Filed 9/2/26 P. v. Bennett CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Yolo)
THE PEOPLE, C105208
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. Nos. CR2021-
v. 2111, CR2023-0488, CR2024-
1951)
DAVID HILL BENNETT,
Defendant and Appellant.
The People charged defendant David Hill Bennett with carjacking, attempted
carjacking, theft or unauthorized use of a vehicle, attempted theft or unauthorized use of a
vehicle, resisting or obstructing a public officer, and assault by force likely to produce
great bodily injury. The trial court declared a doubt as to defendant’s competence to
stand trial, denied defendant’s motion to substitute appointed counsel pursuant to People
v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden), found defendant incompetent to stand trial,
and committed him to the Department of State Hospitals. (Pen. Code §§ 1368, 1370.)
Defendant appealed from the order finding him incompetent to stand trial, arguing
the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Marsden motion. Finding no abuse of
discretion in the denial of the Marsden motion, we will affirm the trial court’s order
finding defendant incompetent to stand trial.
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BACKGROUND
In early 2023, while defendant was in custody on charges related to a carjacking
(case No. CR2021-2111), his mental health decompensated and competency proceedings
were initiated. During those proceedings, defendant attempted to escape, resulting in
additional charges (case No. CR2023-0488). The trial court found defendant
incompetent to stand trial, and nine months later declared him restored to competence.
In mid-2024, as the criminal cases proceeded, defendant again decompensated and
competency proceedings were initiated once more. During those competency
proceedings, defendant assaulted correctional officers in jail (case No. CR2024-1951).
The trial court again found defendant incompetent to stand trial. In mid-2025, the trial
court declared defendant restored to competence and the second two cases were
consolidated. After doubt as to defendant’s competence to stand trial was declared once
again on July 16, 2025, and the trial court ordered reports evaluating his competency,
defendant requested a Marsden hearing.
During the Marsden hearing, the trial court gave defendant an opportunity to
explain why he wanted substitute counsel, and then gave defense counsel an opportunity
to respond. We organize defendant’s expressed concerns, and defense counsel’s
responses, by topic for ease of reference.
Defendant complained that his defense attorney and another person pressured him
into doing a social history that he did not want to do; he said he did the social history
because they threatened to report him to law enforcement and immigration if he did not.
Defense counsel responded that they prepared the social history because defendant
wanted the best outcome possible, and they used it to successfully argue for dismissal
of a prior strike in case No. CR2021-2111. Defense counsel denied ever threatening
to report defendant to law enforcement or immigration, noting that efforts had been made
to connect defendant with an immigration attorney.
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Defendant claimed the competency proceedings involved retaliation and also fraud
when the state hospital gave him forms saying he was responsible to pay for his mental
health treatment. Counsel denied retaliation and noted that the competency proceedings
were initiated by the trial court, not defense counsel. Defense counsel said he had not
previously heard about the hospital forms but he could work with defendant on that issue.
Defendant alleged that defense counsel pressured him to take plea deals. Defense
counsel replied that he had advised defendant to take a favorable plea deal but respected
defendant’s choice not to take the deal.
Defendant asserted that defense counsel failed to procure and share with
defendant, and improperly excluded, audio and video evidence. Referring to the incident
involving defendant’s assault on correctional officers in jail, defense counsel explained
that there were jail videos of the incident, but he had confirmed there was no
accompanying audio, and the lack of audio was consistent with his experience that the
jail’s cameras recorded video but not audio. Defense counsel said he reviewed the video
with defendant.
Defendant further stated that he “spent money coming out of [defense counsel’s]
pocket in order to access court,” that defense counsel tricked him into handing over
property and owed him reimbursement, and that defense counsel and county counsel or
others owed him reimbursement for fees he incurred in representing himself in civil
proceedings. Defense counsel said he had added money to defendant’s commissary
account because he knew defendant was away from family. Defense counsel also
referenced a ledger of filing fees defendant had incurred while representing himself and
that defendant had been reimbursed for some of those costs.
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In addition, defendant claimed defense counsel filed false Pitchess1 motions,
failed to comply with defendant’s letters that presented a defense, and made arguments
with which defendant did not agree. During defense counsel’s opportunity to respond, he
did not specifically address those assertions. Defendant also referenced other topics, such
as the judge who previously declared doubt as to defendant’s competency, defendant’s
self-represented civil cases, the fact that charges were brought against him for the in-
custody incidents, and the jail.
