Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

P. v. Black CA4/3

Filed 11/9/26 P. v. Black CA4/3
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 11/9/26 P. v. Black CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G065379

v. (Super. Ct. No. 19WF2388)

AMY LYNN BLACK, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Gary S. Paer, Judge. Affirmed.
Marcia R. Clark, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, A. Natasha Cortina and Elizabeth M. Renner, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Amy Lynn Black was convicted of second degree
implied malice murder under an aiding and abetting theory. She contends
the conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence that she knew the
perpetrator would commit the life-endangering act or intended to aid him in
doing so. We affirm.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August 2024, the Orange County District Attorney filed a
second amended information charging Black with the murder of Carlos
Aguilar. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).)1 The information also charged Black
with conspiracy to commit murder (§§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a)(1)),
possession of heroin for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11351), and possession of
methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378).
In October 2024, a jury acquitted Black of first degree murder
and conspiracy to commit murder, but convicted her of second degree murder
and both drug offenses. The trial court sentenced Black to 15 years to life for
the murder and imposed concurrent terms of three years for the heroin
offense and two years for the methamphetamine offense. Black timely
appealed.

1
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.

2
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
I.
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE
In August 2019, Black lived in a motel room in Stanton. The
motel was located within feet of territory claimed by the Crow Village gang.
Joel Martinez, a member of the gang known as “Capone” or “Caps,” supplied
Black with drugs, which she sold out of her room and in Crow Village
territory. Black was in close contact with Martinez; in the two weeks prior to
the murder, they exchanged 132 text messages and 32 voice calls.
Black was involved in a romantic relationship with Aguilar, who
belonged to Crow Village’s rival gang, the Lopers. Their relationship was
tumultuous, marked by infidelity and accusations thereof. Multiple witnesses
testified they heard Black and Aguilar argue loudly, and Black’s friend and
customer J.P. testified he observed injuries on Black and to her property on
several occasions.
In the early morning hours of August 22, 2019, Black texted
Martinez, “I need u to call me.”2 Around the same time, she and a contact
named “My Bud” exchanged numerous text messages about Aguilar and his
alleged infidelity. Black complained Aguilar was “over chilling in a.Bitches
room getting loaded.” She continued, “He cheated on me for the last time,”
and “I can never forgive him.”
Around the same time, Black texted another contact, referred to
as Woo, “its now time to start dishing back what the fuck has been being
served.” Woo responded, “All U gotta go is say the word Mija.” After a few

2
All text messages are reproduced with abbreviations and
grammatical errors intact to accurately reflect the nature and content of the
conversations.

3
more messages, Black told Woo, “Either he goes or i do.” Black continued, “Im
done hurting.” “I want him gone gone.” Black subsequently reiterated to Woo,
“I want him GONE,” “Completely Fucking Gone.”
A few hours later, Black texted My Bud, “I’m gonna have him
removed,” “It’s already in motion,” and “He can no longer get away with this.”
Black told My Bud to “Find him” and “Let him know.” Black also texted
another contact, “Aleah,” to ask if she had “seen his bitch ass.”
Over the next two days, Black sent text messages to My Bud,
Woo, and Aleah asking if they had seen Aguilar. Black also sent a Facebook
message to Aguilar’s sister, whom she had never met, asking if the sister
could have Aguilar call Black.
Around 2:15 a.m. on August 26, 2019, Black sent Aguilar a series
of text messages accusing him of sleeping in her car and asking who he had
been with instead of her. Later that morning, Aguilar came to the motel. He
and Black engaged in a screaming match, and Aguilar kicked in the door to
Black’s room. As Aguilar was leaving the property, another resident heard
Black yell “over and over,” “‘you’re going to die, I’m going to kill you.’” The
resident testified the last thing she heard Black say to Aguilar was “‘I’m
gonna make sure you’re dead.’”
After the altercation, around 9:30 a.m., Black texted Aguilar,
“Your done. I don’t give two fucks…. U broke my door… Been up in my car…
All that’s on camera.” Aguilar replied, “It’s ok call the Cops that’s war u do.”
In a series of five messages sent within 30 seconds, Black responded, “Plus
I’m making other calls as well,” “Your done for,” “For real this time,” “You’re
done,” and “Watch.” After Aguilar responded, “Ok,” Black continued, “Your
done bitch,” “Ur done,” “Your fucked,” “Watch,” and “Run.”

