Filed 8/17/26 P. v. Alspaugh CA4/3
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, G066118
v. (Super. Ct. No. 25HF0897)
LEAH CAROL ALSPAUGH, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Kevin Haskins, Judge. Affirmed.
Richard Jay Moller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Leah Carol Alspaugh appeals from her conviction for
felony petty theft, though her appointed counsel raised no issues. We have
independently reviewed the record, find no arguable issues, and affirm.
FACTS
The Orange County District Attorney charged Alspaugh with one
felony count of petty theft with two or more prior theft convictions. (Pen.
Code §§ 484, subd. (a), 488, 666.1, subd. (a)(1).) The matter proceeded to
sequential trials for the petty theft charge and other, unrelated charges.
Before trial, Alspaugh sought to waive her right to counsel and
represent herself at trial. She filled out a Faretta1 waiver form, indicating she
was aware of various disadvantages to self-representation. But she did not
respond to a question on the form asking what she had been charged with.
And her explanation for why she wanted to represent herself was hard to
follow.2
The trial court advised her that this was unwise and that she
would have to understand the various rules governing a criminal trial. She
said she understood. The court gave her an approximation of the maximum
sentence she was facing. When Alspaugh asked what charges one of the other
cases involved, the court replied that she would get the case numbers if it
granted her request but it would not go through each charge at that time.
1 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
2 Alspaugh stated, “Public Defender did not excuse me from court
states cases vacates. On a traffic stop w/ National Guard could not make A
case was set for jury trial date supervisor say judge hold warrant. Lawyer tell
me no court date. Close to reinstate Bond Lawyer say before 6/8 1030, Bailiff
say not [illegible].”
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The court asked Alspaugh if her decision was voluntary and, when satisfied
that it was, granted her motion to represent herself.
At a hearing before a different judge (Judge M. Marc Kelly), the
court reviewed Alspaugh’s prior Faretta waiver and, believing it was
insufficient, went through the waiver process with her again. The court
required her to fill out a new waiver and, in a colloquy spanning about 26
pages of the reporter’s transcript, went over the completed waiver with
Alspaugh: it ascertained her reasons for wanting to represent herself, advised
her of the pitfalls of self-representation, and verified her understanding of the
different charges and the maximum sentence for each. Alspaugh
acknowledged it was “really stupid” to represent herself but chose to do so. In
accepting her waiver, the court stated she had undergone a court-ordered
mental health evaluation that concluded she did not “currently [ ]present a
major mental illness [or] disorder.”
The case proceeded to trial before yet another judge (Judge Kevin
Haskins). According to the evidence at trial, Alspaugh had entered and slept
in a yacht in the possession of Orange Coast College. The yacht was owned by
an organization affiliated with the college, which was repairing it so it could
be sold. Later, when confronted by an employee outside the yacht, she walked
away with the yacht’s ignition keys.
The jury found Alspaugh guilty of petty theft. The court denied
her motion to reduce her conviction to a misdemeanor and sentenced her to
the low term of 16 months in jail, to run concurrent with the sentence in
another case.
DISCUSSION
After examining the record, Alspaugh’s appointed appellate
counsel filed a brief raising no issues and asking this court to independently
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review the record. (See People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende); Anders
v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738.) We gave Alspaugh 30 days to submit a
supplemental brief raising any argument she wished us to consider. We
received no response. To assist this court with its independent review,
counsel identified the following issue that might arguably support an appeal:
Did Alspaugh knowingly and voluntarily waive her Sixth Amendment right
to counsel under Faretta?
We see no arguable issue. The record establishes that Alspaugh
knowing and voluntarily waived her right to counsel. For a defendant to
knowingly and voluntarily waive their right to counsel, the defendant must
“be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so
that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice
is made with eyes open.’” (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.) The trial court
must rigorously convey “[w]arnings of the pitfalls of proceeding to trial
without counsel.” (Iowa v. Tovar (2004) 541 U.S. 77, 89.) And at least some
authority requires trial courts to ensure the defendant understands the
nature of the charges and the possible penalties. (E.g., People v. Sullivan
(2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 524, 545.)
We review a Faretta waiver de novo and examine the entire
record to determine its validity. (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 205
(Mickel).) The burden is on the defendant to show they did not knowingly
waive their right to counsel. (People v. Sullivan, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at
p. 547.)
The trial court’s supplemental Faretta inquiry was exhaustive
and left no stone unturned in ensuring that Alspaugh’s waiver was knowing
and voluntary. The court advised her of the pitfalls of self-representation at
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length and verified her understanding of the different charges and the
possible penalties. No more was required.
Nor did any mental health issue prevent Alspaugh from
knowingly and voluntarily waiving her right to counsel: according to the trial
court, her mental health evaluation concluded she did not present a major
mental illness. (Cf. Mickel, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 208 [trial court may deny
self-representation where defendant suffers from “severe mental illness such
that he or she is unable to perform the basic tasks necessary to present a
defense”].)
We have also independently examined the record. We have found
no arguable issues. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
SCOTT, J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, ACTING P. J.
SERVINO, J.
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