Filed 9/1/26 P. v. Adams CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084606
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(San Diego Super. Ct.
v. No. SCN266226)
XAVIER AKEEM ADAMS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Joan P. Weber, Judge. Affirmed.
Edward Mahler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Assistant Attorney General, A. Natasha
Cortina, Kelley Johnson and Tami Hennick, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Xavier Akeem Adams appeals the order denying his Penal Code1
section 1172.6 petition to vacate his March 2011 conviction for first degree
murder. He claims the trial court erred by assuming that the fact that he
had received weapons training from the Marine Corps essentially obviated
the need to consider fully the evidence that his age of 19 years at the time of
the killing prevented him from forming the mental state required for felony
murder. But our review of the record reveals that the court made no such
assumption and that it fully considered Adams’s age-related evidence.
Because the governing substantial evidence standard of review does not
permit us to reweigh the evidence to reach the conclusion Adams desires,
the order denying his petition must be affirmed.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2009, Raphael Ramey recruited Adams, a fellow active duty Marine,
to confront Charles Williams over his delay in delivering a Chevrolet Impala
he sold to Ramey. Using knives Ramey bought while with Adams the day
before the murder, the men fatally attacked Williams in his repair shop in
August 2009. The assailants were arrested the next day after being observed
getting into the victim’s car, which they took from the shop when they failed
to find the keys to the Impala.
Although Ramey initiated the altercation and was responsible for most
of Williams’s injuries, Adams admitted to stabbing him once in his torso and
once again in the back of his neck. For Adams’s part in the killing, a jury in
March 2011 convicted him of first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and found
true the special circumstances that he committed the murder while engaged
in the commission or attempted commission of (1) a carjacking (§ 190.2, subd.
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
(a)(17)) and (2) a robbery of keys (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).). Jurors also found
true that he used a dangerous or deadly weapon within the meaning of
section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). Adams, who was 19 years old at the time
of the killing, was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole for the
murder conviction plus a one year term for the weapon enhancement. We
affirmed the judgment in December 2012.2 (People v. Adams (Dec. 6, 2012,
D059954) [nonpub. opn.].)
The jury in Adams’s case was instructed on multiple theories of first
degree murder, including felony murder. As this theory then applied, a
person who committed or attempted to commit one or more of certain
enumerated inherently dangerous felonies—including carjacking and robbery
(former § 189)—was guilty of first degree murder if a killing resulted,
regardless of whether the homicide was unintentional or committed by a
codefendant. (People v. Lamoureux (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 241, 247–248.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which became effective on
January 1, 2019, limited the felony murder doctrine to defendants who were
either (1) the actual killers, (2) intended to kill, or (3) were major participants
in one or more inherently dangerous underlying felonies (which still included
carjacking and robbery) and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 3; § 189, subd. (e).)
In addition to modifying some of the requirements for a murder
conviction, the bill also added section 1172.6, which since January 1, 2022
2 Ramey was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole after a
separate jury convicted him of first degree murder and found true the special
circumstances that the murder involved the infliction of torture and that he
personally used a knife in the commission of the crime. (People v. Ramey
(Aug. 31, 2012, D059412) [nonpub. opn.].)
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has allowed a person convicted of felony murder under the old law to petition
the sentencing court for relief on the theory that the conviction could not be
obtained under current law.3 (See Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; § 1172.6, subd.
(a)(3).) Upon a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, the court must
issue an order to show cause and, absent a waiver or stipulation by the
parties, hold a hearing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).) At the hearing, the
People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the petitioner is guilty of
murder under the law as it presently exists; otherwise, the murder conviction
will be vacated and the petitioner will be resentenced “on any remaining
counts in the same manner as if the petitioner had not previously been
sentenced, provided that the new sentence, if any, is not greater than the
initial sentence.” (Id., subd. (d)(1)–(3).)
In July 2023, Adams filed a section 1172.6 petition that prompted the
court to issue an order to show cause. The People argued that Adams would
be guilty of first degree felony murder because there was no reasonable doubt
that he (1) was a major participant in the carjacking and robbery who (2)
displayed a reckless indifference to Williams’s life.4 (§ 189, subd. (e).)