4
In the midst of this exchange with Aguilar, Black texted
Martinez, “I’m not paying to be fucking ignored,” and “I need help.” Martinez
responded at 11:41 a.m., “Whats up,” and, a few minutes later, “Where are
you just got phone back.” Black responded she was in her room and things
were calm. At 12:18 p.m., Martinez responded, “Let me get mobile.” At 12:32
p.m., Black replied she believed Aguilar was no longer in the immediate area
and mentioned some places she heard he might be.
Aguilar returned to the motel at about 12:46 p.m. Black called
Martinez twice, at 12:52 and 12:53 p.m. She then texted Martinez, “Come
fast” at 12:53 p.m., and called him again at 12:55 and 12:57 p.m.
Martinez arrived at Black’s room around 1:10 p.m., with two
other men. One of them, Brandon Iseminger, testified at trial as part of a
plea deal. Iseminger testified he fell asleep in the backseat of a friend’s car on
the night of August 25 and awoke when the car pulled out of the driveway in
“‘broad daylight’” the following day. Iseminger’s friend T.R. was driving.
Martinez, who was in the front passenger seat, asked Iseminger if he “wanted
to go fuck somebody up.” Iseminger did not know who Martinez was talking
about, but “figured it had something to do with” Black when they arrived at
the motel. Iseminger got “on board,” because Martinez had helped him in the
past and he thought there would be “a physical altercation at the most.”
When they parked at the motel, Martinez exited the car and went
into Black’s room. As Iseminger followed, he saw Black and Aguilar arguing
and Martinez standing on the bed. Black was telling Aguilar to leave or “get
the fuck out,” and saying, “‘I told you so, this was going to happen.’” Aguilar
“kind of got physical” with Black, “kind of hugging her” with his hands
around her torso, “against her will.” At that point, Iseminger saw Martinez

5
“in a firing position” with a gun drawn. He had seen Martinez “pull a gun” in
the past, but had never seen him fire.
Iseminger nevertheless “knew instantly it was going to change
my life forever” and left the room to go outside. Shortly thereafter, he heard a
gunshot. Iseminger “freaked out and ran to the car.” Martinez also ran to the
car, which left the motel at approximately 1:13 p.m. Later in the day,
Martinez told Iseminger, “‘I killed him, he’s dead.’”
The motel manager testified he was in his room a little after 1:00
p.m. when he heard a loud noise and Black screaming, “‘my dog, my dog.’” He
went outside and saw people chasing a dog. He followed them back to Black’s
room, where he saw Aguilar lying face down on the floor. The manager called
911 and handed the phone to Black, who seemed “confused.”
Another motel resident, C.C., heard someone calling for a dog. He
followed the dog, then went to Black’s room to get a leash. C.C. saw Aguilar
lying in the doorway. Aguilar was moaning, and there was blood.
Orange County Sheriff’s Department deputies arrived on the
scene within minutes of the 911 call. Black was “frantic” as she told the
deputies, “someone was down in the room.” The deputies found Aguilar lying
in the doorway, silent and lifeless. They determined he was deceased. An
autopsy revealed the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the chest. The
shot was fired with a downward trajectory and likely killed Aguilar within
minutes. Martinez’s DNA matched a DNA sample recovered from a bullet
casing found in the room.
Black’s friend J.P. went to the motel in the early morning hours
of August 27, 2019, after hearing about the shooting on the news. Black told
him Aguilar was dead and casually said, “‘I smoked him.’” When J.P. asked

