Filed 9/1/26 P. v. Bouslaugh CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A174288
v. (Del Norte County
COLIN ALAN BOUSLAUGH, Super. Ct. No. CRF29501)
Defendant and Appellant.
Colin Alan Bouslaugh appeals following a contested violation of
probation hearing wherein he was sentenced to the midterm of three years
for violation of Penal Code1 section 245, subdivision (a)(4), assault by means
of force likely to cause great bodily injury. Bouslaugh argues his counsel
rendered ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing by failing to present
available mitigating information about his mental health. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On September 2, 2022, the victim, K.D., was finishing grocery shopping
when an elderly homeless woman, S.S., asked her for a ride. S.S. used a
wheelchair and lived out of a tent. K.D. drove S.S. to the location of her tent
and began to take out S.S.’s wheelchair when Bouslaugh approached her car
while holding a large knife in one hand and a wooden club in the other.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
1
Bouslaugh stated to K.D. that he “wanted to steal a car today” and that he
had decided to steal hers. K.D. responded, “Not my car” and was able to run
back into her car. Bouslaugh stood behind the car, preventing K.D. from
driving away. Bouslaugh then walked around to the front of the car while
staring at K.D., waving the knife and club around. When he reached the
front of the car, K.D. reversed the car, drove away, and contacted law
enforcement. Bouslaugh ended up walking towards a nearby wooded area
where he was later detained by police.2
On December 21, 2022, the district attorney filed an information
charging Bouslaugh with one count of attempted carjacking (§ 664/215,
subd. (a)) with a special allegation for use of a deadly weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)). On February 9, 2023, the information was amended to add
count 2, assault by means of force likely to cause great bodily injury (§ 245,
subd. (a)(4)). Bouslaugh pled guilty to count 2 in exchange for being placed
on probation.
On March 21, 2023, the probation department filed a Presentence
Investigation Report. As relevant here, the report stated that Bouslaugh
“reported no major medical issues or psychological diagnosis. However,
[Bouslaugh] believes that he suffers from Attention Deficit Hyperactive
Disorder and Autism but has never been officially diagnosed. He reports
sporadically working with County Behavioral Health but that they only ever
informed him that he was ‘Hypervigilant.’ ” The report noted that Bouslaugh
appeared to believe the statements he made to the probation officer were
rational when they were not. The report concluded that Bouslaugh “appears
to need some mental health treatment and possible diagnosis. When
speaking with him, it was clear to the Probation Department that he had an
2 These facts are taken from the preliminary hearing transcript.
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unusual cadence of speech, disjointed thought patterns, and slow recognition
of complex concepts and ideas. It also appears that [Bouslaugh] may feign
understanding in order to demonstrate compliance.”
The report identified two factors in aggravation, that Bouslaugh
engaged in violent conduct which indicated a serious danger to society and
that his prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory, and one factor in
mitigation, that he had an insignificant record of criminal conduct. The
report went on to recommend the court reject the plea deal and impose the
middle term because Bouslaugh had no desire to participate in probation.
On April 10, 2023, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The court
read and considered the probation department’s Presentence Investigation
Report and stated that it was inclined to reject the plea because Bouslaugh
had indicated that he had no interest in or intention of participating in
probation. Defense counsel noted that there is a “mental-health component”
to Bouslaugh and that on more than one occasion he came close to declaring a
doubt as to his competence under section 1368. Defense counsel explained
that he never did because Bouslaugh “was able to assist in his own defense
rationally and offer insight as to what — from his perspective, what did or
didn’t happen that day in a rational way with rational facts.” Counsel also
represented that, contrary to the report, his client was willing to participate
in probation. Bouslaugh confirmed that this was the case.
The court stated that it was “convinced” Bouslaugh had mental health
issues, “coupled with what we call self-medicating through street drugs, and
he needs professional intervention.”3 The court commented that Bouslaugh
3 The prosecution also expressed concerns about Bouslaugh’s mental
health and recommended mental health treatment.
3
was “either going to get that intervention here, now, or he’s going to get it in
prison if he keeps going on the path he’s going.”
In ultimately finding the plea to be in the interest of justice, the court
noted Bouslaugh’s very minimal record. It thus accepted Bouslaugh’s plea
and dismissed the remaining counts. Imposition of Bouslaugh’s sentence was
suspended, and he was granted formal probation for two years which
included, among other things, serving 120 days in county jail. Other
conditions of probation included cooperating with the probation officer to plan
for psychological, psychiatric, or substance abuse treatment. The court
ordered an assessment for whether appellant should “complete the Integrated
Treatment Court, if he is accepted into it.”
On October 11, 2023, the probation department filed a first petition for
revocation of probation for violation of the order granting probation. The
petition alleged Bouslaugh failed to check-in with the probation department
and provide a scheduled urine sample numerous times between July 2023
and October 2023. On October 31, 2023, the trial court summarily revoked
Bouslaugh’s probation and issued a bench warrant for his arrest.
On October 16, 2024, Bouslaugh was arrested on the bench warrant.
