Filed 8/25/26 P. v. Bridgette CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B343920
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. A018108)
v.
GEORGE CLARENCE
BRIDGETTE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Chet L. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed, remanded with
directions.
Corey J. Robins, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy
Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________
This case comes to us following a remand from the Court of
Appeal ordering the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to Penal Code1 section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3).
In 2021, George Clarence Bridgette filed in the trial court a
petition pursuant to section 1172.6 requesting vacatur of his four
murder convictions (count 1, Cristal Gail Baxter; count 2, Pamela
Cade; count 3, Luther Larry Evans; and count 4, Chinue Cade).
Appointed counsel for Bridgette additionally sought vacatur of
Bridgette’s conviction for attempted murder (count 5, Carolyn
Denise Ferguson) and resentencing. The trial court denied the
petition at the prima facie stage, because it found that Bridgette
was either the direct perpetrator or a direct aider and abettor of
the offenses in all counts.
Bridgette appealed, and another panel of this court
affirmed the trial court’s order as to count 1 because it held as a
matter of law that Bridgette killed the victim. The panel
reversed as to the remaining three murder counts and the
attempted murder count because the jury was instructed on the
now-invalid natural and probable consequences doctrine, and the
prosecutor’s closing argument may have led the jury to believe
that it could convict Bridgette under that theory of liability.
On remand, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing.
The court found that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that Bridgette was guilty of the offenses as a direct
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
perpetrator or as a direct aider and abettor in Luther Larry
Evans’s (Evans) murder (count 3), and as a direct aider and
abettor in the murders of Pamela Cade and Chinue Cade, and the
attempted murder of Carolyn Denise Ferguson (counts 2, 4, and
5).
On appeal, Bridgette contends: (1) with respect to the
murders in counts 2, 3, and 4, the trial court erred by relying
heavily on a felony murder theory that was not supported by
substantial evidence; (2) with respect to Evans’s murder in count
3, the court erred because Bridgette did not inflict the injury that
caused Evans’s death; (3) the court erred by denying Bridgette’s
two motions to substitute counsel; (4) counsel provided ineffective
assistance; (5) Bridgette was prejudiced by cumulative errors in
the trial court; and (6) errors in the trial court’s minute order for
the evidentiary hearing must be corrected to reflect that (a) the
court did not find Bridgette prima facie ineligible for relief, and
(b) the court found that Bridgette was a direct aider and abettor
with respect to the attempted murder in count 5 only.
The People challenge Bridgette’s first five contentions, but
concede that the trial court’s minute order must be corrected to
reflect that on February 10, 2025, the court denied Bridgette’s
petition following an evidentiary hearing, not a prima facie
hearing. The People assert that the trial court’s statement that
“The [c]ourt finds that the [d]efendant was an aider and abettor
as opposed to felony murder” is misleading because it implies
that the court did not make any felony murder findings in the
murder counts. The People suggest that this court should order
the trial court to delete the sentence and clarify the minute order
to reflect that the court found Bridgette guilty under the current
law as to all counts.
3
We remand to the trial court to correct the minute order
dated February 10, 2025, to reflect that the matter was called for
an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(3), and to reflect that the court denied Bridgette’s petition
under the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard set forth in
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). As we discuss below, the trial
court rejected the theory that Bridgette was guilty of the murders
under the amended felony murder laws. Thus, the minute order
accurately reflects the court’s oral pronouncement regarding the
theory of guilt the court relied upon. We therefore decline to
order the court to modify its minute order in that regard. We
affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Trial, Sentencing, and Appeal
1. Ferguson’s Trial Testimony
At trial in 1989, attempted murder victim Ferguson
testified that when the offenses occurred she was 15 years old.
She was six months pregnant and showing. The murder victims
were her mother Pamela, her three-year-old sister Chinue, her
aunt Cristal Gale Baxter, and her mother’s boyfriend Evans.2
2 Pamela, Chinue, and Elvis Cade share the same last
name as codefendant Jimmy Cade. We refer to Jimmy Cade as
Cade and Pamela, Chinue, and Elvis by their first names to avoid
confusion. No disrespect is intended.
4
a. The Inciting Incident
Ferguson testified that on September 2, 1977, Elvis and
Evans had an altercation. Elvis, Baxter, Evans, Pamela,
Ferguson, and Ferguson’s grandmother were all at Pamela’s
apartment. Elvis talked to Pamela until Pamela took Ferguson’s
grandmother home. When Pamela returned, she opened her
purse and asked Ferguson if she had taken money out of it.
Evans had given Pamela two $20 bills earlier. Ferguson said no.
Pamela then asked Baxter if she took the money. Baxter also
said no.
Elvis was ready to leave, so Pamela asked Evans to take
Elvis home. As Elvis and Evans were walking toward Evans’s
car, Pamela told Ferguson to go out and tell Elvis to come back,
but not to tell Evans why she wanted to talk to Elvis. When
Elvis came back, Pamela asked if he had taken her money. Elvis
denied that he had. Pamela asked if she could check his pockets.
