Filed 9/9/26 P. v. Beadle CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A173358
v.
DANIEL THOMAS BEADLE, (Sonoma County Super. Ct.
No. SCR7539121)
Defendant and Appellant.
Following a jury trial, defendant Daniel Thomas Beadle was convicted
of aggravated domestic violence, false imprisonment, interference with a
wireless communication device, and vandalism. He was sentenced to four
years and eight months in prison. On appeal he raises two issues: first, that
the trial court erred in declining to unseat a juror mid-trial, and second, that
his sentence for false imprisonment should have been stayed pursuant to
Penal Code section 654.1 We find no error and affirm.2
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was charged with various offenses related to alleged
incidents in January, February, and March 2022. The only convictions
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We grant defendant’s unopposed request for judicial notice filed June
25, 2026, and supplemented July 7, 2026.
1
relevant to this appeal arise from conduct alleged to have occurred on the
night of March 6 and early morning of March 7, and we limit our discussion
of the evidence accordingly.
Trial Evidence
Jessica Doe dated defendant for a few months starting around
November 2021. Doe was going through a divorce and had young children;
the children were two and five years old in 2022. After about a month of
dating, Doe started working at an auto body shop with “a bunch of guys,” and
defendant became jealous and controlling. He would show up at her
workplace, and he “didn’t want [her] to talk to [her] friends, family, anyone.”
Asked if she felt like she could break up with him, Doe testified, no, because
“[t]here was . . . no getting rid of him.” She would ask defendant to leave, and
“ ‘Let me be,’ ” but “he wouldn’t.”
By March 6, 2022, Doe had been “trying to distance [her]self from
[defendant] for quite a while.” That day, Doe picked up her children after
work and went home. Defendant said he was leaving for Arizona and asked
if he could see Doe’s children before he left. Doe allowed him to come say
goodbye to them. Defendant arrived at Doe’s house that evening. Doe and
her children had a phone call with Doe’s ex-husband in the living room while
defendant was in Doe’s bedroom. Later, Doe put her children to bed, and the
children were asleep by around 9:00 p.m.
Doe went to her bedroom and lay in bed watching television. Doe
testified, “[Defendant] was kind of pacing around and then came and laid
next to me and then got upset because I was on the phone with my ex-
husband with my kids and then started choking me.” She testified, “He
jumped on top of me and put his . . . knee on my chest and then started
choking me.” After he strangled her for about a minute, he stopped and then
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he was “off and on” her. He said things to her like, “ ‘Stupid motherfucker’ ”
and “ ‘Shut the fuck up.’ ” Doe testified, “If I moved an inch, like if I even
tried to scratch my face, [he’d say something] like, ‘Don’t fucking move, you
stupid motherfucker.’ Like, ‘I’m coming back,’ . . . and it would continue.”
Defendant strangled her “[m]any, many, many times,” at least 20 times. She
felt like she “could not breathe” and was going to lose consciousness, but she
never actually passed out. Defendant also jabbed at Doe while verbally
abusing her. Doe testified, “He was poking me. Like, ‘Shut the fuck up.’
Like—and I’m like, ‘Please stop,’ and he just kept . . . .” The poking was
“jabbing,” “very hard” and “very forceful,” on her chest, neck, and face, and it
hurt a lot. Once or twice he used a pillowcase to strangle her. Doe described
what happened as “like three hours of torture” that continued into the early
morning hours of March 7.
The prosecutor asked, “What would happen when you got up and tried
to leave?” Doe responded, “That was not possible.” “He wouldn’t let me. He
wouldn’t even let me move. . . . [I]f I looked in one direction, if I—he just
wouldn’t let me.’ ” When she tried to leave, defendant said, “ ‘Try it. Try it.
See what happens.’ ” She asked “[m]any times” to go to the bathroom.
