Filed 11/4/26 P. v. Bowie CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B344446
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. YA075518)
ANTHONY BOWIE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hector M. Guzman, Judge. Affirmed.
Brad J. Poore, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David E. Madeo, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
In 2010, a jury convicted defendant and appellant Anthony
Bowie (Bowie) of two counts of robbery and found that a principal
used a firearm during the robbery. The trial court found that
Bowie had suffered two prior “strike” convictions within the
meaning of the “Three Strikes” law and two prior serious felony
convictions. The court also found that Bowie had served two
prior prison terms. Accordingly, the court sentenced Bowie to
33 years to life, which included one year for the firearm
enhancement, five years for the prior serious felony conviction
enhancement, and two years for the prior prison term
enhancements.
In 2025, the trial court recalled the sentence under Penal
Code section 1172.75,1 struck the prior prison term
enhancements, and resentenced Bowie to 31 years to life. The
court declined to strike Bowie’s two strikes or the serious felony
conviction enhancement. Bowie now appeals that decision and
raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Facts2
On the afternoon of June 3, 2009, David Parker (Parker)
and Leroy Holliman (Holliman) robbed the Check ‘N Go, a check
cashing business, in Carson. Parker used a gun during the
robbery. Although Bowie did not enter the store, he was an
accomplice: Bowie discussed the robbery with Holliman the day
1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We draw these facts from the unpublished opinion
affirming Bowie’s convictions. (People v. Parker (Nov. 16, 2011,
B226650) [nonpub. opn.].)
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before, drove Holliman to the Check ‘N Go, introduced Holliman
to Parker, volunteered to be the getaway driver, and spoke with
Holliman on the phone after the robbery to coordinate Holliman’s
pickup.
II. Procedural History
A. Conviction and sentencing
A jury convicted Bowie on two counts of robbery (§ 211;
counts 5 & 6), one for each employee working at Check ‘N Go
during the robbery. The jury found that a principal used a
firearm during the robbery (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1)).
The trial court found that Bowie had two strikes (§§ 667,
subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–(d)) based upon two 1999
convictions for attempted murder (§§ 664, 187). The court found
that Bowie had serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) based
upon those same convictions (§§ 664, 187). Finally, the court
found that Bowie had served two prior prison terms (former
§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
The trial court sentenced Bowie to a total term of 33 years
to life in state prison. The court sentenced Bowie to 25 years to
life on count 5, which was his third strike. The court also
sentenced Bowie to one year for the firearm enhancement, five
years for the prior serious felony conviction enhancement, and
two years for the prior prison term enhancements. The court
sentenced Bowie to a concurrent term of 32 years 4 months to life
on count 6. The convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct
appeal.
B. Section 1172.75 proceedings
In 2023, Bowie was deemed eligible for resentencing under
section 1172.75. Bowie requested that the trial court strike one
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or both strikes.3 The court denied the request under People v.
Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497. The court found
as follows: “This case clearly under the facts of the case, the
underlying facts, falls squarely within the [T]hree [S]trikes law.
It’s not outside of the spirit of the Three Strikes law, considering
not only the underlying factors but also his priors. [¶] As the
People pointed out, his criminal history shows a continuous
pattern of criminal activity and demonstrates an individual who
has no regard for following the law. Keeping in mind the safety
of the community, he’s squarely within the category of
individuals that the three-strike law focuses on.”
Bowie then requested that the trial court strike the strikes,
or in the alternative, strike the prior serious felony conviction
enhancement under section 1385, subdivision (c). Bowie’s
counsel made clear that she was raising an independent basis for
relief: “There’s two considerations. There’s the Romero
considerations and then there’s 1385.” Bowie’s counsel also
argued: “I think 1385 almost definitely these days mandates the
striking of the five-year prior” because subdivision (c) uses the
word “shall.”
