Filed 9/30/26 P. v. Arangure CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D085913
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. INF2001108)
v.
ANGEL ARANGURE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Otis Sterling, Judge. Affirmed.
Arthur Martin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene Sevidal, Senior Assistant Attorney General,
Christine Y. Friedman, Acting Supervising Deputy Attorney General and
Paige B. Hazard, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Angel Arangure of the first degree murder of Pablo
Encino (Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a); count 1) and three counts of attempted
robbery (§§ 664, 211; counts 2-4). As to count 1, the jury found true special
circumstance allegations that the murder was committed while Arangure
was engaged in the commission or attempted commission of a robbery
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(A)). As to all counts, the jury found true that Arangure
committed the offenses as a principal armed with a firearm (§ 12022, subd.
(a)(1)). The court sentenced Arangure on count 1 to life without the
possibility of parole plus a one-year enhancement for the firearm use
allegation, which it stayed under section 654. On count 2, it imposed a
consecutive one-year four-month low term and a consecutive one-year term
for the firearm enhancement. On counts 3 and 4, the court imposed
concurrent one-year four-month terms, plus one year on each count for the
attached enhancements. Arangure’s total term is life without the possibility
of parole plus two years four months.
Arangure contends (1) the evidence is insufficient to prove he acted
with reckless indifference for human life to support his murder conviction; (2)
the record lacks evidence corroborating an accomplice’s testimony to prove
that point, as well as whether he was a major participant who acted with
such intent; and (3) his conviction should be reversed and a new trial granted
based on the trial court’s prejudicial error in admitting under Evidence Code
section 352 evidence that police found ammunition in a closet at his and his
family’s residence. We affirm.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Shooting
In July 2020, Pablo Encino and two of his friends drove to a house on
Santa Cruz Road in Desert Hot Springs to make a sale of marijuana pens and
cartridges. Encino was in the front passenger seat. They had been contacted
on a social media account by someone who they believed was a female,
identified as “Smoky.” The three hesitated at first because it was a new
account and it was dark, and bad things sometimes happen at night. At
about midnight, the men pulled over to the side of the street of the delivery
address, left the engine running, and messaged the girl that they had
arrived.
A female exited the house and approached the car. She spoke with
Encino through a rolled down window. At her request, Encino showed her
the product, then asked if she had the money. The girl reached into her shirt
but as she did so, two men ran up from behind both sides of the car, yelling
for Encino and his friends to get out of the car and hand over the drugs. One
of the men shined a flashlight into the car, blinding the back-seat occupant.
Encino’s friend started to drive off, but as he struggled to do so he heard
gunshots then realized Encino had been shot. He headed for a hospital but
saw a police officer and stopped for help.
Hearing gunshots, the neighbor next door to the Santa Cruz house ran
outside. She saw two males and yelled out to them using expletives, asking
3
what was going on. One of the men said, “Sorry, Cat,” using the neighbor’s
nickname.2
Encino died from the gunshot wounds. His friends initially lied to
police about what they saw and had been doing when the shooting occurred.
But after Encino’s death they admitted to police they drove to the Santa Cruz
house to conduct a drug deal.
D.S.’s Testimony
D.S., the girl who approached the car that night, testified under a grant
of immunity. She was 16 years old at the time of the shooting. D.S. said that
on that night, she, her then17-year-old boyfriend M.P., 18-year-old Arangure,
and Arangure’s then girlfriend made a plan to smoke marijuana and
Arangure drove them to the Santa Cruz house for that purpose. D.S. testified
that earlier, M.P. had found a “plug,” a marijuana seller, and both M.P. and
Arangure talked about robbing him. When they arrived at the Santa Cruz
house, M.P. and Arangure planned what they were going to do. Using D.S.’s
phone to text the seller, M.P. ordered a large quantity and told D.S. to go
outside to talk to the person and get the order; the plan was that M.P. and
Arangure would approach and scare him with guns that they both had at the
time.
D.S. testified she walked out the front door with M.P. and Arangure,
who separated and hid behind cars. D.S. walked to the car where Encino and
2 The People assert that the neighbor recognized Arangure as one of the
two men just after the shooting, but the record citations provided do not
support the proposition. The neighbor testified that when she walked out of
her house she saw two males outside but did not recall giving detectives any
descriptions. She testified she had seen the man who used her nickname a
couple of times at the next door property, but they were not friends, and she
could not remember what he looked like.
4
his friends were and engaged in conversation with Encino about the product.