Defendant eventually “led [her] to the bathroom,” and after she used the
bathroom, “[l]ifted” her up—at one point grabbing her neck—and took her
back to the bedroom. At times, defendant “would just pace around” and “keep
an eye on” her, and “he left to smoke a cigarette right outside the window, . . .
five feet away from the bed, a couple times.”
Doe told defendant she was going to call the cops, and defendant said,
“ ‘You’re not a cop caller.’ ” She said to defendant, “ ‘Then let me call my ex-
husband’ ” because she “knew he would come and help [her] or at least come
get the kids.” Doe tried to call her ex-husband at 11:48 p.m.; it rang once,
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and defendant grabbed her phone and hung up. Doe’s ex-husband texted her,
“ ‘Why did you call?’ ” Defendant held Doe’s phone to her face to unlock it
(using facial recognition) and then responded to the ex-husband’s text, “ ‘Butt
dial.’ ” Defendant kept Doe’s phone for the rest of the night. He also took her
keys and the landline phone. Defendant said things like, “ ‘You say one more
fucking word, I’m going to kill you.’ ” He also made threats to Doe’s father,
her bosses, and her ex-husband.
Defendant eventually fell asleep. Doe waited about a half an hour and
then went upstairs to her children. She went to bed with them around 3:30
a.m., and defendant came and got her up at 5:00 a.m. Doe told defendant to
leave and he wouldn’t. Defendant said things like, “ ‘Get the fuck down
here,’ ” “ ‘Get down here right now. We’re going to continue this until . . . you
answer my questions,’ ” and “ ‘You’re just a horrible person.’ ” Doe asked
defendant to leave her house, but he would not. Doe left her house with her
children. After she took her children to daycare and preschool, she went to
work. Her coworkers saw bruising on her neck and told her to go to the
police.
A male police officer met with Doe on March 7 and found her upset and
shaking with a hoarse voice. He observed bruising across her chest and neck,
and, “[d]ue to the sensitive nature of the investigation as well as the areas on
the body where [Doe] described having injury,” he requested a female officer
photograph her injuries. Photographs taken on March 7 and a few days later
showed bruising under Doe’s ear, on the right side of her chest, on the left
side of her neck, on her left forearm, on the left side of her back, and on her
left leg caused by defendant grabbing her, holding her down, and poking her
and a pronounced bruise on the right side of her jawline and neck from
defendant choking her with his hands. After the incident, Doe’s eyes hurt,
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her vision was blurry, she couldn’t swallow, and her throat hurt for a long
time.
Defendant testified in his own defense. He denied that he was violent
with Doe on the night of March 6. He testified that they argued, but he never
took Doe’s phone, and he went to sleep around midnight. According to
defendant, Doe’s bruising “was from sex.” He testified, “She liked me to be
physical with her, as far as biting, choking, and that was her perspective, and
I was doing what she wanted me to do.” Defendant testified he had marks on
his body from sex, and he took photos of himself, which were admitted in
evidence.
Relevant Verdict and Sentence
Regarding the events of March 6 and 7, defendant was charged with
willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon
Doe, a person with whom defendant had a dating relationship (§ 273.5, subd.
(a)(1); count 1), assault with a deadly weapon, to wit, a pillowcase (§ 245,
subd. (a); count 2), felony false imprisonment in that defendant unlawfully
violated the personal liberty of Doe by use of violence, menace, or deceit
(§§ 236, 237; count 3), and misdemeanor interference with a wireless
communication device in that defendant unlawfully removed and obstructed
the use of a wireless communication device with the intent to prevent the use
of the device to summon assistance or to notify law enforcement of a crime
(§ 591.5; count 4).
The jury found defendant guilty of count 1 (aggravated domestic
violence), count 3 (false imprisonment), and count 4 (interference with a
communication device) and not guilty of count 2 (assault with a deadly
weapon). In a subsequent court trial, the court found the following factors in
aggravation: the crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of
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great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty,
viciousness, or callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)); the victim
was particularly vulnerable (id., rule 4.421(a)(3)); and defendant’s prior
performance on probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease community
supervision, or parole was unsatisfactory (id. rule 4.421(b)(5)).
