Filed 7/24/26 P. v. Allbright CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B345738
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24ARCF00421)
v.
JOSEPH ALLBRIGHT,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William L. Sadler, Judge. Affirmed.
Morad Fakhimi, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Megan A. Banke, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
Joseph Allbright appeals from a judgment entered after he
pleaded no contest to, among other charges, possession of
methamphetamine that a police officer saw in plain view inside
Allbright’s truck during a traffic stop. Allbright argues that the
trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence
because the traffic stop was unlawfully prolonged in violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights. Finding no error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
appellant with possession of a controlled substance with a
firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a); count 1),
possession of a firearm by a narcotic addict (Pen. Code, § 29800,
subd. (a)(1); count 2), two counts of possession for sale of
methamphetamine (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378; counts 3 & 5),
and two counts of possession for sale of fentanyl (Health & Saf.
Code, § 11351; counts 4 & 6).
After Allbright was held to answer at a preliminary
hearing, he moved to suppress all evidence obtained through his
detention. The trial court heard the motion at a special hearing.
Los Angeles Police Department Officer Frank Robles was the sole
witness. The trial court admitted Robles’s body-worn video into
evidence. At Allbright’s unopposed request, the trial court also
took judicial notice of excerpts from Robles’s preliminary hearing
testimony.1 Robles testified to the following facts:
1 We disregard Allbright’s citations to preliminary hearing
testimony that the trial court did not judicially notice and that
neither party offered for the trial court’s consideration. (See
People v. Fisher (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 338, 341; People v.
Neighbours (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1115, 1118-1120.)
2
On March 16, 2024, Robles patrolled the area of Bellanca
Avenue, south of Manchester Avenue, in Los Angeles. He knew
the area was a “high narcotics area” where he had made and
assisted in arrests for possession of narcotics, firearms, and
stolen vehicles. He saw a pickup truck parked on the curb with a
driver (later identified as Allbright) seated in the driver’s seat.
He noticed that Allbright’s truck did not have a front license
plate, in violation of Vehicle Code section 5200, subdivision (a).2
Allbright was speaking with another man (Kenneth
Ledete), who was standing next to the truck’s front passenger
door.3 Robles recognized Ledete, whom he had arrested for
possession of methamphetamine for sale on two prior occasions.
He had recovered significant quantities of methamphetamine
from Ledete during both prior arrests. He knew that at least one
of the prior arrests had led to a conviction and he suspected (as
Ledete later confirmed) that Ledete was on probation.
Based on his prior contacts with Ledete and his knowledge
of the area, Robles suspected that Allbright’s and Ledete’s
interaction concerned narcotics. Robles decided to conduct a
“pretextual stop” of Allbright both because the truck was missing
a front license plate (as “the pretext”) and because he intended to
investigate the suspected presence of narcotics.
2 “When two license plates are issued by the department for
use upon a vehicle, they shall be attached to the vehicle for which
they were issued, one in the front and the other in the rear.”
(Veh. Code, § 5200, subd. (a).)
3 Officer Robles recalled that the front passenger door was
open but admitted on cross-examination that his body-worn video
showed the door was closed (with its window partially open).
3
Robles exited his vehicle, approached Allbright’s truck, and
asked Allbright what he was doing there. Allbright said he was
discussing the purchase of a bicycle seat.
Around three minutes into the body-worn video, Robles
ordered Allbright to exit the truck and detained both Allbright
and Ledete next to a fence. Robles searched Ledete’s person and
found no narcotics.4 Robles handcuffed Ledete but not Allbright.
Because Robles was working solo, he summoned and
waited for a backup unit. Around six minutes into the body-worn
video (as the parties agreed), while waiting for backup, Officer
Robles looked into Allbright’s truck from the adjacent sidewalk
and saw methamphetamine in plain view in a cup holder, as well
as aluminum foil and a torch lighter (which he recognized as
paraphernalia often used to ingest fentanyl and other narcotics)
in the area of the center console. Robles described what he saw
to Allbright, who admitted that he had “dope” in the truck.
Around 10 minutes after Allbright exited his truck, and
after backup officers arrived, Robles searched the truck and
recovered the methamphetamine he had seen. He arrested
Allbright.5
4 Allbright’s counsel represented during closing argument
that Officer Robles also searched Allbright’s person. The
appellate record contains no evidence that the alleged search of
Allbright’s person prolonged his detention.
5 Robles and other officers later executed a search warrant
at Allbright’s residence and found a firearm, fentanyl, and
additional methamphetamine. Allbright challenges the legality
of that search only on the ground that it was the fruit of his
initial, allegedly unlawful detention.
