Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

P. v. Baquiax CA1/3

Filed 9/30/26 P. v. Baquiax CA1/3
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 9/30/26 P. v. Baquiax CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. A173709
OSCAR JOSUE AREVALO
BAQUIAX, (Alameda County Super. Ct.
Defendant and Appellant. No. 22CR011668)

A jury convicted Oscar Josue Arevalo Baquiax of the second degree
murders of his best friend and his best friend’s father. On appeal, he
contends the prosecutor committed misconduct; his counsel was ineffective;
the trial court erred while imposing a parole revocation fine; and the abstract
of judgment and the sentencing minute order contain clerical errors. In
supplemental briefing, he also contends the case should be remanded for the
court to determine if he is able to pay standard assessments, and the
Attorney General contends that there are other clerical errors in the abstract
of judgment and sentencing minute order. We remand so the court can
correct the clerical errors but otherwise affirm.
BACKGROUND
In March 2024, the prosecutor charged Arevalo Baquiax with the
murders of Rigoberto Perez, Jr., and Rigoberto Jr.’s father, Rigoberto Perez,

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Sr. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a), undesignated statutory references are to this
code.) The prosecutor also alleged he personally used a deadly and dangerous
weapon during both killings. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)
On September 24, 2022, Arevalo Baquiax, Rigoberto Jr., and Rigoberto
Sr., gathered at the Rigobertos’ apartment to celebrate their friend J.P.’s
birthday. Rigoberto Sr., Rigoberto Jr., and Rigoberto Jr.’s older brother —
E.H. — lived in the apartment together. M.R. and A.S. — whom Arevalo
Baquiax occasionally had sex with — also arrived. The group drank together.
E.H. passed out drunk around midnight. Arevalo Baquiax drank at a
“[m]edium” pace.
Around 1:00 a.m. the next morning, Arevalo Baquiax and A.S. went
into a bedroom to have sex. About an hour later, Arevalo Baquiax rejoined
the party while A.S. slept naked in the bedroom.
Rigoberto Jr., who was drunk, entered the bedroom. A.S. testified she
woke up to Rigoberto Jr. and Arevalo Baquiax arguing, but defense counsel
impeached her with her preliminary hearing testimony that she woke up to
Rigoberto Jr. touching her side. Arevalo Baquiax testified he went into the
bedroom and saw Rigoberto Jr. touching A.S. while masturbating. M.R.
testified she opened the bedroom door with Arevalo Baquiax behind her,
turned on the lights, and saw A.S. and Rigoberto Jr. laying down naked
before immediately covering themselves.
J.P. testified he entered the bedroom after Arevalo Baquiax and M.R.
He saw Arevalo Baquiax covering A.S. with a shirt and Rigoberto Jr. wearing
shorts. Arevalo Baquiax and Rigoberto Jr. argued. Arevalo Baquiax told
Rigoberto Jr. to leave because A.S. was naked and asked him, “ ‘[w]hy did you
do this?’ ” and “ ‘[w]hy did he go into the room,’ ” and told him they were not
best friends anymore. Rigoberto Jr. apologized but did not leave because it

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was his room. He kicked Arevalo Baquiax and A.S. out of the room, and
Rigoberto Sr. escorted them out of the apartment.
Arevalo Baquiax and A.S. walked to the apartment’s parking lot. In
the parking lot, he told her “nobody could hurt” her. After 15 to 30 minutes,
he returned to the apartment. Meanwhile, Rigoberto Sr. and Rigoberto Jr.
had a physical altercation. They argued about Rigoberto Jr.’s behavior
towards A.S. and family dynamics. It escalated into a violent fight.
Eventually, Rigoberto Sr. put his son in a headlock.
Arevalo Baquiax returned to the apartment. J.P. saw him walk toward
the kitchen and wait there for five minutes. Then, J.P. saw him walking
towards the bedroom with a knife. J.P. told him “[n]ot to enter” and “ ‘[d]on’t
do anything crazy.’ ” Arevalo Baquiax tried to enter the bedroom but backed
up when J.P. told him to. While J.P. tried to separate Rigoberto Sr. and
Rigoberto Jr., Arevalo Baquiax pushed J.P. to the ground and stabbed
Rigoberto Sr. in the neck. After Rigoberto Sr. released Rigoberto Jr., J.P. saw
Arevalo Baquiax make two more stabbing motions but did not see where the
knife landed. M.R. tried to stop Rigoberto Sr.’s bleeding and later noticed
Rigoberto Jr. on the ground. Rigoberto Jr. died from two stab wounds, one to
his neck and the other to his abdomen. Rigoberto Sr. died shortly after
paramedics arrived.
Arevalo Baquiax returned to the parking lot with his hands and arms
“full of blood.” When A.S. asked him what he had done, he said “ ‘ “I did what
I had to do. . . . I grabbed a knife and I started stabbing him.” ’ ” He said he
“stabbed Rigo” and “Rigo’s dad.” The two stayed in the parking lot for several
hours, while an ambulance and police arrived, before getting picked up by a
friend. They did not approach the first responders.