At sentencing, defense counsel asked for probation or, in the
alternative, the low term for count 1. He asked for a concurrent term for
count 3 “as it was unclear as to whether it was encompassed and [defendant]
should be entitled to that benefit.”3
The trial court found defendant was not suitable for probation, noting
“his general lack of insight and remorse make him dangerous to others.” The
court also found, “based on the evidence received at the trial . . . that the
conduct in Count 1 and Count 3 were, in fact, separate acts of violence
committed against [the victim] over a period of hours.” It found Doe’s trial
testimony “compelling and thoughtful” and “did not find [defendant’s] words
credible.”
The court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years for count
1 and a consecutive eight months (one-third the middle term) for count 3.
3 Here, it appears defense counsel may have been implicitly referring to
California Rules of Court, rule 4.425, on factors affecting concurrent or
consecutive sentences. Whether “[t]he crimes involved separate acts of
violence or threats of violence” is a “fact[] relating to [the] crimes” that
“affect[s] the decision to impose consecutive rather than concurrent
sentences.” (Id., rule 4.425(a)(2).) Defense counsel seemed to imply that the
court should presume count 1 and count 3 did not involve separate acts of
violence.
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DISCUSSION
A. Failure to Discharge a Juror
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying a defense motion to
discharge a juror during trial. We are not persuaded.
1. Additional Background
On the first day of testimony, the prosecutor asked Doe to describe the
first thing defendant did to her physically on the night of March 6. She
responded that “he jumped on top of me and put his, like, knee on my chest
and then started choking me,” and put his hands around her neck so that she
could not talk, and kept saying things like “ ‘you [s]tupid motherfucker,’ ” and
“ ‘[s]hut the fuck up.’ ” After her response, the following exchange occurred
between the prosecutor and the trial judge:
“[Prosecutor]: Just for the record, Your Honor, the witness was holding
both of her hands out, with her index and thumb in I guess I would describe
as a choking motion, a standard choking motion.
“[The Court]: I would phrase it as hands in front of her in close
proximity to one another, with her thumbs towards her chest at about her
chest level, I would say two to three inches apart, and then I would say
cupped in a C and a backwards C. That’s how I would describe it.
“[Prosecutor]: That was much better.”
Testimony then resumed.
The next day, the trial judge told counsel and defendant, outside the
presence of the jurors and in a closed courtroom, that Juror No. 4602
expressed concerns to the bailiff that, after the prosecutor’s comment, a
number of people laughed, whether that was fellow jurors, audience
members, or others. The trial judge said that Juror No. 4602 reportedly felt
“very bad” for Doe, but this would not impact his ability to serve as a juror,
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and he just wanted to bring it to the court’s attention. Defense counsel
responded that he had seen the juror that morning “pacing through the
hallway” and “saying things” that defense counsel could not hear and that
were not directed to him. The prosecutor stated that it did not appear to him
that Doe “was taking any offense” at the courtroom colloquy described above.
The trial judge responded, “I just want to ensure that this juror hasn’t
emotionally prejudiced anything or is fully able to continue.”
Juror No. 4602 was brought back into the courtroom, with the trial
judge acknowledging that the bailiff had indicated the juror had some
concerns or something was bothering him, and it is “best for you to just tell
me in your own words.” Juror No. 4602 explained that it was about the point
where Doe was on the stand “with respect to the motion around the neck, he
[prosecutor] gave a very simple—you gave a much more detailed description
about what had happened. And the prosecutor made a quip about being, you
know, far more detailed, and everybody in the room kind of chuckled and
laughed at that.”
The juror went on to explain, uninterrupted by the trial court:
“For someone who is on the stand, given their emotional state, pouring
their heart out in testimony, for us to laugh at their trauma—
“My wife went through an experience, somebody made a quip about
that, and I can tell you, sitting down, hold—at night, listening to her cry at
how people could minimize that, it dug at me.
