Filed 6/17/26 P. v. Bernhardy CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A173424
v.
CHARLES ALLEN BERNHARDY, (Sonoma County
Super. Ct. No. SCR756692-1)
Defendant and Appellant.
While driving his pickup truck under the influence of alcohol,
defendant Charles Bernhardy hit a motorcycle from behind and killed its
rider, 23-year-old Vance Stammer. A jury convicted Bernhardy of several
crimes, including second degree murder under People v. Watson (1981)
30 Cal.3d 290 (Watson), and he was sentenced to 19 years to life in prison.
Bernhardy’s only claim on appeal is that his murder conviction must be
reversed because there was insufficient evidence of implied malice. We reject
this claim and affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
A. Bernhardy’s Drinking Before the Crash
The crash that killed Stammer occurred shortly before 9:00 p.m. on
September 6, 2022, in Santa Rosa. Around 5:00 p.m. that evening, then 37-
year-old Bernhardy finished work at the tire center where he was employed
and went home. A co-worker and friend testified that Bernhardy was sober
when he left.
Bernhardy returned to the apartment he had recently moved into with
his girlfriend, Amanda T., and her two children, ages 11 and 6. Around
5:30 p.m., Bernhardy visited his neighbor, Kenneth R., who lived in the
apartment next door with his adult daughter and her boyfriend. Kenneth R.
testified that Bernhardy “seemed kind of buzzed” and was “loud and hyper,”
and he thought that Bernhardy might have already consumed alcohol before
arriving. While visiting over the next hour and a half, the men each took two
shots of whiskey from a “regular-sized” shot glass.
Around 7:00 p.m., the two men left Kenneth R.’s apartment to buy
more alcohol. Bernhardy drove them in his 1980’s Chevrolet C20 pickup
truck. Kenneth R. testified that at this point, Bernhardy’s impairment level
was “a 4 or 5” on a scale of 1 to 10.
Bernhardy first drove himself and Kenneth R. to the bank to withdraw
money. They then proceeded to a grocery store to buy alcohol. Kenneth R.
testified that on the way to the grocery store, Bernhardy “was just being
erratic[] inside the truck and going real fast.” Kenneth R. estimated that
they were travelling at 65 to 70 miles per hour, and he told Bernhardy to
slow down.
At one point, while still traveling very fast, Bernhardy ran over several
white plastic lane markers in the middle of the road. Kenneth R. testified
that it was apparent the truck was being damaged, as “[y]ou [could] see the
pieces flying up, from the grille of the truck, flying right up in the air.” When
he told Bernhardy, “You’re doing damage to your truck,” Bernhardy
responded, “What do you think would happen if I hit those?” Bernhardy then
2
ran over more of the lane poles. Kenneth R. testified that he told Bernhardy,
“ ‘You’re going to kill some of us,’ or ‘kill me.’ ”
Bernhardy and Kenneth R. arrived at the grocery store around
7:30 p.m. They picked out a bottle of whiskey and got in the checkout line.
While in line, a woman said to Bernhardy, “Oh. You’re getting whiskey?”
According to both Kenneth R. and the store cashier, Bernhardy said
something like, “Yeah. That would make your pussy wet.” The cashier
testified that despite this inappropriate comment, Bernhardy did not appear
impaired such that he should not be sold alcohol. A receipt timestamped
7:39 p.m. showed that Bernhardy purchased a bottle of Jim Beam whiskey
and “a single packet of Kool-Aid.”
After the two men left the grocery store, Bernhardy drove them back to
the apartment complex, and they returned to Kenneth R.’s apartment.
There, they “took turns” taking shots of whiskey. Kenneth R. estimated that
they each took seven to nine shots, ultimately consuming “[t]hree-quarters of
the bottle.”1
Kenneth R. characterized himself as “drunk,” at 10 on a scale of 1 to 10,
and he testified that Bernhardy seemed to be at the same level. Bernhardy
“was hyper and moving around, waving” some on his feet, and he was “loud.”
