Filed 9/29/26 P. v. Aregger CA1/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A174483
v. (Marin County
TIMOTHY CHARLES AREGGER, Super. Ct. No. CR0000788)
Defendant and Appellant.
Timothy Charles Aregger appeals from a judgment entered on a jury
verdict finding him guilty of multiple counts of making criminal threats and
one count of brandishing a weapon. We see no merit in the appeal and will
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 2024, the People filed an information charging Aregger
with three felony counts of criminal threats (§ 422; counts 1, 2, 3) and
three misdemeanor counts of brandishing a firearm (§ 417, subd. (a)(2);
counts 4, 5, 6).1 The information also alleged as to counts 1, 2, and 3 a
prior serious or violent felony allegation (Pen. Code, § 1170.12) and a
1 All undesignated statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
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California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2) sentencing enhancement
allegation that Aregger was armed with or used a weapon. The case
proceeded to jury trial in June 2025. At trial, the evidence showed the
following.
A. The Prosecution Case
On September 22, 2023, at approximately 5:20 p.m., three
teenagers, Jacob, Zachary, and Silas, were listening to music at a
municipal water district pump station located across the street from
Aregger’s residence at 14 Sandalwood Court in San Rafael. Aregger
came out of his residence holding a gun and pointed it at the boys.
Jacob said the gun was not like a pistol but was “a little longer gun”
because of the way Arreger’s hands were oriented; Zachary said it
looked like a “long rifle,” including because of how Arreger was holding
it; and Silas testified that he saw from the barrel that it was “a longer
gun.” Neither Silas nor Jacob could see the gun’s profile. Jacob
remembered telling police it could have been a pistol. Zachary gave
conflicting descriptions of the gun, describing it at trial as a brown rifle
but telling police it was a black pistol.
When Aregger pointed the gun at the boys, they hid behind a
retaining wall for their safety. He threatened to “blow [the boys’]
brains out” and “blow [their] heads off.” He told the boys to “get the
fuck out of [there],” not to “call the cops,” and that he “would shoot
[them] if [they] did not leave.” He also stated that he “[knew] where
[the boys] live[d].” In response, Jacob said, “don’t shoot, don’t shoot,
we’ll leave.” Aregger yelled that he would “fucking blow [their] heads
off if [he] ever [saw them there] again.” This yelling lasted for
approximately one to three minutes.
Jacob, Zachary, and Silas testified that they were frightened by
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Aregger’s threats and believed that they could have been harmed when
Aregger pointed the gun at them and stated he would “blow their
brains out.” Silas and Zachary believed Aregger would shoot them.
Jacob recalled thinking to himself that he “[did not] want to die
[there].” While hiding behind the wall, Silas took a photograph, which
depicted Aregger standing near the edge of his property holding a gun.
Jacob was visible in the corner of the image. When Aregger started to
walk in the boys’ direction toward the pump station, they scattered
and escaped. As the boys escaped, Aregger—still on his property with
the gun pointed their direction—told them he “never want[ed] to see
[them] . . . [there] again.”
A bystander called the police about a “suspicious circumstance.”
The police responded and talked to Zachary and others; other juveniles
and parents were also nearby. Police ordered Aregger to exit his
residence unarmed. Aregger came outside of his residence wearing an
empty holster on his hip. A nine-millimeter handgun was found inside
of Aregger’s residence. While in custody, Aregger told an officer that
he was tired of these juveniles making noise because they were
disturbing his sick wife.
Later that evening, Aregger was interviewed by officers at the
San Rafael police station. A portion of the recorded interview was
played for the jury. Officers told Aregger that they had received a
report of a disturbance at his house involving children. Aregger
responded that he had taken a “little bit of an aggressive avenue
yesterday, or today.” He stated that youths had been spending time at
the pump station across the street from his house, smoking, drinking
alcohol, and making noise. This bothered Aregger and he had made
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complaints to the water department and law enforcement “for years,”
but nothing had been done about it.
Aregger told officers that he is a “CCW” weapon holder and that
he knew the difference between brandishing and “not brandishing.”
Aregger believed that as a gun owner, if he was on his property he
could not commit the crime of brandishing a firearm. He explained
that earlier in the day, he had been sitting on a retaining wall on the
back of his property when he saw the “little pieces of shit” making
noise at the pump station. Aregger admitted to holding a firearm and
yelling at the boys to “get out of here!” After yelling at them, he
“holstered” his firearm. He “hoped it scared” them.
On June 6, 2025, after the People rested their case, Aregger
moved for judgment of acquittal on all counts under Penal Code section
1118.1. The People conceded that two of the three brandishing counts
must be dismissed under In re Peter F. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 877,
881 [“a single act of brandishing can only support a conviction of a
single count of violation of section 417, subdivision (a)(1), no matter
how many people witness the act”], but otherwise opposed the motion.
The court granted the motion as to two of the brandishing charges
under section 417 (counts 5 and 6), and denied it as to all three threats
charges under section 422 (counts 1, 2 and 3) and one brandishing
charge under section 417 (count 4).