“So this doesn’t change how I’m viewing this. I am still trying to be
impartial. But from that perspective, I—even having a victim advocate here,
I felt like we minimized their trauma, and that just stuck with me, and I
thought about it all night based on my own personal experiences, and I just
wanted to call that out.
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“And I don’t know if there’s anything that can be done to rectify that.
We can’t go into the past and undo it. But I wanted to bring it to your
attention that I felt it was a disservice to them testifying, that we all
essentially laughed at how that was described.” (Italics added.)
The trial court asked the juror, “Are you going to be able to set this
aside and decide this case solely on the evidence presented?” The juror
responded:
“As I said, it doesn’t change my perspective looking at the case, but if I
take a step back from just in terms of what they’re going through, again, it’s
yet to be determined because the proceedings have not concluded, obviously.
“But I just wanted to say that I know how that can make somebody
feel, even if—because perception is reality. It’s their perception, so it’s their
reality.
“But from, you know, stepping back, looking objectively at the case and
everything that’s going on, it’s still all up in the air. We still haven’t heard all
the evidence, haven’t heard from everybody.
“Does it give me empathy for someone? It absolutely does, but more in
so that—the way that we minimized their trauma in that way.
“So from that perspective, I—I can say that I can be impartial.· I still
haven’t listened to all the evidence. I still have thoughts that I’m thinking
about all the time. I mean, it’s a real-time event.
“I don’t know how I can clarify it more than that. But again, this was
just about—something that I did not expect to come up, and that’s how it
affected me.” (Italics added.)
The trial court went on to ask about whether the juror had already
prejudged the case and the juror stated he had not:
“It’s a perception of reality.
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“And again, I don’t want to do a disservice to the court, but if what is
going on up there is—if it is an act to bring empathy, that’s one thing.
“I’m looking at it from a trauma perspective based on my own personal
experience, but I have not made any decisions yet. All I can say is that we
laughed at somebody who is testifying, and this is supposed to be a safe space
where people can do that. They had a [sic] advocate. And I feel that we
minimized their testimony, If we boil it down to the most base form, that’s
all.” (Italics added.)
The court asked counsel if they had any questions; when they did not,
the court thanked the juror and asked him to leave the courtroom.
The court then stated to counsel:
“With that, I really let the juror try to explain it their own way, because
at the beginning, he sounded like he had started to prejudge or maybe have a
bias or move towards one side, and the Court wanted to be very sure he
wasn’t just giving me the rote answer of ‘I haven’t judged anything yet. I just
thought you should know. I haven’t judged.’ By the time he had concluded
answering the questions and really put it into his own words—
“I will just hear from the parties.”
Defense counsel asked to have the juror removed from the panel
because he had prejudged the case. The prosecutor opposed the motion,
noting that he understood what the juror was saying, that “there was a point
of levity in a very serious situation and a very serious testimony, and I think
that’s what he was getting at . . . I don’t think that means he can’t be
impartial. He was very clear that he could be. But he did not like the
moment of levity in a very serious time.”
The trial court then denied defendant’s motion to excuse the juror,
stating as follows:
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“Based on the totality of the answers, I at first did agree with [defense
counsel]. [Juror No. 4602] was using terms as if he had prejudged it.
“However, I kept asking him over and over, and not in a leading way.
By the end of the conversation, he was very clear. He physically would say
with his hands—he would use hand gestures, ‘this situation,’ like something
in front of him, and then put up his hands and literally take a step back as if
he is removing himself but yet, being a very diligent juror, is bringing it to
my attention. It was in his head. He wanted us to know about it.
“So I do feel, based on his answers—unequivocally, he indicated ‘I can
be fair and impartial, it won’t interfere with my job as a juror’ but that he’s
clearly trying to follow all of the Court’s directives, to the letter.· So that’s
why I think he came forward, letting us know it was bothering him.