Kenneth R.’s daughter and her boyfriend, who were also present, agreed that
Bernhardy “seemed very amped” and was “excessively repeating himself over
and over” about a light fixture he wanted to help them repair. The daughter
also testified that Bernhardy’s intoxication level was 10 on a scale of 1 to 10.
1 Kenneth R. was unsure whether the whiskey bottle was “a fifth or a
pint,” but he used his hands to indicate the bottle was about 18 inches high,
“[n]ot a small quantity.”
3
At some point, Amanda T. came next door and told Kenneth R. that
Bernhardy was “a bad drinker” and the other man “should stop drinking with
him.” Kenneth R. told Bernhardy that he should go home. Bernhardy left,
and Kenneth R. went to bed.
Amanda T. testified about Bernhardy’s prior alcohol use and her
reaction when she realized that Bernhardy was drinking that night. In the
seven years leading up to the crash during which she had known Bernhardy,
she had seen him drunk “maybe five or six times” only. She nonetheless
believed he had a problem with alcohol because when he did drink, “he’d have
a hard time stopping” and would “[u]sually [drink] till he would pass out.”2
Amanda T. described two prior incidents during which Bernhardy was
drunk and exhibited concerning behavior. First, about a year before the
crash, he was drinking alcohol, and the two got into argument at her parents’
home. She called the police, “because he would get very angry and accuse
[her] of cheating and different things like that, so [she] wanted him to
probably leave the house.”
Second, less than a month before the crash, Bernhardy and Amanda T.
were drinking with Kenneth R. to celebrate the new apartment. Bernhardy
got “drunk and smashed everything in the house,” including a television.
After this incident, Amanda T. told Bernhardy that if he wanted to stay in a
relationship with her, he could not drink any more. She testified that
Bernhardy “promised he wouldn’t drink” at all. Thus, she “[d]idn’t
2 Amanda T. testified that Bernhardy regularly took Norcos
(hydrocodone) and smoked marijuana, and he tested positive for both
substances after the crash. As noted below, the jury acquitted Bernhardy of a
charge of driving under the influence of drugs, so we do not detail the
evidence of his drug use.
4
understand why he would be” drinking with Kenneth R. on the night in
question.
After Amanda T. went next door and told Bernhardy to come home, he
returned to their apartment. She testified that his eyes “were glazed over,”
“[h]e was leaning over,” and he smelled “[l]ike alcohol.” Amanda T. put his
intoxication level at an 8 out of 10, explaining that she would consider 10 out
of 10 to be “[f]alling-over drunk.”
Bernhardy became “[v]ery angry” after Amanda T.’s daughter referred
to a prior occasion when he accused her mother of cheating. Amanda T.’s
daughter said, “You remember, Mom. You’re cheating on him with Marco.
Ha ha. Just kidding.” A “full-blown fight” over cheating ensued between
Bernhardy and Amanda T., and “he was breaking stuff and screaming and
yelling.”
Feeling “unsafe,” Amanda T. “grabbed the kids and ran out of the
house.” At 8:34 p.m., she called 911. During the call, which was played for
the jury, she reported that her boyfriend “got drunk and he started smashing
things all over.” Amanda T. then drove to a grocery store nearby to meet the
police, not returning to the apartment until around 9:30 p.m. When she got
there, Bernhardy was not home.
B. The Crash
At 8:47 p.m., Bernhardy left the apartment and drove away in his
truck.3 The crash occurred approximately five minutes later, at the
3 GPS data from Bernhardy’s cell phone revealed his location
throughout the night, confirming that he was at work until around 5:00 p.m.,
went to the bank and then the grocery store around 7:30 p.m., and left “the
general location of his apartment” at 8:47 p.m. That data also confirmed his
driving route before and after the crash and showed that he sent a text
message to Amanda T. about one minute before the crash occurred.
5
intersection of Fountaingrove Parkway and Sedgemoore Drive. As we will
discuss, the evidence showed that Bernhardy hit Stammer’s motorcycle from
behind, ejecting Stammer, and the motorcycle became lodged in the truck’s
grille. Bernhardy then hit another car before driving away, stopping only
after he ran into a median and the truck became inoperable.