The trial court disagreed that Romero and section 1385
provide independent bases to strike strikes: “I see it the same—
the 1385 argument is a Romero argument.” Nevertheless, the
court considered Bowie’s argument under section 1385 and
3 The People filed an opposition before Bowie asked the trial
court to strike the strikes. The “Statement of Facts” related to
Bowie, but the “Discussion” section referenced facts relating to a
different defendant. Bowie filed a reply in which he made the
request. The People then filed an amended opposition to remove
the erroneous references to a different defendant.
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denied the request: “The request to strike any prior strikes under
Romero, or even if someone sees it as a different argument on the
1385, is denied for the same reasons. The conduct, again. [¶]
And in regard to the five-year [enhancement], that’s denied as
well. [¶] The conduct of his priors and the underlying facts of
this case are egregious and show an individual that’s extremely
dangerous to society.”
Bowie filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Standards of Review
We review the trial court’s sentencing decisions for an
abuse of discretion. (People v. Moseley (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
870, 874.) Under this standard, “ ‘ “we ask whether the trial
court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence,
whether its rulings of law are correct, and whether its application
of the law to the facts was neither arbitrary nor capricious.” ’
[Citations.]” (People v. Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 857
(Garcia).) We interpret relevant statutes and review claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. (People v. Mayfield
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 199; People v. Terwilligar (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 585, 595.)
II. Relevant Law
A. Section 1172.75
Section 1172.75 renders “legally invalid” any former
section 667.5, subdivision (b) prior prison term enhancement
imposed before January 1, 2020, except for a prior conviction for
a sexually violent offense. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).) A defendant
who qualifies for the recall of sentence under section 1172.75 is
entitled to “a full resentencing” at which the trial court may
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reconsider all prior sentencing decisions. (People v. Monroe
(2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393, 402.)
Section 1172.75 provides “specific instructions” for the trial
court to exercise its broad resentencing authority. (People v.
Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 966.) Among other things, the
court must “apply any . . . changes in law that reduce sentences
or provide for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(2).) The court “may consider postconviction factors,
including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that
reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(3).)
B. Section 1385
Under section 1385, as amended by Senate Bill No. 81
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.), effective January 1, 2022, a trial “court
shall dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice
to do so[.]” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1).) “In exercising its discretion” to
dismiss an enhancement, “the court shall consider and afford
great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to prove” the
presence of nine enumerated “mitigating circumstances . . . .
Proof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances
weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless
the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would
endanger public safety.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Mitigating factors
include that (1) “[t]he application of an enhancement could result
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in a sentence of over 20 years” (id., subd. (c)(2)(C)); (2) “[t]he
current offense is connected to prior victimization or childhood
trauma” (id., subd. (c)(2)(E)); (3) “[t]he defendant was a juvenile
when they committed the current offense or any prior offenses . . .
that trigger the enhancement or enhancements applied in the
current case” (id., subd. (c)(2)(G)); and (4) “[t]he enhancement is
based on a prior conviction that is over five years old” (id.,
subd. (c)(2)(H)).
III. The Trial Court Exercised Its Informed Discretion
Bowie argues that the trial court did not understand the
scope of its discretion and accordingly did not exercise informed
discretion. Bowie points to the court’s statement that “ ‘the 1385
argument is a Romero argument’ ” to contend that the court did
not understand that it had the discretion to strike enhancements
under section 1385, subdivision (c), separate and apart from its
discretion to strike prior strikes under Romero and section 1385,
subdivision (a).
The record does not support Bowie’s argument. The trial
court denied Bowie’s request to strike the strikes under Romero
and section 1385. The court then separately denied Bowie’s
request to strike the prior serious felony conviction enhancement
under section 1385. The court disagreed with Bowie’s argument
that it was required to strike the enhancement under section
1385, and the People informed the court that it had discretion to
strike the enhancement. Moreover, Bowie’s brief quoted large
portions of section 1385, subdivision (c), including those relating
to the court’s authority to strike enhancements. We thus
presume the trial court was aware of its obligations under section
1385, subdivision (c). (See People v. Nielsen (2026) 119
Cal.App.5th 816, 827; People v. Caparrotta (2024) 103
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Cal.App.5th 874, 905, disapproved on another ground in People v.