Within seconds, M.P. and Arangure approached the car from both sides with
their guns out yelling at the men to give them their stuff. D.S. thought she
saw Encino reach for the center console so she backed up while the men in
the car tried to drive off and M.P., who was on the passenger side, started
shooting. D.S. saw Encino get shot. Afterwards, Arangure told D.S. to say
she was inside the house asleep when the shooting occurred, and to act like
she did not know anything. She believed the guns were still inside the house
when police arrived.
The Investigation
Police arrived at the Santa Cruz house shortly after the shooting and
surrounded it, calling on the occupants, including M.P., Arangure and D.S.,
to exit. A responding officer observed shell casings outside in the street and
at the Santa Cruz address. Based on a neighbor’s statements, police detained
M.P., Arangure and D.S. and brought them to the police station. Other
people, including Arangure’s godmother, were at the house. Officers searched
the house for a gun but did not find anything.
The next morning, D.S. was called back into the station to speak with
a detective, but did not give him all the details about what happened. A
couple of days later, D.S. contacted the detective again to tell the truth, but
because she was getting threats from M.P.’s mother and other strangers, she
told him M.P. did not shoot at the car. She did not give the detective all of
the details because she was scared of being alone, and worried about being a
snitch.
When interviewed by police after the shooting Arangure gave
conflicting accounts. An officer testified: “So [Arangure] said that he was
inside the residence, and that he was asleep; and that around 9:00 o’clock, he
5
went to the car to put his—his marijuana away. And then he said that he
heard the gunshots, and then went outside. Then he said he went outside.
He didn’t hear the gunshots. He talked to the neighbor. Didn’t talk to the
neighbor. Apologized to her. Didn’t apologize to her.” The detective knew
due to the changing stories that Arangure was not telling the truth.
A forensic technician collected seven Winchester .45-caliber shell
casings from the roadway of Santa Cruz Road and driveways near the home
where Arangure, M.P. and D.S. were on the night of the shooting.
After interviewing D.S., police arrested Arangure and executed a
search warrant at his house where he lived with family members. They
found 20 live .38-caliber rounds of ammunition in a bag inside a hallway
closet. In the center console of Arangure’s car they found six more .38-caliber
live rounds, as well as Arangure’s wallet containing his ID card and cash, and
a large quantity of marijuana. Arangure gave police the location of a .45-
caliber gun at his brother’s house, where it was hidden inside the air intake
compartment of a car in the garage. A criminalist determined that the
casings recovered from the crime scene were all fired from that .45-caliber
gun.
Evidence Concerning .38-Caliber Ammunition and Closing Arguments
Before trial, Arangure sought to exclude firearms evidence apart from
the .45-caliber gun found at his brother’s house. The People acknowledged
there was other evidence of magazines, a holster and gun parts, including 20
rounds of .38-caliber ammunition, but stated that the only firearms evidence
at trial would be the pistol found at Arangure’s brother’s house. After D.S.
testified during trial that Arangure was also armed, the People advised the
court that the evidence of gun paraphernalia and ammunition found at
Arangure’s house was relevant. Arangure’s counsel objected on relevance
6
grounds and questioned whether there was corroboration for D.S.’s
statement.
In briefing, the People limited their request to admit only evidence of
the 20 rounds of .38-caliber ammunition. During arguments on the matter,
Arangure’s counsel again objected on grounds the ammunition evidence was
irrelevant and not related to any firearm allegedly used in the case. He
suggested there was no foundation in part because D.S. did not describe a
gun using .38-caliber ammunition. The court acknowledged the absence of
evidence that a .38-caliber ammunition was involved in the crime, or that
more than one gun was fired at the scene. But, it ruled “it does have reason
and logic that someone with a firearm would have bullets to go into [it].” The
court then rejected Arangure’s counsel’s objection under Evidence Code
section 352, ruling the evidence had probative value that was not
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
During closing arguments, the prosecutor summarized what made
Arangure a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human
life for purposes of finding him guilty of felony murder: “So what makes the
defendant a major participant? Well, he’s at the scene of the crime. He’s
hatched this plan with [M.P.]. He’s the oldest out of all three of them. He is
armed with a gun. And he’s told both [D.S.] and [M.P.] that he intends to
rob, and they come up with this plan to do it. He’s involved with the
planning, the execution. And then he gets rid of his gun. And the logical
conclusion is that he hides the murder weapon in his brother’s house.” The
prosecutor argued that Arangure armed himself because he appreciated the
dangerousness of his conduct and Encino’s death would not have occurred
without Arangure’s participation in the robbery with M.P. She pointed out
7
that after the lethal force was used, Arangure got rid of his gun, apologized to
the neighbor, and lied to police.