A woman driving westbound on Fountaingrove in her Honda testified
that as she was proceeding up the hill, she saw “an older-model pickup truck”
that was “parked askew on the right curb on the westbound lanes” with “[i]ts
right front wheel . . . up on the curb.”
The woman continued westbound on Fountaingrove until she reached
its intersection with Sedgemoore. She testified that she slowed to around
10 miles per hour to turn right onto Sedgemoore. She then noticed “a light
behind [her], and then as [she] was turning right, [she] felt [her] car hit from
behind” with a “medium impact.” The woman looked to her left and “saw the
same truck go around [her] vehicle and continue westbound on
Fountaingrove.” She was confident that it was the truck that hit her because
“immediately after [she] was hit, [she] didn’t see any other vehicles.” The
Honda’s rear exhaust pipe was “sheared off,” and the car’s “bumper was out
of alignment.” She did not see a motorcyclist before or after the collision.
A different woman driving on Fountaingrove reached the intersection
with Sedgemoore and noticed a young man, Stammer, lying in the middle of
the road. A backpack was lying nearby, and “his shoes were off and his
helmet was off.” Stammer was still alive, but the woman “could tell he was
badly hurt.” She called 911, and police were dispatched to the scene at
8:57 p.m.
Stammer was transported from the crash scene to the hospital. He was
in “[a] very deep coma,” his neck was broken, and he had subdural
6
hematomas on both sides of his head. Attempts to alleviate the pressure on
his brain were unsuccessful, and he was eventually taken off life support. An
autopsy showed that Stammer died of “complications of blunt-force injury of
[the] head.”
C. Bernhardy’s Flight and Arrest
Meanwhile, other witnesses saw Bernhardy’s truck on Fountaingrove
after the crash. As one man was driving eastbound on that road, about one-
and-a-half to two miles from the Sedgemoore intersection, he saw an old
Chevrolet pickup truck approaching from the other direction going “very,
very fast, definitely over the speed limit,” which was 35 miles per hour. The
truck struck the center median, “straddled it[,] and then regained some[]
control” and returned to the road. The truck’s driver “might have slowed
down to the speed limit” when the vehicle was on the median, but not
“drastically, like a normal person would. . . . [H]e just kept going.”
The other driver, who had swerved away from the median to avoid the
truck, pulled over and parked. He observed a sapling tree on the median
“that was completely toppled over” and a motorcycle lying on the median,
“halfway in a bush.” The man and other bystanders who arrived “surveyed
the area to make sure there was no rider” and did not see anyone.
Another witness was at the intersection of Fountaingrove and
Mendocino Avenue when she saw a truck come to a “quick stop” on the road.
The truck had “front-end damage” and “light-colored smoke” was coming from
the hood, but “[i]t didn’t look like it was going to catch fire.” A man exited the
truck and ran down an embankment, toward a mobile home park. The man
kept looking back at the truck and was not travelling “very fast,” but he did
not appear to be in pain.
7
A different motorist drove by the same spot and saw a man running
away from a damaged truck, “like [he was] trying to get away in hurry.” The
motorist testified that the man was “stumbling,” such that he appeared to be
“under [the] influence of alcohol.”
A deputy sheriff located Bernhardy’s truck, which did not appear to be
operable, stopped in the road on Mendocino. After a bystander indicated the
direction in which the truck’s driver had left, the deputy and other law
enforcement officials unsuccessfully attempted to locate Bernhardy.
Amanda T. eventually learned that Bernhardy had been in a crash but
did not see him again that night. When she returned to their apartment the
following morning, however, Bernhardy was there. He indicated that “he
thought that he had just crashed his truck,” at which point she told him
“[t]hat there was an accident and a 23-year-old boy was hit.” Bernhardy
asked Amanda T. to call the police and tell them he was at the apartment.
Later that morning, the police arrived at the apartment and arrested
Bernhardy, who said he thought he had a broken ankle. He was transported
to the police department, where he was interrogated, and then to the hospital
for treatment.
