Filed 10/19/26 P. v. Archuleta CA4/2
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, E082960
v. (Super.Ct.No. RIF1605083)
RAYMOND ANTHONY ARCHULETA, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John D. Molloy, Judge.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
William D. Farber, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Melissa A. Mandel, and Joseph C.
Anagnos, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Raymond Archuleta appealed from the trial court’s order finding he
was ineligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 after the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) notified the trial court that his
judgment included a now-invalid prior prison term enhancement.1 At the time of
Defendant’s guilty plea and original sentencing, the trial court had imposed a prison prior
enhancement pursuant to section 667.5, subdivision (b), but it struck the punishment.
On appeal, Defendant argued that section 1172.75’s resentencing procedure
applies to any defendant who is serving prison or jail time on a judgment that includes a
now-invalid prior prison term enhancement, regardless of whether the enhancement was
originally stayed, or its punishment was stricken, but we affirmed the trial court’s
decision. The Supreme Court granted Defendant’s petition for review but deferred
further action pending disposition of a related issue in People v. Rhodius (2025) 17
Cal.5th 1050 (Rhodius), and later deferred further action pending the disposition of
People v. Espino (2026) 20 Cal.5th 57 (Espino).
Subsequently, the Supreme Court transferred the cause to this court for
reconsideration in light of the decision in Espino and we invited supplemental briefing.
In light of these recent developments, we reverse and remand the cause to the superior
court with directions to conduct a full resentencing.
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.
2
BACKGROUND2
We adopt the background information set forth in our prior opinion, People v.
Archuleta, E082960, unpublished opinion filed on January 30, 2025 (Archuleta):
“Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty in April 2017 to a criminal
threat (§ 422), and he admitted personal use of a deadly and dangerous weapon (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)), a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), also referred to as a
“nickel” prior), two prior strikes (§§ 667, subds. (c), (e)(2)(A), 1170.12, subd. (c)(2)(A)),
and two prison priors (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). At sentencing, the trial court struck one of the
strikes pursuant to People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, and
sentenced defendant to 12 years in state prison, consisting of the upper term of three
years for the criminal threat, doubled for the remaining strike, plus one year for the
personal use enhancement, and five years for the nickel prior.
“Regarding the prison priors, the reporter’s transcript reflects as to the first prison
prior the court stayed the enhancement and struck the punishment, while for the second
prior, the court ‘impos[ed] it but str[uck] it.’ The minute order of the sentencing, as well
as the abstract of judgment, indicate that both prison priors were stayed.
“In 2022, CDCR notified the trial court that defendant’s abstract of judgment
included prior prison term enhancements under subdivision (b) of section 667.5.
2 Because Defendant pled guilty and based on the nature of the issue raised on
appeal, consideration of the underlying facts of this case is not necessary to determine the
issue on appeal.
3
“In October 2022, the People filed an opposition to defendant’s resentencing,
stating that the ‘court [had] stayed the two prison priors.’ The People argued that the
court should ‘strike/dismiss his stayed prison priors,’ which ‘should be the end of the
matter because there is no reduction of defendant’s sentence to begin with.’ The People
further argued that ‘[i]f these priors, unnecessary to the plea, had been dismissed at the
time of the plea or stricken . . . instead of stayed at immediate sentencing, defendant
would not have even been referred to this court by [CDCR].’
“In January 2023, the People filed a supplemental memorandum with the court,
opposing defendant’s resentencing and arguing that the ‘court should summarily deny
resentencing and simply dismiss/strike the prison priors that were previously stayed,
keeping the 12-year prison sentence intact.’
“In November 2023, defendant filed a motion in support of his resentencing,
arguing that he was eligible ‘regardless of whether the prior was imposed and executed,
stayed, or punishment stricken.’ (Capitalization omitted.)
“The following month, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s eligibility for
resentencing under section 1172.75. The court declined to recall defendant’s sentence
and resentence him under section 1172.75. The court found that defendant was ineligible
because he was not ‘serving additional time’ based on his prison priors. The court then
struck defendant’s prison priors on the ground that ‘post 2004 . . . we were directed to
strike, not stay’ prison priors and ordered an amended abstract of judgment to reflect the
modifications.
“Defendant appealed.” (Archuleta, supra, E082960.)
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In our prior opinion, we held that Defendant was not entitled to a full resentencing
because the punishment for both the enhancements had been stricken and therefore had
not been “imposed and executed” within the meaning of section 1172.75, to qualify for a
resentencing hearing. (Archuleta, supra, E082960.) On April 16, 2025, the Supreme
Court granted review, deferring further action pending consideration and disposition of a
related issue in Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1050. (People v. Archuleta (Apr. 16, 2025,
S289560) [2025 Cal. LEXIS 2184.) Following the decision in Rhodius, on
September 17, 2025, the Supreme Court issued an order holding this matter for a new
lead case, and that further action was deferred pending the disposition of a related issue in
Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th 57. (People v. Archuleta (Sept. 17, 2025, S289560) [2025 Cal.
LEXIS 6047.)
On July 2, 2026, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Espino, holding that even
where punishment for a prison prior enhancement has been stricken, a defendant is
entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75. (Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th at pp. 60, 66.)