3 Certain other conditions that were met here must also exist, including
that “(1) A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against the
petitioner that allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine,”
and “(2) [t]he petitioner was convicted of first degree or second degree murder
following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the
petitioner could be convicted for first degree or second degree murder.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
4 The court also found that Adams was guilty of second degree implied
malice murder under current law. Because the court focused mainly on
whether Adams could be guilty of felony murder—as have the parties on
appeal—we limit our discussion to that theory.
4
Adams countered that he could not have known Ramey’s plan beforehand,
could not have stopped the attack once it began, and he was there merely to
have his codefendant’s “back.”
Adams offered the additional argument that his age prevented him
from forming the mental state of reckless indifference. He based his
contention on a “brief summary of research on adolescent development”
prepared by Dr. Kristina J. Malek for his case. According to Malek,
“adolescents are attracted to immediate rewards, have more difficulty
assessing the risks and consequences of their behavior, … are less able to
regulate their emotions in stressful situations[,] tend to rely more on their
peers[,] and have difficulty resisting peer influence.” Although Malek neither
interviewed Adams nor offered any opinions as to his case, he contended
her summary established that, at 19 years old, he could not have been
“subjectively aware” his actions on the day of the murder embodied a reckless
indifference to human life.
The court denied Adams’s petition after finding that the People had
established the elements of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The
court recognized that Ramey was not always clear about his intentions
toward Williams leading up to the altercation.5 But, the court reasoned,
Adams knew immediately before they entered the shop on the day of the
5 For example, at various times, Ramey told Adams that he wanted to
“ ‘get’ ” and “ ‘jack’ ” Williams, that he wanted to “shoot him,” and that there
were going to be “ ‘some problems’ ” if the car was not ready on time. The day
before the murder, Ramey explained they needed knives because Williams
could call the police if they just beat him up. On the day of the murder,
Ramey stated that Williams would not be able to walk out the door if he did
not get what he wanted. And right before the fatal altercation, Ramey told
Adams, “[L]et’s go in and get him.”
5
murder that things were going to “get serious” and “ugly” because he and
Ramey were “armed with knives”; Ramey was “really mad”; and, while
standing outside just before the fatal confrontation, Ramey said that the
victim was “not going to be able to walk out this door ... anymore.” The court
went on:
“What does Mr. Adams do? … He shuts the door. He
stands at the door and he witnesses Ramey repeatedly
stabbing the victim. The victim is fighting for his life.
The victim at one point tries to stand up off the floor. Mr.
Adams, what does he do? He runs over behind the victim
and stabs his knife in the victim’s neck pushing that blade
into his head. He also stabs him in the back. … So there’s
just no question that he had an extremely important role in
being a guard at the door and then assisting with the
stabbing.”
In reaching this conclusion, the court referred to Dr. Malek’s report
and “acknowledge[d] that Mr. Adams was 19, was young, was impulsive ... .”
But the court also believed “there were too many opportunities to act here.
Too many times when he realized this was going terribly wrong, where
morally he should have done something under these circumstances as
opposed to getting involved in the stabbing.”
Throughout the hearing, both Adams’s attorney and the court referred
to the fact that the defendant was an active duty Marine at the time of the
killing. At one point, the court asked, “[w]hat impact does the fact that he’s a
trained Marine have on this? For me, it was a substantial factor that unlike
most 19-year-old men[,] he had been trained in weapons.” Adams’s attorney
conceded that his client received “weapons” training, without elaborating,
and pivoted to arguing that the salient point about this military service was
that it caused Adams, who enlisted in the Marine Corps a year before the
killing, to feel a misplaced sense of loyalty toward another Marine despite
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knowing him for just “a couple [of] months.” The court observed a few more
times that Adams was a “trained Marine” in the context of either having
experience with weapons or in noting that this fact made the murder even
more “tragic.”
