Filed 11/6/26 P. v. Burroughs CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ord ered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E085733
v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB023644)
MICHAEL L. BURROUGHS, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ronald M.
Christianson, Judge. (Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
1
Complex Appellate Litigation Group and Kirstin M. Ault, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant..
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Arlene A. Sevidal,
Assistant Attorneys General, Christopher P. Beesley and Michael D. Butera, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Defendant and appellant Michael L. Burroughs appeals from an order denying him
1
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6. Burroughs filed multiple section 1172.6
petitions, relating to two separate cases. In one case, a jury found Burroughs guilty of
first degree felony murder and robbery, but that conviction was overturned on appeal,
after which he pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and robbery and served an eight-
year sentence. Later, he was tried and convicted in a new case of possessing and selling a
controlled substance while armed with a firearm, for which he is now serving an
indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life as a third strike offender. We will refer to these
separate cases as “the homicide case” and “the three strikes case.”
After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied Burroughs resentencing as to
his voluntary manslaughter conviction because it found, beyond a reasonable doubt, he
was the actual killer in the homicide. Burroughs argues this finding is precluded by his
jury’s not true verdict on an enhancement allegation that he personally used a firearm in
committing that homicide. Choosing sides in a current split of authority, we hold the
jury’s not true verdict on the enhancement allegation has no such preclusive effect.
1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Moreover, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion, Burroughs’s
arguments to the contrary notwithstanding.
The trial court denied as moot Burroughs’s petitions for relief in the three strikes
case given its ruling on the homicide case petitions. This was the correct result, but there
is a better reason for those petitions to have been denied. None of the conviction offenses
in the three strikes case fall within the scope of section 1172.6, so the trial court would
not have been empowered to resentence Burroughs in that case, no matter the outcome of
his petitions in the homicide case. The petitions in the three strikes case should have
been denied at the prima facie stage.
Because all of Burroughs’s petitions were correctly denied, we affirm.
I. FACTS
The events underlying the homicide case occurred in October 1993, when
Burroughs was 24 years old. The victim Michael Harris had allegedly taken $10 from
Cessie Evans, a codefendant who pleaded guilty to being an accessory after the fact to the
killing and testified against Burroughs. Although Evans’s trial testimony was different in
some details from earlier statements, she had told police that Burroughs suggested
robbing Harris during a conversation that also included Burroughs’s brother Paul Jones,
2
and that it was Burroughs who committed the robbery. She testified that she went down
into her basement, leaving Harris alone with Burroughs in her living room, which was the
2
At trial, Evans said Jones was the first one to propose robbing Harris, though
“[e]verybody commented.”
3
prearranged signal for Burroughs to rob Harris. A minute or two later, she heard a
shotgun fire once. She said that even after that shot, it sounded like there was more than
one person moving around upstairs. She went back upstairs and saw Harris’s body on her
kitchen floor. At trial, she could not remember exactly where Burroughs was, but she
told police that Burroughs was near Harris’s body in the kitchen, and she did not say she
3
saw anyone else present on that level of the house. Harris’s cause of death was a
shotgun wound to the neck and chest, fired at a downward angle.
Burroughs’s version of events, both at trial and in new testimony here, was that the
victim was suddenly and unexpectedly shot by Evans’s “baby daddy.” According to
Burroughs, he was no more than a witness to the killing, though he helped to dispose of
Harris’s body and car.
In 1994, a jury convicted Burroughs on two counts, first degree felony murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) and second degree robbery (§ 211). The jury found not true
enhancement allegations that Burroughs personally used a firearm in committing the
murder and robbery (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Burroughs to life
without the possibility of parole.
On direct appeal, in an unpublished opinion, we reversed. (People v. Burroughs
(Apr. 14, 1997, E016609) [nonpub. opn.] (Burroughs I).) The trial evidence had included
3
Evans testified at trial that the sister of her baby’s father was in the basement at
the time of the shooting, a fact she had omitted from her discussions with police. She
explained: “[S]he’s only thirteen at the time, you know, and I didn’t see no need to bring
her into it.”
4
testimony from his parole officer that Burroughs had confessed to the killing, describing
the motive for robbing Harris and saying he had personally shot Harris in the neck with a
shotgun, aiming at a downward angle to prevent blood splatter. According to the parole
officer, Burroughs boasted that he would “never have to go to court because no one
4
would ever be able to find the body.” We held that these statements were obtained in
violation of Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 486. Unbeknownst to the parole officer,
Burroughs had 57 days earlier invoked his right to counsel, and he had not yet received
5
counsel. We found the Miranda violation prejudicial and reversed the judgment.