On September 30, 2026, the Supreme Court transferred the matter back to this court with
directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the cause in light of Espino. (People v.
Archuleta (Sept. 30, 2026, S289560) [2026 Cal. LEXIS 5621.)
We vacated our prior decision and invited the parties to submit supplemental
briefing. Both parties have now done so, and the People agree that we should remand for
a full resentencing under section 1172.75, subdivision (d).
5
DISCUSSION
As of January 1, 2020, Senate Bill No. 136 (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) amended
section 667.5, subdivision (b), to eliminate sentence enhancements for prior prison terms
unless the enhancements related to prior terms for sexually violent offenses. (Stats. 2019,
ch. 590, § 1; People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 567.) The purpose of the
statute is to “reduce the societal and fiscal burdens of incarceration” by “eliminat[ing]
prior-prison-term enhancements for all prior crimes except for ‘sexually violent
offense[s].’ ” (Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1054.) Section 1172.75, subdivision (a),
which was added to implement Senate Bill No. 136, states, “Any sentence enhancement
that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020, pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, .
. . is legally invalid.”
The statute requires the CDCR and county correctional administrators to identify
“persons in their custody currently serving a term for a judgment that includes an
enhancement” under section 667.5, subdivision (b). (§ 1172.75, subd. (b).) Upon receipt
of the list, the sentencing court must verify that the “the current judgment includes a
sentencing enhancement described in subdivision (a).” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) If so, the
sentencing court must recall the sentence and resentence the defendant. (Ibid.)
At the hearing to determine eligibility for resentencing, a sentence less than the
original sentence must be imposed due to the elimination of the enhancement, unless the
court finds a lesser sentence would endanger public safety. “[T]he phrase ‘lesser
sentence’ need not refer to a shorter sentence; rather, it can be understood to mean that
the new sentence must eliminate whatever adverse effects flow from the now-invalid
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prior prison term enhancement, even if those effects do not take the form of a longer term
of imprisonment.” (Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 62, citing Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th
at p. 1060.) The court must also apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or
provide for judicial discretion. (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(1)-(2).)
Following the enactment of section 1172.75, conflicting interpretations were
issued by the Courts of Appeal, resulting in diverse outcomes, which we do not need to
address here. (See Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 1057, 1066, fn.2.) The Supreme
Court’s opinion in Rhodius clarified that “It is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature
also intended for section 1172.75 to accomplish this purpose through its full resentencing
procedures for defendants whose judgments contain now-invalidated section 667.5(b)
enhancements, regardless of whether the enhancements were stayed or executed.” (Id., at
p. 1065.)
This left the question of whether resentencing was required for defendants as to
whom the enhancement was imposed but the punishment therefor was stricken, a
question answered in the affirmative in Espino: “The question in this case is whether an
enhancement was ‘imposed’ even though the sentencing court struck the punishment for
the enhancement. The answer is yes.” (Espino, supra, 20 Cal.5th at p. 60.) The court
explained “It is true that the potential effects are not the same as when an enhancement is
stayed. (See Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1061 [‘when a sentence is stayed, the trial
court retains the ability to “lift the stay and impose the term under certain
circumstance[s], such as if an alternately imposed term is invalidated’ ”].) But that does
7
not mean the potential effects are nonexistent, or that the Legislature would have believed
them to be so.” (Espino, at p. 65.)3
The opinion in Espino concluded by holding that while the punishment for the
defendant’s prison prior enhancement had been stricken, it had been imposed, and was
now invalid, rendering the defendant entitled to resentencing under section 1172.75,
again citing Rhodius, supra, 17 Cal.5th at page 1068.
In the present case, the punishment for both the enhancements was similarly
stricken. As such, Defendant is in the same position as the defendant in Espino and is
entitled to the same relief. Both parties agree that the cause must be remanded to the
superior court for a full resentencing hearing pursuant to the mandate of Espino, supra,
20 Cal.5th at pages 60 and 66. We therefore reverse the order denying Defendant’s
petition for recall and resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75, and remand the matter to
the superior court to conduct a full resentencing hearing, pursuant to Espino.
3 For persons committed to state prison, the CDCR relies on the information
contained in the sentencing minutes and the abstract of judgment to determine the
defendant’s release date, eligibility for educational programs, as well as to determine
where the defendant should be housed, based on a classification score determined by
ascribing points for various elements of the sentence. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, §§
3075 [initial intake], 3077 [criteria for county assessment program], 3078.3 [criteria for
alternative custody program exclusion], 3269 [criteria considered for inmate housing
assignments], 3375 [classification process], 3375.1 [inmate placement based on
classification score].) Inclusion of now-invalid enhancements can result in errors in a
defendant’s classification score, and impact the availability of rehabilitative or
educational programs for the inmate, among other things.
8
DISPOSITION
The order finding that Defendant is ineligible for resentencing is reversed. The
cause is remanded to the superior court with directions to conduct a full resentencing
hearing, pursuant to section 1172.5, subdivision (d).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J.
We concur:
McKINSTER
J.
MENETREZ
J.
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