B. The Defense Case
Aregger testified that juveniles had congregated at the pump
station across the street from his house for years. He was
“aggravat[ed]” and “frustrat[ed]” by the noise they made, their use of
foul language, their littering, and the smell of cigarette smoke and
marijuana that would waft into his house when they were there. He
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had previously asked juveniles who gathered there to leave on several
occasions, but was “frustrated” because law enforcement and the local
water district never responded to his complaints.
On one occasion before the incident, he interacted with a juvenile
at the pump station and asked him and his friends to be quiet “for [his]
wife’s sake” because she was dying and going through chemotherapy.
That statement was false. Aregger testified he was a “life-long
bachelor” and he lied to the juveniles having a wife with cancer
because he had “hop[ed] that would do the trick.” But it made no
difference. The juveniles continued to exhibit the same behavior.
On September 22, 2023, Aregger went out to the edge of his
property, unholstered a nine-millimeter handgun, and “yelled . . . very
loudly” at the boys at the pump station across from his house, telling
them that his wife was dying and repeating several times that they
should “get out of [there]” and “not come back.” The boys left
immediately after that. He claimed he did not threaten to shoot
anyone or threaten to “blow someone’s head off.”
Aregger denied pointing his gun at the boys. Rather he
maintained that he pointed the gun at the pump station while holding
the gun in a defensive stance. Aregger conceded that the photograph
victim Silas took at the time of the incident was of him holding a gun.
Aregger’s recollection was that the entire interaction took place in
about five seconds. Aregger did not expect to be arrested because “in
[his] opinion, [he] did nothing wrong” and did not brandish a weapon.
C. Verdict and Sentence
After closing argument, the People dismissed the California
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2) weapons use allegations as to the three
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threats counts.2 The jury found Aregger guilty on all remaining
counts—the three threats counts, plus the brandishing count. The
court thereafter suspended imposition of sentence and placed Aregger,
then age 70, on two years of supervised probation. Aregger filed a
timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Denial of Motion for Acquittal
Aregger’s principal claim on appeal is that the denial of his section
1118.1 motion for acquittal with respect to counts 1 and 4 was erroneous.
Specifically, he asserts the court should have granted the motion because, at
trial, Jacob failed to identify him as the perpetrator who threatened him
while holding a firearm, and, in the absence of such an identification, the
section 422 charge cannot be sustained because the requisite elements that
(1) Aregger is the person who carried out the alleged threat against Jacob
and (2) “victim-specific intent” on his part, as the perpetrator of the threat
against Jacob, are lacking. In his view, the section 417 count 4 charge “is
likewise tethered to Jacob” because the information alleged brandishing “in
the presence of another person, to wit: J.M., age 15.” Summing up this line
of argument, he contends that “[i]dentity—the proof that this [defendant] is
the man who threatened or brandished a firearm in Jacob’s presence—is . . .
an element of both Counts 1 and 4” and thus that both counts should have
been dismissed at the close of the People’s case.
We disagree.
2 The disposition of the prior strike allegation is unclear from the
record (apparently the People did not seek a finding on it either from the jury
or the court), but that allegation is not material here.
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In deciding a section 1118.1 motion, the trial court inquires “whether
from the evidence[,] . . . including reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom, there is substantial evidence of the existence of every element of
the offense charged.” (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1,
89.) An appellate court reviews “the denial of a section 1118.1 motion under
the standard employed in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support
a conviction.” (People v. Houston (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1186, 1215.) Accordingly,
this court examines “ ‘the entire record in the light most favorable to the
prosecution to determine whether it contains evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value, from which a rational trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Bolden (2002) 29
Cal.4th 515, 553.)
Aregger builds his entire argument on the premise that the sole source
of evidence to support a jury finding that he was the person who threatened
Jacob had to come out of Jacob’s mouth at trial. He tries to suggest that,
absent the admissions in Aregger’s testimony—that Aregger was present at
the scene, holding a gun, in the presence of all of the victims, including
Jacob—there is no evidence in the record to support any identification of him
as the threatener or to support any finding that Jacob was in fear because of
anything Aregger did. According to Aregger, the identification testimony
from the other boys might support the denial of the section 1118.1 motion as
to counts 2 and 3, but not as to count 1 because the elements of a section 422
threats offense, as he puts it, must establish “victim-specific intent.”
To explain why this argument fails, we need not try to unpack what
exactly Aregger means by “victim-specific intent” (a term nowhere used in the
applicable case law). Fundamentally, what Aregger ignores is that, before
his motion for acquittal was made, the transcript and the video of his
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interview with the police were admitted into evidence (Exhibits 5, 6 and 6A),
along with photographs taken by Silas of the man who emerged from the
house (Exhibits 4 and 5). Based on Aregger’s police interview, the
photographs, and the identifications of Aregger by Silas and Zachary, and
Jacob’s testimony that he was in fear of an armed man who yelled a threat,
the jury had plenty of circumstantial evidence to conclude that, despite
Jacob’s testimony identifying a juror as the perpetrator—testimony which
was obviously mistaken, but as the court pointed out, still had some
probative value because there was a physical resemblance between Aregger
and the juror—there was enough proof in the record at the close of the
prosecution case to allow the jury (1) to decide that Aregger was the accused
man on counts 1 and 4 and (2) link Jacob’s testimony about his fear to
Aregger. In short, the jury was entitled to disregard Jacob’s mistaken
identification, rely on other evidence for that identification, and accept the
rest of Jacob’s testimony.
