Filed 8/14/26 P. v. Anderson CA1/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
A174135
v.
DONALD SHAWN ANDERSON, (Lake County Super. Ct.
No. CR971498)
Defendant and Appellant.
Following jury and court trials, defendant Donald Shawn Anderson was
found guilty of arson during a state of emergency, and found to have suffered
five prior “strike” convictions for arson. Defendant filed a request to dismiss
his prior strike convictions (Romero motion).1 The trial court denied the
request and sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison pursuant to the
Three Strikes law.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in
denying his Romero motion. We find no abuse of discretion and affirm.
1 A request pursuant to Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a), that
the trial court exercise its discretion to dismiss a prior strike conviction is
called a “Romero motion,” referring to People v. Superior Court (Romero)
(1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504. (People v. Dain (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 235, 246.)
1
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Current Charges and Convictions
In an amended information, the Lake County District Attorney charged
defendant with two counts of arson, alleging he unlawfully set fire to a
structure and forest land located at Siegler Canyon Road in Lower Lake,
California, on or about September 22, 2024 (Pen. Code,2 § 451, subd. (c);
count 1), and he unlawfully set fire to a structure and forest land located at
New Long Valley Road in Clearlake Oaks, California, on or about October 2,
2024 (ibid.; count 2). For both counts, it was alleged that defendant
committed the arson during, and within an area proclaimed by the Governor
to be, a state of emergency pursuant to Government Code section 8625.
(§ 454, subd. (a)(2).)
The district attorney alleged defendant had been convicted of five prior
serious or violent felonies. (§§ 667, subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b).) Specifically,
it was alleged that in 2004, defendant was convicted of five counts of arson of
a structure or forest land (§ 451, subd. (c)) with the offenses committed on
four separate dates in August and September 2003. The district attorney
also alleged various circumstances in aggravation.
A jury trial began on April 30, 2025. On May 9, the jury informed the
court it had reached a verdict on count 2 and was hopelessly deadlocked on
count 1. The jury found defendant guilty of count 2 and found the special
allegation true.3 The trial court declared a mistrial as to count 1 and
subsequently dismissed the count on the prosecution’s motion.
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 Because the parties are familiar with the evidence at trial and the
specific facts of the current arson offense are not pertinent to the appeal, we
do not summarize the trial evidence in this opinion. Defendant does not
2
Defendant elected to proceed by court trial on the allegations regarding
prior strike convictions and aggravating circumstances. The trial court found
defendant had five prior strike convictions for arson. The court also found
true two circumstances in aggravation: defendant’s prior convictions as an
adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings are
numerous or of increasing seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(2)),
and defendant had served a prior prison term (id., rule 4.21(b)(3)).4
Defendant’s Romero Motion
On June 2, 2025, defendant filed a “[r]equest that the court strike prior
strikes which are over ten years old.” He requested that the court strike four
of the five prior strike convictions, so that he would be sentenced as if he had
one prior strike conviction, which would double the punishment. Defendant
argued such “punishment is reasonable given the fact the prior conviction is
over 20 years old.” He also argued, “This case turned on circumstantial
evidence, and the Defendant believes that there was bias on the part of the
investigators from CAL FIRE which led them to fit the evidence into their
theory. The Defendant has not been involved in any other criminal cases for
a significant time period.”5
challenge his conviction on appeal; his appellate claim relates to his sentence
only.
4 The trial court found not true the allegations that the crime involved
great violence, other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)) and that defendant engaged
in violent conduct (id., rule 4.21(b)(1)). The court observed, “Although the
defendant may pose a serious danger to society, that danger is not due to any
violent conduct committed by the defendant.”
5 Again, we note defendant does not challenge his conviction on appeal.
3
Probation Report
On June 9, 2025, the Probation Department submitted a presentence
investigation report and recommendation (probation report). The probation
report documented defendant’s criminal history, which included juvenile
wardships for offenses including arson and battery; adult convictions of
arson, burglary, and other offenses in 2004 that resulted in a sentence of 17
years, eight months in state prison; a burglary conviction in 2014 with a
sentence of two years, eight months in state prison; and an attempted theft
conviction in 2016 with a sentence of two years in state prison. Defendant
was 41 years old; he reported using illicit substances in his early teenage
years, and he reported prior to his incarceration that he had been using
methamphetamine daily for approximately one year; he lived with his
girlfriend of 21 years.
The Probation Department recommended that defendant be sentenced
to 25 years to life in prison pursuant to section 1170.12, subdivision (c)(2)(A)
of the Three Strike law.
Sentencing Hearing and Court Ruling
At sentencing on August 4, 2025, the trial court stated it had reviewed
defendant’s Romero motion and the probation report. The prosecutor opposed
the Romero motion, arguing it would not be in the interests of justice to
dismiss any of the strike offenses, “given the amount of time he’s spent
incarcerated and now picking up effectively the same offense as his history
would reflect.”
The trial court confirmed with defense counsel that defendant was in
custody from 2004 to 2014 and noted that, “soon after being released, he
committed another second-degree burglary” and returned to prison, “[a]nd
then he committed another offense or offenses” and “was convicted of those
4
charges in April of 2016 and sentenced to serve two years in state prison.”
