Filed 9/14/26 P. v. Ariza CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G064848
v. (Super. Ct. No. 22WF0123)
ERICK GARCIA ARIZA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Lance P. Jensen, Judge. Affirmed.
Patricia L. Brisbois, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General,
A. Natasha Cortina and Liz Olukoya, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
* * *
Defendant Erick Garcia Ariza appeals after being convicted and
sentenced to 90 years to life in prison for sexually abusing his stepdaughter.
He contends the trial court erred in admitting into evidence statements he
made to law enforcement before he was formally arrested because they were
the product of a custodial interrogation before which he was not advised of
his Miranda1 rights. In addition, Ariza argues a later interrogation,
conducted after he was formally arrested and provided Miranda warnings,
should have been suppressed pursuant to Missouri v. Seibert (2004) 542 U.S.
600 (Seibert) because officers used a deliberate two-step interrogation
strategy without intervening curative measures. We conclude the trial court
erred in admitting Ariza’s unwarned statements but did not err in admitting
the warned statements. Because we find the sole error to be harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS
I.
REPORT OF ABUSE
After sustaining years of sexual abuse by Ariza, beginning when
she was about 11 years old, P.M. reported the abuse for the first time to her
then boyfriend when she was 18 years old. Her boyfriend accompanied her to
tell her two brothers. The four of them decided to confront Ariza and tell the
rest of the family at the house where P.M. lived with her mother, her sisters,
and Ariza.
1 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 467 (Miranda).
2
When her mother came home from work, P.M. told her what had
been happening. Ariza was there and responded, “‘That’s not true. That’s not
how it happened.’” P.M.’s brother told her to step outside, which she did, and
about 10 minutes later Ariza left the house with “his stuff.”
Two days later, after being partially blamed by her mother for
the abuse, P.M. went to a police station to report the abuse. Costa Mesa
Police Officer Dominic Tedesco interviewed her, and she explained everything
that had happened. The same officer also separately interviewed P.M.’s
boyfriend who had come with her. P.M. asked if law enforcement would go
with her to collect her belongings because she did not want to go to her house
alone.
Officer Tedesco accompanied P.M. to get her belongings. While at
the house, he spoke with P.M.’s mother who said Ariza was at a park saying
goodbye to some of his kids and was ready to turn himself in. Officer Tedesco
sent two other officers who were with him, Officer Jared Osborn and Officer
Elliott, to the park identified by the mother to ensure Ariza would not flee
while he finished assisting P.M.
II.
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO ARIZA’S ARREST
Officers Osborn and Elliott arrived at the park and parked their
two marked police vehicles, one behind the other. They were in uniform and
each had with them a holstered gun and taser. They observed a truck
consistent with information they had been given about Ariza’s vehicle, to the
rear of which were Ariza, two females, and a male. The latter individuals
later identified themselves as Ariza’s daughter and son, and the son’s
girlfriend.
3
The officers exited their vehicles, Officer Elliott called out Ariza’s
first name as they started walking toward Ariza, and Ariza took a few steps
toward them. The officers asked how Ariza was doing and inquired whether
they could search him to make sure he did not have any weapons. Ariza
agreed. The search did not uncover any weapons, but the officers took Ariza’s
wallet from his pocket. Officer Elliott asked if Ariza understood he was “being
detained right now,” to which Ariza responded affirmatively, and then Officer
Elliott clarified “[s]o that means you can’t leave.” He told Ariza to “come over
here,” “take a seat on the push bumper” of one of the patrol vehicles, and
“hang out” with Officer Osborn “real quick.”
During the roughly five minutes it took for Officer Tedesco to
arrive, Officers Osborn and Elliott exchanged a few words with Ariza, who
sat with his arms behind his back. In response to a question from Ariza about
whether it would be okay to move his hat down to block the sun, Officer
Osborn said he could. A couple of minutes later, Officer Elliott informed Ariza
there was another officer on his way who was going to talk to him and they
would “[p]robably try to . . . figure out if [his] kids need[ed] anybody to talk to
or if they need[ed] help with anything.” When asked about his car keys, Ariza
responded his son had them and was going to take care of his truck.
