Filed 9/16/26 P. v. Boggs CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SIX
THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B345633
(Super. Ct. No. 2024018172 )
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Ventura County)
v.
BRYAN LEE BOGGS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Bryan Lee Boggs appeals from the judgment after a jury
convicted him of assault by force likely to produce great bodily
injury (force-likely assault, Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(4); count
1, felony), infliction of corporal injury on a dating
partner/cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a); count 2, felony), and two
counts of battery of a dating partner/cohabitant (§ 243, subd.
(e)(1); counts 3 and 4, misdemeanors). The jury also found true
allegations that Boggs engaged in violent conduct indicating a
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
serious danger to society (Cal. Rules of Court,2 rule 4.421(b)(1)).
Boggs admitted a prior strike under the “Three Strikes” law
(§§ 667, subds. (c)(1), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (a)(1), (c)(1)), a prior
serious or violent felony conviction (§ 1170, subd. (h)(3)), a prior
conviction within seven years of corporal injury on a cohabitant
(§ 273.5, subd. (f)(1)), prior convictions or juvenile adjudications
that were numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule
4.421(b)(2)), and having served a prior prison term (rule
4.421(b)(3)). The trial court sentenced Boggs to 12 years in state
prison for counts 1 and 2, and concurrent county jail sentences of
365 days for counts 3 and 4.
Boggs contends the trial court erred when it admitted
evidence he threatened to have the Mongols kill the victim,
entered convictions for both counts 2 and 3 that were part of the
same course of conduct (§ 954), and failed to stay count 2 or 3
(§ 654). We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Boggs strangled his cohabitant and fiancée, G.N.3, until she
was unconscious. In other incidents he kicked her, struck her
with bottles, and threatened her life. Boggs had 10 prior
convictions for domestic violence against six other women.
G.N. described the crimes against her to police and a
neighbor. She also described the abuse in a sworn request for a
domestic violence restraining order, including Boggs’s threat to
have members of the Mongols kill her. She recanted at trial,
stating that Boggs had never choked her, kicked her, hit her with
2 All rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
3 We refer to the victim by her initials to protect her
privacy. (Rule 8.90(b)(4).)
2
a bottle, or physically abused her. The prosecution impeached
her testimony with her prior statements. Boggs testified on his
own behalf and denied using any violence against G.N.
Count 1 (§ 245, subd. (a)(4))
In mid-June 2024, Boggs strangled G.N. to the point of
unconsciousness. When she woke up, he was pounding on her
chest. She told police he had “a habit of choking” her.
Counts 2 and 3 (§§ 273.5, subd. (a), 243, subd. (e)(1))
On the morning of July 4, 2024, Boggs was angry that he
had woken up late. He and G.N. argued in the living room.
When G.N. turned to go to the kitchen to finish making
breakfast, Boggs said, “[D]on’t walk away from me when I’m . . .
talking to you.” He then kicked the back of her thigh. G.N. told
him, “[T]hat’s not right. You can’t be kicking me and stuff.”
Boggs then followed G.N. into the kitchen and started
“throwing things.” “[R]ight after” the kick, Boggs “pound[ed]” her
arm three or four times with a half-full glass handle4 of vodka.
G.N. believed he was aiming the bottle at her head. She
described the incident to a police officer and showed him the
bruises on her arm. G.N.’s leg was “a little tender” but she did
not check if there was a bruise on her leg from the kick.
The prosecutor told the jury the kick was the basis for
count 3, misdemeanor battery of a cohabitant (§ 243, subd. (e)(1)),
and the battery with the bottle causing bruises was the basis for
count 2, felony infliction of corporal injury on a cohabitant
(§ 273.5, subd. (a)).
4 “Handle” is slang for a 1.75 liter liquor bottle, which
frequently (as here) has a handle. (See Doe v. Delta Tau Delta
Beta Alpha Chapter (S.D. Ind., July 11, 2018, No. 1:16-CV-01480-
JMS-DML) 2018 WL 3375016, at *2, fn. 3 [nonpub. opn.].)
3
Count 4 (§ 243, subd. (e)(1))
On the morning of July 5, 2024, Boggs made G.N. leave the
house. She took a bus to her work to pick up her paycheck and
Boggs followed her on another bus. While G.N. sat outside
waiting for her jobsite to open, Boggs confronted her and told her
he was going to “rupture [her] spleen” and “crack [her] head.” He
spit on her neck and hit her arm with a half-full cranberry juice
bottle. G.N. went into her work and told an employee that Boggs
was harassing her.
G.N. described this incident to a police officer and said
there had been approximately 15 to 20 prior domestic violence
incidents between them.
