Filed 10/27/26 P. v. Adams CA2/5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B340626
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA511811)
v.
ROELING ADAMS,
Defendant and
Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the
County of Los Angeles, Kevin P. Stennis, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with directions.
Jeffery Manning-Cartwright, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Jason Tran and Louis W. Karlin,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
A jury found defendant Roeling Adams guilty of committing
four armed robberies. On appeal, he contends he received
ineffective assistance of counsel during pretrial competency
proceedings when his attorneys obtained and referenced a report
finding him incompetent, but failed to submit it to the court. He
also contends the trial court erred during sentencing by failing to
declare a doubt as to his competency and suspend proceedings.
And, he argues the sentencing minute order and abstract of
judgment must be corrected to reflect the court’s waiver of certain
fines and fees. We will order the minute order and abstract of
judgment corrected to reflect that the trial court waived fines and
fees. As so modified, we affirm the judgment.
II. BACKGROUND1
A. Complaint and Preliminary Hearing
On January 23, 2023, the Los Angeles County District
Attorney filed an amended complaint charging defendant with
four counts of second degree robbery in violation of Penal Code
1 Because this appeal involves only defendant’s competency
to stand trial and sentencing issues, we do not include a
summary of the facts underlying his convictions. As his opening
brief concedes, victims and eyewitnesses identified defendant as
the perpetrator of the armed robberies that occurred at a 7-
Eleven store on December 25, 2022, a Circle K store on
December 26, 2022, and a Union Oil gas station on December 28,
2022, and their testimony was corroborated by surveillance video
evidence.
2
section 211.2 The amended complaint alleged as to each count
that defendant personally used a firearm within the meaning of
section 12022.5, subdivision (a) and also alleged that he had
suffered two prior strike convictions within the meaning of
sections 667, subdivisions (a) through (d) and 1170.12,
subdivisions (b) through (i).
On January 23, 2023, defendant filed a waiver of his right
to counsel and represented himself at the preliminary hearing.
Among other things, he cross-examined three of the witnesses to
the robberies concerning their recollection of the perpetrator’s
appearance and objected, unsuccessfully, to the detective’s
reliance on the surveillance video to provide identification
testimony. The trial court found sufficient cause to believe that
the allegations in the amended complaint were true.3
B. First Declaration of Doubt and Competency Finding
At the November 3, 2023, pretrial hearing—Judge Kevin P.
Stennis presiding—defendant again represented himself. The
court made the following observations and rulings on defendant’s
mental competency: “The court notes [defendant] appears to be
in a somewhat catatonic state. He’s half dressed. He won’t
answer or look up. Based on all of that, the court is declaring a
doubt. A doubt having arisen as to the mental competence of the
defendant, criminal proceedings are suspended pursuant to
2 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
3 The complaint was then superseded by an information
upon which defendant was arraigned.
3
[section] 1368. He’s ordered transferred to the mental health
court for a hearing on November [17, 2023].”
At the November 17, 2023, hearing in the mental health
court—Judge Maria Cavalluzzi presiding—the court considered a
report submitted by Jacob Pourat, M.D., which observed that
“defendant’s claimed symptoms seem possibly exaggerated and
he did not appear to put much effort into his responses” but
recommended that, “[d]ue to his symptoms being unclear and the
seriousness of his charges,” a “‘long report’ of competency” be
prepared. (Boldface omitted.) The court appointed Kory J.
Knapke, M.D., a board-certified forensic psychiatrist, to examine
defendant and prepare “a report on his current mental status”
and set a hearing for December 15, 2023, pursuant to section
1368.
On December 14, 2023, Dr. Knapke examined plaintiff and,
in his report signed the next day, he opined: “In my opinion, …
defendant is malingering. For example, at the beginning of my
interview, before I even asked him any specific questions, he was
insistent to tell me that he sees things and hears things. He
appeared very eager to endorse almost every symptom that I
asked him about. … [¶] Clearly, based on … defendant’s claim of
these visual hallucinations and his quick endorsement of bogus
psychotic symptoms, it is exceedingly clear during this interview
that [defendant] is feigning psychiatric symptoms.” Dr. Knapke
concluded: “I believe … defendant is feigning memory loss and in
fact does remember and know what he is being charged with, as
well as having an understanding regarding courtroom
proceedings. It should also be known that this defendant was
going pro per earlier in his case. I believe [he] understands the
charges and proceedings against him and has the capacity to
4
rationally assist his attorney if he chooses to do so. [¶] …
[D]efendant is competent to stand trial.”