When Officer Tedesco arrived, he observed Ariza “leaning up
against [the] front of a patrol vehicle talking with two officers.” After Officer
Elliott told Officer Tedesco he thought Ariza “sorta knows what’s going on,”
Officer Tedesco introduced himself to Ariza. The exchange then proceeded as
follows:
“OFC. TEDESCO: . . . How’s it going? Could be better?
“[Ariza]: Yeah. Just waiting.
“OFC. TEDESCO: Why . . .What are you waiting for?
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“[Ariza]: For you guys.
“OFC. TEDESCO: For us?
“[Ariza]: Yeah.
“OFC. TEDESCO: Why is that?
“[Ariza]: Because we [sic] I know like you guys were gonna come
here.
“OFC. TEDESCO: Say again? You can speak up a little louder.
“[Ariza]: Because I know that you guys were going to come over
here.
“OFC. TEDESCO: You knew you were going to come over here?
“[Ariza]: Yeah.
“OFC. TEDESCO: For you?
“[Ariza]: Yes.
“OFC. TEDESCO: Why?
“[Ariza]: Because of what I did.
“OFC. TEDESCO: What did you do?
“[Ariza]: Like uh abuse.
“OFC. TEDESCO: Huh?
“[Ariza]: Abuse.
“OFC. TEDESCO: Abuse? What kind of abuse?
“[Ariza]: Umm what is it like . . . sexual abuse.
“OFC. TEDESCO: Sexual Abuse?
“[Ariza]: Mhm.
“OFC. TEDESCO: With who?
“[Ariza]: My daughter.
“OFC. TEDESCO: Who?
“[Ariza]: My daughter.
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“OFC. TEDESCO: Your daughter?
“[Ariza]: Step-daughter.
“OFC. TEDESCO: Step-daughter? Which one?
“[Ariza]: Uhh [P.M.].
“OFC. TEDESCO: [P.M.]. Erick, did you uh ever touch anyone
else?
“[Ariza]: No. No.
“OFC. TEDESCO: Just [P.M.]? Why her?
“[Ariza]: It just happened.
“OFC. TEDESCO: It just happened?
“[Ariza]: Yeah.
“OFC. TEDESCO: How old was she when you first touched her?
“[Ariza]: Um I don’t remember how old.
“OFC. TEDESCO: How many years ago?
“[Ariza]: Hmm, I don’t know she was 15, 16.”
Officer Tedesco’s questioning lasted about seven minutes, with
questions ranging from whether Ariza engaged in certain types of behavior
with P.M., to where things took place, to how old P.M. was at various times.
Throughout, Officers Osborn and Elliott stood next to Ariza and Officer
Tedesco. Over the course of the questioning, Ariza admitted to “cuddling”
with P.M., “play[ing] with each other” with hands, and having vaginal, oral,
and anal intercourse with her. At first, Ariza repeatedly denied doing the
latter, but he eventually admitted to it after Officer Tedesco said he was
“going to ask [him] one more time.”
When the questioning ended, Officer Tedesco allowed Ariza to say
goodbye to his kids and then formally arrested him by placing him in
handcuffs. About an hour later, Ariza was questioned at the police station by
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two other police officers after being advised of his Miranda rights and
indicating he understood them. During the roughly two-hour warned
interrogation, Ariza admitted to engaging in extensive sexual activity with
P.M., claiming it was all consensual and done without any force or threat.
III.
THE CHARGES
An information charged Ariza with 10 counts: lewd act upon a
child under 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)), aggravated sexual assault of a
child (penetration) (id., § 269, subd. (a)(5)), forcible lewd act on a child under
14 (id., § 288, subd. (b)(1)), aggravated sexual assault of a child (rape) (id.,
§ 269, subd. (a)(1)), two counts of forcible rape (id., § 261, subd. (a)(2)), two
counts of forcible sodomy (id., § 286, subd. (c)(2)(A)), and two counts of
forcible oral copulation (id., § 288a, subd. (c)(2)(A)).