D. Bernhardy’s Interrogation and Prior Watson Advisement
Recordings of various statements Bernhardy made to the police and in
jail calls were played for the jury. He generally took responsibility for driving
drunk, although he also blamed the police for not responding quickly enough
to Amanda T.’s 911 call to prevent him from doing so. We focus on
Bernhardy’s interrogation, during which he made the most relevant
statements. We also discuss a Watson advisement about the dangers of
drunk driving that he signed in connection with a previous conviction, which
he also made statements about during the interrogation.
8
At the outset of the interrogation, Bernhardy told the two police officers
questioning him that he “fucked up.” He explained that he “had a few drinks
with a neighbor” after work, estimating that he took “six to eight shots of Jim
Beam,” which was “[w]ay too much.” Bernhardy said his level of
drunkenness the previous night was “a 6 or 7 at least” on a scale of 1 to 10.
After Bernhardy finished drinking with the neighbor, he got mad at
Amanda T. and “broke some shit.” Eventually, he “told her, fuck you, I’m
gonna go kill myself,” and then “got in the fucking truck and left.”4 He
claimed that he stopped drinking “at least a couple hours before th[e]
accident” and “was fine when [he] got in the truck,” but he also admitted, “I
probably shouldn’t have drove.”
Bernhardy stated that after leaving the apartment, he headed to his
cousin’s house. As he went over a hill on Fountaingrove, he “felt the rearend
of [his] truck like come up off the ground” and “the truck go bam, like, [he] hit
someone or something.” He also stated, “I thought maybe I hit a divot, or, or
somethin’ in the road or . . . blew a tire or something.”
Bernhardy claimed that he stopped and “looked around,” but he “never
[saw] the vehicle or the pole or whatever the fuck it was” he hit. He denied
continuing to drive after the crash, saying that the impact was “hard” and it
“dead-in-tracks stopped” him. When one of the officers told him he hit a
motorcyclist and continued to drive with the motorcycle stuck to his truck, he
stated, “I don’t recall none of that.” He also did not recall hitting the median,
though he was “not saying [he] didn’t” because he “had too much to drink”
and the alcohol negatively impacted his memory.
4 Later, Bernhardy indicated that he was not actually suicidal and
probably said this to indicate he was “angry” and needed to leave the
situation.
9
Bernhardy reported that after getting out of his truck, he realized his
“ankle was fucked up” and he “couldn’t find [his] phone,” which the evidence
tended to suggest fell out of the truck when he hit the median. Not
“know[ing] what else to do,” he started walking home. But his ankle hurt too
much to continue, and he “ended up falling asleep in between some . . .
bushes” before walking the rest of the way home the next morning.
Bernhardy admitted that he had a 2018 conviction for “wet reckless”
driving (the 2018 conviction).5 He reported that on that occasion, he “drank
two beers” and crashed his vehicle after being distracted by some deer. When
asked whether he was told during the previous proceeding “about the dangers
of drinking and driving and how it’s inherently dangerous to human life,” he
responded, “No, I don’t recall, no.” He was supposed to take a court-ordered
DUI class, but it never happened because “COVID took over.”
The officers then presented Bernhardy with the plea form he signed in
connection with the 2018 conviction. The form, which was admitted into
evidence, included as an addendum the following Watson advisement: “You
are hereby advised that being under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both,
impairs your ability to safely operate a motor vehicle. Therefore, it is
extremely dangerous to human life to drive while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs, or both. If you continue to drive while under the influence of
alcohol or drugs, or both, and as a result of that driving, someone is killed,
you can be charged with murder.”
5 A DUI charge is sometimes reduced to a “wet reckless” if “there is
either a very low blood alcohol level or there are other facts that make the
case difficult to prosecute.” At trial, Bernhardy admitted the allegation that
he suffered the 2018 conviction, which was under Vehicle Code
section 23103.5. All further statutory references are to the Vehicle Code
unless otherwise noted.
10
Bernhardy then admitted that he signed the Watson advisement,
although he could not remember doing so. The signature indicated
agreement with the following statement: “I have discussed my case with my
attorney and I understand this advisement. [¶] I have read this document or
have had it read to me, and I understand it.”6 After one of the officers
summarized the advisement’s contents, Bernhardy stated, “I already knew
anybody who drinks and drives[,] it’s bad for anybody’s health, so—” The
officer said, “You and others, right?” Bernhardy responded, “Correct.”
