Filed 10/21/26 P. v. Bunyad CA1/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A173944
v.
(Sonoma County
DARIUS BUNYAD, Super. Ct. No. SCR-673191-1)
Defendant and Appellant.
In 2017, a jury convicted Darius Bunyad of six counts of
felony sexual battery by fraud (Pen. Code, § 243.4, subd. (c));1 one
count of misdemeanor battery (§ 242); and six misdemeanor
counts of annoying or molesting a child (§ 647.6, subd. (a)(1)).
The trial court sentenced him to a total prison term of 10 years
and required him to register as a sex offender (§ 290). On direct
appeal, we affirmed that judgment. (People v. Bunyad (May 14,
2024, A165881) [nonpub. opn.].) Nine months later, the trial
court held a postjudgment hearing, updated Bunyad’s credits,
and ordered Bunyad released for time served. Bunyad now
appeals from that postjudgment order (§ 1237, subd. (b)).
Bunyad’s appointed counsel on appeal filed a brief raising
no issues but seeking our independent review of the record, citing
People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 and People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. Because the instant appeal is from a
postjudgment order rather than a first appeal as of right from a
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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criminal conviction, we are not required to undertake an
independent review of the record in search of arguable issues.
(Delgadillo, at pp. 226, 232.) We have evaluated the arguments
raised in Bunyad’s supplemental brief (see id. at p. 232 [“the
Court of Appeal is required to evaluate the specific arguments
presented in [the defendant’s supplemental] brief and to issue a
written opinion”]), concluded any error was invited and/or
harmless, and affirm.2
BACKGROUND
In March 2017, Bunyad, who worked as a chiropractor, was
convicted by a jury of six counts of felony sexual battery by fraud,
one count of misdemeanor battery, and six misdemeanor counts
of annoying or molesting a child. His victims were his patients
and employees, many of whom were minors.
In June 2022, the trial court sentenced Bunyad to a 10-year
prison term, required him to register as a sex offender, and
credited him with 548 actual days of presentence custody credit
and 548 days of conduct credit. He was not immediately
transferred into the custody of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (Department) and instead remained in local
custody awaiting trial on charges pending against him in another
case (People v. Bunyad (Super. Ct. Sonoma County, No. SCR-
684956-1)).3
2 Bunyad also filed a related petition for writ of habeas
corpus (case No. A175633), which we address by separate order.
3 In a pro se motion, Bunyad asks us to take judicial notice
of court records from the SCR-684956-1 case. Even if we assume
that Bunyad’s motion is properly considered despite Bunyad
being represented by appointed counsel (but see In re Barnett
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 466, 473 [“all appellate motions . . . must be
prepared and filed by counsel and may not be submitted pro se”]),
we deny the unopposed requests for judicial notice because
Bunyad fails to show relevance. (See Doe v. City of Los Angeles
2
On February 18, 2025, a hearing was held to “address
[Bunyad’s] custody status” and adjust his credit award. Bunyad’s
retained trial counsel did not appear and was relieved. Instead, a
public defender appeared on Bunyad’s behalf.
When Bunyad asked to represent himself at the purported
“resentencing,” the trial court made clear that he was not being
resentenced. The trial court told Bunyad that, because he had
served his time in county jail without ever being transferred to
prison, he had “two options.” The trial court said, “I can give you
the credits and you can get out today, or we can leave the credits
as were previously ordered when you were sentenced, you can be
transferred to state prison, which could take I don’t know how
long, and then you’d get there any they’d say, ‘Oh. He’s time
served,’ and they’d release you. But you would have to go
through the whole process of being transferred to state prison. I
assume you’d rather me just give you those updated credits now
so you can get out today.” Bunyad agreed with the trial court’s
proposal to adjust his credits and release him on a paper
commitment, saying, “I would prefer that, of course.” He only
objected to the court’s order to the extent it directed him to report
to parole, stating that this “increased” his sentence because
parole had not been previously announced by the judge who
presided at his 2022 sentencing.
The trial court overruled Bunyad’s objection and reiterated
that Bunyad would be immediately released because he had a
(2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4.) To the extent Bunyad seeks
alternative record augmentation relief, the request is denied as
untimely (see Ct. App., First Dist., Local Rules of Ct., rule 4(c),
Augmentations of the Record; People v. Preslie (1977) 70
Cal.App.3d 486, 492) and because augmentation cannot be used
to add material to the record on appeal that was not before the
trial court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155(a)(1)(A); Vons
Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 444,
fn. 3.)
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total of 3,652 days’ credit for time served—including 1,826 days of
actual credit and 1,826 days of conduct credit. The court issued
an amended abstract of judgment, which stated the exact same
prison sentence (10 years) as had been ordered in 2022.
Consistent with his 2022 sentence, Bunyad was ordered to
register as a sex offender.
DISCUSSION
After Bunyad’s appointed counsel on appeal filed a brief
raising no issues, Bunyad himself submitted a supplemental
letter brief. He argues that the trial court’s postjudgment order,
dated February 18, 2025, was unauthorized because (1) it
modified his sentence after it was served; (2) parole is not
authorized; and (3) he was not represented by counsel at the
hearing. We conclude that any error was invited and harmless.
A.