The prosecutor also argued Arangure acted with reckless indifference
to human life; that it was common sense and Arangure knew “that when you
engage in robbery in the middle of the night in [Desert Hot Springs] of drug
dealers, that either they could try to rob you or you’re going to have to use the
gun that you armed yourself with.” The prosecutor argued Arangure knew of
the risks involved because he and M.P. armed themselves, and there was no
reason to do so if it were not a dangerous activity. She argued Arangure
knew a lethal weapon would be present and likely to be used because the
guns were loaded; he knew the lethal weapons were used and the number of
them; he was with an armed 17-year-old, M.P., and he did not try to
minimize the possibility of violence in that they approached the vehicle in the
middle of the night with guns, demanding the drugs from the victims. The
prosecutor pointed out Arangure was older than M.P. and D.S., and had
admitted to police that the area was dangerous and his car had been shot at
multiple times there. The prosecutor argued Arangure “knows the dangers
involved in guns and shooting.”
DISCUSSION
I. Sufficiency of Evidence
Arangure contends his murder conviction must be reversed because the
record lacks evidence that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Specifically, he maintains D.S.’s testimony does not prove that point even if
we accept her assertion that he was holding a gun during the attempted
robbery of Encino and his friends. According to Arangure, the totality of the
circumstances, including his young age, do not establish he participated in
the attempted robbery understanding that there was a good chance someone
8
would die but decided to do it anyway. Arangure points to what he
characterizes as D.S.’s “demonstrably dubious” testimony on certain points,
such as the order in which she, M.P. and Arangure exited the house and
approached the car with Encino and his friends and whether she saw
Arangure holding a weapon or fire shots. Arangure argues the circumstances
show he merely assisted in a “garden-variety armed robbery” where death
might be possible but not probable, and not a course of conduct that
reasonably could be found to entail a likelihood of death. Thus, he argues,
under California Supreme Court authority on the matter—including People v.
Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 and
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522—the evidence is insufficient to support
a conclusion he acted with reckless indifference to human life.
A. Legal Principles
Effective in 2019, the Legislature significantly narrowed the felony-
murder rule. (People v. Morris (2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 677, 679-680; People v.
Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 875; Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess., Stats. 2017, ch. 1015, § 3.) “If a defendant was not the actual killer or
an aider and abettor acting with intent to kill, the [felony-murder] statute
now requires that the defendant be a major participant in the felony who
9
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Emanuel, at p. 875; see also
id. at p. 880.)3
“ ‘[R]eckless indifference to human life is “implicit in knowingly
engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.” ’
[Citation.] ‘Examples include “the person who tortures another not caring
whether the victim lives or dies, or the robber who shoots someone in the
course of the robbery, utterly indifferent to the fact that the desire to rob may
have the unintended consequence of killing the victim as well as taking the
victim’s property.” ’ ” (People v. Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 883.)
“[R]eckless indifference to human life ‘encompasses a willingness to kill (or to
assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does
not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.’ ” (Ibid.) The
concept “encompasses both subjective and objective elements. [Citation.] ‘As
to the subjective element, “[t]he defendant must be aware of and willingly
involved in the violent manner in which the particular offense is committed,”
and he or she must consciously disregard “the significant risk of death his or
her actions create.” ’ [Citations.] ‘As to the objective element, “ ‘[t]he risk [of
death] must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and
purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him [or her],
3 Section 189, subdivision (e) provides that “[a] participant in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of a [qualifying felony] in which a
death occurs is liable for [first degree] murder only if,” among other
alternatives not asserted here, “[t]he person was a major participant in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life, as
described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2.” (§ 189, subd. (e)(3); see People
v. Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 881-882 [explaining the Legislature
imported the major participant and reckless indifference standards from
section 190.2, subdivision (d)].)
10
its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe in the actor’s situation.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Under this standard, “ ‘ “[a]wareness of no more than the foreseeable
risk of death inherent in any [violent felony] is insufficient” to establish
reckless indifference to human life; “only knowingly creating a ‘grave risk of
death’ ” satisfies the statutory requirement.’ ” (People v. Emanuel, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 884; People v. Guiffreda (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 112, 125.) Thus,
“participation in a ‘ “garden-variety armed robbery,” ’ i.e., one in which the
only factor supporting a reckless indifference finding is that a participant was
armed with a gun, is insufficient without more to establish reckless
indifference.” (Emanuel, at p. 884.)