Also alleged as to most counts were four aggravating factors:
(1) the offenses involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great
bodily harm, and other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness,
and callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)); (2) the victim was
particularly vulnerable (id., rule 4.421(a)(3)); (3) the offense was carried out
with planning, sophistication, and professionalism (id., rule 4.421(a)(8)); and
(4) Ariza took advantage of a position of trust and confidence to commit the
offenses (id., rule 4.421(a)(11)).
IV.
ARIZA’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Prior to trial, the prosecution sought to have Ariza’s statements
to Officer Tedesco on the day he was arrested deemed admissible. Ariza
moved to suppress those statements, arguing they were made during a
custodial interrogation and he was not provided Miranda warnings
7
beforehand. The court reviewed videos from the body worn cameras of Officer
Osborn, Officer Elliott, and Officer Tedesco, along with transcripts thereof.
During an Evidence Code section 402 hearing, Officers Osborn
and Tedesco testified. Officer Osborn said he was with Officer Tedesco at
P.M.’s house when Officer Tedesco told him to go to the park identified by
P.M.’s mother to see if Ariza was there. It was about five minutes away from
the house, and neither Officer Osborn nor Officer Elliott had the sirens or
lights of their patrol vehicles on. Upon seeing them, Ariza “began walking
towards [them].” At no point did either officer draw their weapon, place Ariza
in handcuffs, or tell him he was under arrest. Officer Tedesco explained he
was the lead officer on the matter and in charge of all the interviews, so he
spoke to Ariza at the park “to get . . . his side of the story.”
After hearing the testimony, and considering all briefing,
exhibits, and argument, the trial court concluded the totality of the
circumstances showed the interrogation was not custodial and, thus, there
was no Miranda violation. It found Officer Tedesco’s questioning was “part of
an initial investigation or some times [sic] called on-scene questioning.” The
court further noted the interaction “appeared to be voluntary,” as Ariza
“freely walked up and almost appeared to be turning himself in so to speak”
when the first two officers arrived, there was no restraint on Ariza’s freedom
or movement, and “[t]here didn’t appear to be any type of domineering or
controlling or aggressive or confrontational or accusatory or any type of
express or implied pressure tactics” employed by the officers.
V.
CONVICTION AND SENTENCING
Testifying at trial were P.M., the boyfriend to whom she
originally reported the abuse, Officer Tedesco, the two police officers who
8
questioned Ariza after his arrest, and a clinical and forensic psychologist who
testified as an expert about child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. The
jury found Ariza guilty on all counts. After a request by Ariza for a court trial
on the aggravating factors, the court found all four aggravating factors true.
It sentenced him to a total of 30 years to life plus 60 years determinate.
Ariza timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Ariza challenges the trial court’s admission of both his unwarned
and warned statements. He argues the former were the product of an
unlawful custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings, and the latter
violated Seibert’s prohibition on certain deliberate two-step interrogation
strategies by police officers. We find no merit in the latter contention. As for
the former, although we conclude the unwarned statements were the product
of a custodial interrogation under Miranda, the error in admitting them was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the properly admitted warned
statements and the remainder of the evidence.
I.
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
Ariza contends the trial court wrongly characterized the park
interrogation as noncustodial and, thus, erred in concluding there was no
Miranda violation. We agree.
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
“In Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, the United States Supreme
Court held that a person questioned by law enforcement after being ‘taken
into custody’ must first be warned that he or she has the right to remain
silent, that any statements he or she makes may be used against the person,
and that he or she has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained
9
or appointed. [Citation.] If police take a suspect into custody and then
interrogate the person without informing of such rights, the person’s
responses cannot be introduced into evidence to establish his or her guilt.”
(People v. Saldana (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 432, 454 (Saldana).)
