Filed 7/7/26 P. v. Bell CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B346199
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA034729)
v.
CHARLES EDWARD BELL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Michael D. Carter, Judge. Affirmed.
Nancy Gaynor, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________________
Defendant Charles Edward Bell appeals from the denial of
his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6,
formerly section 1170.95. We affirm because the jury was never
instructed on a now invalid murder theory and the jury found he
personally used a firearm in the commission of his crimes.
On May 23, 2000, a jury convicted Bell of first degree
murder in violation of section 187, subdivision (a) (count 1) and
attempted murder in violation of sections 187, subdivision (a)
and 664 (count 2). As to count 2, the jury found true the
allegations Bell committed the attempted murder willfully,
deliberately, and with premeditation. As to both counts, the jury
found true that he personally used a firearm, a handgun, within
the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision (a)(1). Bell waived
his right to a jury trial as to the prior strike allegations, and the
trial court found those allegations were true. On count 1, the
trial court sentenced Bell to 50 years to life plus 10 years for the
section 12022.5, subdivision (a)(1) allegation with a total prison
term of 60 years to life. On count 2, the court sentenced Bell to
life imprisonment plus 10 years for the section 12022.5,
subdivision (a)(1) allegation; the court ordered Bell’s sentence on
count 2 to run consecutively with the sentence on count 1.
On August 22, 2022, Bell, in pro. per., filed a petition for
resentencing under former section 1170.95. Bell contended he
could have been convicted under a now invalid felony murder
theory or the natural and probable causes doctrine. The trial
court appointed him counsel, who filed a brief in support of his
petition.
1 Unspecified statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
2
The People opposed the petition. They argued Bell was
ineligible for resentencing relief because the court never
instructed the jury on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or on felony murder. They also contended the jury found
that Bell personally used a handgun in the commission of his
crimes. The People attached to their opposition our unpublished
opinion in Bell’s direct appeal (case No. B144867), along with the
jury instructions and verdicts from defendant’s trial. Thus, they
contended, Bell was convicted as a principal who committed his
crimes with actual malice.
On April 18, 2025, the trial court denied the resentencing
petition at the prima facie stage. The court stated it had read the
jury instructions attached to the People’s opposition and found
Bell ineligible for relief because the jury (1) was not instructed on
a felony murder theory or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, and (2) had found true that Bell personally used a
firearm.
Bell timely appealed. We appointed counsel who filed a
brief identifying no issues. We informed Bell of his right to file a
supplemental brief which he has done.
Because this is an appeal from denial of postconviction
relief, we are not required to conduct an independent review of
the record, as we might in a direct appeal from a criminal
conviction. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 221–222.)
Although appointed counsel has asked us to exercise our
discretion to conduct an independent review, we decline to do so.
(Id. at p. 232.) When a defendant files a supplemental brief,
however, we are “required to evaluate the specific arguments
presented in that brief and to issue a written opinion.” (Ibid.)
3
In his supplemental brief, Bell makes the following
arguments:
1. The evidence was insufficient to support a finding of
actual malice or that he was the actual killer, the “prosecution’s
case relied on theories of imputed malice that have since been
invalidated,” and independent review will reveal insubstantial
evidence of intent to kill or of Bell being a major participant who
acted with reckless indifference to human life;
2. A key witness committed perjury and the prosecutor
committed misconduct by relying on that false testimony;
3. The prosecutor committed a Brady2 violation by
suppressing evidence of criminal records of key witnesses; and
4. There were “racial biases present during the
prosecution and sentencing phases of [the] case” in violation of
section 745, California’s Racial Justice Act.
Section 1172.6 provides a mechanism for defendants
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter to seek
resentencing if they could no longer be convicted under
amendments to the Penal Code generally eliminating murder
liability based on imputed malice except for felony murder by a
major participant with reckless disregard for human life. (See
People v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1173–1174.) Bell’s
arguments claiming insubstantial evidence at trial to support a
conviction “as a ‘principal with actual malice’ ”(boldface omitted);
perjured testimony; suppression of Brady information; and
violations of section 745 have no bearing on whether he was
convicted under a now invalid theory of imputed malice.
Accordingly, they are not cognizable upon review of the denial of
2 Brady v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 83.
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Bell’s section 1172.6 resentencing petition. We express no
opinion on whether Bell may raise these challenges to his
convictions by means other than a section 1172.6 petition.
We have reviewed the jury instructions and verdict forms
in assessing Bell’s argument that he could have been convicted
based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or a
now invalid felony murder theory. There were no instructions
asking the jury to consider the natural and probable
consequences doctrine or on felony murder at all. Rather, the
trial court instructed the jury that it could not convict Bell on
either count without finding malice aforethought. As to the
attempted murder in count 2, the trial court also instructed the
jury to determine whether the attempted murder was
“accompanied by a clear, deliberate intent to kill, which was the
result of deliberation and premeditation.” The jury found true
that the attempted murder was “willful, deliberate and
premeditated” (capitalization omitted), and that Bell “personally
used a firearm” in committing both crimes. In short, Bell’s
assertion he could have been convicted based on a now invalid
theory of imputed malice is belied by the jury instructions and
the jury’s verdicts.
In sum, Bell fails to demonstrate the trial court erred in
denying his section 1172.6 resentencing petition.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the order denying defendant Charles Edward
Bell’s Penal Code section 1172.6 petition.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:
WEINGART, J.
M. KIM, J.
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