Courts must analyze the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. (People
v. Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 884; People v. Guiffreda, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 126.) The California Supreme Court has identified a
“nonexhaustive list of considerations relevant” to distinguishing persons who
knowingly engage in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death
from other felony perpetrators. (Emanuel, at p. 884.) These include “ ‘use of
or awareness of the presence of a weapon or weapons, physical presence at
the scene and opportunity to restrain confederates or aid victims, the
duration of the crime, knowledge of any threat the confederates might
represent, and efforts taken to minimize risks.’ ” (Ibid.; see also People v.
Chhuon (2026) 19 Cal.5th 1018, 1068) “ ‘ “[N]o one of these considerations is
necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient.” ’ ” (Emanuel, at p.
884; see also Chhuon, at p. 1068.) Some Courts of Appeal have considered a
defendant’s age as a factor as well. (See In re Harper (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
450, 467-470 [discussing cases and assuming without deciding youth is a
11
proper factor]; In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434, 454 [16-year-old
defendant “lacked ‘ “the experience, perspective, and judgment” ’ to
adequately appreciate the risk of death posed by his criminal activities”].)4
B. Standard of Review
We apply the substantial evidence standard of review. (People v.
Montanez (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 245, 270; People v. Guiffreda, supra, 87
Cal.App.5th at p. 125.) In conducting such review, this court’s “ ‘role is a
limited one. “ ‘ “ ‘The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of
evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of
fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]
On appeal, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
People and must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every
fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Chhuon, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 1064; see In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th
at p. 451.) “ ‘ “Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable
suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive
province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and
the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends.” ’ ”
(Montanez, at p. 270.)
“ ‘The same standard governs in cases where the prosecution relies
primarily on circumstantial evidence.’ [Citation.] . . . And ‘ “unless the
4 The California Supreme Court in People v. Emanuel also observed that
Courts of Appeal had considered youth as a factor in whether the defendant
acted with reckless indifference. (People v. Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p.
885, fn. 6.) However, it noted the defendant acknowledged he did not raise
the issue of his youth below and the lower courts did not address that issue.
(Ibid.) The court in Emanuel declined to discuss the significance of the
defendant’s youth for the first time. (Ibid.)
12
testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable, testimony of a
single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “ ‘We
resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for
substantial evidence.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘ “A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is
unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support” ’ ” ’ the fact finder’s decision.”
(People v. Montanez, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 271; People v. Guiffreda,
supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 125.)
C. Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding that Arangure Acted with
Reckless Indifference to Human Life
We first address Arangure’s assertions about the “dubious” or
unreliable nature of D.S.’s testimony, particularly as to whether Arangure
had a gun or fired shots during the attempted robbery. The prosecutor asked
D.S. whether M.P. and Arangure “were talking about what they were going to
do in order to get the stuff.” She responded, “Yeah. They were just going to
go up to the guys and scare them with the, with their guns that they had at
that time.” When asked, she confirmed her testimony that “they both had
guns” and the guns were black. D.S. also stated when asked if she saw the
guns, that she didn’t “know about none of that. But I did see they both had
one.” The jury could reasonably interpret her testimony as admitting she
was unable to identify more particularly the type of gun both men possessed.
And the People’s theory of reckless indifference did not turn on whether
Arangure fired his gun; the prosecutor pointed out to the jury that D.S. said
M.P. was the shooter and the prosecutor also argued Arangure was aware
that M.P. was likely to kill, as he was only 17 years old and was armed. In
any event, the matters Arangure raises go to D.S.’s credibility, which is
outside our purview on substantial evidence review. We will not reweigh the
13
jury’s credibility findings because the jury had the exclusive province to
determine witness credibility, and the truth or falsity of the determinative
facts. (§ 1127; see People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 162.)
Turning to the substantive question and considering the factors as well
as the totality of the circumstances as we must (People v. Emanuel, supra, 17
Cal.5th at p. 884), we conclude the People presented sufficient evidence of
reasonable, credible and solid value (People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p.
618) to support a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Arangure exhibited
reckless indifference to the grave risk of death created by his actions. In
addressing this issue, it is important to emphasize that the factors outlined
above are not exclusive. (Emanuel, at p. 884; see also Clark, at p. 618 [no one
factor is “ ‘necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient’ ”].)