He was released with a signed agreement to appear before the trial court on
November 15, 2024, but he did not appear on that date. The trial court
issued another bench warrant for his arrest. On June 16, 2025, Bouslaugh
was arrested again on the bench warrant.
On June 18, 2025, the probation department filed a second petition for
revocation of probation. The petition alleged Bouslaugh violated the terms
and conditions of his probation by failing to appear before the court as
ordered, failing to report to the probation department, and failing to provide
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urine samples between November and December of 2023, January through
December of 2024, and January through June of 2025.
Bouslaugh was appointed new counsel because his original counsel was
no longer on the public defender contract. On June 30, 2025, Bouslaugh
admitted the probation violations.
On July 22, 2025, the probation department filed a Supplemental
Presentence Investigation Report. The probation department “re-reviewed
the circumstances in aggravation and mitigation due to the previous absence
of circumstances review for Rule of Court 4.421(a).” The probation
department identified five circumstances in aggravation and one
circumstance in mitigation. It noted that particular consideration was given
to the California Rules of Court,4 rule 4.421(b)(2) circumstance — that “the
defendant has numerous or increasingly serious prior convictions.” The
report stated that it “seems clear to the Probation Department that the
defendant was suffering from some sort of mental health condition; however,
at no time before or after the incident has a relevant diagnosis been
identified, therefore, the Probation Department did not identify it as a
circumstance in mitigation.” The report went on to note that Bouslaugh
absconded within weeks of his release from custody, which indicated that he
would not comply with a term of supervision, and recommended that the
imposition of sentence previously suspended be imposed. In light of this and
the five circumstances in aggravation, the probation department
recommended that the middle term of three years be imposed.
On August 7, 2025, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The court
noted that it read the Supplemental Presentence Investigation Report, went
back through the file and reviewed the original Presentence Investigation
4 All further “rule” references are to the California Rules of Court.
5
Report, and read through the sentencing judge’s notes throughout the
original report. The court stated its intention to impose the middle term.
Defense counsel noted that under the original terms of probation, Bouslaugh
“would actually at this point have completed [probation] were probation not
revoked. So it does have a tendency to tie the Court’s hands as to options.”
Counsel also noted that Bouslaugh had been accepted into the adult Teen
Challenge in Humboldt and “ha[d] taken it upon himself to seek a number of
opportunities for self-improvement, including opportunity for rehabilitation
and moving forward.”
The trial court went on to consider the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. The court found five aggravating circumstances: (1) the crime
involved a threat of great bodily harm; (2) Bouslaugh was armed with or used
a weapon at the time of the commission of the crime; (3) the crime involved
an attempted or actual taking of great monetary value; (4) that he engaged in
violent conduct which indicates a serious danger to society; and (5) that his
prior performance on probation was unsatisfactory. The court only identified
one circumstance in mitigation, that Bouslaugh had no prior record or
insignificant record of criminal conduct. The court also stated, “I don’t think
it needs to be said that probation is not an option for a number of reasons;
just the complete and utter failure of doing anything whatsoever on
probation. In fact, just absconding the entire time that he was under a
probation term speaks loudly.” The court found that “the circumstances in
aggravation far outweigh the circumstances in mitigation” and sentenced
Bouslaugh to the middle term of three years.
DISCUSSION
“To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘the
defendant must first show counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell
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below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional
norms. Second, the defendant must show resulting prejudice, i.e., a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” (People v. Guevara
(2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 919, 926–927 (Guevara), quoting People v. Mai (2013)
57 Cal.4th 986, 1009.) “ ‘A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome’ of the proceeding.” (Id. at p. 928,
quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 (Strickland).)
Prejudice must be “affirmatively proved.” (People v. Bolin (1998)
18 Cal.4th 297, 333.) “A reviewing court can begin an ineffective assistance
of counsel inquiry with either element and need not address both elements if
one is not satisfied.” (In re Tellez (2024) 17 Cal.5th 77, 88.)
“We ordinarily presume trial counsel’s actions and inactions fall ‘within
the wide range of reasonable professional assistance’ and reflect reasonable
tactical decisions. [Citation.] ‘On direct appeal, a conviction will be reversed
for ineffective assistance only if (1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel
had no rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2)
counsel was asked for a reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply
could be no satisfactory explanation.’ ” (Guevara, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at
p. 927.)
Bouslaugh argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
“meaningfully put forward” his mental health issues as a mitigating factor to
the trial court during sentencing and to advocate for an alternative sentence,
such as a lower prison term or reinstatement of probation. Specifically,
Bouslaugh asserts that “[t]rial counsel’s performance fell below the standard
of reasonableness because he had information within his purview but failed
to either set forth the information that was already readily available from the
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prior proceedings or conduct a reasonable inquiry into whether or not there
was any mitigation for [Bouslaugh] based on his mental health problems.”
Bouslaugh argues that the record contained significant information that his
mental health was a “contributing factor to the crime,” thereby mitigating his
culpability, including the Presentence Investigative Report and the facts
underlying the crime itself. Bouslaugh further contends there can be no
satisfactory explanation for counsel’s failure to advocate for a more
advantageous sentence.