Defense counsel acknowledged defendant’s current offense was “of the same
variety” as his prior strike convictions, but stated, “he has been law abiding
and has not committed any other offenses within ten years.”
The trial court observed that after defendant was convicted of the five
strike offenses in 2004, he spent more than half of the intervening years in
state prison. The court continued: “And although he has not committed an
offense in an eight-year period after being released from prison, and it may
be less than eight years, but during that period of time after 2016 to 2024,
that is not such a lengthy period of time that the Court can find that this
defendant is outside the spirit of the three-strikes law. For that reason, the
Romero motion is denied.”
The trial court sentenced defendant to 25 years to life in prison.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The Three Strikes law “establishes a sentencing norm”; “it carefully
circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart from this norm and requires
the court to explicitly justify its decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates
a strong presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing
norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th
367, 378 (Carmony).) A trial court may dismiss a prior strike felony
conviction under the Three Strikes law on its own motion “in furtherance of
justice.” (§ 1385, subd. (a); People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, 13
Cal.4th at p. 504.)
In ruling on a Romero motion, a trial court “must consider whether, in
light of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious
and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of his background,
5
character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed outside the [Three
Strike law’s sentencing] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should
be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more
serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148,
161 (Williams).)
“[A] trial court will only abuse its discretion in failing to strike a prior
felony conviction allegation in limited circumstances. For example, an abuse
of discretion occurs where the trial court was not ‘aware of its discretion’ to
dismiss [citation], or where the court considered impermissible factors in
declining to dismiss [citation]. Moreover, ‘the sentencing norms [established
by the Three Strikes law may, as a matter of law,] produce [ ] an “arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd” result’ under the specific facts of a particular
case. [Citation.]
“But ‘[i]t is not enough to show that reasonable people might disagree
about whether to strike one or more’ prior conviction allegations. [Citation.]
Where the record is silent [citation] or ‘[w]here the record demonstrates that
the trial court balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision
in conformity with the spirit of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s
ruling, even if we might have ruled differently in the first instance’ [citation].
Because the circumstances must be ‘extraordinary . . . by which a career
criminal can be deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within
which he squarely falls once he commits a strike as part of a long and
continuous criminal record, the continuation of which the law was meant to
attack’ [citation], the circumstances where no reasonable people could
disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three strikes scheme
must be even more extraordinary.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.)
6
“[A]lthough a trial court is required to state on the record its reasons
for striking a prior conviction (§ 1385, subd. (a)), there is no similar statutory
requirement of an on-the-record statement of reasons when a court declines
to strike a prior.” (In re Coley (2012) 55 Cal.4th 524, 560.) In “the absence of
an affirmative record to the contrary,” we presume the trial court considered
the relevant factors in ruling on a Romero motion. (People v. Myers (1999) 69
Cal.App.4th 305, 310 (Myers).)
B. Analysis
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his
Romero motion “without considering all the relevant factors.” (Bolding and
capitalization omitted.) He argues the court “failed to consider the state’s
interest in maintaining [him] in prison until the age of 67, when the same
punitive purpose could have been served by imposing a Two-Strike sentence
of 14 years.” He also accuses the trial court of ignoring facts in the probation
report, such as that he was in a stable, long-term relationship and had a
supportive family life, and disregarding the remoteness of his prior strike
offenses and his eight years of crime-free living.
Defendant’s arguments fail to show the trial court abused its discretion.
We presume the court considered the relevant factors unless the record
affirmatively demonstrates misunderstanding. (Myers, supra, 69 Cal.App.4th
at p. 310.) The mere fact that the court discussed certain factors “does not
mean that it considered only” those factors. (Ibid.) Defendant fails to point
to anything in the record affirmatively demonstrating the trial court
misunderstood the law. (See People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th
984, 988 [to establish abuse of discretion in sentencing, the appellant “ ‘must
“affirmatively demonstrate that the trial court misunderstood its sentencing
discretion” ’ ”].)
7
Here, the trial court properly considered whether “this defendant is
outside the spirit of the three-strikes law” and found that he is not. For a
trial court to dismiss a strike conviction under section 1385, it must find
extraordinary circumstances; for a reviewing court to find that no reasonable
person “could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit of the three
strikes scheme[, those circumstances] must be even more extraordinary.”
(Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) We cannot say defendant’s
circumstances are “even more extraordinary” (ibid.) such that four of his five
prior strike convictions of arson6 must be dismissed as a matter of law.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Miller, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
Stewart, P. J.
_________________________
Richman, J.
6 It should go without saying that the circumstances that defendant’s
prior strike convictions were for arson and his current offense is arson do not
militate in favor of granting the Romero motion. (See Williams, supra, 17
Cal.4th at p. 163 [“nothing” “favorable” to defendant’s request to dismiss
strikes where the current conviction was for the same offense as the prior
strike convictions; “ ‘the existence of such convictions reveals that [he] had
been taught, through the application of formal sanction, that [such] criminal
conduct was unacceptable—but had failed or refused to learn his lesson’ ”].)
8