Filed 6/25/26 P. v. Bishop CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B344962
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA060882)
v.
GREGORY BISHOP,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Alison Matsumoto, Judge. Affirmed.
Bess Stiffelman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General,
Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Steven E. Mercer,
Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Gregory Bishop was convicted of numerous counts of
kidnapping for sexual purposes, and forcible rape, sodomy and oral
copulation while acting in concert. He was 17 years old at the time of the
heinous offenses. The trial court sentenced him to 166 years in state prison.
In 2023, Bishop filed a petition for recall of sentence under Penal Code
section 1170, subdivision (d).1 Under that statute, the trial court must recall
and resentence a petitioner if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that
at least one of four qualifying circumstances is satisfied. Following a
hearing, the trial court denied the petition, finding that Bishop did not meet
his burden. Specifically, the court found that Bishop failed to establish that
he had performed acts that tended to indicate rehabilitation or the potential
for rehabilitation. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(D).)
On appeal, Bishop argues the trial court erred when it found he did not
establish the qualifying circumstance. In addition, Bishop asserts an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim for failure to raise the qualifying
circumstance that he committed the offenses with at least one adult
codefendant. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(C).) We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Prosecution’s Evidence
On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the appellate opinion in
People v. Bishop (Aug. 28, 1998, B106688) [nonpub. opn.]. The following facts
are taken directly from the opinion.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
a. The Attacks Against Sandra E.
Shortly after 8:00 p.m. on December 25, 1991, Sandra E. returned home
from the laundromat and honked her car horn hoping someone would come
out and help her with the laundry. Two men walked toward her on the
sidewalk. The taller man grabbed her from behind, put his hand over her
mouth, and put a gun to her left temple.
The taller man pulled Sandra into an alley by the side of the house. He
told the shorter man, whom Sandra identified as Bishop, to search her bra
and panties for money. As Bishop searched Sandra while the taller man held
the gun to her head, she noticed Bishop’s face was swollen and one of his eyes
was smaller than the other. The taller man then gave Bishop the gun, which
he pointed at Sandra’s head, while the taller man searched her.
The taller man told Bishop to search Sandra’s car; Bishop did so and
said there was nothing in the car. The taller man took Sandra’s car keys and
told Bishop to bring the car to the alley. The taller man pushed Sandra into
the front seat and put a sweater from the laundry over her eyes. After they
drove for about five minutes, the taller man removed the sweater from her
eyes. She saw that they were in another alley.
The taller man, who still had the gun, pulled Sandra from the car and
pushed her against a wall. He called Bishop “Pee Wee,” and said they would
take her into the house. Bishop said they could not because his grandmother
was there. The taller man pulled Sandra toward the car, opened her blouse,
pulled down her pants, and gave the gun to Bishop. The taller man raped
her. Bishop said, “‘Hurry up.’” The taller man pushed Sandra into the car
and raped her again. Bishop said, “‘Hurry up, I want my turn.’” When the
taller man finished, Bishop threw Sandra to the ground and raped her.
Bishop took some of the laundry from the back seat of the car and
wiped off the steering wheel. The taller man told Sandra that if she called
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the police, he would kill her and her family because he knew where she lived.
Bishop said he was leaving, and the taller man said he could, so Bishop
walked up the alley. The taller man, still holding the gun, pushed Sandra
back into the car and tied a sweater around her eyes. He got in the car and
drove for a few minutes. She felt the car stop and heard the door open.
When she pulled off the blindfold, she saw that she was at 47th Street and
St. Andrews. She drove home.
When Sandra arrived home, she asked her mother to call her husband.
He rushed home and then they both went to the police station where Sandra
was interviewed by a police officer. She told the officer that one of the
suspects had a bruised or swollen face. The officer took Sandra to the
hospital. A sexual assault examination was performed at about 1:00 a.m. on
December 26, 1991. Blood, urine, and vaginal samples were obtained, a pubic
combing was conducted, and Sandra’s clothes were collected. She complained
of pain to her head, neck and back. The examining doctor found redness and
superficial lacerations around her vagina consistent with forcible sex.
On February 3, 1992, Sandra was shown two photographic six-packs by
the police. She wrote on the back of the card that “number 5 [Bishop’s
photograph] ‘looks an awful lot as the man that attacked me.’” Sandra also
identified Bishop at the preliminary hearing.
b. The Attacks Against Maria C.
At about 6:30 a.m. on January 24, 1992, Maria C. was standing at the
bus stop at the corner of Vernon Avenue and St. Andrews Place, near her
home. Maria saw two males approaching.
The taller man wore a black jacket with a hood that covered his
forehead and which was zipped up to his lip. The shorter man was wearing a
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black sweatshirt, dark pants, and gloves. His face was covered by a thick
stocking that had holes for his eyes, nose, and mouth. Maria estimated that
the taller man was 18 to 19 years old, and the shorter man was 17 to 18 years
old.