At the December 15, 2023, competency hearing before
Judge Cavalluzzi, defendant was represented by counsel, and the
parties submitted on Dr. Knapke’s report. Based on the report,
the court found defendant competent to stand trial, reinstated
the criminal proceedings, and transferred the matter back to the
criminal court.
C. Second Declaration of Doubt and Competency Finding
At the next hearing in criminal court on December 22,
2023—Judge Yvette Verastegui presiding—the court addressed
defendant, who was representing himself, to confirm its
understanding that he wanted the court to appoint the public
defender’s office to represent him, but he failed to respond. The
assigned public defender4 asked for a recess to confer with
defendant and, when the hearing resumed, the court provided the
following background: “[Defendant] was returned … from the
mental health court, indicating that he was competent. [This]
court was going to appoint a doctor to evaluate [defendant] to
determine whether or not he was competent to represent himself.
And in fact, had the public defender basically at the ready so that
the court could appoint the public defender while the court
waited for the [Evidence Code section] 730 evaluation.”
Defendant’s appointed counsel informed the court that “in
our conversations in lockup, [defendant] was giving delusional
4 A different deputy public defender from the one who
represented defendant in mental health court represented
defendant at this hearing.
5
ideations, as well as he did not understand the nature of the
proceedings against him. Therefore, he’s unable to assist me in
his defense presently.”
The court then declared a doubt as to defendant’s
competence pursuant to section 1368, suspended the criminal
proceedings, and transferred the matter back to the mental
health court for a hearing on January 5, 2024, explaining: “This
is my issue and concern. Because we have had [defendant]
before. My understanding is that he has been able to
communicate with my bailiff, and has been oriented through
time, place, and has had logical conversations. When he comes
out to the court, he does not communicate. And I’m not sure if
it’s due to his mental health issues or if it’s something else. So I
am absolutely asking for a long report so that the court can make
a determination.”
On January 5, 2024, David Rad, M.D., interviewed
defendant, and his report to the mental health court on that date
concluded: “In summary, although these initial observation
significantly raise concern for a feigned presentation, the
presence of a genuine mental disorder cannot be ruled out in such
a short evaluation. A more [thorough] evaluation with access to
additional information is therefore recommended.”
At the hearing that same day in the mental health court—
Judge Cavalluzzi presiding—defendant was represented by a new
appointed counsel, who informed the court that “we received a
report from Dr. [Rad]. It was inconclusive, but I spoke with him.
This is a referral by the judge in the criminal court over the
defense’s objection.[5] We have a long report from Dr. Knapke,
5 As we describe above, defense counsel did not object to the
referral at the time it was made.
6
dated [December 15, 2023], that finds [defendant] competent.”
The court responded, “We have a report today from Dr. David
[Rad], but we also have a previous report from Dr. Knapke. [¶]
Based upon that report, the court finds that [defendant] is
competent. Criminal proceedings are reinstated, and he’ll be
ordered to appear in Department 124 of the Foltz courthouse on
January 8, 2024.”
D. Third Declaration of Doubt and Competency Finding
At the hearing in the criminal court on January 8, 2024—
Judge Stennis presiding—different appointed counsel informed
the court that he believed, based on information from the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, that defendant had
refused to leave his cell that morning and was not in court. The
court continued the matter to January 10, 2024, and then had the
following exchange with defense counsel: “The Court: … And
he’s ordered out. And are you familiar with this case? [¶]
[Defense Counsel]: Barely. It landed on my desk this morning.
[¶] The Court: The last time I had him in court I remember he
wouldn’t respond to anything. I couldn’t get him to speak or do
anything. So I declared a doubt and they returned him and I
guess they sent him back when I was on vacation and Judge
Verastegui declared a doubt and he’s back again. [¶] [Defense
Counsel]: Got you. [¶] The Court: So you might—I don’t know.
[¶] [Defense Counsel]: Okay. I’ll see what I can do.”
At the next hearing in criminal court before Judge Stennis
on January 31, 2024, defendant’s appointed counsel reported that
he “had [George R.] Elias[, M.D.,] visit [defendant] at his jail cell
and write [an Evidence Code section] 730 evaluation, and [the]
doctor concluded that [defendant was] not competent to stand
7
trial.”6 Counsel requested that the matter be sent back to the
mental health court and represented that he would “send a copy
of Dr. Elias’s report to the attorney there.” The court noted that
defendant had “been there a couple of times” and recounted that
“when he’s been to [this] court, he’s been unresponsive. He’s not
even lifted his head up.” When the court asked defense counsel
to “reach out to whoever will represent him from your office and
explain what is going on here,” defense counsel agreed, and the
court again declared a doubt pursuant to section 1368, suspended
criminal proceedings, and transferred the matter to the mental
health court for a hearing on February 14, 2024.