6
for clarification, Black said, “‘I shot him’” and “damn right I did.” Black also
told J.P. that Crow Village gave her the “green light” to kill Aguilar.
II.
DEFENSE EVIDENCE
Black testified she and Aguilar dated for a couple of years and
had a “[v]ery rocky” relationship. The good times initially outweighed the
bad, but the relationship devolved over time as Aguilar abused heroin, stole
money and drugs from Black, and physically abused her. The physical abuse
began when Black was pregnant and ranged from throwing objects to choking
her to threatening her with knives. Aguilar also “play[ed] games with
[Black’s] head” by acting erratically and making empty promises. Black never
reported the domestic violence to law enforcement and did not cooperate with
law enforcement on the one occasion they were called.
Black described Martinez as her “friend” and “connect in the drug
world.” She knew he was a Crow Village gang member who killed people who
disrespected him. Black had also heard Martinez carried a gun. When Black
had difficulties with Aguilar in the past, she asked Martinez to help her by
talking to Aguilar because he was “the only one that Carlos seemed to listen
to, to have any response to.” About eight months prior to the shooting, at
Black’s request, Martinez “took Carlos outside and talked to him. And after
he was done, Carlos left.” Aguilar was incarcerated shortly after that, but
Black knew they would resume their relationship when he was released.
By August 2019, Aguilar had been released and “put hands on”
Black again. Black texted her friend Mike, listed in her phone as “My Bud,”
because she was in pain and brokenhearted. When she told Mike she was
going to have Aguilar “removed” and that was “already in motion,” she meant
she “was going to have him told to stay away, not even to come around.” That

7
plan did not involve Martinez; rather, Black planned to have “[d]ifferent
people in the neighborhood” tell Aguilar to leave and stay away.
Black also texted her friend Woo around the same time she
texted Mike. When she told Woo it was “time to start dishing back what the
fuck has been being served,” she just meant she was no longer going to let
Aguilar control her. Black wanted Aguilar “removed,” or “told that he can’t be
around there.” When she said she wanted Aguilar “gone gone,” she meant she
wanted him to leave and not come back.
Black explained she looked for Aguilar in the days following her
texts with Mike and Woo because she “was missing him” and was worried he
may have overdosed. Black eventually learned Aguilar had been sleeping in
her car, and she was upset about it.
On the morning of August 26, 2019, Aguilar came to Black’s
room, kicked in her door, choked her, and threatened to kill her. Black was
“mad” and texted Aguilar he was “done.” Black did not tell Aguilar she was
going to kill him or make any of the similar statements the other motel
resident testified she overheard that morning. When Black texted Aguilar
she was making other calls, she was referring to Martinez, whom she wanted
to “remove Carlos just like he did eight months before.” Black’s text to
Martinez about not paying to be ignored referred both to drug sales and his
failure to respond to her. Black never spoke to Martinez about doing
something to Aguilar.
When Martinez responded to Black’s texts later that morning,
she told him Aguilar was no longer there. Black had “really no reason” to
mention Aguilar’s possible whereabouts. Black texted Martinez to “come fast”
after Aguilar returned to the motel and acted rudely and aggressively toward
her. Black feared Aguilar would get physical with her or break her

8
belongings. She wanted Martinez to talk to Aguilar like he had eight months
prior, not threaten or kill him.
Black and Aguilar saw Martinez and the others arrive on Black’s
surveillance camera. Black had not asked Martinez to bring anyone with him
and did not know he was going to. Aguilar called Black names before going
into the kitchen and “doing something on his phone.”
Martinez entered Black’s room, got onto the bed, and called
Aguilar out of the kitchen. Martinez told Aguilar he needed to leave. Aguilar
came out of the kitchen, grabbed Black, and told her he loved her and was
going to rehab. Black told him it was too late, and he needed to leave;
Martinez also told Aguilar to get out. Black heard Aguilar say, “‘If you’re
going to shoot me, shoot me now’” and saw Martinez “pulling something”
before she heard a pop and saw smoke. Black “never really saw the gun.” She
never asked anyone to hurt or murder Aguilar.
After the shooting, Martinez ran out of the room; so did Black’s
dog. Black “was frantic” and did not know what to do. She did not want to
touch Aguilar for fear of hurting him further. She screamed, “My dog,” and
asked neighbors to call 911, but they did not want to get involved. The motel
manager came by and called 911, and Black spoke to the operator. Black then
went back to her room and started removing drug paraphernalia; she gave it
to neighbors and told them to get rid of it. At some point, she looked over at
Aguilar and saw him take his last breath.
When law enforcement arrived, Black spoke with them and
identified Martinez as the shooter. She also told them Iseminger was present,
and she identified both in a photographic lineup. Black showed the officers
some messages from her phone. She denied telling J.P. she “smoked” or “shot”
Aguilar or that there was a “green light” on Aguilar.

