Filed 6/29/26 P. v. Brown CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A172848
v.
BRODERICK URIAH BROWN, (Humboldt County Super. Ct.
No. CR2401489)
Defendant and Appellant.
After pleading guilty to felony stalking, Broderick Uriah Brown was
sentenced to probation for three years with conditions. On appeal, Brown
contends the trial court’s imposition of a probation condition requiring him to
submit to alcohol testing was unreasonable because it was not related to his
future criminality. We agree and strike the challenged condition.
BACKGROUND1
Brown and T.B. were in a relationship that ended in 2018. On May 2,
2024, T.B.’s mother left her home with the front door unlocked for about 45
minutes. When T.B.’s mother returned, she discovered a handwritten note in
T.B.’s room. The note read: “Hey, [T.B.] I stopped by your house
1 As the parties did, we take our background summary from the
preliminary hearing that was the stipulated factual basis of Brown’s guilty
plea.
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‘uninvited.’ . . . The best way to go where you want to go is head backwards.
Your old room looks way better now. Next time you are here, remember to
call the police with your mom. She could be on Lost Coast Outpost if you are
not quick. Anyways, when you are done storming the KBR just know that
your flushed face wasn’t forgotten at all. . . . As I recounted my memories of
you. There is plenty, but there are -- but they are all layered below the fact
that I wasn’t truly in love with you. Love Broderick.”
Humboldt County Sheriff’s Deputy Joe Rogers was dispatched to T.B.’s
mother’s home. T.B. told Rogers she was “scared” by the note and “feared
that [Brown] was going to up the antics.” She stated that she had not been in
contact with Brown for months. But since the end of their relationship, T.B.
received multiple harassing text messages from “one to three” unknown
numbers signed “Broderick.” One of the messages stated, “I hope you get
shot in the head one day.”
A few days later, Brown was arrested. In his postarrest interview,
Brown spoke “nonsensically,” “going off topic and talking about . . . satellites
and him being targeted.” Brown admitted that he texted T.B. “a couple of
times” after their relationship ended. When questioned whether he sent T.B.
threatening text messages, Brown accused T.B. of texting herself. Brown
also spoke of lasers and accused T.B. of “using satellites to target and monitor
him” and “recording his movement and voice.”
On May 8, 2024, the Humboldt County District Attorney filed a felony
complaint charging Brown with felony first degree residential burglary (Pen.
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Code,2 § 459; count 1), felony stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a); count 2), and
misdemeanor aggravated trespass (§ 602.5, subd. (b); count 3).3
On December 16, 2024, after being held to answer at a preliminary
hearing and the filing of an information, Brown entered into a negotiated
disposition in which he pled guilty to felony stalking, count 2.4
In its presentencing report, the probation department represented that
in his statement to them, Brown, who was 29 years old at the time, began
experimenting at age 14 with “multiple substances including alcohol,
cannabis, psilocybin mushrooms, and LSD.” Brown stated that he had
previously used ecstasy (his “preferred drug”) and cocaine (“at social outings”)
but stopped using them at ages 24 and 25, respectively. According to the
report, Brown was “not worried about drug use while on probation due to it
being a behavior he participated in more fully . . . during his younger years.”
Brown “admitted to a history of substance use that continued up to the end of
2023.” Brown’s criminal history included in the report listed one prior
conviction for misdemeanor reckless driving (Veh. Code, § 23103) in 2017; it
did not include any reference to alcohol or drug-related offenses.
2 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 On July 11, 2024, the court ordered the proceedings suspended, found
Brown mentally incompetent, and issued an involuntary administration of
antipsychotic medication order. On October 24, 2024, the court found Brown
was restored to competency and reinstated proceedings.