On remand, in October 1997, Burroughs pled guilty to robbery (§ 211) and
voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) with a vicarious firearm enhancement
(§ 12022, subd. (a)). Per the plea agreement, the court sentenced Burroughs to a total
term of eight years.
After his release, Burroughs was convicted of new crimes. In August 2000, a jury
convicted him of possessing cocaine base for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351.5),
possessing a controlled substance while armed with a firearm (id. § 11370.1, subd. (a)),
and sale of a controlled substance (id., § 11352, subd. (a)), and found true allegations
regarding his prior felony convictions, specifically, the voluntary manslaughter and
4
The victim’s body was discovered about a week later.
5
Our 1997 opinion was issued before Maryland v. Shatzer (2010) 559 U.S. 98,
106-112, which held that the prohibition on further police interrogation of a suspect who
invokes the right to counsel does not necessarily extend indefinitely but instead no longer
applies after a break in custody of 14 days. The parties disagree as to whether Burroughs
I would be decided differently under current law. We need not resolve this dispute.
5
robbery convictions in the homicide case (§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). The trial court
initially sentenced Burroughs to 50 years to life. On appeal, we held punishment for one
of the two counts should have been stayed per section 654, and the court resentenced
Burroughs to the 25 years to life term he is currently serving.
In March 2013, Burroughs petitioned for his sentence in the three strikes case to
be recalled under section 1170.126 (Proposition 36). The trial court denied that petition,
finding he was ineligible for relief because he was armed with a firearm for one of the
conviction offenses, and we affirmed. (People v. Burroughs (Dec. 11, 2013, E059014
[nonpub. opn.].)
In 2022 and 2023, without counsel, Burroughs filed five section 1172.6 petitions,
three in the three strikes case and two in the homicide case. The trial court held an
evidentiary hearing on them in February 2025. The court considered the trial transcript of
the homicide case, our opinion vacating the initial judgment in that case, and Burroughs’s
plea agreement. Other exhibits included a one-page document entitled “Notice to Parolee
Awaiting Violation Action,” signed by Burroughs and dated October 29, 1993, in
connection with his conversation with his parole officer, during which he boasted about
shooting Harris. The only new evidence was Burrough’s testimony that he did not help
plan or commit the robbery or homicide. He admitted he was present during the robbery
and homicide, but said he assisted only in disposing of the victim’s body and car.
Burroughs’s new testimony was consistent with his trial testimony in the homicide case.
6
The trial court denied Burroughs’s section 1172.6 petitions. It found Burroughs’s
statements to his parole officer were voluntary and not coerced, and admissible as
impeachment of his trial testimony and his testimony at the evidentiary hearing on his
petitions. It found the People had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Burroughs was
Harris’s actual killer. It denied Burroughs’s section 1172.6 petitions in the homicide case
on that basis, and it denied his petitions in the three strikes case as moot given its decision
not to vacate the voluntary manslaughter conviction.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Issue Preclusion
Burroughs argues the trial court erred by determining he was the actual killer even
though the jury in the homicide case found not true allegations that he personally used a
firearm in connection with the robbery and murder. This argument implicates a split of
authority currently before our Supreme Court. Pending further direction, we follow more
recent and, in our view, better reasoned caselaw holding that a jury’s not true finding on a
personal use enhancement does not preclude a finding that the defendant was the actual
6
killer for a section 1172.6 determination.
Effective January 1, 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) amended
the Penal Code to eliminate or curtail theories of murder liability based on imputed
malice, particularly felony murder. (People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 558.) It also
6
We exercise our discretion to address Burroughs’s arguments on the merits,
rather than consider whether he forfeited some of them, as the People have argued. (See
People v. Williams (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1118, 1126.)
7
created a path, now found in section 1172.6, for convicted defendants to obtain relief if
their convictions would not be sustained under the amended law. (Ibid.) In relevant part,
section 1172.6, subdivision (a) provides that a “person convicted of . . . manslaughter
may file a petition with the court that sentenced the petitioner to have the petitioner’s . . .
manslaughter conviction vacated and to be resentenced on any remaining counts” if three
conditions apply. First, “[a] complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder,
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a
crime . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) Second, “[t]he petitioner was convicted of . . .
manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the
petitioner could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(2).) Third, “[t]he petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3).)