E. The Physical Evidence and Related Expert Testimony
Some of the travel of Bernhardy’s truck, Stammer’s motorcycle, and the
Honda was recorded by nearby residential surveillance cameras, and the
recordings were played for the jury. A police officer qualified as an expert in
traffic collisions and photogrammetry used one of the recordings to calculate
the respective speeds of the Honda, the motorcycle, and the truck at the
intersection before the crash site. He testified that the Honda was going
41 miles per hour, which was followed by the motorcycle going 42 miles per
hour, which was followed by the truck going 79 miles per hour. The videos
also indicated that the motorcycle’s running lights were working and that the
motorcycle slowed down as it approached the intersection where the Honda
turned.
Bernhardy’s truck was located over two miles from the collision site
and less than a quarter mile from where he struck the median and the
motorcycle was found. There was a “pretty full” water bottle full of “pinkish-
colored liquid,” which “smelled like a fruity beverage mixed with alcohol,” on
6 The attorney who represented Bernhardy in the prior case could not
remember him. She testified that her typical practice was to review plea
agreements with her clients “line by line,” including giving the relevant
advisements.
11
the truck’s front-passenger floorboard. The investigating officer, who found
the bottle, testified that based on Bernhardy’s purchase at the grocery store
“it would be reasonable to believe that there was Kool-Aid and alcohol,
potentially Jim Beam, within.”
The truck’s grille was missing and later located about a mile away.
The front right headlight was also missing, and the hood was dented. The
truck’s right front tire was “destroyed and barely attached to the wheel,” and
the wheel was “bent and damaged.” The investigating officer, who was also
qualified as an expert in traffic collisions, opined that the truck struck
multiple objects. He testified that it would require “a substantial level of
force” to bend the wheel, and he believed this damage resulted from striking
the median.
The investigating officer also opined that since the deflated tire was
wrapped around the wheel, it appeared that the truck kept driving after the
tire went flat. It “would be quite noticeable” to someone who drove on a tire
in this condition, as it would be loud, there would be “violent” bumping, and
the vehicle would be hard to steer.
Stammer’s motorcycle’s rear wheel and tire were damaged, and its
exhaust pipe and tail were “bent upwards and damaged.” The investigating
officer concluded that the truck hit the motorcycle from behind, which “fully
ejected” Stammer into the air, and “the rear wheel of the motorcycle got
lodged . . . underneath the front bumper of the truck.” The officer opined that
after becoming stuck in the truck’s grille, the motorcycle “would have been
readily visible” to the truck’s driver “from the front cabin and through the
windshield.”
Bernhardy’s blood was drawn at the police station before his
interrogation started, approximately 13 hours after the crash. Bernhardy
12
weighed 215 pounds at the time, and his blood alcohol content (BAC) was
zero percent. The criminalist who analyzed the sample testified that
“everybody is too impaired to operate a motor vehicle safely at a [BAC] of
.08 percent and higher.” She estimated that a 215-pound man who drank
10 standard-sized drinks would have a BAC of up to .17 percent, and his BAC
would reach zero percent within 13 hours or less.
A mechanic who inspected the motorcycle and the pickup truck after
the crash testified that neither had any mechanical or other defects that
would have caused a collision. Based on the evidence as a whole, the
investigating officer opined that “Bernhardy caused the collision when he
drove under the influence of alcohol . . . [and] additionally, by driving at an
unsafe speed.” Stammer was not at fault, because he “was not driving
grossly above the speed limit,” he was slowing down before the crash, and
there was nothing to suggest he “contributed to this collision in any way
other than just being on the roadway.”