They talked for about five minutes. Evans got out of the car and
came back to the apartment. Evans told Elvis to give Pamela the
money back. Evans told Elvis he should not steal from Pamela.
Evans said that if Elvis had asked for the money, Pamela would
have given it to him. Elvis continued to deny that he had taken
the money.
Evans reached into Elvis’s pocket and pulled out two $20
dollar bills. The men immediately started fighting. Evans
knocked Elvis into a faucet, which broke. Evans was holding a
pocketknife and was about to stab Elvis. Pamela put her hand in
front of the knife and told Evans not to do it. Evans told Elvis to
leave the apartment.
5
Someone called the police. When they arrived, the police
took Elvis around the side of the apartment and arrested him for
possession of a prescription in someone else’s name. Bridgette
and another man came to the apartment while the arrest was
occurring. They said that it was wrong for Evans to attack Elvis
and take money from him.
b. The Crimes
Ferguson testified that on September 4, 1977, her mother
Pamela, her three-year-old sister Chinue, her mother’s boyfriend
Evans, and her aunt Baxter were watching television at
Ferguson’s home when Bridgette, Cade, and William Thomas
walked into the apartment. Ferguson knew Cade’s name and she
knew Bridgette and Thomas by their street names. Ferguson
knew Cade and Thomas well. Bridgette was an acquaintance
who Ferguson knew through her boyfriend.
When the men walked into the apartment, Bridgette was
carrying a shotgun, Thomas had a handgun, and Cade was
holding a knife. Bridgette pulled down the window shades and
closed the door. Ferguson asked Pamela, “ ‘What did we
do?’ ” “ ‘What’s going on?’ ” Pamela told her to be quiet.
Ferguson got up from the couch where she was sitting next to
Evans and sat next to Pamela on the floor. When Ferguson
moved to sit next to Pamela, Cade said, “ ‘Sit down, bitch.’ ”
Thomas said they (Ferguson, Baxter, Pamela and Chinue) did not
have anything to do with it, but that Bridgette, Cade, and
Thomas wanted the guy who jumped Cade’s brother Elvis.
Evans started to stand. Bridgette shot Evans, and Evans
fell. Bridgette then stuck the shotgun in Baxter’s back and shot
6
her. Thomas walked over to Pamela and shot her in the head.
Thomas picked up Chinue, who was sleeping. Ferguson
screamed and pleaded for her sister’s life, but Thomas shot the
toddler in the neck. Thomas approached Ferguson and put the
gun against her chest. Cade told Thomas, “ ‘Just shoot the bitch
in the head.’ ” Ferguson struggled with Thomas over the gun.
Thomas shot her in the right side of her chest. Thomas then said,
“ ‘Let’s get out of here.’ ” Ferguson laid on the floor until she
heard the men leave. Once they were gone, she went outside and
found a couple who helped her. Ferguson was transported to the
hospital where she was treated for her injuries.
Ferguson did not see Cade use the knife he was carrying,
but she later learned that Evans was stabbed approximately
eight times.
2. Autopsy
Dr. Lakshmanan Sathyavagiswaran, chief of medicine of
the Los Angeles County coroner’s office, performed the autopsies.
Baxter suffered two fatal gunshot wounds—one to the head
behind her ear and one to the left shoulder. The doctor recovered
plastic and shotgun pellets from her body. The wounds were
consistent with the killer firing from less than three feet away.
Chinue suffered a fatal gunshot wound to the left side of her
neck. Chinue was shot with a firearm that was not a shotgun.
She was shot from two to three feet away. Pamela died from a
gunshot to the top of her head. Evans suffered injuries from
three different weapons. He died of a stabbing injury to the
heart, but a gunshot wound to the shoulder and a stabbing injury
to the neck contributed to his death. Evans also suffered a
7
shotgun wound to the left thigh and seven other stab wounds.
Shotgun pellets were recovered from the wound to Evans’s thigh.
3. Bridgette’s Arrest
Federal Bureau of Investigation agent Ronald Risner
apprehended Bridgette in Florida in 1984. Bridgette denied that
his name was Bridgette, and provided a false driver’s license and
Social Security card. Bridgette denied ever having been in
California.
4. Verdicts
The jury convicted Bridgette of four counts of first degree
murder (§ 187, subd. (a); counts 1–4) and one count of attempted
murder (§§ 187, subd. (a) & 664; count 5). With respect to count
1—the murder of Baxter—the jury found that Bridgette
personally used a firearm in the commission of the crime
(§ 12022.5) and found true a multiple murder special
circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)). The jury also
found that Bridgette personally used a firearm in the commission
of the crime (§ 12022.5) in count 3—the murder of Evans.
5. Sentencing
The trial court sentenced Bridgette to life without parole
for the murder of Baxter in count 1, plus two years in prison for
the firearm enhancement. In counts 2, 3, and 4 for the murders
of Pamela, Evans, and Chinue, Bridgette was sentenced to
consecutive terms of life in prison. In count 3 relating to Evans,
8
the trial court additionally sentenced Bridgette to two years for
the firearm enhancement. In count 5 relating to the attempted
murder of Ferguson, the court imposed the high term of seven
years in prison.