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The night of September 25, Arevalo Baquiax told police he killed
Rigoberto Jr. and Rigoberto Sr. in a videorecorded interview. He recounted
the night in detail. He and A.S. had sex. When he left the bedroom,
Rigoberto Jr. went in. He followed Rigoberto Jr. and saw him masturbating.
He confronted Rigoberto Jr., “and they started arguing and pushing and
shoving each other.” Rigoberto Sr. kicked them out. When he returned to the
apartment, Rigoberto Sr. confronted him. He then went to the kitchen,
grabbed a knife, and went to the bedroom. He “ ‘stared at them’ ” and “ ‘made
the decision’ ” to kill, and he stabbed Rigoberto Sr. and Rigoberto Jr. in the
neck. He told police, “ ‘I stuck the knife in’ ” and “ ‘I bury the knife here’ ”
while pointing to his neck. When police asked him how he was “feeling in
relation to the alcohol,” he answered “ ‘I felt fine. Yes, as I am telling you, I
remember everything very well,’ ” and said he stopped drinking two hours
before the killings.
At trial, Arevalo Baquiax recanted his admissions. He testified after he
and A.S. left the apartment, M.R. texted him “they were bleeding and that
the police had been called.” He returned to the apartment because of the
message. When he arrived, Rigoberto Jr. and Rigoberto Sr. were on the
ground bleeding. He returned to A.S. with blood on his hands because he got
too close to the bodies. He denied telling A.S. he stabbed the men. When the
police arrived, A.S. told him maybe he had done something. He explained he
told the police he killed the men because, “when I came outside, my hands
were bloody. And I had not slept. I don’t know. And I was confused and I
thought at one point that I had done it.” And his confusion was “why I’m
telling the truth today.” But the prosecutor impeached him with his
statements to police and the video recording of his interview. During cross-

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examination, he also admitted he was never “angry” or “afraid” of either
victim.
During closing arguments, Arevalo Baquiax argued there was
reasonable doubt as to whether he stabbed the men. Alternatively, he argued
that he killed in the heat of passion and thus should only be convicted of
voluntary manslaughter.
In January 2025, the jury acquitted Arevalo Baquiax of first degree
murder but convicted him of second degree murder for both killings. (§ 187,
subd. (a).) It also found he personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon.
(§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).) The trial court sentenced him to 32 years to life in
prison.
DISCUSSION
Arevalo Baquiax first argues the prosecutor committed misconduct
during closing arguments by making improper comments. He concedes he
failed to object at trial but contends the comments nonetheless warrant
reversal. The claims are forfeited.
During his closing arguments, the prosecutor stated there was “[n]ot
too much to discuss here. But kind of like when you’re on an airplane flight
going over the desert and the flight attendant stands up and tells you how
the life rafts work. They’re just doing their job. I have to do my job; [trial
counsel] has to do his job. Got to get up here and say something.” The
prosecutor also stated, “[a]s part of the job as a juror, I ask you guys to use
your commonsense. Please don’t be gullible. What else was [Arevalo
Baquiax] going to say?”
During his rebuttal to Arevalo Baquiax’s closing argument, the
prosecutor quoted another prosecutor’s argument in People v. Morris (1988)
46 Cal.3d 1 — a Supreme Court case. After telling the jury he was going to