4
The trial court denied Allbright’s motion to suppress all
evidence obtained through the detention. The court found
Robles’s testimony was credible. The court concluded that Robles
lawfully detained Allbright based on the truck’s missing front
license plate, notwithstanding that the missing plate was a
pretext for a narcotics investigation, and that Robles’s
observation of methamphetamine in plain view inside the truck
justified his search of the truck.
Allbright pleaded no contest to all counts. The trial court
sentenced Allbright to three years’ imprisonment on count 1,
stayed the terms on all other counts, suspended execution of the
sentence, and placed Allbright on formal probation for two years.
Allbright timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Fourth Amendment principles
“ ‘ “The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling
on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial
court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by
substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so
found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” ’ ” (People
v. Valle (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 195, 200 (Valle).) “ ‘In reviewing
factual determinations for substantial evidence, a reviewing court
should “not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of
witnesses, or resolve evidentiary conflicts.” ’ ” (People v. Helzer
(2024) 15 Cal.5th 622, 646 (Helzer).)
“ ‘[T]he lack of a front license plate has long been
recognized as a legitimate basis for a traffic stop.’ ” (Valle, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 202, quoting People v. Saunders (2006) 38
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Cal.4th 1129, 1136.) “Whether the officer also had additional
reasons for conducting the traffic stop does not eliminate an
otherwise reasonable suspicion that a driver was violating the
law.” (Valle, at p. 203, citing Whren v. U.S. (1996) 517 U.S. 806,
810.) “In other words, ‘[p]retextual stops are tolerated—so long
as the lawful bounds that justify the stop are observed.’ ” (Valle,
at p. 203, quoting People v. Esparza (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1084,
1094 (Esparza).)
“A pretextual stop only ripens into an unlawful detention if
it deviates too far from the proper legal justification, which is to
‘address the traffic violation that warranted the stop’—what the
[United States Supreme] Court has called the ‘mission’ of the
stop—and ‘attend to related safety concerns.’ ” (Esparza, supra,
95 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094, quoting Rodriguez v. United States
(2015) 575 U.S. 348, 354 (Rodriguez).) The “ ‘mission’ ” includes
“ ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop,’ ” such as
“ ‘checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are
outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the
automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.’ ” (Esparza, at
p. 1094, quoting Rodriguez, at p. 355.) “[T]he government’s
officer safety interest stems from the mission of the stop itself.
Traffic stops are ‘especially fraught with danger to police officers,’
[citation], so an officer may need to take certain negligibly
burdensome precautions in order to complete his mission safely.”
(Rodriguez, at p. 356.) For example, safety concerns justify an
officer in ordering the driver to exit the car. (Pennsylvania v.
Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 110-111 & fn. 6; see also People v.
Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 564 [even absent individualized
suspicion, “[o]nce a vehicle has been detained in a valid traffic
stop, police officers may order the driver and passengers out of
6
the car pending completion of the stop without violating the
Fourth Amendment” (italics omitted)].)
“Authority for the seizure . . . ends when tasks tied to the
traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.” (Rodriguez, supra, 575 U.S. at p. 354.) “The seizure
remains lawful only ‘so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not
measurably extend the duration of the stop.’ ” (Id. at p. 355.)
B. Allbright’s detention did not violate his Fourth
Amendment rights.
Allbright challenges the credibility of Officer Robles’s
testimony that the truck’s missing front license plate supplied a
basis (albeit a pretextual one) for Allbright’s detention. The trial
court, however, found Robles credible. We may not reevaluate
credibility. (Helzer, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 646.) Robles’s
observation that the truck was missing a front license plate
supplied “ ‘a legitimate basis for a traffic stop.’ ” (Valle, supra,
105 Cal.App.5th at p. 202.) That the basis was pretextual is
immaterial. (Id. at p. 203.)
Around six minutes into the traffic stop, Robles saw
methamphetamine in plain view inside Allbright’s truck. From
that point, Robles had reasonable suspicion to detain Allbright
for a narcotics investigation. (See People v. Ramirez (2024) 104
Cal.App.5th 315, 328 [officer’s observation of firearm in plain
view inside defendant’s vehicle four minutes into traffic stop
established probable cause to believe defendant was unlawfully
carrying concealed firearm].)
The key question is whether the traffic stop became
unlawfully prolonged in the six minutes between when Robles
initiated the stop and when he saw the methamphetamine in
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plain view. For the reasons explained below, we conclude it did
not.
Allbright cites no evidence or authority suggesting that
Robles should have completed the mission of the traffic stop and
attended to related safety concerns in fewer than six minutes.
Instead, Allbright argues that the traffic stop was “unnecessarily
prolonged ab initio”—apparently meaning regardless of its
duration—because Robles did not mention the missing front
license plate to Allbright or affirmatively investigate the traffic
violation. We disagree.