At the hearing on February 14, 2024, before Judge
Cavalluzzi in mental health court, defendant was represented by
a new deputy public defender. The court granted the
prosecution’s request for the appointment of Dr. Knapke to
conduct a second evaluation of defendant and prepare a new
report on his competence.
On March 15, 2024, Dr. Knapke interviewed defendant and
then prepared a new report dated March 18, 2024, in which he
noted that, in addition to his in-person evaluation of defendant,
he “reviewed the basic discovery for the underlying offense, as
well as voluminous jail mental health records.” Dr. Knapke
concluded defendant was “currently malingering,” explaining:
“[He] has no objective clinical history of psychotic symptoms, but
was eager to endorse almost every psychotic symptom I
questioned him about, and he appeared to be working very hard
at trying to convince me that he is psychotic. For example, he
claimed during this interview that he believed there was an
6 Defense counsel did not file Dr. Elias’s report with the
court.
8
anaconda snake around his neck at the time of this interview,
and he also claimed he sees demons and rats and snakes in his
cell. He also claimed he sees angels in his cell in the form of
humans. [¶] Visual hallucinations are very rare in individuals
suffering from chronic psychotic disorders. In addition,
individuals with diagnoses such as Schizophrenia or
Schizoaffective Disorder[,] for example[,] usually have long
histories of psychiatric hospitalizations and long histories of
being treated with antipsychotic medications. It appears that . . .
defendant’s only psychiatric history is comprised of depressive
symptoms and a history of suicide attempts while in state
prison.”
According to Dr. Knapke, his conclusions that defendant
was currently malingering and had “no objective clinical history
of psychotic symptoms” were corroborated by the fact that
defendant “consistently refus[ed] his psychotropic medications
… .” Based on Dr. Knapke’s experience, inmates who feign
mental illness “frequently refuse their antipsychotic medication
because it is much too sedating … .” He also observed that
defendant’s “thought processes were logical, linear, and coherent.
Even though he claimed he was hallucinating at the time of this
interview, he was joking around …, laughing at times, and
appeared very comfortable with the interview process. He was
not distressed or agitated in any way, nor was he responding to
any internal stimuli.” Dr. Knapke added that the reports of
defendant’s “neat and clean” appearance were inconsistent with
the appearance of “[i]ndividuals who suffer from untreated
psychosis” who present “disheveled … and rarely shower or take
care of their personal surroundings.”
9
Dr. Knapke concluded: “Because I believe [defendant] is
malingering, I believe that he understands the charges and
proceedings against him. He had no difficulty cooperating with
me in a rational manner throughout my interview, but would
occasionally sprinkle in a delusional comment, even though it
appeared to be contrived and exaggerated. … [¶] I believe …
defendant is competent to stand trial. There is a lack of objective
clinical evidence that [defendant] suffers from any psychotic
illness.”
At the continued competency hearing before Judge
Cavalluzzi on March 20, 2024, a new appointed counsel appeared
on defendant’s behalf and submitted on Dr. Knapke’s second
report. Following the prosecutor’s submission on the report, the
court found, based on Dr. Knapke’s second report, that defendant
was competent to stand trial, reinstated criminal proceedings,
and transferred the matter back to the criminal court.
E. Fourth Declaration of Doubt and Final Competency Finding
At the outset of the next hearing in criminal court before
Judge Stennis on April 24, 2024, defendant’s appointed counsel
advised, “[Defendant] will not speak to me or give an indication
really that he hears me.” The trial court then addressed
defendant: “You can keep your head down and ignore me. I can’t
do anything about that, but if you … won’t communicate with the
court, if you won’t communicate with the attorney, we’re just
going to waste more time by me sending you back to
mental[ ]health court. Most likely they are going to give you the
same doctor. [¶] If I do that now, I’m going to request that
[defendant] be evaluated by another doctor, and I’m going to
make a record that every time we bring you to court after your
10
refusals, you refuse to even look up and acknowledge anyone, but
I can’t have your attorney go to trial … if you’re acting in this
state. I couldn’t even put you in front after [sic] a jury in this
state.” Defendant’s counsel responded by reminding the court
that defendant had previously been evaluated by Dr. Elias and
was found incompetent to stand trial.