F. Procedural History
An information charged Bernhardy with felony counts of murder, gross
vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated, driving under the influence (DUI)
of alcohol causing injury with a prior conviction, hit and run driving causing
death, and driving under the influence of any drug causing injury with a
prior conviction, and a misdemeanor count of hit and run driving causing
property damage.7 In connection with the vehicular manslaughter count, it
7 The charges were brought under Penal Code sections 187,
subdivision (a) (murder), and 191.5, subdivision (a) (gross vehicular
manslaughter), sections 23560 and 23153, subdivisions (a) (alcohol-based
DUI causing injury) and (f) (drug-based DUI causing injury), and
sections 20001, subdivision (b)(2) (hit and run causing death), and 20002,
subdivision (a) (hit and run damaging property). The 2018 conviction
13
was alleged that Bernhardy fled the scene, and in connection with the DUI
counts it was alleged that he personally inflicted great bodily injury (GBI).8
Finally, several aggravating factors were alleged, including that the crimes
disclosed a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness (cruelty factor)
and that Bernhardy engaged in violent conduct indicating a serious danger to
society (violent-conduct factor).9
The jury acquitted Bernhardy of drug-based DUI causing injury and
convicted him of the remaining counts. It also found true the allegations that
he fled the scene after committing gross vehicular manslaughter and inflicted
GBI while committing the alcohol-based DUI causing injury. Finally, as to
all of the felony convictions, the jury found true the two aggravating factors
that were submitted to it, the cruelty factor and the violent-conduct factor.
The trial court sentenced Bernhardy to a total term of 19 years to life,
composed of a term of 15 years to life for the murder and a consecutive term
of four years, the aggravated term, for the hit and run causing death.10 A
discussed above was alleged as the prior conviction supporting the two DUI
counts.
8 The allegation of fleeing the scene was made under section 20001,
subdivision (c). The same allegation was made as to the count of hit and run
causing death but was stricken during trial. The GBI allegations were made
under Penal Code section 12022.7, subdivision (b).
9 In addition to these two factors, it was alleged that the victim was
particularly vulnerable, Bernhardy was being concurrently sentenced,
Bernhardy’s convictions were numerous or of increasing seriousness, and
Bernhardy’s prior performance on probation or other supervision was
unsatisfactory. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1), (3), (7) & (b)(1), (2),
(5).) Four other aggravating factors were stricken before trial.
10 The parties inaccurately state in their briefing that Bernhardy’s total
term is 23 years to life, but the record is clear that the trial court imposed
15 years to life for the murder plus four years for the hit and run. The
determinate and indeterminate abstracts of judgment also reflect the correct
term.
14
term of 15 years for the gross vehicular manslaughter, composed of the
aggravated term of 10 years and a consecutive term of five years for fleeing
the scene, was imposed and stayed, and the conviction for the alcohol-based
DUI causing injury was stricken “as duplicative.” Finally, the sentence for
the misdemeanor was deemed served.
II.
DISCUSSION
Bernhardy claims that his murder conviction must be reversed because
there was insufficient evidence of implied malice. We are not persuaded.
A. General Legal Standards
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) “Malice is express when there is
manifested a deliberate intention to unlawfully take away the life of a fellow
creature,” and it is “implied when no considerable provocation appears, or
when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart.” (Id., § 188, subd. (a)(1) & (2).) All murders committed
with implied malice are of the second degree. (People v. Gonzalez (2012)
54 Cal.4th 643, 653.)
“Express malice is an intent to kill,” but implied malice does not
require such intent. (People v. Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 653.)
Instead, “[m]alice is implied when a person willfully does an act, the natural
and probable consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and the
person knowingly acts with conscious disregard for the danger to life that the
act poses.” (Ibid.) Thus, implied malice has “an objective component (an
intentional act endangering the life of another) and a subjective component
(knowledge and disregard of the danger).” (People v. Pierce (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 508, 523.) “To suffice for implied malice murder, the
defendant’s act must not merely be dangerous to life in some vague or
15
speculative sense; it must ‘ “involve[] a high degree of probability that it will
result in death.” ’ ” (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 989.)
