Filed 9/18/26 P. v. Arredondodonis CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B338383
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA462299-01)
v.
ORLANDO
ARREDONDODONIS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
Lori A. Nakaoka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Jason Tran and Megan Moine, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________
In 2024, Orlando Arredondodonis was convicted of the 1989
murder of Monica Wertlieb. He appeals, contending (1) the true
finding on the rape-murder special circumstance (Pen. Code,1
§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) is not supported by substantial evidence
because there was no evidence Wertlieb was still alive when he
penetrated her; and (2) the prosecutor committed error by
introducing, and the trial court abused its discretion by allowing,
evidence of Arredondodonis’s domestic violence against his wife.
We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the pre-dawn hours of September 17, 1989, Monica
Wertlieb’s body was found in a vacant, brush-filled, trash-strewn
Los Angeles field. The area where Wertlieb’s body was
discovered had once been a residential neighborhood featuring
homes built above street level and reached by ascending stairs.
The homes had since been razed, leaving behind only cement
driveways and steps up to what had become overgrown fields
where unhoused people lived. The field where Wertlieb’s body
was found was approximately 20 feet above street level.
On the sidewalk, police found a “dirt twirl mark” indicative
of a struggle. Wertlieb’s prescription eyeglasses were found along
the driveway that led up from the street and toward the field. At
the top of the driveway, drag marks in the dirt led to Wertlieb’s
body. Wertlieb was dragged approximately 195 feet from the
street up to the field, and the drag marks came from her ankles
and/or buttocks as she was pulled across the ground.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Wertlieb was found lying face down in a thicket. Police
theorized that the murderer chose this location to avoid being
seen by potential witnesses.
Wertlieb was naked except for one shoe and a sweatshirt
that had been pulled up over her head and face. Her other shoe,
bloody clothing, and a belt were found near her body. A broken
glass beer bottle was found next to Wertlieb’s body, and in close
proximity were blood and shards of glass from the bottle. A
caved-in plastic liquor bottle and two Sunny Delight bottles, all
with blood on them, were nearby. Wertlieb’s jacket, freshly
stained with blood, was found on the opposite side of the field
from the location of the original struggle, along a driveway
leading down to a different street.
An autopsy revealed Wertlieb had suffered strangulation
injuries, including petechial hemorrhages in her eyes and mouth,
discoloration and hemorrhages in her neck area, and a fractured
hyoid bone. On her face, she had abrasions and a “large amount”
of blunt force trauma bruising, and her nose was fractured.
Massive hemorrhages on the sides of her brain, as well as a
subarachnoid hemorrhage on the top of her head, indicated
multiple impacts of blunt force trauma. The magnitude of the
hemorrhaging indicated Wertlieb was alive when she sustained
the blunt force trauma.
There was a gaping three-inch cut across the front of
Wertlieb’s neck and a three-quarter inch puncture cut
immediately above it. Her right and left jugular veins, left
carotid artery, trachea, and aorta were all severed. A large piece
and several smaller pieces of glass were recovered from her neck.
She had inhaled blood into her lungs. Wertlieb had sustained
these injuries while she was still alive.
3
Wertlieb’s body had no defensive wounds or injuries to the
vagina or vaginal area.
Wertlieb’s autopsy report stated that she “died as a result
of strangulation and incised cuts to the neck.” Her head injuries
were not listed as a cause of death because they were “a lesser
degree of severity” and thus only “potentially [] fatal” rather than
“clearly” or “definite[ly] fatal.”
No perpetrator was identified during the initial
investigation into Wertlieb’s 1989 death, and the case went cold.
In August 2004, however, forensic swabs taken from Wertlieb
when her body was found were examined, and spermatozoa were
found on the anal swab, vaginal swab, and external genital swab.
The DNA generated from the vaginal swabs was “high-quality”
with “a high amount of DNA,” indicating the sample was
“collected fairly soon after the time of the deposition of the sperm
in the vaginal cavity” and was stored properly. Later forensic
analysis determined one external genital swab contained
spermatozoa DNA from one unknown male and DNA from
Wertlieb, and the anal swab contained spermatozoa. In 2017, the
DNA profile submitted into an offender database returned with a
match for Arredondodonis. Further testing indicated it was
Arredondodonis’s spermatozoa on the external genital and
vaginal swabs taken from Wertlieb’s body.
Testing also revealed Arredondodonis’s DNA was on the
liquor bottle that had been found near Wertlieb’s body. Blood
from a bottle fragment was a partial DNA profile match for
Wertlieb. The blood on one of the Sunny Delight bottles was
consistent with Wertlieb’s DNA; there was not enough DNA to
test the blood on the other. Both Arredondodonis’s and Wertlieb’s
blood were on Wertlieb’s jacket.
