P. v. Belloso CA2/7

Filed 9/28/26 P. v. Belloso CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B290968

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. VA147067)
v.

JUAN LUIS BELLOSO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael A. Cowell, Judge. Affirmed.
Dawn S. Mortazavi, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta and Xavier Becerra, Attorneys General, Gerald
A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Viet H. Nguyen,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_________________
In 2018 a jury convicted Juan Luis Belloso of carrying a
concealed dirk or dagger. (Pen. Code,1 § 21310.) On appeal,
Belloso argued there was insufficient evidence to establish his
stainless steel knife with a four-inch fixed blade was a dirk or
dagger.2 Belloso also asserted the trial court violated his rights
to due process and equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment by failing to consider his ability to pay
before imposing court assessments and restitution fines, relying
on this court’s opinion in People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th
1157 (Dueñas), disapproved by People v. Kopp (2025) 19 Cal.5th 1
(Kopp). We followed this court’s holding in Dueñas and
remanded for the trial court to allow Belloso to request a hearing
and present evidence demonstrating his inability to pay the court
assessments and restitution fines imposed by the court. We
otherwise affirmed. (People v. Belloso (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 647,
663, judg. vacated and cause remanded for further consideration
in light of Kopp, at pp. 1-2.)
On June 10, 2026 the Supreme Court granted review and
transferred the case to us with directions to vacate our decision
and reconsider Belloso’s appeal in light of Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th
1. In his supplemental brief, the Attorney General argued the
$300 minimum restitution fine and parole revocation restitution
fine in the same amount were not excessive fines under Kopp.

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.
2 Belloso also argued the abstract of judgment incorrectly
reflected that Belloso was convicted after a plea, not by a jury.
However, on September 28, 2018 the trial court corrected the
abstract of judgment at the request of Belloso’s appellate counsel.

2
Further, the Attorney General argued Belloso forfeited his
contention the trial court should have held an ability-to-pay
hearing with respect to the court’s imposition of a $30 court
facilities assessment and a $40 court operations assessment by
failing to raise his inability to pay at the sentencing hearing.
Belloso did not file a supplemental brief. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Information
The information charged Belloso with carrying a concealed
dirk or dagger in violation of section 21310. The information
alleged Belloso suffered three prior convictions of a violent or
serious felony under the three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(j),
1170.12), including a 1995 conviction of assault in violation of
section 245, subdivision (a)(1), and 2013 convictions of assault
with a deadly weapon in violation of section 245, subdivision
(a)(1), and making a criminal threat in violation of section 422.
The information also alleged five prior felony convictions for
which Belloso served separate prison terms within the meaning
of section 667.5, former subdivision (b).

B. The Evidence at Trial
On the evening of February 20, 2018 Los Angeles County
Sheriff’s Deputy Scott Simpkins and his partner were on patrol in
an unmarked black SUV in the City of Lakewood. Deputy
Simpkins was driving northbound on Woodruff Avenue when he
observed Belloso about 50 feet away walking in the same
direction on the sidewalk. The area was illuminated well by
street lights and lights from the surrounding buildings.
According to Deputy Simpkins, Belloso “was walking very ridged,

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kind of very upright. He was very rapid in his movements and he
was constantly turning around, looking around nervously. There
was [nobody] else around him.”
Deputy Simpkins pulled the SUV alongside the curb,
within 15 feet of Belloso. As the vehicle came to a stop, Belloso
reached into his front right pocket with his right hand and pulled
out a long, fixed-bladed knife. Belloso held the knife with his
right hand, keeping it low by his side. As Deputy Simpkins
exited his vehicle and approached, Belloso dropped the knife,
stepped to the side, and got down on his knees. Deputy Simpkins
detained Belloso. Belloso stated he was carrying the knife
because he was not from the area and was “sketched out.”
Deputy Simpkins interpreted this to mean Belloso had the knife
for protection. Deputy Simpkins recovered the knife from the
ground and booked it into evidence.
Deputy Simpkins brought the knife in an envelope to court
to show the jury. The knife was covered by a piece of thick paper,
secured by rubber bands. Deputy Simpkins explained, “It’s
wrapped like this so the person does not cut themselves.” He
described the knife as a stainless steel knife, measuring eight to
nine inches, with a four- to four-and-a-half-inch fixed blade,
which could not be folded. The jury was shown a photograph of
the knife taken by Deputy Simpkins as part of the booking
process.3 The photograph shows the blade is curved on one side
and straight on the other, with a pointed tip on the end.
Belloso did not call any witnesses.