The shorter man grabbed Maria by the hair and put a gun to her left
temple. The shorter man told Maria that this was a sexual attack. While the
taller man stood watch, the shorter man, holding a gun, pulled Maria into an
alley. Maria held onto a fence while the shorter man tried to pull her into a
yard; he then put the gun in her mouth. The shorter man pulled her by the
hair, and the taller man pushed her up the stairs into a house. One of the
men hit her on the head behind her left ear.
Inside the house, both men removed her clothing. The shorter man
grabbed her by the hair and pulled her to a bed, while the taller man stood at
the door as a lookout.
The shorter man got on top of her and hit her on the left cheek with the
gun. The shorter man then put his fingers in Maria’s vagina, then his penis,
continuing to hold the gun in his hand. He then sodomized her and raped her
again. The shorter man forced her to orally copulate him twice. The shorter
man then stood at the door while the taller man took Maria to the bed and
raped her. He sodomized her, then raped her again. He forced her to orally
copulate him. He raped her again. With Maria on the bed, the shorter man
again put his penis in her vagina and tried to kiss her.
The shorter man got up and went through Maria’s purse. He found a
police officer’s card in her purse. The men said that they would kill her if she
called the police. They took her immigration card and said she would be
deported.
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While the shorter man held the gun, both men forced Maria to orally
copulate them simultaneously.
The men said they were going out to bring back some food, and that
they would kill her if she left. They left, taking her clothing. The shorter
man returned shortly thereafter and threw her underwear then her dress at
her. She put her dress on when she saw them walking down the alley, then
walked home.
When she arrived home, her mother, sister and brother-in-law were
there. They called the police, and paramedics took Maria to the hospital. A
sexual assault examination was performed, including collection of blood,
vaginal, oral and rectal samples, and pubic combings. Her clothing was
collected. Maria reported head, chest, and abdominal pain. The left side of
her head was swollen, and she had blood stains on her face, inner thigh,
underwear and dress. She had a hematoma on the left side of her head. She
had secretions on her left inner thigh. Her hymen was lacerated, and she
had a hematoma on the left portion of her hymen. She also had a laceration
in the area between her vagina and rectum, and rectal bleeding.
Maria was shown a photographic lineup but was unable to identify
anyone because the attackers covered their faces and her eyes.
c. Other Evidence
Regina Williams testified that she knew Bishop because her oldest
brother was a friend of his. She knew Bishop as “Pee Wee” and “Hot Dog.”
Bishop lived on 43rd Place near Western Avenue. Williams stated she and
Bishop would hang out at the same house on 45th Place nearly every day.
She last saw Bishop on December 28, 1991. Williams testified that Bishop
had a “messed up” eye.
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Blood typing and DNA evidence connected Bishop to the victims.
II. Conviction and Sentence
In 1996, a jury found Bishop guilty of two counts of kidnapping for
sexual purposes (former § 208, subd. (d) [now § 209], counts 2 & 6), nine
counts of forcible rape while acting in concert (§ 264.1, counts 3, 5, 8, 9, 11,
14, 15, 18, & 22), two counts of forcible sodomy while acting in concert (§ 286,
subd. (d), counts 10 & 16), and five counts of forcible oral copulation while
acting in concert (§ 288a, subd. (d), counts 12, 13, 17, 23, & 24).2 As to counts
2, 3, 5, 6, 14 through 18, and 24, the jury found true the allegation that
Bishop personally used a handgun (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). As to counts 3, 8
through 13, 22, and 23, the jury found true the allegation that Bishop used a
handgun in the commission of these offenses (§ 12022.3, subd. (a)). As to
counts 3, 5, 8 through 18, and 22 through 24, the jury found true the
allegation that Bishop kidnapped the victims for the purpose of committing a
sexual offense (§ 667.8, subd. (a)). As to counts 8, 9, and 11, the jury found
true the allegation that Bishop inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.8). The
trial court sentenced Bishop to 166 years in state prison.
In 1998, a different panel of this division affirmed the judgment on
appeal.
III. Petition for Recall
In 2023, Bishop filed a petition for recall of sentence pursuant to
section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). Bishop alleged that he was 17 years old at
the time of the offenses, the trial court imposed a de facto life without parole
2 Counts 2, 3, and 5 were committed against victim Sandra E. Counts 6,
8 through 18, and 22 through 24 were committed against Maria C.
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(LWOP) sentence, and he had been incarcerated for at least 15 years. In
addition, he attached “ ‘statement[s] describing [his] remorse and work
towards rehabilitation.’ ” These statements were undated apology letters
expressing remorse to each victim and the trial court. Bishop asserted he
demonstrated, by a preponderance of the evidence, he had performed acts
that tend to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation.