6. Appeal
Bridgette appealed. Another panel of this court affirmed
the trial court’s judgment.
B. Resentencing Petition
In November 2021, Bridgette petitioned for vacatur of his
four murder convictions and resentencing pursuant to section
1170.95 (now §1172.6). The court appointed counsel. The People
opposed the petition on the ground that the jury’s true finding on
the multiple murder special circumstance showed that the jury
necessarily convicted Bridgette as the perpetrator or as a direct
aider and abettor. The People further argued that Bridgette was
guilty of felony murder as an actual killer who acted with intent
to kill.3 Bridgette filed a reply through counsel contending that
he had made a prima facie showing of eligibility because the jury
had been instructed on the now invalid natural and probable
consequences doctrine. He argued that determining whether he
could be convicted as a perpetrator or direct aider and abettor
would require an evidentiary hearing.
3 The jury was not instructed on felony murder and the
prosecutor did not argue the theory at trial. Absent any mention
of the theory at trial, the jury could not have convicted Bridgette
of felony murder.
9
The trial court denied the petition at the prima facie stage
without setting the matter for an evidentiary hearing, finding
that Bridgette was the actual killer of Baxter and Evans and a
direct aider and abettor of the other crimes.
C. Appeal
On appeal, the People conceded that Bridgette was entitled
to an evidentiary hearing as to counts 2, 3, and 4. As to count 1,
the People argued that Bridgette actually killed Baxter. As to
count 5, the People argued that Bridgette had forfeited the claim
by failing to include the attempted murder in his petition for
resentencing.
Another panel of this court rejected the prosecutor’s
argument that Bridgette forfeited his challenge to count 5.
Bridgette had filed his petition in pro se on a standard form that
did not include the option to seek resentencing on an attempted
murder conviction. However, defense counsel argued for relief in
count 5 in the reply and at the hearing, so the parties and the
court had the opportunity to address it. The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s order with respect to the murder of
Baxter in count 1 because Bridgette was convicted as the actual
killer, but reversed and remanded as to counts 2, 3, 4, and 5,
because the court had instructed on the now-invalid natural and
probable consequences doctrine. The Court of Appeal
emphasized that although it appeared highly unlikely that
Bridgette would be successful due to the overwhelming evidence
of guilt in the record, the court could not entirely foreclose the
possibility that Bridgette was convicted under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine as a matter of law.
10
D. Briefing on Remand
On November 13, 2024, the People filed an evidentiary
brief and a disk of exhibits that included the record of conviction.
The People asserted that Bridgette was guilty of the
premeditated murder of Evans (count 3) as a direct perpetrator,
and the premeditated murder of Pamela and Chinue, and the
attempted murder of Ferguson as a direct aider and abettor.
Bridgette killed Evans first, and then he and Thomas killed
Baxter and Pamela in concert. Thomas immediately killed
Chinue and attempted to kill Ferguson. Bridgette did nothing to
stop the killings that Thomas committed and ignored Ferguson’s
pleas to spare her little sister’s life. Bridgette was armed with a
gun and could have easily intervened, but he did not. This
demonstrated that he shared the intent to kill all of the potential
witnesses. After the murders, when they believed that everyone
was dead, Bridgette fled the scene with his codefendants. The
men did not commit theft or sexual assault. They came to kill,
they killed, and they left. After they slaughtered the family,
Bridgette fled to Florida where he lived for many years. When
arrested he gave false names and said he had never been to
California. Bridgette’s flight demonstrated consciousness of
guilt. Bridgette’s murder of Baxter and Evans supported the
reasonable conclusion that he shared his codefendants’ intent to
kill and to dispose of all of the witnesses to the murders.
Alternatively, the People argued that Bridgette was guilty of
felony murder with respect to Evans, Pamela, and Chinue. The
People asserted that the underlying target felony supporting this
theory was a residential burglary. The People asserted that
11
Bridgette was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference for human life, under the factors set forth in People
v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016)
63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark).
On February 3, 2025, Bridgette filed through counsel a
reply to the People’s evidentiary brief. The reply asserted that
the burden was on the People to prove Bridgette’s guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt; substantial evidence was insufficient to meet
that burden. Bridgette argued that he was not present when the
offenses were committed. Alternatively, the prosecution could
not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Bridgette was a major
participant in the murders or the attempted murder4 or that he
acted with reckless indifference to human life under the factors
set forth in Banks and Clark.
E. Evidentiary Hearing
At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor argued that
Bridgette directly perpetrated the murder of Evans. Although
the other defendants shot and stabbed Evans, the injuries
Bridgette caused contributed to his death. Bridgette was also a
direct aider and abettor of the murders of Pamela and Chinue
4 Counsel appears to have misapprehended that to be guilty
of felony murder as one who is not the actual killer and does not
intend to kill, the defendant must have been a major participant
in the underlying felony, not the murder that occurred in the
course of the underlying felony. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) Moreover,
attempted murder is not a predicate crime for felony murder, nor
does the felony murder rule apply to attempted murder.