The trial court again addressed defendant, advising, “I
cannot in good faith as a bench officer, … whether you’re
malingering or not, I cannot put you in front of a jury because
most likely the result is not going to be good, and it’s going to be a
whole list of appellate issues.” The court therefore declared a
doubt, suspended criminal proceedings, and transferred the
matter to the mental health court with an order requiring that
defendant “be evaluated by someone other than Dr. Knapke … .”
Sharon L. Guo, M.D., was appointed pursuant to section
1368 to evaluate defendant and she interviewed him in lock-up
on May 7, 2024, noting that he was under “suspicion of feigning.”
She reported the following: “He was slightly unkempt. There
were no obvious signs of mental illness (e.g., bizarre behavior,
[hypervigilance], talking to himself, internal preoccupation). His
exam was significant for selective mutism (does not speak but
has the ability to speak). He was not selectively mute due to lack
of understanding. Nonverbal responses indicated he understood
me. For example, I asked to see his wristband to confirm his
name, he made eye contact, then he showed it to me. … I asked
whether he would speak to me. He just looked down at the
table.”
Dr. Guo concluded that “defendant [did] not have
symptoms of a mental disorder that would impair his
competency-related abilities. Based on the available data, …
11
defendant [was] unwilling to cooperate, not unable to cooperate.”
She therefore found that he was “competent in that he … [was]
presently able to understand the nature and purpose of the
proceedings against him … and to conduct or assist in his …
defense in a rational manner.”
At the May 7, 2024, mental competency hearing before
Judge Cavalluzzi, defendant was represented by a new appointed
counsel who waived defendant’s appearance and submitted on
Dr. Guo’s report. Based on Dr. Guo’s report, the court found
defendant competent to stand trial, reinstated criminal
proceedings, and transferred the matter to the criminal court. In
response to the prosecutor’s request for instructions to the trial
court not to send the matter back to the mental health court
absent a change of circumstances, the court stated, “I’ve tried to
be specific about what the situation is. … They’ve sent him back
a couple of times already, and we keep going through this. … I’ll
put another note for the judge. I don’t know if the judge is
looking, though, because I don’t see the other judge having
written any notes; so I don’t know if they’re looking at my notes.”
At the next hearing before Judge Stennis in the criminal
court on May 8, 2024, defendant was present in court and
represented by appointed counsel. The court noted that it had
“requested that … the mental[ ]health court[] assign another
doctor to look at [defendant]. They did. She sent him back. They
believe he’s faking his mental condition.” The court then stated:
“At this point, [defendant], I’m addressing this to you, I cannot
send it back. So if he’s not willing to waive time or acknowledge
the court, I have to just trail it within the period, set it for trial.
[Defendant], what I will do, I will make a long record before I
send it to Department 100 on why I’m … setting it for trial, why I
12
cannot return him to mental[ ]health court. I’m not a doctor. I
have to go by their ruling, their findings … . [¶] And,
[defendant], it’s not in your best interest to act in this condition
in front of a jury, but obviously that’s your choice. And [your
attorney], will just have to do his best by looking at police
reports, using his professional experience to cross-examine and
present the best defense he can.”
F. Trial
On June 20, 2024, trial commenced with Judge Stennis
presiding over jury selection. During a break in jury selection,
the trial court returned to the issue of defendant’s competency
and marked as exhibits Dr. Knapke’s March 15, 2024, second
report and Dr. Guo’s May 7, 2024, report. The court observed,
among other things, that it had referred defendant to the mental
health court numerous times and that defendant “was self-
represented during the preliminary hearing, and it appeared he
had no problems at the preliminary hearing asking questions on
cross[-examination] in an intelligent manner.”
Defendant’s trial counsel then addressed defendant’s
competency and specifically referenced Dr. Elias’s report as
follows: “I got him evaluated by Dr. Elias who did an interview
with him at his jail cell at, I believe, Twin Towers, and he found
that he was not competent. And he indicated in his report, which
I provided to the mental health[ ]court attorneys, that he was
visited at the cell by the doctor at the request of the deputies due
to behavioral concerns. They indicated that … defendant had
been saving his urine in drink cartons and was up all night
pacing back and forth in his cell not taking medication.” Counsel
then complained about his ability to prepare for trial given
13
defendant’s refusal to communicate with him, stating, “I’m not
really ready … it’s difficult when you have a client who you’re not
able to communicate with. I don’t think I have an option at this
point … . [The] mental[ ]health court doesn’t want him returned
there.”
The trial court then engaged in the following brief exchange
with defense counsel: “The Court: Right. They said in their
notes ‘do not return him.’ [¶] [Defense Counsel]: So here we are.