“What was bothering him was the levity during a serious conversation,
that he repeatedly said, ‘I don’t know what happened. I still haven’t decided.
I haven’t heard all the evidence.’ ”
“So I am going to retain him as a juror at this time.”
2. Analysis
“The trial court may discharge a juror at any time if good cause exists
to find that the juror is unable to perform his or her duty. (§ 1089.) ‘The trial
court’s decision whether or not to discharge a juror under section 1089 is
reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be upheld if supported by
substantial evidence; to warrant discharge, the juror’s bias or other disability
must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality.’ (People v. Holloway
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 124–125.) A reviewing court does not reweigh the
evidence but ‘must be confident that the trial court’s conclusion is manifestly
supported by evidence on which the court actually relied.’ (People v. Barnwell
(2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038, 1053.)” (People v. Lopez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 339, 365.)
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Here we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to leave
Juror No. 4602 on the panel. The trial judge took the right approach: he told
counsel before inviting the juror into the courtroom that he wanted to be sure
the juror had not “emotionally prejudged anything” and was “fully able to
continue.” The trial court then asked the juror an open ended and non-
confrontational question, letting the juror speak at length uninterrupted.
Although the juror was concerned that there appeared to be levity in the
courtroom after the prosecutor’s self-deprecating quip, and took seriously
that the courtroom is “supposed to be a safe space where people testify,” the
juror reiterated that he could be fair and impartial and do his job as a juror.
The court then asked whether the juror could set aside his feelings and
decide the case on the evidence presented, and the juror said he could and
that he would be impartial. And in response to whether he had prejudged the
case, the juror said he had not made any decisions yet. The trial court
permitted counsel to ask questions, but there were none. And then the trial
court summed up the reasons for his finding that the juror should not be
dismissed, based on the totality of the answers that he had heard and his
observation of the juror.
We are not persuaded by defendant’s position that the very same
colloquy between the court and the juror that we have quoted in its entirety
shows the juror was “actually biased in favor of the complainant.” In support
of this conclusion, defendant contends that the juror did not really
understand the “actual interchange” between the court and the “prosecutor’s
deft, self-deprecating comment that the trial judge’s phrasing was ‘much
better’ than his own description,” or that the judge’s description was actually
“much better” than the prosecutor’s description of what happened, and that
any “attorney or judge who has participated in a trial understands that a
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brief amount of levity is a welcome respite from the very intense, serious
endeavor.” This argument misses the point that the inquiry of the juror was
not to determine whether the juror understood trial tactics and techniques or
who better described the witness’s gestures but rather to get to the bottom of
the juror’s apparent concerns to determine if he could continue to serve
consistent with giving defendant a fair trial. The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the juror.
B. Consecutive Sentencing
Defendant next contends the trial court was required to stay the eight-
month term for count 3 under section 654.4 We disagree.
1. Applicable Law
Section 654, subdivision (a), provides in relevant part, “An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law
may be punished under either of such provisions, but in no case shall the act
or omission be punished under more than one provision.” “[T]he purpose of
section 654 ‘is to insure that a defendant’s punishment will be commensurate
with his culpability.’ ” (People v. Latimer (1993) 5 Cal.4th 1203, 1211.)
Determining “[w]hether a defendant may be subjected to multiple
punishment under section 654 requires a two-step inquiry.” (People v.
Corpening (2016) 2 Cal.5th 307, 311.) The first step is to determine whether
“the different crimes were completed by a ‘single physical act.’ [Citation.] If
so, the defendant may not be punished more than once for that act.” (Ibid.)
If “the case involves more than a single act—i.e., a course of conduct,” then
4 Defendant may raise a claim under section 654 on appeal even though
he did not raise the issue below. (See People v. Brents (2012) 53 Cal.4th 599,
618 [considering appellate claim under section 654 although the issue was
not raised in the trial court because error under section 654 results in an
unauthorized sentence].)