12
and the attempted murder of Ferguson. Bridgette acted with
intent to kill and shared the specific intent of the shooter.
Defense counsel argued that a codefendant killed Evans.
She asserted: “The burden is on the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Mr. Bridgette was a major participant
who acted with reckless indifference to human life.” Counsel
argued that Bridgette was not a major participant because he
was not in a position to facilitate or prevent any of the other
murders and was not present during the planning of the offenses.
Counsel also argued that Ferguson was mistaken in her
identification of Bridgette. Ferguson had only seen Bridgette a
few times and had never conversed with him. Counsel claimed
that because the murders occurred at night Ferguson was not in
a position to make a positive identification.
The court asked defense counsel what motive Ferguson
would have to lie about Bridgette’s identity. Counsel stated that
the event was scary and Ferguson may have made a mistake.
The court asked counsel to explain why, when Bridgette was
arrested in Florida, he denied having been in California. The lie
suggested consciousness of guilt. Counsel responded that the lie
did not prove Bridgette committed murder. The court then asked
if Bridgette entering the apartment with his cohorts while
carrying a gun and then pulling down the shades constituted
aiding and abetting. Defense counsel asserted that the offenses
happened simultaneously, so Bridgette was not in a position to
prevent any of the offenses.
The court observed that when Bridgette left the apartment
he did not call the police or seek medical assistance. Counsel
conceded that these were factors to consider but argued that
these factors alone did not prove major participation.
13
The court responded that the factors were relevant to
determining whether a defendant was a major participant or
acted with reckless disregard for human life. Counsel conceded
that the court was correct.
The prosecutor reiterated her argument that Bridgette shot
Evans and contributed to his death. Defense counsel’s assertions
that the offenses occurred while Bridgette was closing the blinds
and shutting the door were inaccurate. Bridgette shot Baxter at
the same time that Thomas shot Pamela. The prosecutor argued
that it was not necessary for the court to consider the felony
murder factors. “[G]iven the fact [that Bridgette] murdered two
people and was present for the murder of the additional people
and he did everything possible to facilitate them from beginning
to end, I don’t think there’s any question whether he shared the
intent to kill everyone in the home.”
The court stated that Ferguson witnessed the killings.
Ferguson had met Bridgette before and she positively identified
him as the person who shot Evans and Baxter. The court ruled,
“[I]t’s clear to the court, Mr. Bridgette executed Larry [Evans]
and Gail [Baxter].”
The court assured counsel that it considered the Banks and
Clark factors relating to felony murder, and found that Bridgette
expressed no concern for the victims, and did nothing to prevent
Thomas from shooting Chinue, Pamela, or Ferguson. The court
continued: “[T]his was not a case of robbery. There was nothing
taken from the [apartment]. The [apartment] was not
burglarized. The [apartment] was not ransacked. This was
clearly a planned set of circumstances, in which Mr. Bridgette
and the other two individuals went into this [apartment] with the
intent to murder everyone in the [apartment]. Unfortunately,
14
the [three]-year-old was in the wrong place at the wrong time.
[¶] The court finds Mr. Bridgette, at the very least, was an aider
and abettor. More importantly, he also demonstrated reckless
disregard for human life.[5] I think, under many theories, the
People have proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he would not
be entitled to any relief under [section] 1172.6.” The court ruled
the People had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Bridgette
was guilty of first and second-degree murder under the
amendments made to the law in 2019.
The prosecutor asked the court to clarify with respect to the
attempted murder whether the court found that Bridgette was a
direct aider and abettor or guilty of felony murder. The court
confirmed that it found Bridgette guilty as an aider and abettor.
A minute order dated February 10, 2025, stated that the
matter was called for a hearing on a section 1172.6, subdivision
(a) petition. It reflected that the court ruled: “The Court having
read and considered the petition pursuant to [] section 1172.6[,
subdivision](c), does not find a prima facie showing that the
Petitioner is entitled to relief. [¶] The Court finds that the
Defendant is not entitled to relief. [¶] The Court finds that the
Defendant was an aider and abettor as opposed to felony
murder.”
5 The court appears to have conflated the “conscious
disregard” element of implied malice and the “reckless
indifference” element of felony murder. However, as we discuss
below, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Bridgette was an aider and abettor who acted with intent to kill,
so we need not analyze whether the court also made an implied
malice finding.
15
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.6
“Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate
Bill 1437 ‘to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure
that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the
actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a
major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1,
subd. (f).) In addition to substantively amending sections 188
and 189 of the Penal Code, Senate Bill 1437 added section
1170.95 [now § 1172.6)], which provides a procedure for convicted
murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended
to retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th
952, 959 (Lewis).)
Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended
former section 1170.95. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 1). As a result of
these amendments, section 1172.6 provides that “person[s]
convicted of felony murder or murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which
malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime, attempted murder under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine, or manslaughter,” may file a
petition to have that conviction vacated under certain
circumstances. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) If the petitioner makes a
prima facie showing that the petitioner is entitled to relief, the
trial court must issue an order to show cause. If an order to show
16
cause issues, the court then “hold[s] a hearing to determine
whether to vacate the murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter conviction and to recall the sentence and
resentence the petitioner on any remaining counts” (id., subd.
(d)(1)), unless the parties “waive a resentencing hearing and
stipulate that the petitioner is eligible to [have his or her] . . .
conviction vacated and to be resentenced (id., subd. (d)(2)).” “At
the hearing . . . the burden of proof . . . [is] on the prosecution to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder under California law as amended
by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019.” (§ Id., subd. (d)(3).)
On appeal from a trial court’s order denying a section
1172.6 petition following a subdivision (d)(3) hearing, this court
evaluates the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s
determination using the substantial evidence standard of review.
(People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735, 747.) “ ‘[W]e look
to whether the prosecution has introduced sufficient evidence of
“ ‘ “reasonable, credible, and of solid value” ’ ” to “support a
finding beyond a reasonable doubt” ’ that petitioner was guilty.
[Citation.]” (People v. Henley (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1003, 1017.)
We review questions of law de novo. (People v. Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 961.)
B. Analysis
17
1. Felony Murder (Counts 2, 3, and 4)
Bridgette first contends that the trial court erred by
denying his petition as to counts 2, 3, and 4 on a felony murder
theory premised on the murders as predicate felonies. We
disagree with Bridgette’s interpretation of the trial court’s ruling.
The parties devoted the bulk of their evidentiary briefs to
discussions of felony murder, and in particular whether, if
Bridgette was not the actual killer and did not intend to kill, he
was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to
human life under the factors set forth in Banks and Clark. The
prosecutor relied on the theory that the predicate crime for felony
murder liability was a residential burglary. As we noted above,
defense counsel appears to have misunderstood the standard and
treated murder as the underlying felony.
The trial court discussed all of the theories that the parties
raised in the briefs—direct perpetrator, direct aider and abettor,
and felony murder under the theory that Bridgette was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
The court never stated that murder could serve as a predicate for
felony murder and specifically rejected the People’s assertion that
a felony murder theory could be predicated on a residential
burglary for which there was no factual support in the record.
Instead, the court ruled as to Evans that Bridgette was a direct
perpetrator of the murder (along with one or more codefendants),
and as to all three murders Bridgette was, at the very least, a
direct aider and abettor of murder acting with premeditation
and/or intent to kill, as the prosecutor had argued in briefing and
at the hearing. The court ruled:
18
“[T]his was not a case of robbery. There was nothing taken
from the [apartment]. The [apartment] was not burglarized. The
[apartment] was not ransacked. This was clearly a planned set of
circumstances, in which Mr. Bridgette and the other two
individuals went into this [apartment] with the intent to murder
everyone in the [apartment]. . . . [¶] The court finds Mr.
Bridgette, at the very least, was an aider and abettor. . . . [¶] The
court finds that Mr. Bridgette is not entitled to relief, that . . .
beyond a reasonable doubt that he is guilty of the charges under
first- and second-degree murder given the changes in the law
since 2019.” (Italics added.) The court’s minute order reiterated
this ruling, stating: “The Court finds that the Defendant was an
aider and abettor as opposed to felony murder.”
Direct aiding and abetting of murder is still a valid theory
of murder liability. (People v. Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th
177, 183 [“ ‘Senate Bill 1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and
abetting liability for murder because a direct aider and abettor to
murder must possess malice aforethought.’ ”].) The trial court
did not err.
2. Direct Perpetrator (Count 3)
We reject Bridgette’s claim that the trial court’s ruling
must be reversed because it erred in finding that he contributed
to Evans’s death and was therefore guilty as a direct perpetrator.
As we discussed above, the trial court found Bridgette guilty of
Evans’s death based on two theories—direct perpetrator and
direct aider and abettor. Even assuming (without deciding) that
the court erred by finding that Bridgette inflicted one of the
injuries that caused Evans’s death, the prosecution presented
19
overwhelming evidence that he aided and abetted Evans’s
murder. Bridgette entered the apartment without invitation
carrying a loaded shotgun. He was accompanied by Cade and
Thomas, who were also armed. Bridgette closed the blinds, shut
the door, and shot Evans before Evans could even stand up.
Thomas then shot Evans, and Cade stabbed Evans multiple
times, which resulted in Evans’s death. It is hard to imagine a
factual scenario in which there would be stronger evidence that
Bridgette directly aided and abetted murder.
3. Motion to Substitute Counsel
Bridgette next contends that he was prejudiced by the trial
court’s denial of his two motions to substitute counsel made
pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).