3 The trial court later admitted the photograph into evidence.

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C. The Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Belloso guilty of carrying a dirk or dagger,
in violation of section 21310. On June 27, 2018 (the day of
sentencing), Belloso admitted the special allegation he suffered a
2013 conviction of making a criminal threat under section 422,
which was a violent or serious felony conviction under the three
strikes law. Belloso also admitted the special allegation he
suffered five prior felony convictions for which he served separate
prison terms within the meaning of section 667.5, former
subdivision (b). The trial court accepted the admissions and
found the special allegations true. At Belloso’s request, the court
struck the allegations of the 1995 prior strike conviction and the
five prison priors.4

4 Belloso did not admit the special allegation his
1995 assault conviction was of a violent or serious felony under
the three strikes law. The record does not reflect whether
Belloso’s 1995 conviction was for an assault with a deadly
weapon or by force likely to produce great bodily injury, only the
former of which is a violent or serious felony under the
three strikes law. (See § 1192.7, subd. (c)(31) [assault with a
deadly weapon listed as serious felony].) Nor did Belloso admit
the alleged 2013 conviction of assault with a deadly weapon
(§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). On our own motion we augment the record
to include the June 27, 2018 minute order. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).) The June 27 minute order states Belloso
“admits the [sections] 1170.12 and 667[, subdivisions] (b)-(i)
Penal Code allegations which the court finds to be true.” We
direct the trial court to correct the minute order to reflect that
Belloso admitted only the allegation he was convicted of a violent
or serious felony under the three strikes law with respect to the
2013 conviction of making a criminal threat, not the 1995 or
2013 assault convictions.

5
The trial court sentenced Belloso to an aggregate term of
six years, comprised of the upper term of three years (§§ 21310,
1170, subd. (h)(1)), doubled under the three strikes law. The
court imposed a $30 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code,
§ 70373, subd. (a)(1)) and a $40 court operations assessment
(Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)). The court also imposed the
statutory minimum restitution fine of $300 (§ 1202.4,
subd. (b)(1)), and it imposed and suspended a parole revocation
restitution fine in the same amount (§ 1202.45). Belloso did not
object to imposition of the assessments and fines or raise his
inability to pay.
Belloso timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Substantial Evidence Supports Belloso’s Conviction of
Carrying a Concealed Dirk or Dagger
1. Standard of review
“In evaluating a claim regarding the sufficiency of the
evidence, we review the record ‘in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’” (People v.
Westerfield (2019) 6 Cal.5th 632, 713; accord, People v. Penunuri
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 126, 142 [“‘To assess the evidence’s sufficiency,
we review the whole record to determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.’”].) “‘The
standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution

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relies mainly on circumstantial evidence.’ [Citations.] ‘We
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the trier of fact reasonably could infer from the evidence.
[Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of
fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply
because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled
with a contrary finding.’” (Westerfield, at p. 713; accord,
Penunuri, at p. 142 [“‘A reversal for insufficient evidence “is
unwarranted unless it appears ‘that upon no hypothesis
whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support’” the
jury’s verdict.’”].)

2. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding
Belloso’s knife was a dirk or dagger
“[S]ection 21310 makes it a criminal offense to carry
‘concealed upon the person any dirk or dagger.’” (People v.
Castillolopez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 322, 327; see § 21310 [“any person
in this state who carries concealed upon the person any dirk or
dagger” commits a criminal offense punishable as a felony or
misdemeanor].) Section 16470 defines a dirk or dagger as “a
knife or other instrument with or without a handguard that is
capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great
bodily injury or death.”
“[T]he legislative history is clear and unequivocal: the
intent to use the concealed instrument as a stabbing instrument
is not an element of the crime of carrying a concealed dirk or
dagger.” (People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 331; accord,
Stark v. Superior Court (2011) 52 Cal.4th 368, 394-395.)
However, a defendant must know the concealed instrument could
readily be used as a stabbing weapon. (Rubalcava, at p. 332

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[“[T]o commit the offense, a defendant must still have the
requisite guilty mind: that is, the defendant must knowingly and
intentionally carry concealed upon his or her person an
instrument ‘that is capable of ready use as stabbing weapon.’”];
see CALCRIM No. 2501 [“To prove that the defendant is guilty of
this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] . . . [¶] 4. The
defendant knew that it could readily be used as a stabbing
weapon.”].) Whether a knife is a dirk or dagger is a question of
fact for the jury to determine. (People v. Bain (1971) 5 Cal.3d
839, 851; People v. Wharton (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 72, 76
(Wharton).)
Belloso contends there is insufficient evidence to support
the jury’s finding his knife was a dirk or dagger. He admits
Deputy Simpkins testified the stainless steel knife had a four-
inch fixed blade and was wrapped in paper to prevent it from
cutting someone. But Belloso argues Deputy Simpkins did not
testify about the characteristics of the knife, including whether it
was sharp or dull; whether it had a pointed or rounded edge; or
whether the fixed blade was rigid or flexible. He also claims the
photograph did not show these characteristics. Further, Belloso
asserts the fact the knife was wrapped during trial to prevent it
from cutting someone did not mean the knife had the ability to
cause great bodily injury or death.
Contrary to Belloso’s contentions, substantial evidence
supported the jury’s finding the knife could readily be used as a
stabbing weapon. The jury observed the knife at trial, and the
photograph of the knife was admitted into evidence. Deputy
Simpkins testified the stainless steel knife measured eight to
nine inches long, with a four- to four-and-a-half-inch fixed blade.
The knife’s blade could not be folded, unlike a pocket knife. The

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photograph of the knife showed it had a sharp point. Deputy
Simpkins explained the knife was wrapped in paper to prevent
cuts from handling the knife. The jury could have reasonably
inferred from Deputy Simpkins’s testimony the knife was sharp;
otherwise, it would not have posed a risk of cutting someone. In
addition, Deputy Simpkins testified Belloso was carrying the
knife for protection, in light of Belloso’s comments he was
carrying the knife because he was “sketched out” and not from
the area. The jury could have reasonably inferred Belloso would
not have carried a dull, rounded-tip knife for protection.
The evidence the knife was stainless steel, with a fixed
four-inch blade, a sharpened edge, and pointed tip, and it was
carried by Belloso for protection, support the jury’s finding the
knife was “capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may
inflict great bodily injury or death.” (§ 16470; see Wharton,
supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 76 [knife with three-and-a-half-inch
blade that was rigid, sharpened on both sides, and had a sharp
point was dirk or dagger]; In re Quintus W. (1981) 120 Cal.App.3d
640, 642, 645 (Quintus W.) [steak knife with four-and-five-
eighths-inch blade was dirk or dagger]; People v. Ferguson (1970)
7 Cal.App.3d 13, 18-19 (Ferguson) [kitchen knife with eight-inch
blade, one cutting edge, and a point was dirk or dagger]; cf.
People v. Barrios (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 501, 506 (Barrios) [bread
knife was not dirk or dagger because the knife’s four-inch blade
had “one dull serrated edge and one blunt edge,” with a rounded
modest tip only on the serrated edge, and the blade flexed when
the point was applied to an object].)5