“The obligation to administer Miranda warnings attaches only
when the person questioned is in ‘“custody.”’ [Citation.] In Miranda
jurisprudence, custody is ‘a term of art that specifies circumstances that are
thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.’” (Saldana,
supra,19 Cal.App.5th at p. 454.) In that respect, the “primary concern is the
‘psychological pressures “which work to undermine the individual’s will to
resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely,”’
which are created by ‘“incommunicado interrogation”’ in an unfamiliar
‘“police-dominated atmosphere.”’ [Citation.] The Miranda court reasoned that
‘[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the
defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.’” (Id. at pp. 454–455.)
“In determining whether a person is in custody for purposes of
applying Miranda, the issue is whether, in light of the ‘“objective
circumstances of the interrogation,” [citation], a “reasonable person [would]
have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and
leave.”’ [Citation.] ‘And in order to determine how a suspect would have
“gauge[d]” his “freedom of movement,” courts must examine “all of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.”’” (Saldana, supra, 19
Cal.App.5th at p. 455.)
“Courts have identified factors that are relevant in determining
whether the defendant was in custody during police questioning. [Citation.]
‘No one factor is dispositive. Rather, we look at the interplay and combined
10
effect of all the circumstances to determine whether on balance they created
a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced
a restraint tantamount to an arrest.’” (Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at
p. 455.) The relevant factors include: (1) “‘whether contact . . . was initiated
by the police or the person interrogated, and if by the police, whether the
person voluntarily agreed to an interview’”; (2) “‘whether the express purpose
of the interview was to question the person as a witness or a suspect’”;
(3) location of the interview; (4) whether police informed the person they were
under arrest or in custody; (5) whether they informed the person they were
free to terminate the interview and leave at any time; (6) “‘whether there
were restrictions on the person’s freedom of movement during the interview’”;
(7) length of the interrogation; (8) “‘how many police officers participated’”;
(9) “‘whether they dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation’”;
(10) “‘whether they manifested a belief that the person was culpable and they
had evidence to prove it’”; (11) “‘whether the police were aggressive,
confrontational, and/or accusatory’”; (12) “‘whether the police used
interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect’”; and (13) “‘whether the
person was arrested at the end of the interrogation.’” (Ibid.)
Because “[t]he Miranda decision was ‘not intended to hamper the
traditional function of police officers in investigating crime,’” officers are
permitted to detain a person for questioning under certain circumstances
without the need to administer Miranda warnings. (People v. Miller (1969) 71
Cal.2d 459, 480–481.) More specifically, “a policeman who lacks probable
cause but whose ‘observations lead him reasonably to suspect’ that a
particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a
crime, may detain that person briefly in order to ‘investigate the
circumstances that provoke suspicion.’” (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468 U.S.
11
420, 439, fn. omitted (Berkemer); accord People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952,
982–983.) This includes, for example, “‘[g]eneral on-the-scene questioning as
to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the
fact-finding process.’” (Miller, at p. 481.) The questions typically must be
moderate in number and geared toward “determin[ing] [a person’s] identity
and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer’s
suspicions.” (Berkemer, at p. 439; accord People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629,
679 (Clair).) Such investigatory questioning “enable[s] the police to quickly
ascertain whether [the detained] person should be permitted to go about
[their] business or held to answer charges.” (People v. Milham (1984) 159
Cal.App.3d 487, 500.)
“On appeal, ‘we accept the trial court’s findings of historical fact
if supported by substantial evidence but independently determine whether
the interrogation was “custodial.”’” (Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at
p. 454.)
B. Analysis
Ariza argues he “should have been advised of his [Miranda]
rights before being questioned” by Officer Tedesco because, in addition to
other circumstances, he “was told he could not leave.” The Attorney General
counters that the situation should instead be considered an investigatory
detention for which Miranda warnings were not needed. Based on the totality
of the circumstances, we conclude this was not an investigatory detention.