The contention lacks merit.
a. Proceedings
On July 1, 2024, after the Court of Appeal remanded this
matter to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing, Bridgette
submitted to the trial court a handwritten motion for substitution
of counsel. Bridgette alleged the following: (1) appellate counsel
raised the issue of appointed counsel’s ineffective assistance on
appeal; (2) counsel did not visit Bridgette in prison during the six
months prior to his prima facie eligibility hearing to discuss his
case; (3) counsel failed to thoroughly investigate Bridgette’s case
prior to his resentencing hearing; (4) counsel failed to adequately
prepare for the prima facie eligibility hearing; (5) counsel failed
to communicate directly with Bridgette; (6) counsel failed to file
20
and present Bridgette’s 1172.6 petition in the proper court; and
(7) counsel failed to ensure that count 5 was included in the
prima facie proceedings. Bridgette requested that the court hold
a Marsden hearing regarding whether appointed counsel should
be relieved and new counsel appointed.
On July 30, 2024, Bridgette submitted with the trial court a
second handwritten motion for substitution of counsel. Bridgette
alleged: (1) appointed counsel and Bridgette had an unidentified
conflict of interest; (2) counsel failed to communicate directly
with Bridgette; (3) counsel did not communicate with Bridgette in
the six months prior to his prima facie eligibility hearing; (4)
counsel failed to adequately prepare for the prima facie eligibility
hearing; and (5) Bridgette was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to
advance the correct argument regarding his eligibility for an
evidentiary hearing and by counsel’s lack of communication with
him.
Also on July 30, 2024, Bridgette submitted to the trial court
notice that he had filed a complaint with the state bar against
appointed counsel.6 Bridgette informed the court that he had an
upcoming court hearing scheduled for August 21, 2024, and that
he did not intend to be represented by appointed counsel at the
hearing.
The court conducted a Marsden hearing outside the
presence of the prosecutor on November 12, 2024. The court
asked Bridgette why he wanted substitute counsel. Bridgette
said that at the time he filed the motion he felt counsel had
abandoned him. Bridgette then said he still felt abandoned “to
some degree.” Bridgette explained that he wanted a new
6 The notice was received by the trial court on July 30,
2024.
21
attorney because he felt counsel failed to communicate with him.
He stated: “Every now and then, I might receive a letter from my
attorney, but the times I need to discuss stuff, certain things
about my case, she is never available or she is busy.” Bridgette
said that he had tried to contact his attorney approximately five
times by phone and had not reached her. It was difficult because
he had to sign up to make a call. He could not just call when he
wanted to. Bridgette said “not this time, but when I first
submitted my petition” he had trouble reaching his attorney and
he did not want to travel to court without speaking to her first.
The court explained that appointed counsel was very busy and
had a lot of cases. Logistically, Lancaster was far away, and she
might not be able to get in touch with Bridgette as soon as he
would like. Bridgette said he understood, but that he was
worried and stressed because no one came to talk to him.
Counsel asked if Bridgette’s concerns related to her
representation currently or at the prima facie stage. Counsel
informed the court that if Bridgette was concerned about the
earlier proceedings, he had already raised his concerns before
another judge in an earlier Marsden motion, and the court had
denied the motion.
Bridgette said that he did not want their relationship to be
like it was in the earlier proceedings. He did not want to have to
worry about whether they would have a chance to talk and he
wanted to be able to talk before hearings so that he could be on a
schedule. He did not know if counsel had a legal strategy
because they had not discussed it.
Counsel stated that when the Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded the matter in part she wrote to Bridgette and
advised him of the status of his case. Bridgette immediately
22
called counsel’s office and told her secretary that he did not want
counsel to represent him. Counsel stated: “He was very
adamant. He spoke to my secretary more than once.” Counsel
sent Bridgette a letter asking him to confirm that he wanted to
end her representation of him. He responded that he did not
want her to be his attorney. Before the Marsden hearing she told
him that it did not make sense for him to say that he did not
want her to be his attorney and at the same time complain that
she was not communicating with him.
Bridgette confirmed that counsel’s statements were true.
He explained that his appellate attorney told him counsel had
provided ineffective assistance because she failed to advance
important arguments at the hearing. Bridgette felt that counsel
could have raised the same issues that appellate counsel did, but
had not. He felt abandoned and “after listening to what the other
attorney is telling me about putting all this in my head, I decided,
it’s about time for me to get another attorney.”
The court observed that appellate attorneys often take a
“shotgun approach and raise every possible issue. It doesn’t
mean it’s valid, it just means every possible issue.”
Bridgette told the court “I’ve been down 40 years on this
case.” “It is in my head. A lot is in my head. I’m thinking. . . . ‘I
need full cooperation . . . because, I’m in a serious situation.’ ”
Appointed counsel stated that she did not know if appellate
counsel raised ineffective assistance of counsel in the opening
brief to the Court of Appeal, but that the Court of Appeal had not
held that she provided ineffective assistance.