4 As part of the negotiated disposition and pursuant to a waiver per
People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754 (facts underlying charges dismissed as
part of a negotiated plea may not, absent contrary agreement by the
defendant, be considered adversely in sentencing), the court dismissed counts
1 and 3 and two trailing superior court cases (Nos. CR2302148 & CR
2301998) in which Brown had been charged with misdemeanor campus
disruption (§ 626.6, subd. (a)).
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Ultimately, the report recommended a grant of probation with multiple
sentencing conditions including: “12. [Brown] shall totally abstain from the
use of alcoholic beverages and shall not have in their possession or under
their custody or control any alcoholic beverages”; and “13. [Brown] shall
submit to chemical testing for the use of alcohol at any time as directed by
probation officer or other law enforcement officer.” Other recommended
conditions included the direction that Brown not use or possess any “non-
prescribed controlled substance”; “not traffic in controlled substances nor
associate with any person using or trafficking in controlled substances;”
restricted the amount of marijuana Brown could possess; required Brown to
“submit to chemical testing for the use of controlled substances”; and
mandated an “alcohol/drug assessment.”
At the January 13, 2025 sentencing hearing, Brown requested
probation condition 12 concerning alcohol abstention be stricken because
“there is no history of alcohol abuse. It has nothing in the facts related to
this.” The People opposed striking the condition because Brown “needs to
undergo an [alcohol and other drug] assessment. So, before he should be
allowed to take intoxicants, they should make sure there is no problem that
he has with the intoxicants because . . . intoxicants were a big part of his life
so far.” Defense counsel replied, “I don’t know that there’s any facts that
support that.” The discussion did not include any mention of condition 13
related to alcohol testing.
The sentencing court accepted the terms of the negotiated disposition,
suspended imposition of sentence, and placed Brown on felony probation for
three years, adopting all of the recommended conditions of probation except
condition 12. In doing so, the court stated, “I have read the probation report
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with regards to substance abuse as well as the factual summary here. I will
agree to strike term number 12.”
Brown appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Forfeiture
As an initial matter, we address and reject the Attorney General’s
argument that Brown’s failure to object to the alcohol testing condition
forfeited the issue on appeal. “[N]either forfeiture nor application of the
forfeiture rule is automatic,” and appellate courts have discretion to review
otherwise forfeited challenges. (People v. McCullough (2013) 56 Cal.4th 589,
593.) Here, we exercise our right to decide the appeal on its merits, “in order
to eliminate the need to address [appellant’s] alternative ineffective
assistance of counsel claim.” (In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902,
928.) We now turn to the reasonableness of condition 13.
II. The Imposition of Alcohol Testing Condition
Brown challenges the imposition of probation condition 13, which
required him to submit to alcohol testing, as unreasonable under People v.
Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent). He contends the condition “does not make
sense” because the court struck condition 12 that prohibited him from
consuming or possessing alcohol. Brown requests we strike the alcohol
testing condition or remand the matter to the trial court for clarification. We
agree with Brown’s argument and strike condition 13.
On appeal, “We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion.”
(People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) “That is, a reviewing court will
disturb the trial court’s decision to impose a particular condition of probation
only if, under all the circumstances, that choice is arbitrary and capricious
and is wholly unreasonable.” (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403.)
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“A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no
relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to
conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct
which is not reasonably related to future criminality. . . .’ ” (Lent, supra,
15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) The Lent test “is conjunctive—all three prongs must be
satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.” (People v.
Olguin, at p. 379.) The “conditions of probation aimed at rehabilitating the
offender need not be so strictly tied to the offender’s precise crime” as long as
they are “reasonably directed at curbing [an offender’s] future criminality.”
(People v. Moran, supra, 1 Cal.5th at pp. 404–405.) But there must be a
strong connection between “the burdens imposed by the challenged condition
and a probationer’s criminal conduct or personal history.” (In re Ricardo P.
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1120.)
The parties agree that alcohol use was not the direct cause of Brown’s
conviction and is not itself criminal, so there is no dispute that the first two
Lent prongs have been satisfied. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) They
disagree solely on the third Lent prong: whether alcohol testing is reasonably
related to Brown’s future criminality. (Ibid.) In the context of the record
before us, we conclude it is not.