Esparza, supra, 95 Cal.App.5th 1084, is instructive. In
that case, two police officers stopped the defendant and his three
passengers on the pretextual basis that the windows of the
defendant’s car were tinted in violation of the Vehicle Code (the
officers’ “true interest was in policing gang activity”). (Id. at
pp. 1087-1088.) As the officers approached the car, they
summoned backup, which arrived in three distinct “rounds.” (Id.
at p. 1088.) A detective in the second backup round identified the
car’s occupants as gang members and recommended searching
one passenger because he was “ ‘always strapped.’ ” (Id. at
pp. 1088-1089.) After the final backup round arrived, searches of
that passenger and the defendant uncovered firearms, leading to
the two suspects’ arrests. (Id. at p. 1089.) The appellate court
held that the traffic stop was not unlawfully prolonged because
“the detention lasted a mere seven minutes, during which the
officers proceeded expeditiously consistent with reasonable
concerns for officer safety.” (Id. at p. 1087.) “Any delay that
resulted from [the lead officer’s] decision to wait for backup was
reasonable in light of his justifiable safety concerns.” (Id. at p.
1093.)
8
The defendant argued that because the officers did not
issue him a citation for the tinted windows (the opinion does not
address whether the officers mentioned the tinted windows to the
defendant), the officers’ gang investigation unlawfully “overtook
the lawful mission” of the traffic stop. (Esparza, supra, 95
Cal.App.5th at p. 1098, fn. 13.) The appellate court rejected the
argument, reasoning that the officers presumably would have
cited or warned the defendant for the traffic violation if they had
not discovered evidence that the defendant was guilty of felonies,
and that they could rationally forego such action after making
that discovery. (Ibid.)
Here, similarly, Robles presumably would have cited
Allbright for the truck’s missing front license plate if he had not
seen methamphetamine in plain view inside the truck while
waiting for backup, leading to Allbright’s arrest for a felony. As
the Attorney General argues, Esparza supports a conclusion that
Robles reasonably acted to ensure his safety—and thus did not
unlawfully prolong the stop—throughout the six minutes during
which Robles initiated the stop, ordered Allbright out of the
truck, detained Allbright and Ledete nearby, and saw the
methamphetamine in plain view while waiting for backup. (See
also People v. Vera (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1081, 1087-1088
[detective conducting traffic stop lawfully “acted to ensure his
safety by ordering [driver] out of the car, patting him down, and
asking him to sit on a curb”].)
As noted, the United States Supreme Court “has recognized
that traffic stops are ‘especially fraught with danger to police
officers.’ ” (Arizona v. Johnson (2009) 555 U.S. 323, 330, quoting
Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1047; accord, Rodriguez,
supra, 575 U.S. at p. 356.) “[T]he risk of a violent encounter in a
9
traffic-stop setting ‘stems not from the ordinary reaction of a
motorist stopped for a [traffic] violation, but from the fact that
evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the
stop.’ [Citation.] ‘[T]he motivation of a passenger to employ
violence to prevent apprehension of such a crime . . . is every bit
as great as that of the driver.’ ” (Johnson, at pp. 331-332, italics
added.)
Here, although Ledete (whom Robles recognized from prior
narcotics arrests) was not inside Allbright’s truck when Robles
arrived, Ledete was standing next to the truck’s front passenger
door and speaking with Allbright. Robles had made or assisted in
arrests in the area, including for possession of firearms.
Allbright and Ledete outnumbered Robles. While waiting for
backup, Robles searched and handcuffed Ledete (and allegedly
searched Allbright as well). Based on those facts, the trial court
could reasonably find that Robles’s concern for his safety was
genuine and reasonably supported his decision to wait for backup
before addressing the missing front license plate.
Allbright addresses officer safety only by quoting Knowles
v. Iowa (1998) 525 U.S. 113, 117, for the proposition that “[t]he
threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation . . . is a good
deal less than in the case of a custodial arrest.” Knowles held
that after an Iowa police officer completed a traffic stop and
issued a citation, the officer unlawfully searched the driver’s
vehicle. (Id. at p. 114.) Knowles did not address whether the
stop was unlawfully prolonged. It did, however, recognize that in
the context of routine traffic stops, a concern for officer safety is
“plainly” present. (Id. at p. 117.)
In short, we conclude that Officer Robles did not unlawfully
prolong the traffic stop because he reasonably acted to ensure his
10
safety throughout the six-minute period leading to his
observation of methamphetamine in plain view inside Allbright’s
truck. Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying
Allbright’s motion to suppress.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
M. KIM, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
WEINGART, J.
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