will also modify the parole
revocation restitution fine to the amount of $10,000.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is modified to impose a restitution fine (§ 1202.4,
subd. (b)) in the amount of $10,000 and a parole revocation restitution fine
(§ 1202.45, subd. (a)) in the amount of $10,000. The trial court shall prepare
an amended abstract of judgment and forward a certified copy to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. As modified, the judgment is
affirmed.
BERMÚDEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, Acting P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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