5
quote another prosecutor from a Supreme Court case, he stated, “I have
changed basically just the name [the other prosecutor] refers to and the date
to fit our facts, but this is his argument, essentially. [¶] ‘Keep in mind that
there is not a shred of evidence, not a shred to suggest that anybody else did
the killing other than Defendant, not a shred. [¶] ‘There is not a shred of
evidence to indicate that Defendant was anywhere else on or during the
evening of September 24 into the 25th, 2022, nothing. Put yourself in the
position of being a defendant and you can bet your boots’ ” “ ‘if he had
anything to offer by way of evidence, by way of alibi, that he would offer it.
Be assured of that. Be assured of the fact that any defense attorney would
make sure that if any such evidence existed, you would have it. You don’t
have it.’ ”
The prosecutor also stated that “[d]efendant wants to claim that,
essentially, his confession is coerced. Now if there was any indication that
this was coerced or inappropriate at how they arrived at this statement, it
wouldn’t have been let in by the judge.”
When describing the reasonable doubt standard, the prosecutor stated
the “[d]efense also talks about my burden quite a bit and the burden is to
prove it beyond a reasonable doubt and that is on me. However, he says
things like, ‘[r]easonable doubt means there’s nothing left.’ That’s not true.
It’s right there in the name, reasonable doubt. We talked about this during
jury selection, not all possible doubt. We all have doubts. [¶] Every day I
drive down the freeway and I don’t have a memory of me turning off the
stove, closing the garage door, locking my front door. Do I turn around on the
freeway and drive back home? No, because the doubt is not reasonable
because I know every single day I do that, and my house is not unlocked, my
house is not burned down, and my garage is not open. That is not a

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reasonable doubt. It’s a doubt I have just because I’m staring at the other
cars and I’ve got nothing to think about. And sometimes I’ll even work
myself up about it, but it’s not reasonable. To require that human beings
have no manner of doubt whatsoever would require you not to be human
beings.”
The prosecutor also made what Arevalo Baquiax argues are improper
comments about defense counsel. Specifically, the prosecutor said “[t]here is
statements like, ‘[w]hat evidence do we have that they didn’t do this to each
other?’ That’s what the entire [case] has been about. We’ve got [J.P.], we’ve
got [M.R.], we’ve got [A.S.], we’ve got the defendant. We’ve got all that
evidence that they didn’t do it to each other. These are the types of
unnecessary, inappropriate, nonsensical references and jumps to conclusions
that he’s asking you to make because he’s just trying to do his job. But you
have to make sure there’s actually a foundation for those things and you have
to make sure that it is reasonable that this goes to that.”
The prosecutor continued, “[n]ow, and finally, listen, there’s probably a
lot more people in this courthouse that like [defense counsel] a lot better than
me, all right. He’s charming. He’s good at his job, but this isn’t a popularity
contest. And he also doesn’t have license to talk out of every single side of his
mouth, all right. Because he’s saying things like, ‘Oh, you heard my client’s
testimony. He wasn’t there. This is an ID case. This is a who-done-it. But
also, he was provoked. If he was there, he was provoked, guys, and he
absolutely — it was serious provoking going on.’ So there was that. And,
‘[a]re we even sure that these guys died from stab wounds?’ [¶] Guys, can
you really believe that he’s now attacking the cause of death when we have
testimony these people were stabbed in the neck. Officers found them with
holes in their necks, declared dead on scene, again, with no evidence

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suggesting anything else. [¶] Pick a lane. But he’s just trying to do his job
and he’s throwing everything against the wall. But when you make every
argument, it shows you don’t have faith in any one argument.”
Finally, the prosecutor stated the “situation sucks. You guys are
sitting here, and really, based on the evidence, you have no choice but to vote
guilty. Doing otherwise would be to consciously disregard what you’ve seen
with no reason. You would have to make a real effort to ignore the evidence
that’s been in front of you and come to a different conclusion. [¶] [Defense
counsel] wanted you to treat the defendant like family. Fine. You know, say
you go home after this and you’re sitting on the BART train. . . . You strike
up a conversation with someone. ‘Oh, where are you coming from?’ ‘Coming
from the courthouse. Just got done with jury duty.’ ‘Oh, how did it go?’ ‘Oh,
it was fine, this case where this guy saw his best friend stab his other best
friend and his dad right in front of him. Then the guy went out covered in
blood to his girlfriend and told his girlfriend that he stabbed him. And then
he went in and told the . . . police, told them all about how he stabbed them in
detail. And, you know, there was really no other evidence that anything else
happened.’ ‘Oh, okay, so you convicted him.’ [¶] You going to tell the guy on
the BART something else? It’s not a fun position to be in. Like I said, all the
way back in jury selection, this is not a gut feeling. You can feel bad about
this, but your heads know what has to be done.”
Arevalo Baquiax forfeited his claims of prosecutorial misconduct.
(People v. Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674 [defendant forfeited challenge
to prosecutor’s improper argument by failing to object].) Indeed, he concedes
he did not object to the prosecutor’s comments and acknowledges they are
“thus arguably forfeited.” Although he contends this court should exercise its
discretion to review them anyway, a defendant’s failure to object to a