First, D.S.’s testimony demonstrates that Arangure planned the
robbery with M.P. and likely knew guns were going to be used. (Compare
People v. Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 126 [defendant did not use a
weapon and record was absent evidence she knew a weapon would be used
during the felony, a robbery].) Pursuant to this plan, M.P. ordered a large
quantity of drugs, lured a known drug dealer (the “plug”) to the Santa Cruz
house in the middle of the night to a neighborhood that Arangure
acknowledged had experienced a lot of shootings, and he and Arangure
armed themselves with weapons, with at least M.P.’s being loaded. (Accord,
People v. Montanez, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 281 [defendant’s presence
and proximity to armed cohorts permitted fact finder to reasonably infer he
was aware of both weapons]; compare People v. Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 887 [defendant and cohort arranged to meet robbery victim at a park
during daylight hours, in the open where witnesses might be present, which
did not support a reckless indifference finding], Guiffreda, at p. 126 [record
14
lacked evidence defendant was “part of any preconceived plan to beat [the
victim]” or had any reason to suspect her accomplices would use a lethal
weapon].) Brandishing their guns, M.P. and Arangure then surprised the
car’s occupants, one of them blinded the occupants with a flashlight, and they
demanded the drugs. Arangure made no effort to minimize the risks of lethal
violence. (Montanez, at p. 282 [defendant’s physical presence at crime scene,
even though he was not at location where victim was gang raped or shot,
gave him an opportunity to restrain his cohorts and aid the victims]; compare
People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 622-623 [“If the evidence supports
an argument that defendant engaged in efforts to minimize the risk of
violence in the felony . . . the appellate court shall consider it as being part of
all the relevant circumstances that considered together go towards
supporting or failing to support the jury’s finding of reckless indifference to
human life”].) In Clark, the evidence that an attempted robbery was
undertaken after closing time when most employees were gone, only the
defendant’s codefendant carried a gun, the gun was not supposed to be
loaded, and the recovered weapon had only one bullet, contributed to an
absence of evidence to support the reckless indifference element. (Id. at pp.
619, 622-623.)
Though events happened quickly in this case, Arangure was physically
present for the entire sequence of the robbery and close enough (on the other
side of the vehicle) that at any time he could have dissuaded M.P. from
continuing his actions. (People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619 [a
“defendant’s presence gives him an opportunity to act as a restraining
influence on murderous cohorts. If the defendant fails to act as a restraining
influence, then the defendant is arguably more at fault for the resulting
murders”]; In re McDowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 999, 1014 [the defendant
15
“was present when the violence ensued but took no steps to prevent it”];
compare People v. Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 885-896 [defendant did
not use a gun or weapon, was unaware his cohort was armed, and urged him
to leave after they were met with unexpected resistance during their
intended robbery; “[defendant] abandoned the plan rather than resort to
greater violence”].) And though Encino’s friend drove away, Arangure did not
call 911 after the shooting or do anything in an effort to assist the shooting
victim. (Compare People v. Guiffreda, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 127
[defendant’s post assault conduct in failing to call 911 was ambiguous in the
absence of evidence she knew a weapon would be used to commit the
robbery].)
We acknowledge that a finding of reckless indifference will not stand if
the defendant’s age precludes him from possessing the experience,
perspective, and judgment to adequately appreciate the risk of death posed
by his criminal activities. (See In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 454.)
But there is no indication, given his age at the time of the robbery, that
Arangure was unable to reasonably appreciate or expect that getting into an
armed confrontation with drug dealers—likely incentivized to protect their
large stash of drugs—would result in a shooting and pose a substantial and
unjustifiable risk to human life, not just to Encino and his friends, but to
D.S., who Arangure and M.P. put in harm’s way next to the vehicle.
We hold the circumstances go well beyond a “garden-variety armed
robbery” where the only factor supporting a finding is that a participant was
armed or defendant was aware a gun would be used in the felony. (See
People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618 [mere fact of a defendant’s
awareness that a gun will be used in the felony is not sufficient to establish
reckless indifference to human life].) The evidence, viewing the totality of the
16
circumstances, supports the jury’s finding of Arangure’s reckless indifference.