The trial court ruled: “Mr. Bridgette, I find, at this point in
time, that [appointed counsel] is properly representing you. It
appears [that] she will continue to do so. The court does find that
23
the relationship between [appointed counsel] and Mr. Bridgette is
not to the point where it would be impossible for her to represent
the defendant.” The court reiterated that because Bridgette was
in Lancaster and communication might not be as easy as he
would like, “But I do find she is properly representing you.” The
court denied the motion without prejudice.
b. Legal Principles
A defendant bringing a Marsden motion for new appointed
counsel “is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the
appointed counsel is not providing adequate representation or
that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an
irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to
result.” (People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 604 (Smith).)
“Although the trial court must afford the defendant the
opportunity to express specific reasons why he believes he is not
being adequately represented, the court is not required to accept
defendant’s assertions of inadequate representation.” (People v.
Orey (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 529, 568.)
We review the trial court’s denial of a Marsden motion for
abuse of discretion. (People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 599.)
“Denial is not an abuse of discretion ‘unless the defendant has
shown that a failure to replace counsel would substantially
impair the defendant’s right to assistance of counsel.’ ” (Ibid.)
c. Analysis
24
First, we reject Bridgette’s arguments that the trial court
abused its discretion by denying his Marsden motions on the
basis of appointed counsel’s actions and tactical decisions made
after the Marsden hearing. Our Supreme Court has held that
“[w]henever the motion is made, the inquiry is forward-looking in
the sense that counsel would be substituted in order to provide
effective assistance in the future. But the decision must always
be based on what has happened in the past.” (People v. Smith
(1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 695.) The hearing on the Marsden motion
was held on November 12, 2024, following remand but well before
counsel filed Bridgette’s evidentiary brief on February 3, 2025 or
argued on his behalf at the evidentiary hearing. We will not
address Bridgette’s arguments relating to the evidentiary
hearing or the related briefing, as they are not relevant to the
inquiry.
Second, appointed counsel did not provide ineffective
assistance by advancing or choosing not to advance certain
arguments at the prima facie hearing. As Bridgette concedes,
counsel argued that the jury was instructed under the natural
and probable consequences doctrine and was therefore entitled to
an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(3). This argument was the basis for the Court of Appeal’s
reversal in counts 2 through 5, and the basis for its remand for
an evidentiary hearing. Bridgette could not have obtained relief
in count 1. The jury’s findings and undisputed evidence at trial
compelled the conclusion that Bridgette was ineligible for relief
as a matter of law in count 1. Given counsel’s success in securing
an evidentiary hearing, there is no basis for Bridgette’s assertion
that counsel did not provide adequate representation. Counsel’s
25
other arguments and tactical decisions relating to the prima facie
hearing did not prejudice Bridgette.
Third, Bridgette’s assertion that appointed counsel did not
communicate with him between the Court of Appeals’ remand
and the Marsden hearing is inaccurate. Counsel informed
Bridgette of the status of his case via letter. Bridgette responded
in no uncertain terms that he did not want counsel to represent
him. Counsel asked for confirmation that Bridgette did not want
her to represent him, and Bridgette confirmed that he did not.
As counsel told Bridgette, it was illogical for Bridgette to inform
counsel that he no longer wanted her to represent him and also
expect counsel to meet with him to discuss the facts of the case
and potential strategies.
Fourth, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
finding that there was no irreconcilable conflict between
Bridgette and appointed counsel. Bridgette asserts that counsel’s
statement to the court that a different judge had denied an
earlier Marsden motion at the prima facie stage is not supported
by the record in case No. B325386. Bridgette argues that absent
a record of the motion, the court abused its discretion by
accepting counsel’s statement as true. He claims that the court
did not consider his complaints relating to the proceedings that
occurred prior to remand because the court erroneously believed
those issues had already been resolved.
We cannot conclude that Bridgette suffered any prejudice
based on counsel’s statement that the court had ruled on these
issues. Bridgette expressed his concerns about counsel’s earlier
representation and the trial court addressed those concerns.
Bridgette took issue with counsel’s failure to visit him personally
and to communicate with him when he initiated contact. The
26
court explained that counsel had many clients and that because
Bridgette was housed in Lancaster, it would be challenging for
counsel to visit him personally. The court emphasized that
communication between attorney and client might not always
occur in the way that the client wished, but that the
circumstances did not demonstrate a breakdown of
communication sufficient to merit substituting counsel.
Bridgette has not demonstrated a conflict of interest on this
basis.7
Finally, we reject Bridgette’s assertion that the trial court
employed an incorrect standard. Substitution of counsel is only
appropriate where “the record clearly shows that the appointed
counsel is not providing adequate representation or that
defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an
irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to
result.” (People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 604.) Bridgette
urges us to parse the trial court’s words and hold that its
statement that “[t]he court does find that the relationship
between [appointed counsel] and Mr. Bridgette is not to the point
where it would be impossible for her to represent the defendant”
employs an incorrect standard. Focusing on the court’s
7 We note that Bridgette did not assert in the trial court
that counsel’s statement was false, nor is there a basis for this
court to conclude that it was. It does not appear that the
reporter’s transcripts of the proceedings in case No. B325386 are
complete, as there are minute orders reflecting hearings for
which there are no corresponding reporter’s transcripts. Based
on the record before us there is no way for this court to ascertain
whether a prior Marsden hearing was held. The burden is on
Bridgette to demonstrate error. He has not presented this court
with a sufficient record to do so here.