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prosecutorial misconduct claim “will be excused if an objection would have
been futile or if an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the
misconduct.” (Ibid.) He makes no effort to show either.1 Had he timely
objected, it would have given the trial court the opportunity to potentially
sustain the objection, admonish the jury, and correct any improper behavior.
Thus, the claims are forfeited. (Ibid.)
Next, Arevalo Baquiax contends defense counsel’s failure to object to
the comments constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. He contends he
suffered prejudice because the comments interfered with the jury’s
consideration of whether he killed Rigoberto Jr. and Rigoberto Sr. and
whether he killed in the heat of passion. We disagree.
“A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel under the
federal or state Constitution must show both deficient performance under an
objective standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice under a test
of reasonable probability of a different outcome.” (People v. Ochoa (1998)
19 Cal.4th 353, 414.) “ ‘Reviewing courts defer to counsel’s reasonable
tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,’ ”
“ ‘and there is a “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” ’ ” (People v. Weaver (2001)
26 Cal.4th 876, 925.) “Indeed, in assessing a Sixth Amendment attack on
trial counsel’s adequacy mounted on direct appeal, competency is presumed
unless the record affirmatively excludes a rational basis for the trial
attorney’s choice.” (People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1260.)

1 Relying on People v. Sanchez (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1525 and

People v. Denard (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1012, 1019–1020, Arevalo Baquiax
urges this court to exercise its discretion to review his prosecutorial
misconduct claims despite his failure to object. We decline to do so. (People
v. Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 674; People v. Morales (2001) 25 Cal.4th
34, 43–44; People v. Tafoya (2007) 42 Cal.4th 147, 184.)
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Therefore, in “the usual case, where counsel’s trial tactics or strategic reasons
for challenged decisions do not appear on the record, we will not find
ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal unless there could be no
conceivable reason for counsel’s acts or omissions.” (Weaver, at p. 926.) We
may also reject a claim of ineffective assistance “without determining
whether counsel’s performance was deficient” if the defendant fails to
demonstrate prejudice. (People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 366.)
Prejudice must be proved as a “ ‘demonstrable reality,’ not simply speculation
as to the effect of the errors or omissions of counsel.” (People v. Williams
(1988) 44 Cal.3d 883, 937.)
To begin, Arevalo Baquiax contends that since the prosecutor’s
statements concerning the two incompatible defense theories were improper,
trial counsel’s failure to object to them was deficient. Not so. Contrary to his
assertions, the prosecutor’s statements were proper. (People v. Welch (1999)
20 Cal.4th 701, 753 [prosecutor may “pointedly highlight . . . contradictions in
a defendant’s case”].) Arevalo Baquiax’s reliance on People v. Bell (1989)
49 Cal.3d 502, 537, is unavailing. There, the prosecutor stated defense
counsel “ ‘might be worried that [the defendant] did commit’ ” the crime, and
thus directly stated defense counsel was worried his client was guilty. (Ibid.)
No such thing occurred here. Since the comments were not improper, there is
a conceivable explanation for why defense counsel did not object. (People v.
Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 925.) Thus, counsel was not ineffective on
this basis. (Ibid.)
As for the remaining comments, Arevalo Baquiax fails to show they
prejudiced him by interfering with the jury’s determination of whether he
was guilty. (People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 937 [prejudice must be
demonstrable reality].) Put simply, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

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He admitted to A.S. and the police that he killed Rigoberto Jr. and Rigoberto
Sr., and his confession to police was detailed and matched the recollection of
J.P. Arevalo Baquiax stated he grabbed a knife from the kitchen, went to the
bedroom, and stabbed his victims in the neck. He showed police where he
“ ‘bur[ied] the knife’ ” by pointing to his own neck and told detectives he
remembered the night “ ‘very well,’ ” “ ‘felt fine,’ ” and said he stopped
drinking two hours before the stabbings. J.P., for his part, saw Arevalo
Baquiax enter the apartment, walk toward the kitchen, walk into the
bedroom with a knife, stab Rigoberto Sr., and make two more stabbing
motions. Rigoberto Jr. had two stab wounds. M.R. saw both men on the
ground and Rigoberto Sr. bleeding from the neck. Although Arevalo Baquiax
testified the victims had already been stabbed when he returned to the
apartment, his detailed confession to the police and admissions to A.S.
undermined his credibility.
Nor did the remaining comments prejudice his heat of passion defense.
(People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 937.) He testified he was never
“angry” or “afraid” of either victim, and he confessed to killing them after
“ ‘star[ing] at them’ ” and “ ‘ma[king] the decision.’ ” Moreover, the
prosecutor’s remaining comments concerned whether he killed the two men,
not the state of mind with which he killed them. On this record, even if the
prosecutor’s statements constituted misconduct, there is not a reasonable
probability of a different outcome. (Ibid.)
Next — relying on People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 851, People v.
Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, and People v. Vazquez (2009) 178
Cal.App.4th 347 — Arevalo Baquiax contends the trial court erred by not
staying the parole revocation fine. Specifically, he contends the restitution