(Compare People v. Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 895 [the defendant “was
not armed, and the trial court found he did not know [his cohort] was armed
or likely to use lethal force. Accordingly, there was nothing in the plan that
‘elevated the risk to human life beyond those risks inherent in any armed
robbery,’ much less a planned unarmed robbery. [Citation.] The crime
unfolded without a prolonged period of restraint. When met with unexpected
resistance, [the defendant] told [his cohort], ‘let’s go,’ and began to walk
away. This tends to show that [the defendant] was unwilling to engage in
further violence to accomplish the aims of the robbery”].)5
II. Corroboration of Accomplice D.S.’s Testimony
5 Following the completion of briefing, Arangure’s counsel asked us to
consider new authority, People v Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 546. Keel
involved a much younger defendant, a 15-year-old juvenile, who participated
with an 18-year-old in an “unexpected and unplanned” “crime of opportunity”
in which a death occurred when the victim tried to flee. (People v Keel, at
pp. 550, 560, 562.) The youth did not provide the shooter with the gun or
instruct the shooter to fire (id. at p. 559) and the youth did not know the
shooter’s gun was loaded. (Id. at pp. 559-560.) Though the crime was short
and events occurred in rapid succession, giving the youth no opportunity to
restrain the shooter or intervene (id. at p. 560), the “ ‘evidence tended to show
that the shooting was a “somewhat impulsive” response to the victim’s
unexpected resistance’ ” unlike this case, where the attempted robbery using
at least one loaded gun was planned in advance and the victims lured to the
area for that purpose. Keel is distinguishable, and does not convince us to
change the above conclusions.
17
Arangure contends that assuming we hold there is substantial evidence
he is culpable of murder based on his participation in the robbery, we must
nevertheless reverse his conviction because the evidence from D.S., an
accomplice, was not corroborated as it must be under section 1111 and
principles of due process. According to Arangure, the evidence must
corroborate the fact that he was a major participant who acted with reckless
indifference to human life, which is required “to connect [him] with the
commission of the offense” within section 1111’s meaning.
A. Legal Principles
Section 1111 provides in part: “A conviction can not be had upon the
testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence
as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense;
and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of
the offense or the circumstances thereof.” “ ‘Section 1111 serves to ensure
that a defendant will not be convicted solely upon the testimony of an
accomplice because an accomplice is likely to have self-serving motives.’ ”
(People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629, 675.) It “require[s] ‘evidence
tending to connect defendant with the crimes “without aid or assistance from
the testimony of” ’ the accomplice.” (People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 421,
452.) The statute’s corroboration requirement “is based on the Legislature’s
determination that ‘ “because of the reliability questions posed by” ’
accomplice testimony, such testimony ‘ “by itself is insufficient as a matter of
law to support a conviction.” ’ ” (People v. Romero and Self (2015) 62 Cal.4th
1, 32.) “ ‘Thus, for the jury to rely on an accomplice’s testimony about the
circumstances of an offense, it must find evidence that, “ ‘without aid from
the accomplice’s testimony, tend[s] to connect the defendant with the
crime.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1128.)
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“ ‘ “The entire conduct of the parties, their relationship, acts, and
conduct may be taken into consideration by the trier of fact in determining
the sufficiency of the corroboration.” ’ ” (People v. Dalton (2019) 7 Cal.5th
166, 245.) “The corroboration that section 1111 requires ‘ “ ‘may be
established entirely by circumstantial evidence’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘may be slight and
entitled to little consideration when standing alone.’ ” ’ [Citation.] ‘It is only
required that the evidence “ ‘ “tends to connect the defendant with the
commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury
that the [accomplice] is telling the truth.” ’ ” ’ [Citations.] The necessary
corroboration may involve a defendant’s own statements.” (People v. Aguirre,
supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 675-676; accord, Dalton, at p. 245; People v. Gomez
(2018) 6 Cal.5th 243, 307-308.) The corroborating evidence does not need to
by itself establish every element of the crime (People v. McDermott (2002) 28
Cal.4th 946, 985), independently establish the assailant’s identity, or
“corroborate every fact to which the accomplice testifies . . . .” (Dalton, at p.
245; People v. Valdez (2012) 55 Cal.4th 82, 147-148.)
“ ‘[T]he requirement that accomplice testimony be corroborated is an
“ ‘exception[ ]’ to the substantial evidence” rule. [Citation.] It is based on the
Legislature’s determination that “ ‘because of the reliability questions posed
by’ ” accomplice testimony, such testimony “ ‘by itself is insufficient as a
matter of law to support a conviction.’ ” ’ [Citation.] For this reason, ‘[t]he
trier of fact’s determination on the issue of corroboration’ is not binding on
the reviewing court if the ‘corroborating evidence . . . does not reasonably
tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime.’ ” (People v.
Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 245; see also People v. Romero and Self, supra,
62 Cal.4th at pp. 32-33.) As with the substantial evidence rule, we will not
assess the weight of the corroborating evidence or consider matters of
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credibility as those are the province of the fact finder. (People v. Jones (2018)
26 Cal.App.5th 420, 439.)
In People v. Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th 166, the court found an
accomplice’s testimony was corroborated in part by evidence from someone
other than the accomplice that the accomplice and the defendant were
present together shortly after the crime (id. at p. 247) and that the defendant
fled after the crimes. (Ibid.) In People v. Perez, supra, 4 Cal.5th 421,
involving a murder committed during a robbery, evidence satisfied section
1111’s corroboration requirements where eyewitnesses placed the defendant
and two other men at the crime scene, and other witnesses testified they met
those men immediately after the killing, at which time the men tried to sell
some of the stolen property. (Id. at p. 453.) Further, the crime’s timeframe
was confirmed by evidence of where the victim’s stolen SUV was abandoned,
as well as when and where the men checked into a motel near the abandoned
vehicle’s site. (Ibid.)
B. Analysis
Here, we are bound by the jury’s determination on the issue of
corroboration (People v. Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 245; People v. Romero
and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 32-33), because the record contains some
independent evidence corroborating D.S.’s testimony implicating Arangure in
the planning and execution of the attempted robbery and consequently
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Encino’s murder.6 Police responding to the shooting shortly thereafter
placed Arangure with M.P. at the house near where Encino was shot.
(Dalton, at p. 247.) D.S. testified that Arangure told her to say she was
inside the house asleep when the shooting occurred, and to act like she did
not know anything, which was similar to the story Arangure initially gave to
police after the shooting. The fact police found the murder weapon at
Arangure’s brother’s home permitted the jury to conclude Arangure hid it
there, circumstantially tending to connect him with both the robbery and
murder. (People v. Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 675-676 [corroborating
evidence may be circumstantial].) Arangure lied to police afterwards about
his conduct that night, tending to evidence consciousness of guilt. The fact
other theories are possible that do not implicate Arangure is of no moment if
a jury can reasonably infer circumstances tending to connect him with the
crime. (See id. at p. 676, fn. 26.)
6 The court instructed the jury: “If any of the crimes charged against the
defendant were committed, then [D.]S. was an accomplice to those crimes.
[¶] You may not convict the defendant of any of the crimes alleged based on
the statement or testimony of an accomplice alone. You may . . . use the
statement or testimony of an accomplice that tends to incriminate the
defendant to convict the defendant only if: [¶] Number one, the accomplice’s
testimony or statement is supported by other evidence that you believe; [¶]
Number two, the supporting evidence is independent of the accomplice’s
statement or testimony. [¶] And number three, the supporting evidence
tends to connect the defendant to the commission of the crimes. [¶]
Supporting evidence, however, may be slight. It does not need to be enough
by itself to prove that the defendant is guilty of the charged crime, and it does
not need to support every fact mentioned by that accomplice in the statement
or about which the witness testified. [¶] On the other hand, it is not enough
if the supporting evidence merely shows that a crime was committed or the
circumstances of its commission. The supporting evidence must tend to
connect the defendant to the commission of the crime. ”
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Arangure correctly refers to cases citing the basic principles of
accomplice corroboration, but he cites no authority for his assertion that the
corroborating evidence must demonstrate the elements of major participation
and reckless indifference to human life. We find no such authority, and
conclude the statement misapprehends the law, which “need not be sufficient
to establish every element of the charged offense.” (People v. Jasso (2025) 17
Cal.5th 646, 685.) Rather, as explained above, the corroboration need only
independently connect the defendant to the crime. (People v. Perez, supra, 4
Cal.5th at p. 452; People v. Aguirre, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 675; People v.
Romero and Self, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 36.)7 And the evidence can be
slight. (Jasso, at p. 685; Aguirre, at p. 675; People v. Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 245; People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 986.)
We are likewise unconvinced by Arangure’s citation to People v.
Robinson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 373. Robinson and other cases stand for the
proposition that evidence raising only a suspicion of guilt is not sufficient
corroboration. (Id. at p. 399.) In Robinson, multiple defendants were
7 In People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th 946, the court stated that the
corroboration must “tend to implicate the defendant by relating to an act that
is an element of the crime.” (Id. at p. 986.) The McDermott court also said
the corroborating evidence need not by itself establish every element of the
crime, but must only “tend to connect the defendant with the crime.” (Ibid.;
see also People v. Luker (1965) 63 Cal.2d 464, 469 [corroborating evidence
“ ‘ “must tend to implicate the defendant and therefore must relate to some
act or fact which is an element of the crime but it is not necessary that the
corroborative evidence be sufficient in itself to establish every element of the
offense charged” ’ ”].) We do not read this language to require the People to
present independent evidence demonstrating the major participation or
reckless indifference standard, as long as there is evidence apart from D.S.’s
testimony connecting Arangure with the attempted robbery and Encino’s
murder.