[¶] The Court: I don’t disagree with you, [counsel], but like you,
I’m not a mental[ ]health expert or a doctor. And since he won’t
waive time, we’re here. So ...[.] [¶] [Defense Counsel]: Thank
you. [¶] The Court: Okay.”
At that point, defendant addressed the trial court, stating,
“… Your Honor, I want to exercise my Faretta[7] rights, my
Faretta rights. The court responded, “You’re now speaking.
You’re now looking at the court speaking. [¶] … [¶] … [T]hat
request at this point is not timely. It’s respectfully denied.
Defendant replied, “Can you give me an explanation why my
constitutional right are [sic] being denied?”
The trial court proceeded to question defendant to ensure
his readiness for trial, advised him to fill out a Faretta waiver
form over the lunch break, and indicated that it would take the
matter up after the break and likely grant the request. Following
the break, the court admonished defendant concerning the
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, reviewed his
completed Faretta form, ensuring that he had initialed it, and
granted his request to proceed as a self-represented litigant.
The trial court advised the jury of defendant’s decision to
represent himself, proceeded with jury selection—during which
7 Faretta v. California (1974) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta).
14
defendant exercised peremptory challenges—and empaneled the
jury.
During trial, as he did at the preliminary hearing,
defendant cross-examined three of the eyewitnesses who had
identified him as the perpetrator. He also cross-examined the
detective who testified about the surveillance video from the
Union Oil gas station; the officer who participated in his
apprehension at the 7-Eleven store; and the officer who gave
identification testimony based on surveillance videos and
photographs from the crime scenes.
Defendant, who elected not to testify, then made an
unsuccessful motion to dismiss under section 1118, discussed jury
instructions with the trial court and prosecutor, and stipulated to
allowing the court to determine the truth of the prior strike
allegations.
During closing argument, defendant argued that “an officer
may not make an identification based solely on his or her
observation of surveillance videotape unless he has … knowledge
of … [the suspect’s identity] prior to viewing that tape;” asserted
that none of the eyewitnesses had positively identified him from
the six-pack photo lineups; discussed the presumption of
innocence and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard; and
concluded that he must be “exonerated of all charges.”8
Following deliberations, the jury found defendant guilty on
all four robbery counts and found the personal use of a firearm
8 The reporter’s transcript erroneous identifies the speaker
during closing argument as Deputy Tracy but the trial court
identified the speaker as “Mr. Adams” and the substance of the
argument demonstrates that defendant delivered the closing
argument.
15
allegations true. The trial court then advised defendant that he
should allow the public defender to represent him during
sentencing, reminding him that the court was going to strike his
older prior strike and sentence him as a “one-striker.” Defendant
agreed, and the court reappointed counsel to represent defendant
for purposes of sentencing.
G. Sentencing Hearing
In defendant’s sentencing memorandum, counsel argued
that defendant was ineffective in representing himself and stated
that “we have all been party to a faux trial of a sick man and I
hope the court considers that and extends its mercy when
crafting a sentencing.” Counsel attached as an exhibit the
January 20, 2024, three-and-a-half-page report from Dr. Elias, a
forensic psychiatrist, which concluded that defendant was
incompetent “to stand trial due to both a lack of understanding of
the nature of the proceedings against him, and an inability to
assist counsel in a rational manner.” According to Dr. Elias,
“[defendant] meets DSM-5 Diagnostic Criteria for Unspecified
Bipolar Spectrum Disorder. His records indicate that he had
previously been experiencing depressive symptoms and was being
prescribed Prozac. He also had a history of suicide attempts
while in prison. He described to [Jane Chung, M.D.,] that he had
experienced manic symptoms of elevated and irritable mood, loss
of sleep, agitation, impulsive spending, flight of ideas, pressured
speech, and distractibility in the past. More recently, there
appears to have been some acute change in his behavior, as he
began endorsing paranoid delusions of being ‘sacrificed’. His
medications were subsequently switched from Prozac to Seroquel
because of this. However, he has been medication noncompliant.
16
On direct observation, he remains delusional, distractible, and
impaired in his flow of thought. Given the ostensibly episodic
nature of his presentation and history of depressive and manic
symptoms, it is more likely that his current psychotic symptoms
are related to an underlying mood disorder, rather than a chronic
psychotic disorder. However, little is known about the
longitudinal course of these symptoms.”
The prosecution’s sentencing memorandum recommended a
sentence of 20 years.
At the sentencing hearing, the parties submitted on their
sentencing memoranda, and the trial court imposed an aggregate
10-year sentence, comprised of a three-year middle term sentence
on count 1,9 plus a four-year firearm enhancement, and one
additional year for each of the three remaining counts. The court
also struck the firearm enhancements for counts 2 through 4.