After P.M. reported years of sexual abuse by Ariza and P.M.’s
mother informed Officer Tedesco that Ariza was at a nearby park, Officer
Tedesco sent two officers there to make sure Ariza did not flee. Officer
Tedesco then arrived at the park; he testified he wanted to get Ariza’s side of
the story. While the first few questions asked by Officer Tedesco could be
12
considered “‘“on-the-scene questioning, designed to bring out [Ariza’s]
explanation or lack of explanation of the circumstances which aroused the
suspicion of the police, and enable the police to quickly determine whether
they should allow [Ariza] to go about his business or hold him to answer
charges”’” (People v. Hauglund (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d 248, 256), the large
majority of the seven-minute interrogation cannot be so characterized. It was
not used “to determine [Ariza’s] identity and to try to obtain information
confirming or dispelling the officer’s suspicions” that a crime had been
committed. (Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 679.) Instead, the questioning
sought specific details of what, where, and when in relation to Ariza’s sexual
activities with P.M.
Notably, courts have repeatedly described the type of
investigatory questioning allowed without Miranda advisements as being
done by “a policeman who lacks probable cause but whose ‘observations lead
him reasonably to suspect’ that a particular person has committed, is
committing, or is about to commit a crime.” (Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at p.
439, italics added; accord Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 679; People v. Salinas
(1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 925, 935–936; People v. Manis (1969) 268 Cal.App.2d
653, 669.) Here, Officer Tedesco already had probable cause to arrest Ariza
by the time he began questioning him. (See Gillan v. City of San Marino
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1045 [“Information provided by a crime
victim . . . can establish probable cause if the information is sufficiently
specific to cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime was committed
and that the named suspect was the perpetrator”], disapproved on other
grounds by Leon v. County of Riverside (2023) 14 Cal.5th 910, 930–931.)
Ruling out investigatory questioning as justification for the lack
of Miranda warnings, we turn to the various factors in order to determine
13
whether the interrogation was custodial. Reviewing the various
circumstances leading up to and during Officer Tedesco’s questioning of
Ariza, there are some that weigh against a custodial finding. All police officer
contact with Ariza took place in a public park where Ariza had been when
officers arrived, his family was nearby when the questioning took place, and
he was not handcuffed or otherwise physically restrained. In addition, as the
trial court found, the tone of Officer Tedesco’s questioning was calm and
nonaggressive, and he did not make accusations against Ariza or use
interrogation techniques designed to pressure Ariza.
At the same time, other circumstances lean toward a finding of
custody. Through the entirety of what took place at the park, Ariza was
outnumbered by the officers. He was initially approached by two officers, and
both of those officers stood immediately next to him and Officer Tedesco
through the entirety of the questioning. Each officer arrived in a marked
patrol vehicle, was dressed in full uniform, and had weapons on their person.
In the initial search of Ariza for weapons, the officers removed Ariza’s wallet,
which contained his identification, and it remained in the officers’ possession
thereafter.
Contrary to the trial court’s finding that there was no restraint
on Ariza’s freedom or movement, it is undisputed Officer Elliott told Ariza he
could not leave and directed him to sit on the bumper of one of the patrol
vehicles while they waited for Officer Tedesco to arrive to talk to him. Both
officers remained near Ariza, with at least one officer standing immediately
next to him, during the entirety of the roughly five minutes they waited for
Officer Tedesco to arrive. When Officer Tedesco arrived, he did not convey to
Ariza anything different about his ability to leave.
14
Further, while Officer Tedesco initially began with a few open-
ended questions and questions following up on information provided by Ariza,
the inquiry quickly shifted to a more officer-led questioning style targeting
specific details. Officer Tedesco stood about a foot or two away from Ariza
during the questioning, while Ariza remained seated on the bumper of the
patrol vehicle. And Ariza was arrested at the end of the questioning.