Where the petitioner makes a prima facie case showing he is entitled to section
1172.6 relief, the superior court issues an order to show cause and holds an evidentiary
hearing to determine whether to vacate the qualifying conviction and resentence the
petitioner on any remaining counts. (See § 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) Under section
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), at the evidentiary hearing, “the burden of proof shall be on the
prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or
8
attempted murder under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189
made effective January 1, 2019. The admission of evidence in the hearing shall be
governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence previously
admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including
witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed. . . . The prosecutor
and the petitioner may also offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective
burdens.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) “Of course, in a section [1172.6] petition, the trial
judge isn’t charged with holding a whole new trial on all the elements of murder. Instead,
the parties will focus on evidence made relevant by the amendments to the substantive
definition of murder.” (People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 276, 298.)
“Generally, in determining whether a trial court correctly denied a section [1172.6]
petition after an evidentiary hearing, ‘“‘we review the factual findings for substantial
evidence and the application of those facts to the statute de novo.’”’” (People v. Cooper
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 393, 412.) We review de novo whether the jury’s not true finding
on the personal use enhancement barred the trial court from finding Burroughs guilty as
the actual killer in the section 1172.6 proceedings. (People v. Player (2026) 119
Cal.App.5th 931, 943 (Player), review granted July 8, 2026, S296683.) We may affirm a
judgment or order “on any basis fairly supported by the record . . . .” (Williams v.
Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 554 (Williams).)
“[T]he Supreme Court has now made clear that principles of issue preclusion
(collateral estoppel) should ordinarily be applied to determine whether a jury’s findings at
9
7
trial will be binding in section 1172.6 proceedings.” (People v. Lopez-Barraza (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1251, fn. 18.) “As traditionally understood and applied, issue
preclusion bars relitigation of issues earlier decided ‘only if several threshold
requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue sought to be precluded from relitigation must
be identical to that decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have been
actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must have been necessarily decided
in the former proceeding. Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding must be final and
on the merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought must be the same as,
or in privity with, the party to the former proceeding.’” (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 716 (Strong).)
In Strong, our Supreme Court applied a “well-settled equitable exception to the
general rule” of issue preclusion, specifically, “that preclusion does not apply when there
has been a significant change in the law since the factual findings were rendered that
warrants reexamination of the issue.” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 716.) Thus, a jury
finding that the defendant had been a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life, if made before that significant change in
the law, does not have preclusive effect in resentencing proceedings under section 1172.6.
7
The qualifier “ordinarily” is appropriate here because a statutory directive
sometimes forecloses the need for any separate issue preclusion analysis: “If there was a
prior finding by a court or jury that the petitioner did not act with reckless indifference to
human life or was not a major participant in the felony, the court shall vacate the
petitioner’s conviction and resentence the petitioner.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(2).) There is
no such statutory directive regarding prior findings on personal use enhancements.
10
(Id. at p. 718; see ibid. [“Allowing reexamination of the issue under these circumstances
does not permit ‘a second bite of the apple’ because the changes in the law mean there is
now ‘a different apple’”].) In People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433 (Curiel) applying
the same issue preclusion principles led to a different result, because the defendant did
not identify “any similar change in the law that would justify a departure from the general
rule of issue preclusion” as to a jury’s intent to kill finding, so that issue could not be
relitigated in a section 1172.6 proceeding. (Curiel, at p. 455.)
Both Strong and Curiel addressed the preclusive effect of juries’ true findings on
enhancement allegations. There is not yet Supreme Court authority regarding the
preclusive effect of a jury’s not true finding in the section 1172.6 context. As we will
explain, however, older Supreme Court authority, from the analogous context of a remand
for new trial, sheds light on the matter. (See People v. Hart (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th
1099, 1111 (Hart) [“At an evidentiary hearing in a section 1172.6 proceeding, the
question before the court is the same as it would be at a retrial for the murder: whether
the petitioner is guilty of murder beyond a reasonable doubt under current law”].) That
authority indicates that the finding is not preclusive because it is not the identical issue
presented in the section 1172.6 proceeding.
In People v. Santamaria (1994) 8 Cal.4th 903 (Santamaria), a jury convicted the
defendant of murder and robbery and found true a robbery-murder special circumstance,
but it found not true an allegation that the defendant had personally used a knife in
committing those offenses. (Id. at p. 909.) The judgment was reversed on appeal,
11
however, and after a remand for new trial, both the trial court and court of appeal ruled
that the not true finding on the personal use allegation precluded the People from retrying
8
the defendant on the theory that he had personally killed the victim with a knife.
