Filed 7/15/26 P. v. Bradford CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
THE PEOPLE, C103642
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. 96F00581)
v.
ARTNEALIOUS CORTEZ BRADFORD,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Artnealious Cortez Bradford appeals the judgment entered following
resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75.1 Defendant argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss prior strike convictions pursuant to
People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. Defendant further argues that
his restitution fine must be vacated under section 1465.9, subdivision (d). We affirm the
trial court’s denial of defendant’s Romero motion. Because the trial court did not orally
pronounce sentence on defendant’s conviction, impose the mandatory parole revocation
fine, or calculate credits for time served, we remand the matter for full resentencing. On
remand, the trial court is directed to orally impose judgment; determine what the amount
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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of the restitution fine would have been so it can impose, then stay, the parole revocation
fine in a proper amount pursuant to People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1, 23-24 (Kopp);
and calculate defendant’s actual custody credits.
BACKGROUND
In 1997, a jury found defendant guilty of possessing cocaine in violation of Health
and Safety Code section 11350, subdivision (a). At his sentencing hearing, defendant
admitted three prior strike convictions (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12) and
two other prior convictions for which he served time in prison (id., § 667.5, subd. (b)).
After declining to strike any of the defendant’s prior strike convictions, the trial court
sentenced him to 25 years to life plus two years. The trial court also ordered defendant to
pay a restitution fine of $10,000 and imposed and stayed a parole revocation fine of
$10,000.
In 2024, pursuant to legislation invalidating sentence enhancements imposed
under section 667.5, subdivision (b) with exceptions not relevant here (former § 1171.1
[Stats. 2021, ch. 728, § 3], now renumbered § 1172.75), the trial court recalled
defendant’s sentence and scheduled his case for resentencing.
At defendant’s resentencing hearing in 2025, the court struck the section 667.5,
subdivision (b) enhancements as no longer legally valid under section 1172.75 but denied
defendant’s Romero motion. Although the court did not orally impose any sentence upon
the defendant, both the minute order and the abstract of judgment indicated that the court
reimposed defendant’s original 25-year-to-life sentence (minus the stricken
enhancements), with credit for time served, and also reimposed the $10,000 restitution
fine and $10,000 parole revocation fine.
Defendant timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
I. Romero Motion
Defendant argues that the trial court’s refusal to dismiss his prior strike
convictions was an abuse of discretion unsupported by substantial evidence under section
1172.75, subdivision (d)(1). Specifically, defendant argues that the trial court abused its
discretion when it declined to dismiss his prior strike convictions because it did not have
substantial evidence to “find by clear and convincing evidence that imposing a lesser
sentence would endanger public safety,” as defendant asserts was required by section
1172.75, subdivision (d)(1). We are not convinced.
Defendant’s argument fails because it is based on a misreading of section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(1). That provision requires that “ ‘[r]esentencing pursuant to this section
[1172.75] shall result in a lesser sentence than the one originally imposed as a result of
the elimination of the repealed enhancement, unless the court finds by clear and
convincing evidence that imposing a lesser sentence would endanger public safety.” This
language “creates a presumption that the resentencing ‘shall result in a lesser sentence
than the one originally imposed.’ ” (People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 360.)
It does not, as defendant contends, entitle him to a further reduction in sentence after his
invalid enhancements have been dismissed. To reach defendant’s interpretation of
section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1), we would need to read additional language into the
statute. As that would violate the “ ‘cardinal rule of statutory construction that courts
must not add provisions to statutes’ ” , we decline to do so. (People v. Guzman (2005) 35
Cal.4th 577, 587.)
Here, the trial court did as section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1) required.
Defendant’s original sentence was 25 years to life plus two prior prison term
enhancements. At defendant’s resentencing hearing under section 1172.75, the court
dismissed the two invalid prior prison term enhancements. Dismissing the invalid prison
priors, but declining to dismiss prior strike convictions, “result[s] in a lesser sentence
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than the one originally imposed,” consistent with section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(1). As
that section only requires a court to make an “endanger public safety” finding when
resentencing does not result in a lesser sentence, it did not require anything further of the
trial court in this instance.
Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to dismiss any of defendant’s prior strike convictions.
II. Failure to Orally Pronounce Judgment
Defendant also argues that his $10,000 restitution fine should be stricken under
section 1465.9 and removed from the abstract of judgment. The People agree. However,
our review of the record reveals the court did not orally pronounce judgment.
Accordingly, we must remand the matter for a full resentencing.
“The failure to pronounce sentence on a count is an unauthorized sentence and
subject to correction on remand” (People v. Price (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1405, 1411
fn. 6), as is the failure to impose a parole revocation fine required by section 1202.45
(People v. Terrell (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1255). Because an unauthorized sentence
is “ ‘a narrow exception to the general requirement that only those claims properly raised
and preserved by the parties are reviewable on appeal’ ” (People v. Anderson (2010)
50 Cal.4th 19, 26), we raise the issue even though neither party has addressed it.
Here, the trial court failed to orally impose any sentence upon the defendant.
Because the trial court’s recall of defendant’s sentence pursuant to section 1172.75,
subdivision (c) vacated that sentence, the trial court was required to conduct a full
resentencing. (People v. Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 360-361.) While the
court struck defendant’s now-invalid section 667.5, subdivision (b) enhancements and
ruled on his Romero motion, it did not orally pronounce judgment on defendant for his
conviction for possessing cocaine. Nor did it orally reimpose the restitution fine or
parole revocation fine or calculate actual custody credits. Because the trial court’s failure
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to orally pronounce judgment resulted in an unauthorized sentence, we remand for a full
resentencing.
We briefly address defendant’s claim of error and additional errors to provide
some additional guidance on remand.
As both defendant and the People point out, section 1465.9 bars reimposition of
the restitution fine upon defendant. That fine was originally imposed more than 10 years
ago at defendant’s sentencing in 1997. In 2024, the Legislature enacted section 1465.9,
subdivision (d), which imposed a 10-year limit on the enforcement and collection of that
fine. (Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 1; People v. Bertsch and Hronis (2026) 19 Cal.5th 183,
332.)
Because the restitution fine was originally imposed on defendant more than 10
years ago, the fine is uncollectable and unenforceable by operation of law. (See People v.
Salstrom (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 596, 600-601 [resentencing does not restart § 1465.9’s
10-year clock], review granted Mar. 11, 2026, S295038.) Consequently, it may not
legally be reimposed upon defendant.
Defendant’s term of imprisonment, parole revocation fine, and custody credits are
another matter, however. “A trial court has a duty in both felony and misdemeanor cases
to pronounce sentence on every conviction.” (People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
976, 994.) The trial court’s failure to orally pronounce judgment on defendant’s cocaine
possession conviction resulted in an unauthorized sentence.
Although section 1465.9, subdivision (d) imposed a 10-year limit on the
enforcement and collection of the restitution fine, it did not provide relief with respect to
the parole revocation fine. Under section 1202.45 and Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at page
24, that fine remains mandatory and must be set in the same amount as the court would
have set for defendant’s restitution fine even though the restitution fine itself may no
longer be reimposed.
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Finally, at resentencing, the trial court is required to “credit [defendant] with all
actual days he had spent in custody … up to that time,” including time in custody after
the original sentencing. (People v. Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 37, italics omitted;
§ 2900.1.) The record shows the trial court did not do so.
While the term of imprisonment, parole revocation fine, and actual custody credits
are nevertheless listed in the minute order and abstract of judgment, the oral
pronouncement of judgment controls over both. (People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th
1059, 1070; People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380, 385.)
So that the trial court may address these issues, we remand the matter for a full
resentencing.
DISPOSITION
The court’s ruling on defendant’s Romero motion is affirmed. The matter is
remanded to the trial court for resentencing. On remand, the trial court is directed to
orally impose judgment; determine what the amount of the restitution fine would have
been so it can impose, then stay, the parole revocation fine in a proper amount pursuant to
Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pages 23 to24; and calculate defendant’s actual custody
credits. After resentencing the superior court clerk is directed to prepare a new abstract
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of judgment and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
/s/
WISEMAN, J.
We concur:
/s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/s/
MESIWALA, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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