Viewing the circumstances as a whole, we conclude the
atmosphere was such that “‘a reasonable person would have experienced a
restraint tantamount to an arrest.’” (Saldana, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at
p. 455.) Because Ariza was subjected to a custodial interrogation without first
being provided Miranda warnings, the trial court erred in admitting his
statements to Officer Tedesco.
II.
SEIBERT AND HARMLESS ERROR
After Ariza was formally arrested and taken to the police station,
two other officers administered Miranda warnings before conducting another
interrogation. Ariza contends the statements he made during that second
interrogation should have been suppressed pursuant to Seibert, supra, 542
U.S. 600. The Attorney General counters that (1) Ariza forfeited this
argument by failing to challenge the admissibility of the warned statements
or raise Seibert in the trial court, (2) the second interrogation did not violate
Seibert, and (3) any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We agree Ariza forfeited his Seibert claim by failing to raise it in
the trial court. (See Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Even if we were to consider
the issue, Ariza’s argument fails on the merits.
In Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298 (Elstad), the United
States Supreme Court “held that ‘a suspect who has once responded to
15
unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving
his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda
warnings.’ Instead, as long as both the initial unwarned statement and the
subsequent warned statement are voluntary, the warned statement may be
deemed the product of a defendant’s ‘rational and intelligent choice’ to confess
and so is admissible.” (People v. Krebs (2019) 8 Cal.5th 265, 307 (Krebs).)
A couple decades later, Seibert qualified the general rule set forth
in Elstad. In Seibert, an officer “testified that he made a ‘conscious decision’
to withhold Miranda warnings, thus resorting to an interrogation technique
he had been taught: question first, then give the warnings, and then repeat
the question ‘until I get the answer that [the person being interrogated]
already provided once.’” (Seibert, supra, 542 U.S. at pp. 605–606 (plur. opn.).)
A divided Supreme Court held the defendant’s postwarning statements were
inadmissible. (Id. at pp. 617, 622.) Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion,
which controls because of the split nature of the decision (see People v.
Camino (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1370 & fn. 5), explained that if such a
“deliberate two-step strategy [was] used, postwarning statements . . . related
to the substance of prewarning statements must be excluded unless curative
measures [were] taken before the postwarning statement [was] made.”
(Seibert, at p. 622 (conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.).) Curative measures, such as a
substantial break in time and circumstances, “should be designed to ensure
that a reasonable person in the suspect’s situation would understand the
import and effect of the Miranda warning and of the Miranda waiver.” (Ibid.)
Here, there is no evidence law enforcement used a deliberate two-
step strategy. “[S]imply because an officer could have given an advisement
earlier is not enough to show that [they] delayed ‘in a calculated way to
undermine the Miranda warning.’” (Krebs, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 312.)
16
Additionally, unlike the interrogations in Seibert, the two interrogations in
this case cannot be fairly described as “parts of a continuum” (Seibert, supra,
542 U.S. at p. 617 (plur. opn.)) without “curative measures” (id. at p. 622
(conc. opn. of Kennedy, J.)). While Officer Tedesco conducted the first
interrogation, two other officers conducted the second interrogation. The
former took place at the park, and the latter took place later the same day at
the police station following Ariza’s formal arrest. Additionally, there is no
evidence of communication between the officers before the second
interrogation about the substance of Ariza’s unwarned statements to Officer
Tedesco.
Ariza’s failure to demonstrate that the trial court erred in
admitting the warned statements leads us to conclude the error in admitting
the unwarned statements is harmless. (People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405,
447 [confession held inadmissible for being obtained in violation of Miranda
is subject to harmless error standard under Chapman v. California (1967)
386 U.S. 18, 24].) In light of P.M.’s testimony, Ariza’s properly admitted
warned statements, and expert testimony concerning the psychological effects
of sexual abuse by a family member on a victim, the record demonstrates
“‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to
the verdict obtained.’” (People v. Elizalde (2015) 61 Cal.4th 523, 542.)
17
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
DELANEY, ACTING P. J.
WE CONCUR:
SERVINO, J.
SCHWARM, J.*
*Judge of the Orange County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
18