9
Black’s friend B.C. testified she knew Black for about five years
and considered her a peaceful person. B.C. saw Black and Aguilar argue, but
they seemed to be in love and she never saw Aguilar put his hands on Black.
B.C. had stayed in Black’s room the night before the shooting. Black seemed
fine and did not discuss Aguilar or threaten him. B.C. was not present at the
time of the shooting. When she returned to the motel later that day, she
heard Black screaming. That night, B.C. helped Black clean up her room;
Black was “devastated” and “barely able to function.”
Black’s friend Mike (“My Bud”) also testified Black was a
peaceful person. Mike described Aguilar as a “gang member” who “didn’t do
things like a normal boyfriend would do.” Black and Aguilar seemed to fight a
lot, and Black complained to Mike about Aguilar cheating on her. Mike never
heard Black threaten Aguilar or say she wanted to harm him. He understood
Black’s text messages about having Aguilar removed to mean Black was
going to break up with him. Black was sad after the shooting.
A volunteer jail chaplain who met Black after her arrest testified
Black seemed “[v]ery depressed and very quiet.” On the occasions Black
spoke to the chaplain about Aguilar, she seemed sad and cried. The chaplain
never saw Black display a temper and considered her a peaceful person.
III.
REBUTTAL EVIDENCE
An Orange County Sheriff’s Deputy testified he had responded to
a call about a domestic dispute at the motel in November 2018. When he
spoke to Black, she denied any physical altercation, and the deputy did not
see any injuries on her.
An Orange County Sheriff’s Lieutenant testified she spent
several hours with Black on the day of the shooting. Black did not cry and

10
was not hysterical. In fact, she “chuckled a few times” while she was being
interviewed.
DISCUSSION
Black contends the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to
support her conviction for murder as an aider and abettor. We disagree.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most
favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial
evidence–that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value–
from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.” (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) “We presume
in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact
reasonably could infer from the evidence.” (Ibid.) We do not reweigh evidence
or reevaluate witness credibility. (Ibid.) “If the circumstances reasonably
justify the trier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted
simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.” (Ibid.) We reverse only if there is no hypothesis under
which the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction. (People v. Cravens
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.)
II.
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
“Second degree murder is the unlawful killing of a human being
with malice aforethought but without the additional elements, such as
willfulness, premeditation, and deliberation, that would support a conviction
of first degree murder.” (People v. Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 151.) Malice

11
may be express or implied. (§ 188, subd. (a).) “Murder is committed with
implied malice when ‘the killing is proximately caused by “‘an act, the
natural consequences of which are dangerous to life, which act was
deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers
the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.’”’” (People v.
Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 988 (Reyes).)
A person may be found guilty of second degree implied malice
murder under a direct aiding and abetting theory. (See Reyes, supra, 14
Cal.5th at pp. 990–991.) “‘[D]irect aiding and abetting is based on the
combined actus reus of the participants and the aider and abettor’s own mens
rea. [Citation.] In the context of implied malice, the actus reus required of the
perpetrator is the commission of a life-endangering act. For the direct aider
and abettor, the actus reus includes whatever acts constitute aiding the
commission of the life-endangering act. Thus, to be liable for an implied
malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid
the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act. The
mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor,
is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid
the perpetrator in the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is
dangerous to human life, and acting in conscious disregard for human life.’”
(Id. at pp. 990–991.) A life-endangering act is the act which proximately
causes death. (People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689, 713, fn. 27.)
“The aider and abettor must know the direct perpetrator intends
to commit the murder or life-endangering act and intend to aid the direct
perpetrator in its commission.” (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 468.)
“It is this mental relationship to the perpetrator’s acts that confers liability
on the aider and abettor.” (Ibid.) The defendant’s intent is considered

