Filed 10/29/26 P. v. Boyd CA4/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or or dered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E087624
v. (Super.Ct.No. BLF2400070)
AHJEEB JAMAL BOYD, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Mary E. Fuller, Judge.
(Retired judge of the San Bernardino Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
art. VI, § 6 of the Cal. Const.) Affirmed.
Ahjeeb Jamal Boyd, in pro. per.; and Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
1
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Ahjeeb Jamal Boyd appeals from the judgment of the
Riverside County Superior Court entered after defendant pled guilty to one charge of
fraudulent misrepresentations in violation of section 2101, subdivision (a) of the
Unemployment Insurance Code.1 We will affirm.
DISCUSSION
While defendant was incarcerated in Ironwood State Prison, he and others filed
fraudulent applications for unemployment insurance benefits with California’s
Employment Development Department (EDD) using names, birthdates, and social
security numbers of other inmates.
In May 2024, defendant was charged in an information with (i) 10 counts of
making a false statement or representation or knowingly failing to disclose a material fact
to obtain, increase, reduce, or defeat any unemployment insurance benefit payment
(§ 2101, subd. (a), counts 1-10); (ii) three counts of unlawfully conducting a transaction
exceeding $5,000 with the specific intent to promote, facilitate, manage, establish, and
carry on any criminal activity, and knowing the monetary instrument was derived directly
or indirectly from criminal activity (Pen. Code, § 186.10, subd. (a), counts 11-13); and
(iii) two alleged strike priors (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (c) & (e)(2)(A), 1170.12,
subd. (c)(2)(A)).
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Unemployment Insurance
Code. References to rules are to the California Rules of Court.
2
On November 12, 2025, defendant entered into a plea agreement, which was
accepted by the trial court. Included in the plea’s terms were provisions that defendant
would (i) plead guilty to count 2 (violation of § 2101, subd. (a), false statement or
representation or concealment) and admit one of the prior strikes; (ii) he would serve a
48-month prison term consecutive to any other custody time he was ordered to serve in
any other case; and (iii) the trial court would enter an order requiring defendant to pay
restitution to EDD in the stipulated amount of $132,210 (less any credits to be
determined at a hearing set for the following day) with the proviso that, if EDD reported
the amount of loss is less than the stipulated amount, then the amount defendant owed
would be reduced to the reported amount. The reported amount would be the new
stipulated amount with no right to further hearing. Defendant waived “any right to
appeal [he] may have.”
At the hearing to determine whether defendant was entitled to any reduction in the
restitution amount stipulated in the plea agreement, the parties agreed to a credit of
$3,921.13.
In response to defendant’s questions concerning how the trial court would be
notified of payments to EDD to be sure defendant got credit for them, the trial court
explained that it is never notified. Rather, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (CDCR) collects the funds, sends them to the party designated by the
district attorney as the appropriate victim recipient, and keeps track of the credits.
During the hearing, the trial court rejected defendant’s unsupported claim that
$4800 received from EDD could be explained by stimulus payments EDD made in 2020
3
(during COVID) because he would have received them even if he was not engaged in
criminal activity. The court also declined to credit defendant for two $5,000 cashier’s
checks he claimed CDCR had drawn from his account because the court did not have a
current CDCR accounting showing those transactions. The court advised defendant to
work with CDCR to resolve the issue.
After hearing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the plea agreement,
the trial court ordered defendant to pay restitution to EDD in the amount $128,288.87
(the stipulated amount of $132,210 less the credit due of $3,921.13). It ordered the
CDCR to unfreeze defendant’s inmate trust account and release the funds ($22,815.15) to
EDD. The order was made joint and several with the codefendants (whose cases were
pending under another case number).
Defendant noticed this appeal and we appointed counsel to represent him.
Defendant did not obtain a certificate of probable cause.
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s appointed appellate counsel filed an opening brief that sets forth
statements of the case and facts but does not present any issues for adjudication.
Counsel considered the question whether the trial court erred when it did not give
defendant credit for two certified checks ($5,000 each) that may not have been cashed,
for $22,815.15 ordered to be taken from defendant’s prison account, or for $4,800 (the
amount defendant claimed were COVID stimulus payments).
We invited defendant to file a supplemental brief, and he did so. In his brief,
defendant asks this court (i) to determine whether there is an evidentiary basis for the
4
restitution order; (ii) to determine whether the restitution order complies with the
negotiated plea agreement and whether the trial court properly implemented the plea’s
provision that the amount of restitution would be reduced if EDD reported a lower
amount of loss than the stipulated amount; (iii) to review the trust account record attached
to his brief to ensure all court ordered credits have been accurately applied; (iv) to
determine whether the restitution award was limited to losses legally attributable to the
offense of conviction and was consistent with the plea agreement, or whether it
improperly included losses outside the scope of the conviction; and, (v) if we find any
error, to either order correction of the restitution amount or remand his case for a new
restitution hearing.
The Need for a Certificate of Probable Cause
Defendant and his counsel have requested an independent review of the record.
Counsel cites People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441–442 in the opening brief and
posits that where, as here, appointed appellate counsel files an opening brief that does not
raise an issue, we are obliged to independently review the entire record to determine
whether there are any issues that would, if resolved favorably to the appellant, result in
reversal or modification of the judgment (commonly referred to as a Wende review).
That is a correct statement with respect to an appeal from the judgment but, as explained
post, our jurisdiction to conduct a Wende review is limited if a certificate of probable
cause is required but has not been obtained.
A person who pleads guilty cannot appeal the judgment unless (i) they file with the
trial court a written statement executed under penalty of perjury showing reasonable
5
constitutional, jurisdictional, or other grounds for appeal going to the legality of the
proceedings, and (ii) the trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause
for the appeal with the clerk of the court. (Pen. Code, § 1237.5; People v. Mendez (1999)
19 Cal.4th 1084, 1088 (Mendez).) Those requirements must be strictly applied when an
appeal is based on a matter affecting the validity of the plea agreement. (Mendez, supra,
at p. 1088; People v. Zuniga (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1182-1183; rule
8.304(b)(1)(A).)
If an appeal requires a probable cause certificate and one is not provided, then the
matter must be dismissed unless there are issues presented that do not affect the plea’s
validity. (Mendez, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1096; rule 8.304(b)(3).)
Here, defendant’s plea agreement included a stipulation to the sentence he
subsequently received, a restitution order in an amount certain, as well as a waiver to his
right to appeal. When a plea bargain includes an express waiver of appeal, an attempt to
appeal the judgment is necessarily an attack on a term of the agreement and, therefore, a
probable cause certificate is required. (People v. Mashburn (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 937,
943; see People v. Codinha (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1047, 1076-1078.) Accordingly, we
must limit our Wende review and consideration of defendant’s arguments made in his
supplemental brief to matters that do not affect the validity of defendant’s plea or would
not otherwise require a probable cause certificate.
Defendant’s claims
Defendant’s suggestions that the restitution award may lack an evidentiary basis
and may not have been limited to losses attributable to the offense he pled guilty to is
6
essentially an argument that the stipulated amount of the award set forth in the plea is not
supported by the evidence. As such, they are an attack on the validity of his plea that
cannot be reviewed without a certificate of probable cause, which defendant did not
obtain.
Defendant claims there are arguable issues concerning whether the restitution
order complied with the negotiated plea agreement and whether the previously seized
funds and court ordered credits were properly applied but does not make a specific claim
of error.
Our limited Wende review of the record and consideration of those of defendant’s
arguments that do not affect the validity of his plea have not revealed an arguable issue.
(People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 124.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:
MILLER
J.
MENETREZ
J.
7