The trial court ordered that defendant “pay a [$400]
restitution fine; a parole revocation fine in the same amount.
That’s stayed pending any future violation of parole; a [$30] court
facilities assessment; a [$40] court operations fee.” But the court
then stated that it would “waive the [$30, $40, and $400] fines
and fees.”
9 Following the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence,
the prosecutor asked if the court intended to make a record about
the strike allegations, and the court responded, “Well, the People
were not proceeding on the strikes. If they were, based on the
sentencing memo submitted by the defense and the age of the
strikes and the doctor’s report, the court would have struck the
strikes pursuant to [People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1997) 13
Cal. 4th 497].”
17
H. Minute Order and Abstract
The August 28, 2025, sentencing minute order provided,
“The Court finds good cause to waive the [$400] restitution fine,
the [$30] court facilities assessment and the [$40] court
operations assessment.” It did not mention the $400 parole
revocation fine.
The September 6, 2024, abstract of judgment did not reflect
that any fines or fees were assessed, but stated, “The court finds
good cause to waive the [$400] restitution fine, the [$30] court
facilities assessment and the [$40] court operations assessment.”
(Capitalized and bolded emphasis omitted.) It did not mention
the $400 parole revocation fine.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of
counsel when his attorneys failed to submit the report prepared
by Dr. Elias to the courts during the competency proceedings.
According to defendant, “[t]here was a reasonable probability
that if the Elias report had ever been used as a basis for claiming
during a competency hearing that [defendant] was incompetent,
he would have been so found, and committed to a state hospital.
His attorneys’ inexplicable failure deprived him of this chance
and violated his right to effective counsel under the Sixth and
14th Amendments.”
18
1. Legal Principles
A criminal defendant’s right to counsel includes the right to
effective legal assistance. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986,
1009.) A defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel
must show (1) his counsel’s “performance was deficient, in that it
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under
prevailing professional norms,” and (2) “resulting prejudice, i.e., a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient
performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have been
different.” (Ibid.) “Defendant ... bears the burden of establishing
constitutionally inadequate assistance of counsel.” (People v.
Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1211.)
“‘[A] court need not determine whether counsel’s
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice
suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies
… . If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often
be so, that course should be followed.’ (Strickland v. Washington
(1984) 466 U.S. 688, 697.)” (People v. Carrasco (2014) 59 Cal.4th
924, 982.)
2. Analysis
For purposes of our analysis, we will assume, without
deciding, that the failure of defendant’s attorneys to submit
Dr. Elias’s report for consideration during the competency
proceedings fell outside the wide range of professional
19
competence10 and therefore consider only whether there was a
reasonable probability that, but for his attorneys’ failure to
submit the report, the outcome of those proceedings would have
been different.
Between the January 8, 2024, hearing before Judge Stennis
and the January 31, 2024, hearing in that same court,
defendant’s counsel retained Dr. Elias, a forensic psychiatrist, to
evaluate defendant and prepare a report. Dr. Elias’s report
concluded that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. At the
January 31 hearing, counsel informed the trial court about
Dr. Elias’s conclusion and requested that the court declare a
doubt and send the matter back to the mental health court. The
court accepted counsel’s representation about Dr. Elias’s report,
declared a doubt, and returned the matter to the mental health
court for further competency proceedings. Thus, the submission
10 In his reply brief and at oral argument, defendant
emphasized that it was the repeated failures by each of his
appointed counsel to submit the report itself and argue for an
incompetence finding based on it—at every hearing that followed
the January 20, 2024, Elias report—that constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel. To the extent this is a new contention not
specifically addressed in the opening brief, we would not consider
it as defendant raised it for the first time in reply and at oral
argument. (Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern California,
Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 971, 997;
Champir, LLC v. Fairbanks Ranch Assn. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th
583, 591, fn. 3; People v. Dixon (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 985, 996.)
But even if we considered the contention and further
assumed, without deciding, that such repeated failures
constituted deficient performance, we would nevertheless
conclude that defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s conduct,
based on the reasoning set forth below.
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of the report to Judge Stennis at that hearing would not have
resulted in a better outcome as defendant obtained all the relief
to which he was entitled even without the details of the report.