The trial court asked defendant what else he wanted the court to know. Defendant
claimed counsel had mixed up the cases; that with regard to the video, “the escape” was a
different situation; that there was insufficient evidence to convict him; that counsel was
not responding to his letters; and that defendant came up with defenses counsel agreed to
present. Defendant added that he was a victim of human trafficking during his in-custody
incidents “because our jail systems are blanketed with surveillance cameras,” the lack of
missing audio and body camera footage was suspicious, and he was mistreated at the
hospital.
The trial court reminded defendant that the relevant issue pertained to his attorney.
Defendant responded that defense counsel failed to provide him with video, audio, and
cell phones. The trial court referenced defense counsel’s representation that there was no
audio from the jail, then asked defense counsel to respond to defendant’s allegation about
missing cell phone information. Defense counsel said defendant had claimed cell phone
video was taken of him at the state hospital; defense counsel requested any such video
and followed up on the request, but did not receive any video and thought there was a
decent possibility it might not exist. When defense counsel added that he had, at various
times, shown defendant the footage he had obtained relating to defendant’s escape and
1 Pitchess v . Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531.
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assault charges, defendant interrupted, saying he had been talking about different cell
phones. The trial court asked defendant to stop interrupting. When defense counsel
finished his response, the trial court said it had heard enough. Defendant continued to
talk, but the trial court noted that defendant had been given an opportunity to speak for
nearly 30 minutes. The trial court denied the Marsden motion.
The trial court subsequently found defendant incompetent to stand trial, suspended
criminal proceedings as to all three cases, and ordered defendant committed to the
Department of State Hospitals.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his Marsden
motion. He claims he made a compelling showing of irreconcilable conflict, and the trial
court did not sufficiently inquire into the instances of counsel’s alleged inadequacy.
“Marsden motions are subject to the following well-established rules. ‘ “ ‘When a
defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney,
and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain
the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate
performance.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1085.) “Depending
on the nature of the grievances related by defendant, it may be necessary for the court
also to question his attorney.” (People v. Hill (1983) 148 Cal.App.3d 744, 753.)
“ ‘ “ ‘A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed
attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel
have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation
is likely to result [citations].’ [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.] Denials of Marsden motions are
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Denial ‘is not an abuse of
discretion unless the defendant has shown that a failure to replace the appointed attorney
would “substantially impair” the defendant’s right to assistance of counsel. [Citations.]’
[Citation.]” (Barnett, at p. 1085.)
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Defendant argues defense counsel’s attempt to convince him to take a plea deal,
and failure to respond to defendant’s letters, show an irreconcilable conflict. However,
guidance to take a plea deal is not a ground for change of counsel unless it falls outside
“ ‘the range of reasonable competence under the circumstances.’ ” (U.S. v. Rogers (9th
Cir. 1985) 769 F.2d 1418, 1424.) Moreover, a complaint of insufficient communication
is not a ground for change of counsel unless it “ ‘ “prevent[s] an adequate defense.” ’ ”
(People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 606.) Here, the record contains no indication
that defense counsel’s recommendation to take the plea deal fell below the range of
reasonable competence. As for communication, the record shows many examples of
counsel’s responsive communication with defendant. Defense counsel explained why the
audio footage defendant requested did not exist, presented plea deals to him, helped him
with his self-represented civil cases, and agreed to present arguments that defendant
originated. In addition, defense counsel pursued defendant’s requests for cell phone
footage, made efforts to connect defendant with an immigration attorney, helped
defendant obtain reimbursement for some of his self-represented civil filing fees, and
reviewed with defendant the available video footage. The record does not establish an
irreconcilable conflict.
As for defendant’s argument that the trial court failed to sufficiently inquire into
instances of counsel’s alleged inadequacy, it is true that defense counsel did not
specifically address every concern mentioned by defendant. But in upholding the denial
of a Marsden motion in People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 91-92, 95-96, the
California Supreme Court explained that the record demonstrated that the trial court gave
the defendant ample opportunity to detail his concerns and state the grounds for his
motion, and the record supported the trial court’s conclusion that counsel’s representation
was adequate and that there was no irreconcilable conflict. There was no basis to
conclude that the trial court failed to conduct a proper Marsden inquiry or abused its
discretion in declining to substitute counsel. (Id. at p. 96.)
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Here, the record establishes that the trial court gave defendant almost 30 minutes
to detail his concerns, asking him twice to articulate why counsel should be substituted.
Defense counsel responded by describing his efforts to address defendant’s requests and
concerns, and to provide guidance and advice. He denied retaliation or threats against
defendant. The trial court was entitled to credit defense counsel’s explanations. (People
v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696.)
The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that counsel’s representation was
adequate and that there was no irreconcilable conflict. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant’s Marsden motion.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order finding defendant incompetent to stand trial is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, J.
We concur:
/S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/S/
RENNER, J.
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