Filed 7/14/26 P. v Bernal CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B348552
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. XNVPA046660)
RUBEN BERNAL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hayden Zacky, Judge. Affirmed.
William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance by Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Ruben Rodriguez Bernal
(defendant) was charged with two counts of willful, deliberate,
and premeditated attempted murder of a peace officer (Pen.
Code,1 §§ 187, 664), two counts of assault with a firearm on a
peace officer (§ 245(d)(1)), one count of possession of a firearm by
a felon (former § 12021(a)(1)), and one count of grand theft auto
(§ 487(d)(1)). The charges were predicated on evidence that
defendant, at age 27, pointed a firearm at deputies while
attempting to escape being detained during a traffic stop. A trial
jury convicted defendant on all charges and found true firearm
and Three Strikes law allegations. The trial court sentenced
defendant to 109 years in prison. The conviction and sentence
were affirmed on direct appeal. (People v. Bernal (Sept. 14, 2007,
B192608) [nonpub. opn.].)
In July 2025, defendant submitted a request to the trial
court for a People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 hearing to
preserve evidence for a future youth offender parole hearing. (Id.
at 284 [“It is not clear whether Franklin had sufficient
opportunity to put on the record the kinds of
information . . . relevant at a youth offender parole hearing.
[¶] . . . [¶] If the trial court determines that Franklin did not
have sufficient opportunity, then the court may receive
submissions . . .”].) The trial court denied defendant’s request for
a Franklin hearing because he is not eligible for such a hearing—
he was 27 at the time of the offenses of conviction, which is
beyond the statutory age cutoff for a youth offender parole
hearing.
1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.
2
Defendant noticed an appeal, and this court appointed
counsel to represent him. After examining the record,
defendant’s attorney filed an opening brief pursuant to People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 that raises no issues but asks us
to independently review the record. This court thereafter invited
defendant to submit a supplemental brief and he has done so.
We confine our opinion, and our review of the record, to that
brief. (Id. at 232.)
Defendant’s supplemental brief maintains the trial court
“ignore[ed] [his] background,” did not use his “true arrest record,”
and did not “use its discretion” or “refer to a mitigation
specialist.” Defendant also appears to seek to collaterally attack
an earlier Three Strikes law conviction he sustained at age 19.
Even if any of this were true, it would not establish the trial court
erred in denying defendant a Franklin hearing. It is undisputed
that defendant was 27 years old at the time of the offenses of
conviction and he is accordingly not eligible for a youth offender
parole hearing—or a Franklin hearing to preserve evidence for a
youth offender parole hearing that will not occur. (§ 3051(a)(1)
[“A youth offender parole hearing is a hearing by the Board of
Parole Hearings for the purpose of reviewing the parole
suitability of any prisoner who was 25 years of age or
younger . . . at the time of the controlling offense”].)
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DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BAKER, Acting P. J.
We concur:
MOOR, J.
KIM (D), J.
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