At the ensuing February 14, 2024, hearing in the mental
health court, the prosecutor asked the court to appoint
Dr. Knapke to reevaluate defendant’s competence and prepare a
second report. The court agreed, arguably granting defendant all
the relief to which he would have been entitled at that point, that
is, a reevaluation of his competency. Although the record does
not reflect whether Judge Cavalluzzi was aware of the existence
of Dr. Elias’s report, it is nevertheless speculative to assert that
the submission of the report at that point would have resulted in
a different outcome, or that the judge would have followed the
recommendation of Dr. Elias, without first seeking another
evaluation. Even without the report, the court concluded that a
reevaluation was warranted and provided defendant with that
relief.
And, once Dr. Knapke reevaluated defendant in March
2024 and submitted his report to the mental health court,
Dr. Elias’s report was effectively superseded by the more recent
information Dr. Knapke obtained during his evaluation. Thus,
we disagree with defendant’s contention that it was reasonably
probable that the mental health court would have ignored the
two detailed reports by Dr. Knapke and the shorter reports of
Drs. Pourat and Rad, and instead found that defendant was
incompetent to stand trial based on the details set forth in Dr.
Elias’s report.
In any event, at the May 7, 2024, hearing in the mental
health court, defendant ultimately received all the relief from
that court to which he would have been entitled had Dr. Elias’s
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report been previously submitted. At the hearing that day, Judge
Cavalluzzi—after following Judge Stennis’s directive to have
defendant evaluated by someone other than Dr. Knapke and
appointing Dr. Guo to perform an independent evaluation—
considered Dr. Guo’s May 7, 2024, report which corroborated
Dr. Knapke’s March 18, 2024, second report. Both reports were
prepared after Dr. Elias’s report of January 20, 2024, based on
more recent interviews of defendant. By then, the mental health
court had appointed five experts to evaluate defendant’s
competency, starting with Dr. Pourat’s November 17, 2023,
initial report and concluding with Dr. Guo’s May 7, 2024, report,
and none of them concluded he was incompetent to stand trial.
Only Dr. Elias’s report came to that conclusion. Thus, it is
conjecture to posit that defendant would have obtained a more
favorable result from Judge Cavaluzzi had Dr. Elias’s report been
submitted and considered prior to her final ruling on defendant’s
competence.
We also disagree with defendant’s suggestion that he would
have obtained a more favorable result before Judge Stennis if the
details in the report supporting Dr. Elias’s conclusion of
incompetence had been provided in that court. As noted, the
court was aware of Dr. Elias’s conclusion as of the January 31,
2024, hearing and relied on it to provide defendant the relief he
requested that day. Defendant’s counsel again raised Dr. Elias’s
conclusion with Judge Stennis at the April 24, 2024, hearing that
followed Dr. Knapke’s second report. And, in response, the court
provided defendant relief by again declaring a doubt and ordering
that an expert, other than Dr. Knapke, evaluate defendant.
Judge Cavalluzzi then complied by appointing Dr. Guo to perform
an independent evaluation, once again giving defendant all the
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relief to which he was entitled. Moreover, by the time Judge
Stennis made his final determination that defendant was
competent based on the second Dr. Knapke report and
corroborating report of Dr. Guo, he was aware of Dr. Elias’s
contrary conclusion, and presumably factored it into his analysis
of the competency issue.
Finally, defendant’s own conduct, once the trial court made
a final determination of his competence, demonstrated that he
was not prejudiced by his attorneys’ alleged deficient
performance in relation to Dr. Elias’s report. When Judge
Stennis found defendant competent to stand trial, defendant
made a Faretta motion and persuaded the court—which had
observed at the outset of trial that defendant had no problems
representing himself during the preliminary hearing—that he
was capable of representing himself at trial. (See People v. Welch
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 732 [“‘A finding that a defendant is
competent to stand trial ... is not all that is necessary before he
may be permitted to ... waive his right to counsel. In addition to
determining that a defendant who seeks to ... waive counsel is
competent, a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his
constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary’”].) Defendant
then proceeded to actively participate in trial, including during
witness examination and closing argument. That conduct belied
the suggestion that he was, as Dr. Elias concluded, incompetent
“to stand trial due to both a lack of understanding of the nature
of the proceedings against him, and an inability to assist counsel
in a rational manner.”
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B. Failure to Declare Doubt at Sentencing
Defendant next contends that, once the trial court received
and considered Dr. Elias’s report at sentencing, it was error not
to initiate new competency proceedings. According to defendant,
the court “violated [his] statutory rights and his right to due
process of law under the 14th Amendment and the California
Constitution in proceeding with sentencing even though it had
received new substantial evidence that [he] was incompetent.”