With respect to mental health, circumstances in mitigation include that
“[t]he defendant was suffering from a mental or physical condition that
significantly reduced culpability for the crime” and that “[t]he commission of
the current offense is connected to the defendant’s . . . mental illness as
defined by section 1385(c).” (Rule 4.423(b)(2) & (b)(4).) Section 1385,
subdivision (c)(5) provides, “[A] mental illness is a mental disorder as
identified in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders . . . . A court may conclude that a defendant’s mental
illness was connected to the offense if, after reviewing any relevant and
credible evidence . . . the court concludes that the defendant’s mental illness
substantially contributed to the defendant’s involvement in the commission of
the offense.”
Here, the Supplemental Presentence Investigation Report identified
that Bouslaugh did not have any formal diagnosis and nothing in the record
suggests otherwise. Therefore, rule 4.423(b)(4) was inapplicable and counsel
was thus not ineffective for failing to raise it. (See People v. Price (1991) 1
Cal.4th 324, 387 [“Counsel does not render ineffective assistance by failing to
make motions or objections that counsel reasonably determines would be
futile”].)
8
By contrast, rule 4.423(b)(2) only requires that the “defendant was
suffering from a mental . . . condition,” and does not appear to require a
formal diagnosis. However, rule 4.423(b)(2) only applies where: (1) defendant
was suffering from a mental condition at the time the crime was committed,
and (2) the mental condition significantly reduced defendant’s culpability for
the crime. (Rule 4.423(b)(2).) Bouslaugh argues that the record contained
significant information that his mental health was a “contributing factor to
the crime.” The issue, however, is not whether his mental health contributed
to the offense, but whether it significantly reduced his culpability. (Rule
4.423(b)(2).) Although the record does not disclose counsel’s reasons for
declining to make an argument under rule 4.423(b)(2), there are plausible
tactical explanations for that choice. For example, counsel may have
reviewed the record, spoken to Bouslaugh and reasonably determined that
Bouslaugh’s mental health condition did not significantly reduce his
culpability for the crime so as to constitute a mitigating factor. Thus, we
conclude that counsel’s decision not to raise Bouslaugh’s mental health issues
was not deficient, as there is a reasonable strategic basis for that decision.
(See Guevara, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 927; see also Strickland, supra,
466 U.S. at p. 689 [reviewing courts “must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance”].)
Similarly, Bouslaugh contends that counsel “failed to make any
meaningful argument about alternatives to the middle term sentence, such
as a lower prison term or reinstatement of probation.” He maintains that
counsel’s statement that the trial court’s “hands were tied” as to options other
than imposing a prison sentence demonstrates deficient performance, as it
reveals a lack of knowledge about the law. It is not entirely clear what
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counsel’s statement about the court’s hands being “tied” means, but it could
be understood as a recognition that Bouslaugh no longer had the option of
probation. Indeed, the court later unequivocally confirmed that probation
was no longer a possibility for Bouslaugh based on his poor performance and
having absconded for the entire time he was on probation. With respect to
not advocating for probation or the low term, it is entirely plausible that
counsel did not believe he had a credible basis to do so. We thus do not find
deficient performance. (See Guevara, supra, 115 Cal.App.5th at p. 927.)
Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that defense counsel’s failure
to raise Bouslaugh’s mental health issues fell below prevailing norms, on this
record we conclude that Bouslaugh has also failed to demonstrate prejudice.
Bouslaugh has failed to show a reasonable probability that the trial court
would have imposed a lesser sentence had counsel raised Bouslaugh’s mental
health condition during sentencing. The trial court explicitly mentioned that
it reviewed both sentencing reports, including the original judge’s notes
within the original report. Those reports discussed Bouslaugh mental health
and disclosed the same issues Bouslaugh now faults his counsel for not
raising before the court. Yet, the court was already aware of these issues and
counsel’s failure to raise them independently from the probation
department’s reports does not undermine confidence in the outcome of the
proceeding.
Moreover, the trial court found five factors in aggravation and held that
the aggravating factors “far outweigh” the mitigating factors. Even if the
court considered Bouslaugh’s mental health issues, the aggravating factors
would still outweigh the mitigating factors, and it was not reasonably likely it
would have resulted in a more favorable sentence.
10
Finally, respondent notes that the abstract of judgment contains an
error and does not reflect the correct number of local conduct credits awarded
at the sentencing hearing. The abstract of judgment states that Bouslaugh
had 100 days of local conduct credit, while the trial court’s oral
pronouncement stated that he had 110 days of local conduct credit. “Courts
may correct clerical errors at any time, and appellate courts . . . have ordered
correction of abstracts of judgment that did not accurately reflect the oral
judgments of sentencing courts.” (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181,
185.) Therefore, we shall direct the court to correct this clerical error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. We direct the trial court to issue an
amended abstract of judgment to reflect the correct number of local custody
credits and forward a certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to
the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
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_________________________
Gordon, J.*
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Brown, P. J.
_________________________
Goldman, J.
* Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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