Watson held that vehicular homicide may be charged as second degree
murder “if the facts surrounding the offense support a finding of ‘implied
malice.’ ” (Watson, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 294.) The Supreme Court explained
that in contrast to the mind state required for the lesser crime of gross
vehicular manslaughter, “[i]mplied malice contemplates a subjective
awareness of a higher degree of risk . . . , and involves an element of
wantonness which is absent in gross negligence.” (Id. at p. 296.) And
although gross negligence is evaluated objectively, based on whether a
reasonable person would have appreciated the risk, “a finding of implied
malice depends upon a determination that the defendant actually
appreciated the risk involved, i.e., a subjective standard.” (Id. at pp. 296–
297, italics omitted.)
In evaluating a claim of insufficient evidence, “ ‘we review the whole
record to determine whether . . . [there is] substantial evidence to support the
verdict . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in
support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably
have deduced from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Manibusan (2013) 58 Cal.4th
40, 87.) Substantial evidence is “ ‘ “evidence that is reasonable, credible, and
of solid value.” ’ ” (People v. Bertsch and Hronis (2026) 19 Cal.5th 183, 316.)
Reversal is not required unless “ ‘it appears “that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the
conviction].” ’ ” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 508.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports Bernhardy’s Conviction.
16
Bernhardy asserts that there was insufficient evidence that he acted
with implied malice, i.e., a subjective “awareness that his conduct
endangered human life or involved a high probability that death would
result.” He is incorrect.
To determine whether a defendant “actually appreciate[d] the risk to
life involved” in driving while intoxicated, “courts generally refer to the
following factors” derived from Watson: “ ‘ “(1) [BAC] above the .08 percent
legal limit; (2) a predrinking intent to drive; (3) knowledge of hazards of
driving while intoxicated; and (4) highly dangerous driving.” ’ ” (People v.
Pierce, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 531; People v. Wolfe (2018)
20 Cal.App.5th 673, 682–683.) But “ ‘ “courts have recognized that there is no
particular formula for analysis of vehicular homicide cases, instead requiring
a case-by-case approach.” ’ ” (People v. Nevarez (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 552,
562.) In other words, we may consider other factors bearing on a defendant’s
mens rea, and there need not be evidence of all four factors listed to sustain a
finding of implied malice. (People v. Olivas (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 984, 988–
989; see, e.g., People v. Superior Court (Costa) (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 690,
700–701 [defendant’s lack of intoxication did not preclude finding that he
committed vehicular homicide with implied malice].)
Here, there is ample evidence to support the jury’s finding that
Bernhardy acted with implied malice. Most glaringly, Bernhardy admittedly
signed an acknowledgment of being advised that “it is extremely dangerous
to human life to drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs” and that
he could be charged with murder if his intoxicated driving caused someone’s
death. He took numerous shots of liquor over a few hours despite knowing he
had trouble controlling himself when he drank, and several witnesses
described him as extremely intoxicated. He intentionally ran into lane poles
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while driving Kenneth R., who warned him that he was going to kill someone,
and on Fountaingrove he drove at an extremely high speed, running off the
road both before and after colliding with Stammer’s motorcycle. He was also
texting while driving and brought an open container of alcohol with him in
the truck. Taken as a whole, the evidence permitted a reasonable inference
that Bernhardy knew his extremely reckless driving carried a high
probability of death.
In resisting this conclusion, Bernhardy attempts to pick apart the
evidence supporting the four factors listed in Watson. For example, he
emphasizes that there was “no solid proof of [his BAC] at the time of the
accident,” and he downplays the Watson advisement he signed by noting that
he did not take any court-ordered alcohol-education classes as part of the
prior proceeding. But while he cites other cases in which there was evidence
of such circumstances, none of those decisions establish that the evidence
here was thereby insufficient. (See City of San Diego v. Boggess (2013)
216 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1502 [specific facts in other cases are “unhelpful” when
performing substantial-evidence review].) Likewise, although Bernhardy
may be correct that some of the additional factors the prosecutor relied on in
closing argument did not tend to show implied malice, he fails to convince us
that the evidence as a whole was lacking. In sum, Bernhardy’s prior
knowledge of the deadly risk of drunk driving, his acute intoxication, and his
highly dangerous driving throughout the night in question was sufficient to
support his conviction of murder.
III.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________
Humes, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Banke, J.
_________________________
Smiley, J.
People v. Bernhardy A173424
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