1. Legal Principles
“‘“‘Once a defendant has been found competent to stand
trial, a second competency hearing is required only if the
evidence discloses a substantial change of circumstances or new
evidence is presented casting serious doubt on the validity of the
prior finding of the defendant’s competence.’”’ [Citations.] ‘[T]he
duty to suspend [proceedings] is not triggered by information that
substantially duplicates evidence already considered at an
earlier, formal inquiry into the defendant’s competence; when
faced with evidence of relatively minor changes in the defendant’s
mental state, the court may rely on a prior competency finding
rather than convening a new hearing to cover largely the same
ground.’ [Citation.] The court may also ‘appropriately take its
personal observations into account in determining whether there
has been some significant change in the defendant’s mental state.
This is particularly true when … the defendant has actively
participated in the trial.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Bertsh & Hronis
(2026) 19 Cal.5th 183, 233 (Bertsh & Hronis).)
“A trial court’s decision whether to reinstitute a
competency proceeding, after having previously found the
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defendant competent, is fundamentally different from the initial
decision to institute competency proceedings. Mere doubt about a
defendant’s competency is insufficient, since the court has
already gone beyond the identification of doubt and determined
that defendant is not incompetent. Once a trial court has
determined a defendant is competent to stand trial, it would
make little sense to require the court to declare a doubt and
suspend proceedings whenever an expert opines that the
defendant is incompetent, irrespective of whether there is no
evidence of changed circumstances or new evidence.” (Bertsh &
Hronis, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 236.)
“‘Whether there has been a change in circumstances
sufficient to call for a new competency hearing is necessarily a
fact-specific inquiry.’ [Citation.] We review for substantial
evidence the trial court’s finding of no substantial change of
circumstances and no new evidence casting serious doubt on the
initial competency determination, and we review its decision not
to reinstate competency proceedings for an abuse of discretion.
[Citations.]” (Bertsh & Hronis, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 233.)
2. Analysis
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s implied
finding that the submission of the report prepared by Dr. Elias
did not constitute a substantial change in circumstance or new
evidence that cast a fresh and serious doubt about defendant’s
current competency to be sentenced. The sentencing hearing took
place on August 28, 2024. But defendant’s counsel retained
Dr. Elias in January 2024, and he prepared his report on
January 20, 2024. Judge Stennis, the trial and sentencing judge,
was first made aware of the report’s incompetency conclusion at
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the January 31, 2024, hearing, during which the court relied on it
to declare a doubt and return the matter to the mental health
court. Defendant’s counsel also made further reference to the
report at the April 24, 2024, hearing before Judge Stennis,
reminding the court of Dr. Elias’s independent evaluation of
defendant and conclusion that he was incompetent, following
which the court again declared a doubt and sent the matter back
to the mental health court with a directive that defendant be
evaluated by an expert other than Dr. Knapke.
Thus, by the time Judge Stennis was presented with the
submitted report in August 2024, he had been aware of its
conclusion for several months and had relied upon it to declare a
doubt on two occasions. The trial court was also aware of the
more recent reports prepared by Dr. Knapke and Dr. Guo, both of
which formed the basis of the court’s final determination that
defendant was competent to stand trial. On this record, we
conclude that the court did not err when it proceeded to
sentencing without declaring a doubt as to defendant’s
competency.
C. Minute Order and Abstract of Judgment
Defendant contends that the sentencing minute order and
abstract of judgment do not accurately reflect the trial court’s
oral pronouncement at sentencing of its waiver of certain fines
and fees. He argues that, although the court stated during
sentencing that it was imposing but waiving the $400 parole
revocation fine and the $400 restitution fine, the minute order
and abstract inaccurately reflect that only the restitution fine
was waived.
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During the sentencing hearing, the trial court initially
stated that it was ordering defendant to “pay a [$400] restitution
fine; a parole revocation fine in the same amount,” as well as two
other fees. But the court then stated that it would “waive the
[$30, $40,] and [$400] fines and fees.” Although both the minute
order and the abstract of judgment reflect the waiver of the $400
restitution fine, they both fail to state that the $400 parole
revocation fine had also been waived.
We conclude that the sentencing minute order and abstract
of judgment should be corrected to accurately reflect the waiver of
fines and fees, including the waiver of the $400 parole revocation
fine.
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IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed and the matter is
remanded with directions to modify the sentencing minute order
and abstract of judgment to accurately reflect the trial court’s
waiver of fines and fees, including the waiver of the $400 parole
revocation fine. The trial court is directed to issue an amended
abstract of judgment reflecting these modifications and forward a
certified copy of the amended abstract of judgment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
HOFFSTADT, P. J.
MOOR, J.
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