Filed 6/25/26 P. v. Amador CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, A173128
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Del Norte County
MICHAEL ENRIQUE AMADOR, Super. Ct. Nos. CRF20239410,
CRF20239457)
Defendant and Appellant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In August and September 2023, the prosecution charged Michael
Enrique Amador in two cases.1 In both, it charged him with burglary of a
vehicle and alleged he had suffered a prior serious or violent felony
conviction. (Pen. Code, §§ 459, 1170.12, subd. (c)(1); undesignated statutory
references are to this code.) In the September complaint, it also charged him
with grand theft, vandalism, and possession of a burglary tool. (Former
§ 466, §§ 487, subd. (a), 594, subd. (a).)
In April and July 2023, Amador smashed the windows of parked cars
and took approximately $1,750 worth of items. In May 2024, Amador pled no
contest to the burglary charges in exchange for dismissal of the remaining
1 We resolve this case by memorandum opinion, including only
necessary facts. (Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., § 8.1; People v. Garcia (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 847, 851.)
1
charges. In March 2025, the trial court sentenced him to 2 years, 8 months
in prison.
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed approximately $928
in restitution payable to the victims for the stolen items pursuant to former
section 1202.4, subdivision (f). It then began to impose a restitution “base
fine” of $370 but ultimately decided to stay the fine because it “would rather
have him, if he is working in the prison system, to be making whatever
payments they take out of his office books to go towards [victim] restitution.”
At the time of sentencing, Amador “was homeless” and had been
“unemployed” “for quite some time.” The court did not impose any financial
obligations for a court operations assessment or a conviction assessment.
On appeal, the parties agree that (1) the abstract of judgment
mistakenly reflects that the trial court imposed financial obligations for court
operations and conviction assessments; (2) we may strike the assessments;
and (3) the abstract erroneously indicates the restitution fines were not
stayed. But they disagree as to the proper remedy for the unstayed
restitution fines. Amador contends we need only amend the abstract of
judgment to reflect they were stayed. But the Attorney General — citing
section 1202.4, subdivision (c) — contends we must remand to the court for it
to state compelling and extraordinary reasons to stay the fines or for it to
order the fines without staying them. Amador has the better argument. The
court did state a compelling reason — that is, that any income he earned
would best be applied towards compensating the victims rather than paying a
fine. (People v. Mercer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 467 [we draw all inferences
in favor of the judgment].) Thus, we agree remand is unnecessary.
2
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The abstract of judgment shall be corrected
to reflect that the trial court stayed the section 1202.4, subdivision (b),
restitution fines, and the financial obligations from the court operations and
conviction assessments shall be struck.
3
_________________________
RODRÍGUEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________
FUJISAKI, Acting P. J.
_________________________
PETROU, J.
A173128; P. v. Amador
4