5 Wharton, Quintus W., Ferguson, and Barrios were decided
before the 1993 and 1995 amendments to former section 12020,

9
B. Belloso Has Not Met His Burden To Show He Is Entitled to
an Ability-to-pay Hearing on the Court Assessments and
Restitution Fines
1. Belloso forfeited his equal protection challenge to the
court assessments
As discussed, the trial court imposed a $30 court facilities
assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373, subd. (a)(1)) and a $40 court
operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8, subd. (a)(1)). These
costs are “authorized to fund court facilities and operations.”
(Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 14.) They are mandatory and, as
payment to cover costs, “do not constitute punishment.” (Id. at
p. 15.) The court in Kopp held that “in light of the Legislature’s
provision of fee waivers to indigent civil litigants, equal
protection principles require a court, upon request, to consider a
defendant’s inability to pay before imposing a court operations
assessment under Penal Code section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) or
a court facilities assessment under Government Code
section 70373, subdivision (a)(1).” (Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at
p. 30, italics added.)
The Attorney General contends Belloso forfeited his
contention he is entitled to a hearing on his ability to pay the
assessments because, in contrast to the defendant in Kopp, he

now codified as section 16470, which provided a statutory
definition of a dirk or dagger to clarify that a knife qualified as a
dirk or dagger regardless of whether it had a handguard or the
defendant intended to use it as a stabbing weapon. (People v.
Castillolopez, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 328; People v. Rubalcava,
supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 330.) This change in the law does not
affect our analysis.

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failed to request an ability-to-pay hearing in the trial court. We
find forfeiture, but for a different reason.
Belloso was not aware in the trial court that he had a right
to challenge imposition of the $70 in court assessments based on
his inability to pay (whether under a due process or equal
protection analysis), which would have excused his failure to
object in the trial court. (See People v. Perez (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1, 8
[“‘“‘[w]e have excused a failure to object where to require defense
counsel to raise an objection “would place an unreasonable
burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the
law”’”’”]; People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 127
[“Courts generally decline to apply the forfeiture rule to a right
derived from recent, unanticipated changes to the law.”].)
Further, in his February 2019 opening brief on appeal he argued
that he lacked the ability to pay the fees because he was indigent
at the time of his 2018 trial, pointing to the fact he had appointed
counsel.
However, Belloso had an opportunity on remand from the
Supreme Court following the Kopp decision to file a supplemental
brief asserting his right to a hearing on his ability to pay based
on equal protection principles. He failed to do so. He has
therefore forfeited his right to an ability-to-pay hearing on the
court assessments given his failure to argue that he currently
lacks the ability to pay $70 in fees; for example, Belloso has not
addressed whether he could pay that amount from wages earned
in prison during the five years since he was sentenced. (People v.
Evers (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 551, 556 [“Once case law exists
holding that a hearing on ability to pay is constitutionally
required when requested, a defendant who does not object or ask
for a hearing forfeits the claim of error.”]; see People v. Wilson

11
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 867-868 [defendant forfeited contention he
did not have ability to pay restitution fine where there was no
intervening change in the law].)
Accordingly, we reject Belloso’s claim that he is entitled to
a remand for the trial court to hold an ability-to-pay hearing on
the court assessments imposed at sentencing.

2. Belloso has not shown the $300 restitution fine and
parole revocation restitution fine were excessive
As discussed, the trial court imposed the statutory
minimum restitution fine of $300 (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1)), and it
imposed and suspended a parole revocation restitution fine in the
same amount (§ 1202.45). Section 1202.4, subdivision (b),
provides that “[i]n every case where a person is convicted of a
crime, the court shall impose a separate and additional
restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary
reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record.”
The trial court must impose on a defendant convicted of a felony
a minimum restitution fine of $300 but not more than $10,000.
(Id., subd. (b)(1).) A “defendant’s inability to pay shall not be
considered a compelling and extraordinary reason not to impose a
restitution fine,” but the court may consider inability to pay if the
court increases the restitution fine above the minimum amount.
(Id., subd. (c).) Where a defendant is convicted of a crime and the
sentence includes a period of parole, as here, the court must also
impose a parole revocation restitution fine in the same amount as
the restitution fine. (§ 1202.45, subd. (a).) However, this fine
“shall be suspended unless the person’s parole . . . is revoked.”
(Id., subd. (c)).