12
subjectively. He or she must have actually appreciated the risk involved to be
found guilty as an aider and abettor. (People v. Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th 293,
311.) Thus, the defendant must (1) know the perpetrator intended the life-
endangering act, (2) intend to aid the perpetrator in that act, (3) know the act
was dangerous to human life, (4) and act in conscious disregard for human
life. (See Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 992.)
III.
ANALYSIS
The life-endangering act in this case is the gunshot Martinez
fired at Aguilar. Black argues she neither anticipated the act nor intended to
assist Martinez in it. There is substantial evidence to the contrary.
In the days prior to the incident, Black and Aguilar had a falling
out over Aguilar’s alleged infidelity. Black texted several friends, making
statements including “He cheated on me for the last time,” “I can never
forgive him,” “its now time to start dishing back what the fuck has been being
served,” and “Either he goes or i do.” After reaching out to Martinez, a gang
member she knew carried a gun and had killed people who disrespected him,
Black escalated her rhetoric about Aguilar, telling her friends, “I want him
gone gone,” “I want him GONE,” “Completely Fucking Gone,” “I’m gonna
have him removed,” and “It’s already in motion.” She also began inquiring
about Aguilar’s whereabouts, even reaching out to his sister, whom she had
never met. After Black located Aguilar and the pair engaged in a screaming
match, she orally told Aguilar he was “‘going to die,’” “‘I’m going to kill you,’”
and she was “‘gonna make sure you’re dead.’” Black followed up these oral
threats with a series of text messages to Aguilar, telling him he was “done
for,” “[f]or real this time” and to “Run.” Before Aguilar returned to the motel,
Black shared with Martinez places that Aguilar might be found. Then, when

13
Aguilar arrived at the motel, Black called Martinez several times and texted
him to “come fast.” A reasonable jury could conclude from this evidence Black
anticipated and intended the shooting.
Black contends such inferences are unsupported. She points out
she never texted anyone she wanted Aguilar killed, and she claims “none of
the recipients of those texts believed that was what [she] meant.” With
respect to the explicit oral threats to kill Aguilar, she asserts “it’s probably
fair to infer” they were a standard feature of her and Aguilar’s tumultuous
relationship, “which was why Aguilar showed no signs of concern when [she]
threatened to kill him and simply rode away.” Black further claims, as she
testified, that she simply wanted Martinez to talk to Aguilar, as he had eight
months earlier.
Although the jury could have drawn Black’s desired inferences, it
was not required to. “[R]eversal of the judgment is not warranted simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.” (People v. Lindberg, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 27.)
Black also argues her testimony “is entirely consistent with that
of Iseminger, the prosecution’s key witness,” and both their testimony
established “neither of them knew or believed Martinez would shoot Aguilar.”
She asserts there would have been no reason for her or Martinez to tell
Aguilar to leave if they had intended to kill him, and she points to
Iseminger’s testimony that when he agreed to accompany Martinez to the
motel, he assumed there would be “a physical altercation at the most.”
The jury reasonably could have concluded otherwise. Iseminger
testified he had not seen Martinez shoot anyone before but nevertheless left
the room “when [he] saw the situation” and “knew instantly it was going to
change [his] life forever.” The jury was not required to credit Iseminger in