4
In 2017 police interviewed Arredondodonis. According to
Arredondodonis, he came to Los Angeles from Guatemala in
January 1989. In 1989, he lived in two different apartments, one
of which was two blocks from where Wertlieb’s body was found.
Arredondodonis remembered the vacant lot and field; he passed it
every day but never went into it. Arredondodonis denied ever
having sex in the field, drinking in the field, or leaving alcohol
bottles there. He had never fought with his friends or sustained
a cut in that field.
Arredondodonis told police that when he came to the
United States he left behind a girlfriend in Guatemala. That
relationship ended one to two years after he arrived in the United
States, at which time he began a relationship with his current
partner Aura Arroyo. Arredondodonis said he had been faithful
to his girlfriend in Guatemala, and then he was faithful to
Arroyo, so he did not have sexual relations with anyone else in
the United States; however, he later acknowledged a sexual
relationship with a woman from El Salvador. Arredondodonis
denied ever having sex with a Caucasian or American woman.
(Wertlieb was Caucasian and grew up in the United States.)
When shown a photograph of Wertlieb, Arredondodonis
denied recognizing her or ever meeting her.
Arredondodonis had a scar on his right hand. He claimed
the scar dated to 1992, when he drunkenly mistook his own
reflection for somebody else and hit a mirror, cutting his hand.
Arredondodonis was charged with rape (§ 261, subd. (a)(2))
and first degree murder with the special circumstance that the
murder was committed while he was engaged in the commission
of rape (§§187, 190.2, subd. (a)(17)).
5
Arroyo testified for the defense at trial, providing evidence
that Arredondodonis’s hand scars post-dated Wertlieb’s death.
Arroyo confirmed she was still in a relationship with
Arredondodonis but testified she would not lie on his behalf.
On cross-examination, Arroyo denied ever seeing
Arredondodonis drink a lot of alcohol. She denied being afraid of
him, and she denied ever calling the police because she was
afraid of him. The prosecutor then asked, “Did you call the police
on him in April of 2017?” Defense counsel objected.
At sidebar, defense counsel argued it was improper to go
into Arredondodonis’s domestic violence arrest because it had
been excised from the interrogation video, leading counsel to
believe it would not be raised at trial. He also argued much of
what Arroyo had said on the stand was consistent with what she
said to the police in the past. The prosecutor pointed out the
defense had elicited Arroyo’s testimony that she would not lie for
Arredondodonis, and that on cross-examination Arroyo had just
testified Arredondodonis was not a heavy drinker, she was not
afraid of him, and she never called the police because she was
afraid of him. The prosecutor argued, “There’s the police report
that contradicts her directly. It’s just impeaching her credibility.”
The trial court responded, “I don’t think it’s impeachment
with regard to the alcohol. That’s—I mean, I don’t know what
the other thing is, but certainly her saying she’s never called the
police on him before, and there’s actually something where she
called the police, and she says she’s not afraid of him. [¶] So I
think that kind of leads in to her credibility. And also, your last
question was kind of more generic with regard to, ‘Would you
come to court to lie for him?’ She said, ‘No.’ But the People are
allowed to kind of flesh out, if they have a good faith belief there
6
might be other reasons why she might not be as forthright. [¶] So
I’ll go ahead and allow minimal questioning about it.” The
prosecutor indicated his intent to confront Arroyo with a
photograph of her injuries in the event of denials, and the court
said, “Let’s see what she says, and we’ll just take it one step at a
time.”
Questioning resumed, and Arroyo admitted she had called
the police on Arredondodonis on April 1, 2017. She denied,
however, that she called because of an incident in which she was
afraid for her safety. The prosecutor asked if she had told police
Arredondodonis was heavily intoxicated, became violent, and
threatened to kill her. Arroyo said she did not remember. Arroyo
also claimed not to remember whether the police who responded
to her call took photographs of her, prompting the prosecutor to
show her two photographs, one a full-length view of her and the
other showing marks on her arm. Arredondodonis did not object
to the questions or photographs.
Arroyo denied telling the police the marks visible in the
photograph of her arm were caused by Arredondodonis holding a
knife against her. The prosecutor showed her a photograph of a
knife and asked if it had been shown to the police when they
responded to her call. Arroyo testified she did not recognize the
knife and did not remember whether it was the one shown to the
police. Arredondodonis did not object to any of this evidence.
The jury was later instructed that the evidence the People
elicited from Arroyo could only be considered for the purpose of
evaluating her credibility.
Arredondodonis was convicted as charged and the jury
found true the special circumstance allegation. The trial court
7
sentenced him to life in state prison without the possibility of
parole. He appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. Rape Special Circumstance Allegation
Arredondodonis argues the jury’s finding that the murder
was committed in the commission of rape must be reversed
because no rational factfinder could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Wertlieb was still alive when he raped her.