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The Supreme Court in Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at page 13
clarified that a “restitution fine under section 1202.4 constitutes
punishment.” The court in Kopp rejected the holding in Dueñas
that the failure of a trial court to consider a defendant’s ability to
pay before imposing punitive fines (including a restitution fine) is
a due process violation. (Kopp, at p. 23.) Instead, the Kopp court
held, an “excessive fines analysis, which considers ability to pay,
is the proper vehicle to challenge punitive fines.” (Id., at p. 16.)
The court continued, “Although fines may properly be imposed as
punishment for crime, both the federal and state Constitutions
prohibit excessive fines. (U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal. Const.,
art. I, § 17.) As the United States Supreme Court has observed,
the ‘touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the Excessive
Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of
the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the
offense that it is designed to punish.’” (Kopp, at p. 23, quoting
U.S. v. Bajakajian (1998) 524 U.S. 321, 334.)
In Kopp, the defendant argued at sentencing that the trial
court should impose only the minimum restitution fine because of
his inability to pay. (Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 9.) The trial
court rejected this argument and imposed a $10,000 restitution
fine and imposed and stayed a $10,000 parole revocation
restitution fine. (Id. at p. 14.) The Supreme Court acknowledged
that the defendant had not invoked the excessive fines clauses in
the trial court, but it remanded “to give him the opportunity to
assert the legal analyses applicable to such a challenge and argue
how the particular facts of this case inform such an inquiry.” (Id.
at p. 23.)
The Attorney General contends the mandatory
$300 minimum restitution fine and parole revocation restitution

13
fine were not excessive, contrasting them to the
$10,000 restitution fine imposed by the trial court in Kopp.
However, the Supreme Court in Kopp stated more generally, “On
remand, defendant may challenge the imposition of any fine as
constitutionally excessive under the federal and state
Constitutions. (See U.S. Const., 8th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, §
17.)” (Kopp, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 30; see id. at p. 32, conc. opn.
of Lui, J. [“I would hold that in the event the court determines
[the $10,000 restitution fine] is excessive, the court must then
evaluate whether imposing a lesser amount, including the $300
minimum fine, is also excessive.”].)
In any event, we agree with the Attorney General that
Belloso has not met his burden to show the minimum
$300 restitution fine and parole revocation restitution fine were
constitutionally excessive. As with the $70 assessments, Belloso
had an opportunity to file a supplemental brief on remand, but he
failed to do so. Therefore, he has forfeited any contention the fees
were excessive. (People v. Wilson, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 867-
868; People v. Evers, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 556.)6

6 We observe that since Belloso was convicted in 2018, the
Legislature has amended section 1465.9 to provide that “[u]pon
the expiration of 10 years after the date of imposition of a
restitution fine pursuant to Section 1202.4, the balance, including
any collection fees, shall be unenforceable and uncollectible and
any portion of a judgment imposing those fines shall be vacated.”
(§ 1465.9, subd. (d); Stats. 2024, ch. 805, § 1; see Kopp, supra,
19 Cal.5th at p. 17.) Accordingly, Belloso will be entitled to have
any unpaid balance of his restitution fine vacated in 2028.
However, this will not affect payment of the parole revocation
restitution fine. (§ 1202.45, subd. (a); see Kopp, at p. 17.)

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DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The superior court is directed to
correct the June 27, 2018 minute order to reflect that Belloso
admitted the allegation he was convicted of a violent or serious
felony under the three strikes law with respect to his 2013
conviction of making a criminal threat, not the alleged 1995 or
2013 assault convictions.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

SEGAL, Acting P. J.

STONE, J.

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