In opposition, the People contended Bishop failed to establish he was
entitled to relief because he was not sentenced to LWOP. In any event, the
People argued Bishop failed to establish he had performed acts indicating
rehabilitation or potential for rehabilitation because he accrued “several” rule
violation reports while incarcerated. Also, Bishop never disclosed the
identity of his accomplice in his commitment offenses.
Although section 1170, subdivision (d) does not require that the trial
court hold a hearing before ruling on a petition (see § 1170, subd. (d); People
v. Harring (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 483, 498 & fn. 5 (Harring)), the trial court
heard the matter on March 3, 2025. At the hearing, defense counsel argued
Bishop’s sentence of 166 years was a de facto LWOP sentence, and he was
entitled to relief. The People submitted on their papers. The court agreed
with defense counsel that Bishop’s sentence was the functional equivalent of
LWOP. The court acknowledged the three apology letters attached to
Bishop’s petition and stated that “no other information [was] attached.”3
Based on “the information submitted,” the court found, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that Bishop had not performed acts that tended to indicate
3 The court “reviewed the [prison’s] ‘C’ file,” but noted that it was “not
really relevant to these proceedings.” The court went on to state that the
prison file indicated that Bishop had two parole suitability hearings, one in
2015 and another in 2022. At both hearings, Bishop was denied parole.
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rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(D).)
Therefore, the court denied the petition.
Bishop timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
The United States Supreme Court held in Graham v. Florida (2010)
560 U.S. 48 (Graham) that the Eighth Amendment’s ban against cruel and
unusual punishments does not permit the imposition of a sentence of LWOP
for a juvenile offender convicted of a nonhomicide crime. In response to
Graham, our Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 9 (effective Jan. 1, 2013),
which amended section 1170 by adding former subdivision (d)(2), (now
subdivision (d)(1)).4 Section 1170, subdivision (d) created a procedural
mechanism for a juvenile offender sentenced to LWOP to petition for recall
and resentencing to a term of parole. (In re Kirchner (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1040,
1049 (Kirchner).)
Section 1170, subdivision (d) states: “When a defendant who was under
18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the
defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for [LWOP] has been incarcerated
for at least 15 years, the defendant may submit to the sentencing court a
petition for recall and resentencing.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(1).) Bishop makes the
necessary threshold argument that he was sentenced to a term that is the
functional equivalent of LWOP and therefore may seek section 1170,
subdivision (d) relief. (See People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, 450–
454; People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, 622–626.) The Attorney
4 Effective January 1, 2022, the Legislature redesignated section 1170,
subdivision (d)(2), to section 1170, subdivision (d)(1). (Stats. 2021, ch. 731,
§ 1.3.)
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General does not dispute that Bishop’s sentence is the functional equivalent
of LWOP for purposes of eligibility for section 1170, subdivision (d) relief.
Section 1170, subdivision (d) also sets forth certain pleading
requirements for a petition for recall and resentencing. The defendant must
file the petition with the sentencing court. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2).) The petition
must include: (1) a “statement that the defendant was under 18 years of age
at the time of the crime and was sentenced to life in prison without the
possibility of parole”; (2) a “statement describing [the defendant’s] remorse
and work towards rehabilitation”; and (3) a “statement that one” or more of
four qualifying circumstances is true. (Ibid.) The relevant qualifying
circumstances occur when: “[t]he defendant committed the offense with at
least one adult codefendant” and “[t]he defendant has performed acts that
tend to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for rehabilitation, including,
but not limited to, availing themselves of rehabilitative, educational, or
vocational programs, ... using self-study for self-improvement, or showing
evidence of remorse.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(C), (D).) The Attorney General
does not dispute that Bishop met these pleading requirements.
However, a facially sufficient pleading does not entitle a defendant to
recall of his sentence and a resentencing hearing. The trial court must then
decide by a preponderance of the evidence whether the alleged qualifying
circumstance is true. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(5).) If the trial court finds one or
more qualifying circumstances true, the defendant’s sentence must be
recalled for a resentencing hearing. (Kirchner, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1049;
see § 1170, subd. (d)(7).)
We review the trial court’s factual determinations for substantial
evidence, and its interpretation and application of the statute to those factual
findings de novo. (Harring, supra, 69 Cal.App.5th at p. 502.)
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II. Rehabilitative Acts
Bishop contends he has met his burden of demonstrating that he
performed acts tending to indicate rehabilitation or the potential for
rehabilitation. (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(D).) As discussed above, a defendant can
demonstrate rehabilitative acts by “showing evidence of remorse.” Bishop
asserts that his apology letters to the victims and the trial court were
sufficient to satisfy the requisite showing under the statute.5
We find People v. Gibson (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 315, 325 (Gibson)
instructive. In Gibson, the defendant filed a petition for recall of his sentence
pursuant to section 1170, subdivision (d). (Gibson, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p.