11
fine and parole revocation fines are “not in the same amount,” as required by
section 1202.45, since the court stayed the restitution fine. Not so.
The trial court held a sentencing hearing in April 2025. At the hearing,
the trial court imposed a $10,000 restitution fine and a $10,000 parole
revocation fine. It suspended the parole revocation fine as required by
section 1202.45. Arevalo Baquiax requested that the court “reconsider
imposing the $10,000 fine pursuant to Duenas.” (Italics added.) He clarified
he was only asking the court to reconsider the restitution fine, not the
already “stayed” parole revocation fine or standard assessments under
section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373. The court stayed the
restitution fine since Arevalo Baquiax did not have assets and is serving a
significant amount of time.
The trial court did not err because the fines are in the same amount.
Arevalo Baquiax advances no case law to the contrary. In People v. Smith,
supra, 24 Cal.4th 849, the trial court imposed a $5,000 restitution fine and a
$200 parole revocation fine. (Id. at p. 852.) In People v. Dueñas, supra,
30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the court held a court must stay the execution of a
restitution fine “until and unless the People demonstrate that the defendant
has the ability to pay the fine,” but it made no such holding for parole
revocation fines. (Id. at p. 1172.) In People v. Vazquez, supra, 178
Cal.App.4th 347, the trial court issued a conditional $10,000 restitution fine
dependent on whether the defendant paid direct victim restitution. (Id. at
p. 355.) If the defendant did so, the restitution fine reduced to $200. (Ibid.)
It also imposed a $10,000 parole revocation fine. (Ibid.) The high court held
that “because the amount of the restitution fine is conditioned on appellant’s
payment of direct victim restitution,” it is not “in the same amount as the

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parole revocation fine.” (Ibid.) Here, the restitution fine is not conditional
but fixed at $10,000.
In any event, adopting Arevalo Baquiax’s position would have absurd
consequences. (People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 506.) Parole revocation
fines are automatically suspended by statute. (People v. Smith, supra,
24 Cal.4th at p. 851.) Were we to adopt his position, all parole revocation
fines would be unlawful unless trial courts only imposed but suspended
restitution fines.
Next, in supplemental briefing — and relying on People v. Kopp (2025)
19 Cal.5th 1 — Arevalo Baquiax asks us to remand the case to the trial court
so it can consider his ability to pay the standard assessments imposed under
section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373. He did not object to the
standard assessments below and forfeited the claim. (People v. Welch (1993)
5 Cal.4th 228, 237–238 [failing to object excused if objection wholly
unsupported by substantive law then in existence].) Although Kopp was
decided after the sentencing hearing, People v. Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th
1157 was decided before. (Kopp, at p. 1; Dueñas, at p. 1157.) Dueñas held
that a defendant may object to the imposition of standard assessments under
section 1465.8 and Government Code section 70373 due to an inability to pay.
(Dueñas, at pp. 1164, 1168.) Thus, an objection would have been supported
by substantive law in existence at the time of the hearing; by failing to object,
he forfeited the claim. (Welch, at pp. 237–238.)
Finally, the parties agree there are clerical errors in the abstract of
judgment and the sentencing minute order. Pursuant to their agreement, we
remand to the trial court for it to correct the errors to reflect there is no order
for direct victim restitution and Arevalo Baquiax was not sentenced pursuant
to section 667.7. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185.) Also, in its

13
response to Arevalo Baquiax’s supplemental brief, the Attorney General
contends the abstract of judgment and sentencing minute order erroneously
grant Arevalo Baquiax presentence conduct credits and requests that this
court correct the errors. At oral argument, Arevalo Baquiax did not dispute
that the abstract and minute order erroneously granted him the credits.
Thus, on remand, we also order the court to correct those errors to reflect
that it awarded 941 days of actual custody credit and no conduct credit at
sentencing. (Ibid.)
DISPOSITION
We remand to the trial court for it to correct the abstract of judgment
and sentencing minute order to reflect there is no order for direct victim
restitution, Arevalo Baquiax was not sentenced pursuant to section 667.7,
and that it awarded him 941 days of actual custody credit and no conduct
credit. The trial court shall forward the corrected abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The judgment is otherwise
affirmed.

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_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.

_________________________
PETROU, J.

A173709; People v. Arevalo Baquiax

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