14
any event. It instead could have placed greater weight on other evidence,
such as Black’s numerous communications with Martinez and her other
friends, her statement that she had gotten a “green light” to kill Aguilar, her
oral threats to Aguilar on the day he was killed that he was “going to die,”
she was “going to kill [him]” and she was “gonna make sure [he was] dead,”
and her comment to a friend after Aguilar died that she had “smoked” him.
The jury also may have found Black’s post-shooting conduct
relevant and indicative of her conscious disregard for human life. (See People
v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 894–895.) Although such evidence is not
sufficient, “standing alone, to support murder liability,” it may provide
insight as to whether Black “acted with the requisite state of mind when the
shooting occurred.” (Id. at p. 895.) Rather than render aid to Aguilar or even
dial 911, Black ran after her dog and busied herself removing drug
paraphernalia from her room, all while Aguilar lay bleeding and moaning on
the ground. There was also evidence she boasted to her friend about
“smoking” Aguilar and “chuckled a few times” during her interview with law
enforcement. Black argues this evidence was “directly contradicted” by
evidence she was frantic and hysterical and cooperated with law enforcement,
but the weighing of contradictory evidence is a task for the factfinder, not this
court.
Black contends Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th 981, “fully supports the
conclusion . . . the evidence failed to prove appellant had the requisite
knowledge, i.e., mens rea, or that she committed the necessary act, i.e., actus
reus, to justify liability as an aider and abettor in an implied malice murder.”
We disagree. Reyes is distinguishable.
In Reyes, fifteen-year-old Reyes was with a group of gang-
affiliated teens and young men on bicycles. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at

15
p. 985.) Reyes was aware one of the others was carrying a gun. (Ibid.) The
group chased a car in rival gang territory; a single gunshot killed the driver.
(Ibid.) Reyes was charged with and convicted of the murder. (Ibid.) In
addition to arguing the then-valid natural and probable consequences theory,
the prosecutor argued Reyes “directly aided and abetted the murder by
‘backing up fellow gang members’ during the killing.” (Ibid.) The Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial of Reyes’s motion for resentencing
under section 1172.6. (See Reyes, at pp. 986–987.)
The Supreme Court reversed. It found the trial court “did not
appear to recognize that implied malice murder requires, among other
elements, proof of the aider and abettor’s knowledge and intent with regard
to the direct perpetrator’s life[-]endangering act.” (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 991.) It held the trial court “should have asked whether Reyes knew Lopez
intended to shoot at the victim, intended to aid him in the shooting, knew
that the shooting was dangerous to life, and acted in conscious disregard for
life.” (Id. at p. 992.) Because the trial court did not, and there was “no
evidence that Reyes’s acts precipitated or provoked the shooting” or did
anything more than “create a dangerous situation in which death is possible”
(id. at p. 989), the court found the conviction could not stand.
Here, there was ample evidence Black’s conduct went beyond
simply creating a potentially dangerous situation and instead was a
substantial factor contributing to the shooting. Black expressed a desire to
“remove” Aguilar, took steps to locate him, contacted Martinez to “come fast”
when Aguilar arrived at her room, and took no steps to prevent a
confrontation when Martinez arrived. Unlike Reyes, who merely knew one
member of his large group was carrying a gun, Black took active steps to set
up the confrontation between Aguilar and his rival gang member Martinez.

16
This was after she had threatened Aguilar she was going to kill him and after
she told Martinez she needed some “help” from him. She set up the
confrontation aware Martinez was known to carry a gun, aware Martinez had
previously shot people, and after she and Martinez had exchanged more than
100 texts and calls in the preceding week–during a time she was texting
other friends that she wanted Aguilar “gone gone,” that she wanted him
“GONE,” “Completely Fucking Gone,” and that she was going to have Aguilar
“removed” and it was “already in motion.”
There was, in short, substantial evidence from which the jury
could have concluded Black knew Martinez intended to shoot Aguilar,
intended to aid him in that act, knew the act was dangerous to human life,
and acted in conscious disregard for human life. We accordingly affirm her
conviction for implied malice murder under an aiding and abetting theory.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

GOODING, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, ACTING P. J.

DELANEY, J.

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