Sentencing
The trial court denied Boggs’s Romero5 motion to strike the
prior strike. The court sentenced Boggs to 10 years for count 2
(high term of five years, doubled for the strike), two years
consecutive for count 1 (one-third middle term, doubled for the
strike), and 365 days in county jail concurrent for counts 3 and 4.
DISCUSSION
Evidence of threat
Boggs contends the trial court abused its discretion when it
admitted G.N.’s statement that Boggs threatened to have the
Mongols kill her. We are not persuaded.
G.N. completed a written request for a domestic violence
restraining order and signed it under penalty of perjury. It
stated in part: “He is constantly threatening to kill me himself or
have me killed by his mother or members of the Mongol M.C.,
5 People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
4
which he rode with but never patched.”6 Boggs objected to
admission of the statement. The trial court ruled that if G.N.
denied making the statement, the prosecution could impeach her
with it as a prior inconsistent statement. The court found it was
not “particularly inflammatory” compared to the inflammatory
conduct of strangulation in the case.
After G.N. denied Boggs had used force against her or
threatened her, the request for domestic violence restraining
order was admitted into evidence. The prosecution had G.N. read
a portion aloud to the jury, including the threat. Boggs testified
he did not make the threat. The prosecution did not mention the
Mongols in closing argument and made no further reference to
them during trial.
We agree with the Attorney General that this evidence was
admissible as a prior inconsistent statement relevant to G.N.’s
credibility. (Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (h).) The threat was also
relevant to her motive to recant and to deny the abuse occurred.
(Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f); People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th
833, 869–870.)
But even if evidence is relevant, “[t]he court in its
discretion may exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission
will . . . create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing
the issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
“[E]ven where gang membership is relevant, because it may have
a highly inflammatory impact on the jury trial courts should
6 A “patch” on a motorcycle jacket indicates membership in
a particular motorcycle club. (See Hessians Motorcycle Club v.
J.C. Flanagans (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 833, 835.)
5
carefully scrutinize such evidence before admitting it.” (People v.
Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 193 [gang evidence properly
admitted].) “The admission of gang evidence over an Evidence
Code section 352 objection will not be disturbed on appeal unless
the trial court’s decision exceeds the bounds of reason.” (People v.
Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1369.)
We conclude no error has been shown. In our view, the
evidence was not unduly prejudicial. The Mongols were not
identified as a gang, and no evidence was introduced about them.
Nor was Boggs identified as a member. Instead, Boggs merely
“rode with” them but “never patched.” Thus, unlike People v.
Garcia (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1040, Boggs was not described as
a “violent gangster[]” (id. at p. 1056) who was a member of an
“ ‘extremely dangerous’ ” gang that “existed to commit violent
crimes,” including killings (id. at pp. 1048–1049).
In light of the evidence of Boggs’s violence against G.N. and
other women and G.N. recanting her statements about the abuse,
the brief reference to the Mongols was de minimis. We conclude
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it determined the
probative value was not “substantially outweighed” by the danger
of undue prejudice. (Evid. Code, § 352; People v. Escobar (2000)
82 Cal.App.4th 1085, 1096–1097.)
Multiple convictions
Boggs also contends counts 2 and 3 constitute a single
offense and one count must therefore be dismissed. We disagree.
“An accusatory pleading may charge two or more different
offenses connected together in their commission . . . under
separate counts . . . . [T]he defendant may be convicted of any
number of the offenses charged.” (§ 954.)
Multiple convictions for one crime are unauthorized, “and
the fact that the sentences were ordered to run concurrently does
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not cure the error.” (People v. Nor Woods (1951) 37 Cal.2d 584,
586.) “We review de novo the issue of whether multiple
convictions are proper under section 954.” (People v. Rodriguez
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 921, 936.)
“Sometimes, multiple convictions are appropriate for
similar acts during a single course of conduct.” (People v. Wilson
(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 193, 200, fn. omitted [criminal threats].)
To determine the correct number of counts, we “ ‘determine when
“the actus reus prohibited by the statute—the gravamen of the
offense—has been committed more than once.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 199.)
Here, the crime of battery on a cohabitant (count 3) was
complete when Boggs kicked G.N.’s leg. When he hit her arm
with the vodka bottle leaving bruises, Boggs committed the
additional crime of causing a traumatic injury on a cohabitant
(count 2).
Multiple convictions are not barred by the closeness in
time between counts 2 and 3. Multiple convictions may be
entered for “rapidly repeated crimes.” (People v. Harrison (1989)
48 Cal.3d 321, 325 [multiple acts of genital penetration].) The
offenses need not be “punctuated by violations of other statutes”
or be separated “ ‘by an appreciable passage of time’ ” or by “ ‘a
reasonable opportunity for reflection.’ ” (Id. at pp. 332–333.)