The presentencing report documented prior alcohol use more than a
decade before the stalking incident, mostly in Brown’s teen years. And while
the report included “alcohol” in the list of “substances” Brown acknowledged
previously using socially, it did not document alcohol abuse, nor did it
represent that Brown’s prior criminal conviction involved alcohol or was
spurred by the use of alcohol.
Notably, when asked to strike condition 13 requiring Brown to abstain
from drinking alcohol, the sentencing court freely did so without any
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apparent reservation. This striking shows the court was not concerned that
Brown’s alcohol consumption had the potential for abuse or was likely to lead
to future criminality. As such, because Brown was allowed to possess and
consume alcohol, there was no rational need to test Brown for alcohol
consumption as a condition of probation. (See People v. Kiddoo (1990) 225
Cal.App.3d 922, 928, disapproved on other grounds in People v. Welch (1993)
5 Cal.4th 228, 236–237 [court struck a probation condition that appellant not
possess or consume alcohol or frequent places where alcohol was sold because
there was “no factual indication in the record that the proscribed
behavior . . . is reasonably related to future criminal behavior”].) Therefore,
we conclude the testing condition here has no deterrent effect on Brown’s
future criminality and is unreasonable.
The Attorney General asks us to follow the logic of People v. Cota (2020)
45 Cal.App.5th 786, 792–793, where, after a conviction for the unlawful
possession of a dirk or dagger, the court of appeal upheld the trial court’s
imposition of a condition prohibiting the possession or use of alcohol because
it was reasonably related to preventing future crimes. The Attorney General
argues the alcohol testing condition is reasonable because Brown might
“drink to the point that his inhibitions are lowered or judgment is impaired,
which could lead to him engaging in criminal activity.” But Cota is
distinguishable first because it challenged only the imposition of an alcohol
abstention condition, not the imposition of an alcohol testing condition after
an alcohol abstention condition had been stricken. Second, unlike Brown,
Cota had a “well documented” history of substance abuse and controlled
substance-related convictions that supported the court of appeal’s statement,
“there is an empirical nexus between drugs and alcohol.” (Ibid., citing People
v. Beal (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 84, 87.)
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The Attorney General further contends Brown’s prior conviction for
reckless driving demonstrates his prior alcohol use led to criminal behavior
and justifies alcohol testing even if Brown is not required to abstain from
drinking. For support, the Attorney General cites Brown’s statements to
competency evaluators that he was previously stopped for or convicted of
driving under the influence. But these prior statements, one of which was
characterized by the evaluator as “vague and confusing”, are not
determinative as they do not specify the use of alcohol (as compared to other
controlled substances), do not match the criminal history set forth in the
presentencing report, and did not appear to concern the trial court when it
struck condition 12. Thus, without additional information, the existence of a
reckless driving conviction does not explain why mandatory alcohol testing is
necessary to minimize the future criminality of someone legally permitted to
drink alcohol. We therefore do not find that imposing an alcohol testing
requirement here satisfies Lent’s third prong.
In sum, the lack of reliable evidence that alcohol was a factor in
Brown’s past or current criminality and the fact that the court permitted
Brown to possess and consume alcohol while on probation means condition 13
fails under Lent’s third prong because alcohol testing was not reasonably
related to Brown’s future criminality. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.)
Because the court’s imposition of condition 13 was therefore an abuse of
discretion, we order it stricken. (In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896,
901 [“In an appropriate case, a probation condition that is not sufficiently
precise or narrowly drawn may be modified in this court and affirmed as
modified”].)
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DISPOSITION
Probation condition 13 requiring alcohol testing is ordered stricken.
The order is otherwise affirmed.
DESAUTELS, J.
We concur:
RICHMAN, ACTING P. J.
MILLER, J.
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