B. Insufficiency of the Evidence
Separately, Aregger mounts a sufficiency of the evidence attack on all
of the threats charges, counts 1, 2 and 3, and on the brandishing charge,
count 4. This line of argument is threefold. First, Aregger claims that the
evidence was insufficient to establish the element of “sustained fear” for
counts 1 through 3. Second, he claims that count 3 fails for the additional
reason that his threat to Silas was expressly conditional. Third, he asserts
that, as to all counts, the prosecution’s case suffered from “material
contradictions” which prevented any reasonable trier of fact from concluding
that the offenses had been proven true beyond a reasonable doubt.
We disagree with these contentions as well.
The governing legal principles here are familiar and well established.
A criminal conviction satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due
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process if supported by sufficient evidence. (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443
U.S. 307, 319–320.) The critical inquiry in reviewing sufficiency of evidence
is whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. (Ibid.; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557,
578.) We are looking for substantial evidence. What that means, of course, is
that we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment
below to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible,
and of solid value, ultimately asking ourselves whether the evidence is
sufficient to support a reasonable trier of fact finding the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 690.)
The three insufficiency arguments Aregger makes all fail when we
apply these basic standards.
First, substantial evidence establishes that, under the circumstances,
appellant’s threats communicated a serious intention and the immediate
prospect that the threats would be carried out, and that each victim suffered
sustained fear as a result of them. Each of the boys testified to either being
in fear for his life or in fear of serious injury. It is hardly unreasonable for
someone to believe they are faced with a grave threat of harm when faced
with a person pointing a gun at them while threatening to “blow your brains
out.” And while it is true that the testimony varied as to how long the boys’
encounter with the armed man lasted before they fled to safety, “[a] victim
can experience sustained fear even if the fear exists only during the incident
itself.” (People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 634.) The law does
not require proof of a minimum period of sustained fear as long as it is more
than “ ‘momentary, fleeting, or transitory.’ ” (People v. Fierro (2010) 180
Cal.App.4th 1342, 1349; see People v. Culbert (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 184,
190–191 [describing as “preposterous” defendant’s contention that the victim
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did not experience sustained fear because it only took a “split second” to hold
an unloaded gun to his head and pull the trigger].)
Second, Aregger’s threats to Silas were not “expressly conditional.” We
do not expect victims to parse words of threat like a lawyer would do in
reviewing a contract. Section 422 targets “ ‘a specific and narrow class of
communication,’ and the ‘expression of an intent to inflict serious evil upon
another person.’ ” (People v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789, 805.) “ ‘A
threat is sufficiently specific [to support a criminal threat conviction] where it
threatens death or great bodily injury. A threat is not insufficient simply
because it does “not communicate a time or precise manner of execution;
section 422 does not require those details to be expressed.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 806.)
“ ‘[U]nequivocality, unconditionality, immediacy and specificity are not
absolutely mandated [by section 422], but must be sufficiently present in the
threat and surrounding circumstances to convey gravity of purpose and
immediate prospect of execution to the victim.’ ” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18
Cal.4th 297, 340.) Here, crediting the testimony supporting the version of
events most favorable to the prosecution, as we must, Aregger’s threatening
conduct lasted approximately one to three minutes. He also told the victims
that he knew where they lived. At that time, the victims were hiding
together at the pump station for their safety (i.e., in one place). Thus,
contrary to Aregger’s claims, his threats were not insufficient simply because
he did “ ‘ “not communicate a time or precise manner of execution.” ’ ”
(Wilson, at p. 806.)
Third, and finally, Aregger’s arguments about “material contradictions”
amount to nothing more than an effort to reargue the strength of the
evidence against him on appeal. He contends that “the prosecution’s own
witnesses [could not] agree on basic perceptual facts—volume of music,
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number of people present, type and color of the weapon, duration of the
incident—”and he emphasizes that, at one point in the deliberations, the jury
asked for a readback of some of the testimony. Readbacks are common, and
no physical impossibility or inherent improbability appears in the evidence
concerning what Aregger calls “material contradictions” in the proof. It
hardly needs to be said that the jury was tasked with resolving evidentiary
conflicts and determining what evidence, if any, it believed. (See People v.
Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1191; CALCRIM Nos. 226, 302.) On this
record, the jury could have reasonably determined any “contradictions” were
unimportant given other, substantial evidence showing Aregger’s guilt on
each count.
III. DISPOSITION
Affirmed.
STREETER, J.
WE CONCUR:
BROWN, P. J.
GORDON, J.*
* Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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