“ ‘ “When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in
the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable
trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” ’ ” (People v. Bertsch and Hronis (2026) 19 Cal.5th 183,
316–317 (Bertsch).) We apply the same standard of review in
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting special
circumstance findings. (Id. at p. 317.) Substantial evidence
includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences
drawn from that evidence. (Ibid.)
Applying these principles, we conclude the evidence is
sufficient to support the true finding on the rape special
circumstance allegation. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment, a reasonable juror could conclude that
Arredondodonis attacked and beat Wertlieb on the street until
she was unconscious, then dragged her up the driveway and into
the field to rape and kill her in comparative privacy. Wertlieb
suffered multiple impacts of blunt force facial trauma, causing a
broken nose, bruises and abrasions on her face, and massive
8
brain hemorrhaging. These injuries, inflicted while she was still
alive, could possibly have proven fatal, but they were not what
caused her death. The dirt twirl mark on the sidewalk permitted
the conclusion that the attack began there and that Wertlieb was
conscious and struggling at that point, but the fatal slashing
injuries could not have been inflicted on the street, as there was
no blood there. Those drag marks and Wertlieb’s lost
prescription eyeglasses in the driveway demonstrated she did not
travel to the field on her own power and strongly suggested she
lost consciousness before she was moved. From this evidence, a
reasonable juror could conclude Wertlieb was severely injured by
blunt force trauma inflicted in the streetside struggle, and she
was dragged to the field alive but unconscious.
It was there, in the field, where Wertlieb’s clothes were
removed and the fatal injuries, “strangulation and incised cuts to
the neck,” were inflicted. Wertlieb was strangled, her throat was
slashed and punctured, and her jugular veins, carotid artery,
trachea, and aorta were severed. Wertlieb was still alive when
Arredondodonis inflicted these injuries, as evidenced by the blood
she inhaled into her lungs when she tried to breathe. These
injuries, the presence of Arredondodonis’s semen on her genitals,2
2 Arredondodonis’s spermatozoa DNA was found on the
external genital and vaginal swabs taken from Wertlieb’s body,
and the high quality of the samples indicated they had been
deposited less than 12 hours before the samples were collected
from her body. As Arredondodonis correctly notes, this timing
does not itself establish Wertlieb was alive at the time of
penetration, but it does rule out the deposit of the spermatozoa at
a time considerably earlier than the incident that resulted in her
death, generally tending to support the jury’s finding and
9
the discarded clothing, and the sweater pulled up over her face
were consistent with an unconscious Wertlieb being raped and
killed in the field, and they also explained the absence of
defensive wounds or injuries from the sexual assault. A
reasonable juror could also conclude that Wertlieb was alive at
the time of the rape but did not resist the attack because she was
unconscious. (See People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614,
659–661 (San Nicolas) [concluding substantial evidence
supported the jury’s finding that victim was alive at the time of
the sexual assault]; Bertsch, supra, 19 Cal.5th at pp. 316–317.)
Arredondodonis points out none of this evidence actually
establishes the sexual assault occurred prior to Wertlieb’s death,
and he contends there is an “evidentiary void” as to when the
rape occurred. When assessing the sufficiency of the evidence,
the reviewing court errs when it focuses exclusively on the
“evidence that did not exist rather than on the evidence that did
exist.” (People v. Story (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1282, 1299.)
Arredondodonis’s argument, moreover, effectively ignores the
jury’s ability to draw inferences from the totality of the evidence.
“ ‘ “ ‘[I]n the absence of any evidence suggesting that the victim’s
assailant intended to have sexual conduct with a corpse
[citation], we believe that the jury could reasonably have inferred
from the evidence that the assailant engaged in sexual conduct
with the victim while [she] was still alive rather than after [she]
was already dead.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044,
1104.) A reasonable jury could infer that was what happened
here.
refuting Arredondodonis’s claim on appeal that the seminal DNA
“could have been deposited days before the victim’s death.”
10
Moreover, even if Wertlieb had already died when
Arredondodonis had sexual intercourse with her, the mere fact
that intercourse occurs after death does not invalidate the rape
special circumstance. “Since the rape special circumstance
applies to a killing while engaged in the commission or attempted
commission of rape [citation], it also does not matter whether
actual penetration did not occur until after death for purposes of
the special circumstance.” (People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495,
525; see also People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 156
[“although intentionally killing the victim during an attempted
rape ultimately might thwart, in the legal sense, the
perpetrator’s goal of committing a rape, this circumstance does
not mean the murder was not” committed while the defendant
was engaged in the attempted commission of rape], disapproved
on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421,
fn. 22; People v. Lewis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1255, 1299–1300
[following Rundle]; People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th
99, 169 [same].)
The evidence here was sufficient for a jury to conclude that
the murder was committed in the commission of a rape.