27
description in this single sentence ignores the fact that the court
stated that it found appointed counsel was properly representing
Bridgette and that she would continue to do so, which is arguably
more than the standard requires.
4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Bridgette argues that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance based on a combination of (1) her arguments at the
evidentiary hearing and (2) all of the other deficiencies alleged in
the opening brief. Bridgette claims that appointed counsel’s
failures at the evidentiary hearing were so complete that
prejudice must be presumed, as the Supreme Court suggested in
dicta in United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648 (Cronic),
rather than evaluated under the state law standard for harmless
error set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 688
(Strickland).
Even assuming that the Cronic standard may be
appropriate under certain extreme circumstances, we disagree
that counsel’s failures were so complete as to require that
prejudice be presumed. Moreover, we conclude that, in light of
the overwhelming evidence of his guilt as a direct aider and
abettor, Bridgette cannot demonstrate prejudice under the
Strickland standard.
“To establish constitutionally inadequate representation, a
defendant must demonstrate that (1) counsel’s representation
was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2)
counsel’s representation subjected the defendant to prejudice, i.e.,
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failings,
28
the result would have been more favorable to the defendant.”
(People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795.)
At the evidentiary hearing, the trial court discussed all of
the potentially viable theories of liability for murder that the
prosecution advanced, which included direct perpetrator (with
premeditation and/or intent to kill), direct aider and abettor (with
premeditation and/or intent to kill), and felony murder with
residential burglary as the target crime.
Appointed counsel, as the trial court aptly observed, “had a
very uphill [sic] to climb in this matter considering the
circumstances, . . . the heinousness of the crimes, [and] the facts
of this case.” Counsel made several arguments that were
relevant to the prosecution’s direct perpetrator and direct aider
and abettor theories. She argued that the injuries Bridgette
inflicted did not contribute to Evans’s death (the autopsy showed
the cause of death was stabbing, with the wounds from Thomas’s
gun contributing), that Bridgette did not have the opportunity to
stop Thomas from shooting Pamela and Chinue because all of the
offenses occurred simultaneously or in close succession, and that
Bridgette’s lies when apprehended in Florida did not necessarily
indicate consciousness of guilt. In light of counsel’s relevant
arguments, we cannot hold that her failure to represent Bridgette
was complete and presume prejudice. (See United States v.
Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659 [“[I]f counsel entirely fails to
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing,
then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that
makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable”].)
5. Cumulative Error
29
Bridgette contends that he was prejudiced by cumulative
error. As we have discussed above, the trial court found that
Bridgette was guilty in all charges as a direct aider and abettor.
Bridgette does not argue that this is an invalid theory under the
amended murder laws or that the trial court’s ruling is not
supported by substantial evidence in the record. The trial court
did not err in its finding of guilt, nor did it abuse its discretion by
denying Bridgette’s Marsden motions. Trial counsel did not
provide ineffective assistance. Bridgette was not prejudiced by
cumulative error.
6. Corrections to the Minute Order
Finally, Bridgette contends that the trial court’s February
10, 2025 minute order must be corrected to reflect that: (1) the
court did not find Bridgette prima facie ineligible for relief
following the evidentiary hearing, and (2) the trial court found
that Bridgette was a direct aider and abettor and not guilty of
felony murder only with respect to the attempted murder in
count 5.
We agree that the minute order improperly states the trial
court found Bridgette prima facie ineligible for relief following
the section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing.
However, we reject Bridgette’s contention that the trial court
found Bridgette guilty under a felony murder theory in counts 2,
3, and 4. As we have discussed, the court did not espouse the
theory that felony murder could be based on aiding and abetting
murder, and expressly rejected the prosecution’s theory that
Bridgette and his cohorts committed or attempted to commit a
burglary or a robbery that could serve as a target crime for felony
30
murder in counts 2, 3, and 4. Thus, the minute order accurately
reflects that the court relied upon a direct aiding and abetting
theory in its oral pronouncement at the hearing.
We remand to the trial court to correct the minute order
dated February 10, 2025, to reflect that the matter was called for
an evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision
(d)(3), and to reflect that the court denied Bridgette’s petition
under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard set forth in
1172.6, subdivision (d)(3). We affirm the trial court’s judgment in
all other respects.
31
DISPOSITION
We remand for the limited purpose of permitting the trial
court to correct the minute order dated February 10, 2025 to
reflect that the court held an evidentiary hearing pursuant to
section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) and that the court denied the
petition because it found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Bridgette could still be convicted of murder under the laws as
amended on January 1, 2019. In all other respects, we affirm the
trial court’s order denying relief under Penal Code section 1172.6.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
MOOR, J.
WE CONCUR:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
KIM (D.), J.
32