DISCUSSION
“Since 2021, ‘Courts of Appeal have recognized that “a defendant’s
youth is a relevant factor in determining whether the defendant acted with
reckless indifference to human life” ’ ” (People v. Diaz (2026) 118 Cal.App.5th
545, 558), and that a 19 year old defendant may be considered a “youthful
offender” (see People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994, 1007). Yet,
according to Adams, the trial court “effectively” refused to consider
Dr. Malek’s evidence about the impulsivity and other psychological
characteristics of adolescence because it assumed the weapons training
he received in the Marine Corps “somehow overcomes or counteracts the
fact that from a neurogenetic perspective an adolescent brain ... is not fully
developed.” More specifically, he argues that his military training was not
a permissible factor for the court to consider for any purpose, much less to
avoid fully considering the impact of his age at the time of the offense.
An order denying a section 1176.2 petition is reviewed for substantial
evidence. (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951; accord People v.
Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 480 [“Whether Oliver was a major
participant in the underlying felonies who acted with reckless indifference to
human life is predominantly a factual question reviewable for substantial
evidence”].) Under this standard, we will uphold a challenged finding when
it is supported by “ ‘evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value’ ”
and that, when viewed “in the light most favorable to the prosecution,”
supports the conclusion that “ ‘any rational trier of fact could have found
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the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v.
Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715.) We will do so even when the evidence
also supports a different conclusion, which means we neither reweigh the
evidence nor resolve evidentiary conflicts. (People v. Helzer (2024) 15 Cal.5th
622, 646 (Helzer).)
We start with Adams’s contention that his Marine Corps weapons
training was not a valid factor for the court to consider in any context.6
Adams had been an active duty Marine for a year at the time of the killing
and, according to his counsel’s response to a question from the court, had in
fact received weapons instruction as part of his training. The court inferred
that this instruction provided Adams with knowledge about how knives could
be used to inflict serious and potentially fatal injuries. For example, the
court observed that Adams stabbed Williams in “critical parts of [his] body,
his side and [the back of] his neck ... [¶] Not a leg, not an arm,” and that
“[w]hen you go into a situation like this armed with knives and you’re trained
Marines, you are aware that weapons can be used.” These inferences—which
have nothing to do with Adams’s age or maturity—were reasonable and
relevant to the court’s analysis of whether he displayed a reckless
indifference to Williams’s life. (People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 618
(Clark) [“knowledge of weapons, and use and number of weapons” are
relevant to this inquiry (capitalization omitted)].)
6 The People contend that Adams’s argument about these remarks was
forfeited for his failure to object to them during the resentencing petition.
While we tend to agree, we exercise our discretion to consider the merits of
Adams’s argument, which the People fully addressed. (In re Sheena K. (2007)
40 Cal.4th 875, 887, fn. 7.)
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To the extent the court implicitly made an unsupported assumption
about the scope of Adams’s weapons training, any error was harmless
because there is no “reasonable probability” that it impacted the court’s
decision in light of the strength of the trial evidence. (People v. Pittman
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 400, 417–418, citing, inter alia, People v. Watson (1956)
46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Simply put, whether or not Adams was a Marine did not
change the highly relevant and undisputed facts that he personally stabbed
Williams twice during a lengthy confrontation, that he had multiple
opportunities to back out of or attempt to stop the attack, and that he
neither rendered aid to Williams nor called for help after fleeing the scene.
(Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 619–623 [“opportunities to restrain the crime
and/or aid the victim,” “duration of the felony,” and defendant’s “efforts to
minimize the risk of violence during the felony” are relevant considerations
(some capitalizations omitted)].)
Finally, Adams’s assertion that the court effectively failed to consider
his age and lack of maturity is refuted by the judge’s recognition that
Dr. Malek’s summary suggested he was young and impulsive. The court’s
statement about Malek immediately followed extensive argument on this
point, contradicting any suggestion that the court gave this evidence short
shrift. But more to the point, “[t]he fact of youth cannot overwhelm all other
factors” that go into determining whether a person is guilty of felony murder.
(People v. Mitchell (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 575, 595.) Here, the court
considered all the relevant evidence—some of which supported Adams’s
arguments and some of which did not—in reaching its ultimate conclusion
that Adams acted with reckless indifference to human life. The applicable
standard of review does not permit us to reweigh that evidence to tip the
balance in Adams’s favor. (Helzer, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 646.)
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DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:
MCCONNELL, P. J.
CASTILLO, J.
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