22
convicted of murder. (Id. at p. 377.) The fingerprints of one defendant,
Charles Drivers, were found in a getaway car, which was owned by one of his
codefendants. (Id. at p. 379.) Another defendant implicated Drivers via an
erroneously admitted cross-examination. (Id. at p. 398.) The California
Supreme Court held that even if the codefendant’s cross-examination
testimony had been properly admitted, it would not have been sufficient to
support the conviction because there was insufficient corroboration of his
testimony. (Ibid.) The fingerprints “showed no more than that Drivers had
been present in or about the [getaway car] on some recent date,” and
therefore did not demonstrate any connection between Drivers and the
murder. (Ibid.) “Drivers’ fingerprints on the [getaway car] are as equally
susceptible to an inference that they came there innocently, as they are to
any inference that their presence connects defendant with the commission of
the crime.” (Ibid.) “At best, the fingerprints merely placed Drivers in the car
at some time prior to the time the car was discovered.” (Id. at p. 400.) Thus,
the evidence failed to connect the defendant with his codefendants at any
time near the commission of the offenses. As we have explained, unlike in
Robinson, the evidence here connected Arangure to the crime in such a way
to reasonably satisfy a jury that D.S. was telling the truth.
III. Evidence Code Section 352 Claim
Arangure contends the trial court prejudicially erred under Evidence
Code section 352 by admitting the evidence that police found 20 rounds of
ammunition in a closet of the house where he lived with family members. He
argues the evidence was minimally probative on any issue in the People’s
case, including whether he was armed during the attempted robbery of
Encino and his friends. According to Arangure, the evidence served as
improper character evidence, showing he was the “kind of person who
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stockpiled ammunition,” which “more than likely affected one or more jurors’
analysis of reasonable doubt as to whether [he] acted with the malice
required for murder.”
The People respond that the court properly admitted the evidence
because it had a tendency in reason to support D.S.’s testimony that
Arangure was armed during the attempted robbery. They maintain the
evidence was not unduly prejudicial because the ammunition did not match
that used to kill Encino, and the prosecutor also presented evidence that
police found ammunition in Arangure’s car. Thus, the People argue that any
possible error was harmless given ample evidence of Arangure’s guilt.
We need not decide whether the court abused its broad discretion by
admitting the challenged evidence under Evidence Code section 352 (People
v. Demolle (2026) 19 Cal.5th 1117, 1160),8 because we conclude any assumed
error would be harmless. “[T]he application of ordinary rules of evidence like
Evidence Code section 352 does not implicate the federal Constitution, and
thus we review allegations of error under the ‘reasonable probability’
standard” of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818. (People v. Marks (2003)
31 Cal.4th 197, 226-227; accord, People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 373-
374 [applying Watson to claimed Evidence Code section 352 error in
8 “Section 352 of the Evidence Code ‘authorizes the exclusion of evidence
by the trial court when its probative value is “substantially outweighed by
the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of
time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury.” The “undue prejudice” that Evidence Code
section 352 is concerned with “ ‘is that which “ ‘ “uniquely tends to evoke an
emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very
little effect on the issues.” ’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Demolle, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p.
1161.)
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admitting assertedly cumulative and inflammatory photographs]; People v.
Rouston (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 997, 1016.) “ ‘Under the Watson standard, the
erroneous admission of [unduly prejudicial evidence] warrants reversal of a
conviction only if the appellate court concludes that it is reasonably probable
the jury would have reached a different result had the [evidence] been
excluded.’ ” (Thomas, at p. 374.) “Probability ‘ “ ‘does not mean more
likely than not, but merely a reasonable chance, more than an abstract
possibility.’ ” ’ ” (Rouston, at p. 1016.)
Notably, Arangure does not challenge the evidence that police found six
live rounds of .38-caliber bullets in his vehicle’s center console. In our view,
the unchallenged evidence renders the challenged evidence merely
cumulative. This, combined with the substantial evidence of Arangure’s
participation in the attempted robbery and conduct afterwards in lying to
police and concealing the murder weapon, leads us to conclude that even if
the court had excluded the evidence of the 20 .38-caliber rounds found in
Arangure’s residence it is not reasonably probable the jury would have
reached a different result.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
O’ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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