(Santamaria, at p. 909.) The Supreme Court reversed, finding the knife-use verdict
shows reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant “specifically used a knife,” but it
“does not show the reverse, that the jury specifically found defendant was an aider and
abettor.” (Id. at p. 919.) “The jury may merely have believed, and most likely did
believe, that defendant was guilty of murder as either a personal knife user or an aider
and abettor but it may have been uncertain exactly which role defendant played. That,
too, would fully explain, and necessitate, the split verdict.” (Ibid.) Thus, the acquittal at
trial on the personal use enhancement did not show a jury decision on the identical issue
that the defense sought to preclude in the second trial, and it did not show a decision on
any ultimate fact to be decided on retrial, so “collateral estoppel does not apply.” (Id. at
p. 922.)
Two recent appellate decisions have applied Santamaria to our context, holding
that a jury’s not true finding on a personal use enhancement does not preclude the People
from arguing the defendant was the actual killer in a section 1172.6 proceeding. In Hart,
supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at p. 1111, the appellate court followed Santamaria in holding
that “the jury’s not true finding on the firearm use allegation in Hart’s trial does not have
8
There was no dispute that the jury’s not true finding on the knife use
enhancement precluded retrial of the enhancement allegation, which was not realleged.
(Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 909-910.)
12
preclusive effect here because it is not an ultimate fact necessary to find Hart guilty of
murder.” Hart reasoned: “Under current law, a participant in a robbery may be guilty of
felony murder as the ‘actual killer’ without using a firearm (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)), or
alternatively, as either an aider and abettor who acted with intent to kill and assisted the
actual killer in committing the murder (id., subd. (e)(2)) or a major participant who acted
with reckless indifference to human life (id., subd. (e)(3)). Because ‘the specific fact of
personal use does not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to find defendant
guilty of murder’ under any of these theories, ‘personal use is not an “ultimate fact” of
murder’ and “collateral estoppel does not apply.’” (Hart, at pp. 1111-1112, quoting
Santamaria, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 922.) The appellate court in Player, supra, 119
Cal.App.5th at pp. 944-951, took the same approach.
Hart and Player split from earlier cases that Burroughs relies on, and both
discussed at length why they chose to part ways from them. (See Hart, supra, 113
Cal.App.5th at pp. 1112-1115; Player, supra, 119 Cal.App.5th at pp. 951-961.) We need
not rehearse those discussions here. The issue has been taken up by our Supreme Court,
which granted review in Player and limited the issue to: “Is a trial court precluded from
finding that a defendant was the actual killer in a Penal Code section 1172.6 resentencing
proceeding where the jury found not true a personal firearm use enhancement and a
robbery-murder special circumstance?” For now, it is enough to note our agreement with
Hart and Player, including as to why the earlier authority is factually distinguishable and
13
at odds with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Santamaria, Strong, and Curiel. (See Auto
Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)
B. Substantial Evidence
Having concluded the jury’s verdict did not preclude the trial court from finding
Burroughs was the actual killer, our next question is whether substantial evidence
supports the finding. It does.
We have already rejected Burroughs’s contention that his jury’s not-true verdict on
a personal use enhancement equates to an affirmative factual finding that he was not the
actual killer for section 1172.6 purposes. The arguments are no more persuasive in this
context.
We also reject Burroughs’s argument that our holding in Burroughs I—deeming
his confession to his parole officer inadmissible at trial because it was obtained in
violation of his Miranda rights—means that under the law of the case doctrine his
statements are also inadmissible in the section 1172.6 proceeding. “We will apply the
law of the case doctrine where the point of law involved . . . was ‘“actually presented and
determined by the court.”’” (People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 197.) The question
of whether Burroughs’s statements were inadmissible for any and all purposes was not
before us in Burroughs I. The question of whether a statement should be excluded due to
a Miranda violation is not the same as whether that same statement nevertheless is
admissible on another basis outside of the prosecution’s affirmative case at trial, or more
specifically in a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. Because Burroughs pleaded guilty
14
before retrial, it has not previously been adjudicated in any court, let alone by this court,
whether Burroughs’s statements might be admissible as impeachment evidence
notwithstanding the Miranda violation discussed in Burroughs I. The law of the case
doctrine is inapplicable.