Arredondodonis beat Wertlieb on the street to the point that she
did not resist being dragged up the driveway and into the field,
but before he inflicted the strangulation and incision injuries that
caused her death. Had Arredondodonis intended only to kill
Wertlieb, he would not have needed to go to the trouble of
dragging her unconscious body nearly 200 feet before killing
her—he could have strangled her or slashed her on the street and
left her there. But Arredondodonis chose to drag Wertlieb a
considerable distance to a secluded location where he could
continue his attack with less likelihood of being observed. As
11
there was evidence that Arredondodonis removed Wertlieb’s
clothing in the field and had sexual intercourse with her, a
reasonable jury could conclude that his motive for moving her to
that less-visible location rather than killing her during the initial
attack was that he intended to rape her. This is sufficient to
support a true finding on the rape special circumstance even if
Arredondodonis ended up killing her prior to the sexual
penetration. (San Nicolas, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 661 [“After
intent to rape is established, the special circumstance is
applicable regardless of whether actual penetration occurred
before or after death”].) Substantial evidence supported the
jury’s true finding on the rape special circumstance allegation.
II. Impeachment of Arroyo
Arredondodonis argues it was trial court error and
prosecutorial misconduct for the prosecutor to question Arroyo
about her reports to police of the 2017 domestic violence incident
between Arroyo and Arredondodonis to impeach her testimony
that she would not lie for Arredondodonis and was not afraid of
him. Arredondodonis argues this evidence was irrelevant and
highly prejudicial propensity evidence.
The only objection raised by Arredondodonis to Arroyo’s
cross-examination was an initial objection to the prosecutor’s
question whether Arroyo had ever called the police on
Arredondodonis. The court ruled that “minimal questioning” in
this area was appropriate to challenge her credibility, but stated
it would evaluate the evidence elicited by the prosecutor on cross-
examination “one step at a time.” Arredondodonis does not
appear to contest the propriety of impeaching Arroyo with the
fact that she had called the police on him; instead, he contends
the inquiry “should have ended” with her admission that she had
12
called the police on Arredondodonis in 2017, and complains about
the rest of the cross-examination. However, even though the
court had left open the issue of the scope of the cross-examination
to be addressed as it proceeded, Arredondodonis did not interpose
any further objections.
By failing to object to the evidence he now challenges,
Arredondodonis has forfeited his objection to it. (See People v.
Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 831 [questions relating to the
admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the
absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the
ground sought to be urged on appeal]; Evid. Code, § 353,
subd. (a).) He has also forfeited his prosecutorial misconduct
claim. (People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 705 (Aguirre) [to
appeal on prosecutorial misconduct grounds, a defendant must
have timely objected to the conduct on the same ground and
requested the jury be admonished, unless an admonition would
not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct].) We address
the merits of these claims, however, because Arredondodonis
argues his trial counsel’s failure to object constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel.
We find no merit to Arredondodonis’s claims. We review a
trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under the
abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th
401, 476.) Abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling “ ‘falls
outside the bounds of reasons.’ ” (People v. Kipp (1998)
18 Cal.4th 349, 371.) Arroyo’s testimony that she would not lie
for Arredondodonis and had never called the police because she
was afraid of him opened the door for the prosecution to impeach
her credibility with evidence of the incident in which she had
called the police on him in fear for her safety. This evidence was
13
relevant to show Arroyo’s fear of Arredondodonis, a possible
motive for her testimony (People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1, 31
[evidence of fear is relevant to a witness’s credibility]) and to
directly contradict her testimony that she had never called the
police in fear of him and would not lie for him. “Evidence tending
to contradict any part of a witness’s testimony is relevant for
purposes of impeachment.” (People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d
991, 1017, abrogated on other grounds in People v. Diaz (2015)
60 Cal.4th 1176, 1188–1190; see also Evid. Code, § 780.) We find
no abuse of discretion.
As the prosecutor’s cross-examination was appropriate, it
did not constitute misconduct, and it was not ineffective
assistance of counsel to fail to object to it. (People v. Stayner
(2026) 19 Cal.5th 395, 509 [prosecutorial conduct violates the
federal Constitution when it is so egregious that it infects the
trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of
due process; conduct that does not render a trial fundamentally
unfair is misconduct under state law only if it involves the use of
deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either
the court or the jury]; Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 707
[“ ‘Representation does not become deficient for failing to make
meritless objections’ ”].)
Finally, we note that although Arredondodonis contends
the evidence was highly prejudicial propensity evidence that
“improperly pushed the jury towards a finding of guilt,” the jury
was expressly instructed that it could use the evidence the People
brought out during their cross-examination of Arroyo only for the
purpose of evaluating her credibility. We presume the jury
followed the instructions given. (People v. Demolle (2026)
19 Cal.5th 1117, 1152.)
14
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
15