First, the February 18, 2025 order did not modify Bunyad’s
sentence. The only differences between the amended abstract of
judgment and the original abstract of judgment are that the
former, consistent with the reporter’s transcript from the
February 18, 2025 hearing, included a total of 3,652 days’ credit
and, instead of ordering Bunyad transferred to the Department,
ordered him to report to “Parole” within one day of his release.
True, the postjudgment order did edit the credits awarded
to Bunyad and order him released on a paper commitment. And
section 2900.5 obligates the court to calculate the number of
presentence credit days and include those on the abstract of
judgment. (§ 2900.5, subds. (a), (d), (e); People v. Johnson (2010)
183 Cal.App.4th 253, 300.) That statute does not authorize the
court to calculate and add any postsentence days spent in custody
in county jail before transfer to the Department; that
responsibility belongs to the Department alone. (§ 2900.5, subd.
(e) [“[i]t is the duty of any agency to which a person is committed
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to apply the credit provided for in this section for the period
between the date of sentencing and the date the person is
delivered to the agency”]; Johnson, at p. 300.)
However, Bunyad was not aggrieved or prejudiced by the
trial court’s decision to release him from custody without transfer
to the Department. In fact, because Bunyad explicitly agreed to
the trial court awarding postsentencing credits, rather than the
Department, his challenge is barred by the invited error doctrine.
(See Transport Ins. Co. v. TIG Ins. Co. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th
984, 1000 [“ ‘[u]nder the doctrine of invited error, when a party by
its own conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim
on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of that
error’ ”].)
B.
Bunyad also challenges the trial court’s order that he
report to the parole office within one day of his release. He
insists the “parole directive” was unauthorized because his
convictions do not qualify him for parole and because the original
sentencing court never announced parole would be required after
Bunyad served his time in custody.
The latter argument is without merit. First, parole was
repeatedly mentioned (by the prosecutor and Bunyad himself) at
Bunyad’s 2022 sentencing hearing. Second, a defendant
sentenced to state prison is subject to a mandatory term of parole
(supervised by the state) or postrelease community supervision
(PRCS) by a county probation department. (People v. Cruz (2012)
207 Cal.App.4th 664, 672; see §§ 3000, subd. (a)(1) [“[a] sentence
resulting in imprisonment in the state prison . . . shall include a
period of parole supervision or postrelease community
supervision, unless waived”], 3451, subds. (a)–(b); People v.
McMillion (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1363, 1368–1369.) Thus, even if
we assume he is correct as a factual matter that the judge
presiding over Bunyad’s 2022 sentencing did not mention parole,
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the court had no discretion “to impose a prison sentence without
parole [or PRCS]” or to decide “whether a parole period shall be
served nor to prescribe its duration; that is the province of the
Board of Prison Terms.” (McMillion, at pp. 1368–1369.)
Bunyad’s argument that he could only be supervised under
PRCS is also unsupported and time-barred. Bunyad is correct
that parole supervision applies only to certain categories of
offenders (§§ 3000.08, subd. (a), 3451, subds. (a)–(b)), and that
“all other offenders released from prison shall be placed on
[PRCS].” (§ 3000.08, subd. (b).) But one of the categories of
persons subject to parole includes persons released from prison,
or “whose sentence has been deemed served pursuant to Section
2900.5,” for “[a]ny crime for which the person is classified as a
high-risk sex offender.” (§ 3000.08, subd. (a)(4).) “The
Legislature has not defined the term high-risk sex offender as
used in section 3000.08, subdivision (a)(4). But [the Department]
. . . has determined a sex offender with a Static-99R score of four
or greater is designated as a high-risk sex offender and therefore
subject to parole supervision.” (People v. Toussain (2015) 240
Cal.App.4th 974, 983–984.)
Even if we assume that Bunyad is not a high-risk sex
offender, it is too late to transfer him to PRCS. (See § 3000.08,
subd. (l) [“[a]ny person released to parole supervision pursuant to
subdivision (a) shall, regardless of any subsequent determination
that the person should have been released [to PRCS] pursuant to
subdivision (b), remain subject to subdivision (a) after having
served 60 days under supervision pursuant to subdivision (a)”
(italics added)]; People v. Johnson (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 379,
388, 403.) The record before us shows Bunyad first asserted that
he should have been released under PRCS supervision when he
filed his supplemental brief in connection with this appeal—more
than a year after he was released to parole supervision.
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C.
Finally, we reject Bunyad’s challenge to the purported
absence of counsel at the postjudgment hearing. A criminal
defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of
counsel “at all critical stages of a criminal prosecution, including
sentencing.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417, 453.)
However, the constitutional right to counsel does not extend
beyond the point of conviction and a direct appeal therefrom.
(People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 224; id. at p. 227
[“ ‘[t]here is no unconditional state or federal constitutional right
to counsel to pursue collateral relief from a judgment of
conviction’ ”]; In re Barnett, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 473.)
Bunyad does not cite any applicable statutory right to
counsel. In any event, the record does not support Bunyad’s
assertion that he was unrepresented by counsel at the February
18, 2025 hearing. Rather, the record shows a deputy public
defender—who represented him in the other (SCR-684956-1)
case—appeared on his behalf at that hearing. Bunyad has not
demonstrated any prejudicial error.
DISPOSITION
The postjudgment order, dated February 18, 2025, is
affirmed.
BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:
JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.
People v. Bunyad (A173944)
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