Furthermore, the trial court was correct to consider Burroughs’s statements to his
parole officer as impeachment evidence, notwithstanding any Miranda violation. A
statement obtained in violation of Miranda safeguards—even if deliberately obtained in
violation of Miranda safeguards, which was not apparently the case here—if otherwise
voluntary, is admissible for impeachment purposes. (People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th
1184, 1191-1202; see Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 307 [even “patently
voluntary statements taken in violation of Miranda must be excluded from the
prosecution’s case,” but “the presumption of coercion does not bar their use for
impeachment purposes on cross-examination”].) Applying independent review, we find
no error in the trial court’s finding that Burrough’s statements were voluntary. (See
People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1093 [“We review independently a trial court’s
determinations as to whether coercive police activity was present and whether the
statement was voluntary”].) There are a few factors that weigh in favor of a different
conclusion; Burroughs was in custody, albeit at a “Youth Training School” under the
9
California Youth Authority, rather than in jail. And Burroughs was an adult, but
9
Burroughs had previously resided at a group home while released on parole, but
he had absconded in August 1993 and was not rearrested until after Harris’s shooting.
15
relatively young, and therefore arguably more susceptible to coercive pressure. (See In re
Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454 [“‘hallmark features’ of youth” include
“‘immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences’”].) These
factors are outweighed, however, by the warning given to Burroughs before he spoke to
the parole officer, both verbally and in writing, that he had the “right to remain silent,”
that anything he said “can and will be used against you . . . in a court of law,” and telling
him that “[I]f you are charged with a law violation, you may wish to talk to your attorney
before or have your attorney present during any questioning by a parole agent.” There is
no evidence that Burroughs was berated, threatened, or otherwise had his will overborne.
(See Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 167 [“coercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary’ within the meaning
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”].) Rather, Burroughs was, in
his parole officer’s description, “getting very cocky,” because he did not believe Harris’s
body would ever be recovered and his release date was approaching. We find
Burroughs’s statements are “‘admissible under current law’ for purposes of section
1172.6(d)(3), and the court properly admitted [them] into evidence” for impeachment
purposes, Miranda notwithstanding. (People v. Palacios (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 942,
953.)
Finally, Burroughs is incorrect to infer that the trial court must have used his prior
statements for more than just impeachment purposes given what he characterizes as a
lack of other evidence he was the actual killer. There was ample evidence other than
16
Burroughs’s statements—for example, Evans’s testimony and statements to police,
describing the circumstances of the shooting—from which a fact finder could reasonably
find Burroughs was the actual killer. Moreover, the trial court heard Burroughs’s new
testimony about the circumstances of Harris’s death. The court was entitled as finder of
fact to make its own decisions about Burroughs’s credibility, based not only on the
factual substance of his testimony but also his demeanor during the hearing, and to make
any reasonable inferences that flow from its conclusion that Burroughs was not a credible
witness.
We find substantial evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that Burroughs
was Harris’s actual killer, so he was not entitled to resentencing under section 1172.6 in
the homicide case.
C. Three Strikes Case Petitions
Because Burroughs’s section 1172.6 petitions were properly denied, it follows that
his petitions in the three strikes case should also be denied, since those petitions were
premised entirely on the expectation that one of his strikes, the voluntary homicide
conviction, would be vacated.
We note, however, that this reasoning skips past an error committed earlier in the
process. Even if Burroughs’s voluntary homicide conviction were vacated under section
1172.6, that would only entitle him to resentencing on “any remaining counts” in that
same case. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1).) Nothing in section 1172.6 itself or its legislative
history, nor any case authority, supports the trial court also vacating the sentence in a
17
separate criminal proceeding, like the three strikes case, that does not independently fall
10
within the scope of section 1172.6.
To make the same point from a different perspective: a prima facie showing under
section 1172.6 includes a showing that the petitioner was charged with and convicted of
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter in a particular superior court case. (§ 1172.6,
subds. (a)(1) & (2), (b)(1)(A) & (B).) Burroughs cannot satisfy that requirement as to the
three strikes case, which did not involve any such charge or conviction. As such,
Burroughs’s petitions in the three strikes case should have been denied at the prima facie
stage, rather than being considered in an evidentiary hearing alongside the homicide
case’s petitions. The trial court’s different reasoning, however, does not change our
conclusion. (See Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 554.) The bottom line is that the trial
court was correct to deny Burroughs’s petitions in the three strikes case, no matter that it
should have done so at the prima facie stage.
10
We need not address here whether there may be other avenues for relief if a
defendant were to have a strike offense vacated, and that strike offense had affected the
sentence in a separate criminal case that falls outside the scope of section 1172.6.
18
III. DISPOSITION
The order denying Burroughs’s section 1172.6 petitions is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAPHAEL
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________
J.
19