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the court reaches the second step and must determine “whether that course
of conduct reflects a single ‘intent and objective’ or multiple intents and
objectives.” (Ibid.) The second step is sometimes referred to as the Neal test.
(See People v. Latimer, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 1205–1206, citing Neal v. State
of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11.)
Under the Neal test, the question “ ‘[w]hether a course of criminal
conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the
meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all
of the offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished
for any one of such offenses but not for more than one.’ ” (People v. Latimer,
supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1208.) On the other hand, if the “defendant
‘entertained multiple criminal objectives which were independent of and not
merely incidental to each other, he may be punished for independent
violations committed in pursuit of each objective even though the violations
shared common acts or were parts of an otherwise indivisible course of
conduct.’ ” (People v. Kwok (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1257.)
“Where reasonable minds can differ on whether multiple crimes involve
a single act, [the California Supreme Court has] applied the [Neal] ‘intent
and objective’ test.” (People v. Jones (2012) 54 Cal.4th 350, 372 (conc. opn. of
Liu, J.).)
“A trial court’s express or implied determination that two crimes were
separate, involving separate objectives [and, therefore, may be punished
separately under section 654], must be upheld on appeal if supported by
substantial evidence.” (People v. Brents, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 618.) The
trial court “is vested with broad latitude in making its determination,” and
“[w]e review the trial court’s determination in the light most favorable to the
respondent and presume the existence of every fact the trial court could
14
reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v. Jones (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 1139, 1143.)
2. Analysis
At the first step of the section 654 analysis, defendant claims count 1
and count 3 involved the same physical act. He argues, “The same physical
injuries inflicted by physical force were the actus reus of both counts one and
three. They both inflicted physical injury by physical force in count one and
accomplished restraint by violence in count three.”
We reject the premise of defendant’s claim that the crimes of count 1,
aggravated domestic violence, and count 3, false imprisonment by use of
violence, menace, or deceit, were completed by a single physical act. Rather,
as the prosecutor argued at trial in closing argument, “Counts 1 and 3 are
referring to multiple acts, strangulation with the hands, the poking, the
sitting on top of her.” (Italics added.) Nor were the acts supporting each
offense identical. As to count 1, the prosecutor relied on defendant’s conduct
that caused the bruising seen in the photos, noting “bruising on [Doe’s]
chest,” “bruising around her neck,” and marks on her arms and legs. As to
count 3, the prosecutor argued the “menace” for felony false imprisonment
“include[d] [defendant’s] verbal threats.” He argued, “[W]hile [defendant]
wasn’t letting [Doe] leave the bed for hours, he was threatening to kill her
father, to kill her. He was threatening her repeatedly.” Defendant’s threats
used to restrain Doe for count 3 were not the same acts that caused Doe’s
corporal injuries for count 1. Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim under
the first step of the section 654 analysis.
At the second step of the analysis, defendant argues count 1 and count
3 involved a single objective. He asserts, “count one’s infliction of injuries
was the incidental means to accomplish count three’s restraint.” In other
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words, defendant claims his only intent and objective in committing count 1
and count 3 was to restrain Doe.
However, the trial court reasonably could have determined that
defendant harbored separate criminal intents and objectives when he
committed the two crimes. As the Attorney General suggests, the trial court
reasonably could have found that one of defendant’s intents and objectives in
committing aggravated domestic violence (count 1) was to inflict physical
harm upon Doe, but in falsely imprisoning Doe in her bedroom over the
course of three hours (count 3), defendant entertained the separate intent
and objective of preventing her from reporting the physical abuse. Because
the record supports a finding that defendant, in committing count 1 and
count 3, entertained at least two intents and objectives that were
independent of each other, we conclude the trial court properly punished him
separately for each count under section 654.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
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_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Stewart, P. J.
_________________________
Richman, J.
A173358, People v. Beadle
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