SanMiguel (2026) 20 Cal.5th 254, 288, fn. 7.)
Bowie argues that the trial court did not exercise “informed
discretion” because it did not expressly discuss the mitigating
circumstances and whether striking the enhancement would
endanger public safety. But “[w]e may not presume error from a
silent record.” (People v. Knowles (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 757,
765.) “Unless the record affirmatively demonstrates otherwise,
the trial court is deemed to have considered all the relevant
sentencing factors set forth in the rules.” (People v. Parra
Martinez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 317, 322.) This is especially true
here, as Bowie’s trial brief identified the relevant criteria.
IV. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
Bowie argues that the trial court’s decision not to strike the
prior serious felony conviction based on its finding that dismissal
would endanger public safety is not supported by substantial
evidence and constitutes an abuse of discretion.4 Bowie argues
the mitigating factors under section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(C),
(E), (G) and (H), exist in this case, requiring the trial court to find
that dismissal of the enhancement would “endanger public
safety.” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(1)–(2).) Bowie further argues that he is
not a danger because his convictions are old; his robbery
convictions are not egregious; and he submitted evidence of
rehabilitation.
4 Bowie appeals the trial court’s purported decision not to
strike the firearm enhancement under section 12022, subdivision
(a)(1). We presume without deciding that Bowie preserved this
issue for appeal. We reject this argument for the same reasons
we reject Bowie’s other arguments.
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Bowie asks this court to reweigh the evidence. Instead, we
consider only whether the sentencing court’s finding is supported
by substantial evidence. (See Garcia, supra, 101 Cal.App.5th at
p. 857.) Here, Bowie was convicted in 1999 of attempting to
murder two different people, after which he was sentenced to
seven years in state prison. Shortly after being released from
prison, he violated parole several times and was remanded to
finish his term of imprisonment. After he completed his term of
imprisonment, he was convicted of possession of a firearm by a
felon and sentenced to two years’ imprisonment. Shortly after he
was released from prison again, he committed the two armed
robberies for which he is currently imprisoned.
These facts are sufficient to support the trial court’s
finding. The court’s refusal to strike the enhancements is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s assessment that “in most
cases, ‘if the trial court finds that dismissal of an enhancement
would endanger public safety, then it is hard to see how dismissal
would further the interests of justice[.]’ ” (People v. Walker (2024)
16 Cal.5th 1024, 1033.)
Bowie also argues that dismissing the enhancement would
not endanger the public because he is serving a life sentence and
would not be released unless the parole board finds he is not a
danger to society. If we adopted this argument, trial courts
would be required to strike all sentencing enhancements for
defendants who are serving life sentences. This would violate
section 1385, which gives trial courts the authority to make this
determination, independent of the parole board.
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IV. Defense Counsel Did Not Render Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
Finally, Bowie argues that his counsel rendered ineffective
assistance. Bowie argues that counsel erred because she: (1)
misunderstood the law pertaining to section 1385, (2) failed to
sufficiently address the circumstances of his prior and current
convictions, (3) failed to sufficiently address his rehabilitation
efforts and lack of rules violations, and (4) failed to sufficiently
argue that both the firearms enhancement and the prior serious
felony enhancement should be stricken.
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must show that counsel’s performance was both deficient and
prejudicial. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) “When
examining an ineffective assistance claim, a reviewing court
defers to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions, and there is a
presumption counsel acted within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance.” (Ibid.) To establish prejudice, “[t]he
defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability
is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.” (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694
(Strickland).)
We reject Bowie’s ineffective assistance claim because he
has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that any
purported error by counsel affected the resentencing. (See
Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 691 [“An error by counsel, even
if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the
judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the
judgment”].) As discussed, the trial court understood the law and
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exercised its authority lawfully, and there was sufficient evidence
to support not striking any enhancement. Further, Bowie has
not established that further discussion of the remaining factors
would have resulted in a different outcome.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
GOORVITCH, J.
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
CHAVEZ, J.
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