322.) The defendant submitted numerous certificates and documents in
support of his rehabilitative efforts, the great majority of which were created
after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 9. (Id. at p. 328.) Following a hearing,
the trial court denied the petition on the grounds that the defendant failed to
demonstrate he had been rehabilitated or that he was remorseful. (Gibson,
supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 322.) The trial court found the “defendant’s
statements of remorse and work towards rehabilitation were neither credible
nor adequate given the length of time defendant had to work on those issues.”
(Id. at p. 328.) The court further found that the “defendant’s statements of
5 Bishop asserts for the first time on appeal that the prison file (or “C-
file”) demonstrated his various acts of rehabilitation. Bishop did not attach
the prison file to his petition or argue at any point prior to this appeal that
the file contained evidence that would illustrate rehabilitative acts. The only
evidence of rehabilitation (which includes remorse) that Bishop provided to
the trial court was the apology letters. Therefore, Bishop forfeited this
argument by failing to raise it below. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875,
880–881.) We also note that the trial court referenced the prison file at the
hearing for the sole purpose of documenting Bishop’s prior parole hearings,
which the court found were “not really relevant” to the proceedings.
Moreover, the People were the only party to utilize the prison file, for the
purpose of opposing Bishop’s petition.
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remorse were not believable and that he made excuses for his behavior.”
(Ibid.) The appellate court affirmed the order, holding that “the majority of
[the] defendant’s efforts at rehabilitation ... postdate the enactment of Senate
Bill [No.] 9,” and “[a] trier of fact could reasonably conclude that [the]
defendant’s efforts were not reflective of genuine remorse or rehabilitation.”
(Id. at pp. 328–329.)
Here, the court noted the only evidence presented by Bishop was three
undated apology letters. We agree with the Attorney General that Bishop’s
evidence of remorse was “fundamentally an issue of credibility.” As argued
by the Attorney General, Bishop never disclosed the name of the individual
who committed these heinous sexual offenses with him. Based on Bishop’s
30-year refusal to disclose the identity of his accomplice, the trial court could
reasonably doubt his recently professed remorse. Also, the undated apology
letters were presumably prepared in 2023 in support of his petition for recall.
As articulated in Gibson, the apparent timing of the letters suggests a self-
serving quality to Bishop’s purported remorse. The trial court was clearly not
persuaded that his statements of remorse were genuine. (See Gibson, supra,
2 Cal.App.5th at pp. 328–329.) We conclude that Bishop failed to meet his
burden under section 1170, subdivision (d)(2)(D).
Bishop argues that Gibson is no longer persuasive authority because
the Legislature subsequently amended section 1170, subdivision (d), by
enacting Senate Bill No. 1084 (SB 1084), effective January 1, 2017. The
changes to the statute do not affect our analysis. “According to the author,
‘SB 1084 makes technical non-substantive changes to the provisions allowing
a person who was under 18 years of age when sentenced to [LWOP] to submit
a petition for resentencing. [Thus,] [t]he bill clarifies language that has
caused some confusion in the courts.’” (Assem. Com. on Appropriations,
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analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1084 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 1,
2016, p. 4.) Contrary to Bishop’s contention, SB 1084 did not “make recall
mandatory upon the filing of a sufficient petition.” The trial court was still
required to make the requisite finding by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant’s statement (i.e., qualifying circumstance) was true prior
to recalling his or her sentence. SB 1084 simply “[clarified] that, if the court
finds by a preponderance of the evidence that one or more of the statements
in the petition is true, the court must recall the sentence and commitment.”
(Assem. Com. on Appropriations, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1084 (2015-2016
Reg. Sess.) as amended Aug. 1, 2016, p. 1.) Therefore, the passage of SB 1084
does not affect our reliance on Gibson.
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In a perfunctory fashion, Bishop asserts an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim for failing to raise another qualifying circumstance in his
petition for recall under section 1170, that “[t]he defendant committed the
offense with at least one adult codefendant.” (§ 1170, subd. (d)(2)(C).) In
order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must demonstrate a reasonable probability of a more favorable result absent
counsel’s allegedly deficient conduct. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668, 694.) Here, Bishop cannot demonstrate that his accomplice was a
“codefendant” as he was never identified, let alone charged or prosecuted.
And because Bishop’s accomplice was never identified, there is no evidence
that he was in fact an “adult.” Maria’s guesstimate that the accomplice was
“around 18 or 19 years old” is insufficient to establish that he was an “adult.”
We therefore conclude Bishop has not established a reasonable probability
that he would have obtained a more favorable result in the trial court.
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order denying Bishop’s petition for recall of sentence
under section 1170, subdivision (d) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
TAMZARIAN, J.
COGLIATI, J.*
*Judge of the Santa Cruz Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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