This principle is not limited to sex crimes. “[A] defendant
may be convicted of multiple crimes—even if the crimes are part
of the same impulse, intention or plan—as long as each
conviction reflects a completed criminal act.” (People v. Kirvin
(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1507, 1518 [multiple phone calls on same
day attempting to dissuade witness]; see People v. Whitmer
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 741 [series of theft offenses]; People v.
Campbell (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 666, 673–675 [hitting 10 groups
of people while continuously driving car constituted 10 counts of
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failure to stop at scene of an accident].)
In People v. Johnson (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1467, the
Court of Appeal affirmed three counts of corporal injury on a
cohabitant (§ 273.5). The defendant struck and stabbed various
parts of the victim’s body in a single incident, resulting in
separate injuries. (Johnson, at p. 1477.) The court upheld the
three convictions because a violation of section 273.5 “is complete
upon the willful and direct application of physical force upon the
victim, resulting in a wound or injury.” (Johnson, at p. 1477.)
Similarly here, the crime of battery was completed when Boggs
kicked G.N. He completed an additional crime when he struck
her arm with the vodka bottle causing injury.
This case is unlike People v. Aguayo (2022) 13 Cal.5th 974.
There, our Supreme Court barred multiple convictions under
section 954 because the counts of assault with a deadly weapon
and force-likely assault were “ ‘different statements of the same
offense’ ” and the jury could have based them on the same
conduct of striking the victim with a bicycle chain. (Aguayo, at
pp. 993–994.) And in People v. Waxlax (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th
579, 583, 590, section 954 barred multiple convictions for assault
with a deadly weapon and force-likely assault based on a single
stab wound. But in contrast here, the jury found Boggs guilty of
separate completed acts of kicking G.N. and causing injury by
striking her with a vodka bottle. The court did not err in
entering convictions for both counts based on separate acts.
Multiple punishment
Related to the issue of whether counts 2 and 3 constitute
separate convictions pursuant to section 954 is whether Boggs
may be punished for both counts pursuant to section 654. (People
v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226–1227.) Boggs contends that
counts 2 and 3 were committed in the same course of conduct
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with the same intent, requiring one of the counts be stayed
pursuant to section 654. We again disagree.
“An act or omission that is punishable in different ways by
different provisions of law” shall not “be punished under more
than one provision.” (§ 654, subd. (a).) Section 654 also precludes
multiple punishment for “a course of conduct encompassing
several acts pursued with a single objective.” (People v.
Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) Multiple punishment is
permitted when a course of conduct involving more than a single
act “reflects . . . multiple intents and objectives.” (Ibid.)
When the facts are undisputed, the application of section
654 is a question of law we review de novo. (People v. Corpening,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 312.) “A trial court’s express or implied
determination that two crimes were separate, involving separate
objectives, must be upheld on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence.” (People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599, 618.)
Although counts 2 and 3 were committed close in time,
substantial evidence supports the conclusion that they involved
separate objectives. Boggs kicked G.N. in the leg because she
walked away from him while he was talking. A reasonable
inference is that Boggs kicked G.N. to get her attention. It is also
a reasonable inference that when he struck G.N. repeatedly with
the vodka bottle on her arm, which G.N. believed was initially
aimed at her head, Boggs’s intent was to injure her.
Our appellate courts have upheld punishment for multiple
assaults committed during the same incident. In People v.
Vasquez (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 732, our colleagues in Division
Five upheld punishment for both attempted murder based on
stabbing the victim in the chest, and mayhem based on biting
and cutting the victim’s fingers when she put her fingers in his
eyes to defend herself. (Id. at p. 735.) The court accepted the
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implied finding that the defendant’s “intent in biting her fingers
was not to kill [her], but to retaliate against her for using her
fingers to injure him.” (Id. at p. 739.)
Similarly, in People v. Nubla (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 719,
the defendant was convicted of causing a traumatic injury
(nosebleed) when he pushed his wife’s face down onto the bed,
and assault with a deadly weapon for pushing a gun into the back
of her head and into her mouth. (Id. at pp. 723, 730.) The First
District Court of Appeal concluded that multiple punishment was
not precluded by section 654 because none of the acts were
committed as a means to accomplish the other acts, and none of
the acts were incidental to the other. (Nubla, at p. 731.) The
same is true here. Kicking G.N. in the leg was not a means to
strike her arm with the bottle, and was not incidental to that
crime.
“ ‘A person who commits separate, factually distinct,
crimes, even with only one ultimate intent and objective, is more
culpable than the person who commits only one crime in pursuit
of the same intent and objective.’ ” (People v. Correa (2012) 54
Cal.4th 331, 341.) We conclude the trial court did not err in
imposing punishment for both counts 2 and 3.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BALTODANO, J.
We concur:
CODY, P. J. YEGAN, J.
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Catherine M. Voelker, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
______________________________
Sally Patrone, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey,
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Blake
Armstrong, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.