7/24/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
SHAWN OSBORNE et al., B342516
Plaintiff and Appellants, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
24STCP02640)
v.
DEAN C. LOGAN, as Los Angeles
County Registrar-
Recorder/County Clerk,
Defendant and Respondent,
LOS ANGELES UNIFIED
SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.
Real Parties in Interest and
Respondents.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Curtis A. Kin, Judge. Reversed.
Law Offices of Jason A. Bezis and Jason A. Bezis for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Bryan Mercke, Deputy County
Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent.
Strumwasser & Woocher, Beverly Grossman Palmer, Dale
K. Larson, Salvador E. Perez; Devora Navera Reed and Mark
Miller for Real Parties in Interest and Respondents.
_________________
INTRODUCTION
Shawn Osborne and Lawrence Sand (the challengers) are
registered voters in the Los Angeles Unified School District.
In 2024 the District sought to issue $9 billion in bonds, which
required voter approval because the bonds would be repaid by an
ad valorem tax on the district’s property owners. Before the
election the challengers filed a petition for writ of mandate in the
trial court, seeking an order requiring various changes to the
language of the measure the District—through the Los Angeles
County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk—planned to place on
the ballot. The trial court denied the petition, the election
proceeded as scheduled with the ballot question as proposed, and
the District’s voters approved the bond measure.
The challengers, who concede their appeal is “technically
moot,” do not seek to overturn the results of the election. They
ask us to decide whether, consistent with Elections Code
section 13119, subdivision (b), 1 the proponents of a bond measure
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Elections
Code.
2
can represent the taxes property owners will pay in one unit of
measurement on the ballot and a different unit of measurement
in the voter information materials the Legislature requires for
bond measures.
We conclude that, though the appeal is moot, we should
exercise our discretion to decide the issue under an exception to
the mootness doctrine that often applies in election cases: appeals
presenting issues of general public interest that are likely to
recur. We also conclude the District should have expressed the
rate of the tax on the ballot as section 9401, subdivision (c),
requires ballot information materials to state it: in terms of the
tax rate per $100,000, not (as the District stated it) per $100, of
assessed valuation. Therefore, we reverse.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The School Board Adopts Bond Measure US and Asks
the Registrar To Include the Measure on the
November 2024 Ballot
On August 7, 2024 the District’s governing board held a
special meeting. The sole item on the agenda was whether to
submit for voter approval a measure authorizing the District to
issue $9 billion in bonds. The Board “encourage[d] public
comment” on the agenda item, but it is not clear from the record
how much time the public had to prepare comments. The record
reveals only that the agenda “was posted at least 24 hours before
the meeting.”
The resolution, which the Board unanimously approved,
proposed submitting the following “statement of the bond
measure” to voters: “‘Local Public Schools Safety and Upgrades
3
Measure: To update school facilities for 21st century learning and
career/college preparedness; improve school facilities for safety,
earthquakes and disability access; upgrade plumbing, electrical,
HVAC; replace leaky roofs; provide learning technology; and
create green outdoor classrooms/schoolyards; shall Los Angeles
Unified School District’s measure be adopted authorizing
$9,000,000,000 in bonds at legal rates, levying approximately
2.5¢ per $100 of assessed valuation (generating $456,123,000
annually) until approximately 2059, with audits/citizens’
oversight?’” (Italics omitted.)
This statement, which was the main content of the “ballot
label” (what voters see printed on the ballot), was a condensed
combination of what the Elections Code defines as the “ballot title
and summary.” (See § 303 [defining ballot label for purposes of a
statewide measure as “a condensed version of the ballot title and
summary” followed by a list of supporters and opponents];
§ 303.5 [defining “ballot title and summary”]; § 9051, subds. (b)(1)
& (c)(1) [requiring a “condensed ballot title and summary” for
statewide initiative measures and defining the “ballot label” as
“the condensed ballot title and summary” followed by a list of
supporters and opponents]; § 10403, subd. (a)(2) [statutes
governing the wording of statewide measures apply when
districts consolidate measures with statewide elections]; § 13103,
subd. (c) [ballot must contain the “titles and summaries of
measures submitted to vote of the voters”].) The Registrar
eventually designated the measure as Measure US.
The Board’s resolution acknowledged there was a statewide
general election on November 5, 2024 and asked the Registrar to
submit Measure US to voters on that election day. (See Ed. Code,
§ 5342 [authorizing consolidation of school district elections with
4
other elections occurring on the same date].) The resolution
directed the Registrar to use the Board’s statement of the bond
measure (meaning the condensed ballot title and summary) on
the ballot.
The Board’s resolution also adopted a tax rate statement,
which section 9401, subdivision (a), states must be “mailed to the
voters with the sample ballot for the bond election.” The Board’s
tax rate statement for Measure US described the “best estimate
of the average annual tax rate” as “$25.04 per $100,000 (2.504
cents per $100),” the “best estimate of the highest annual tax
rate” as “$45.01 per $100,000 (4.501 cents per $100),” and the
“best estimate of the total debt service” as “$15,964,303,000.”
The Elections Code requires any district, city, or other
political subdivision proposing to include a measure on the ballot
in a statewide election to file its resolution with the relevant
elections official at least 88 days prior to the date of the election.
(§ 10403.) The Board’s resolution directed the District
superintendent to submit the resolution to the Registrar “as soon
as practicable, and in any event no later than August 9, 2024.”
August 9, 2024 was exactly 88 days before the November 5, 2024
general election. The District’s superintendent submitted the
Board’s resolution and Measure US to the Registrar on August 8,
2024.
The Los Angeles County Counsel sent its impartial analysis
of Measure US, as required by section 9500, subdivision (b), to
the Registrar on August 16, 2024. The impartial analysis stated
that the “best estimate of the average tax rate” was “$25.04 per
$100,000 of assessed valuation” and that the “best estimate of the
highest tax rate” was “$45.01 per $100,000 of assessed
valuation.” Unlike the District’s tax rate statement, the County
5
Counsel’s impartial analysis did not state any tax rate in terms of
the cost per $100 in assessed property value.
B. The Challengers File a Petition for Writ of Mandate
On August 19, 2024 the challengers filed a petition for writ
of mandate challenging the language of the measure. The
challengers sought an order compelling the Registrar or the
District to make four amendments to the proposed ballot label:
(1) state the tax rate as “$25.04 per $100,000,” rather than
“2.5¢ per $100”; (2) add language describing the funds raised as
“taxes”; (3) add the language “retire existing debt” to the partial
list of bond goals; and (4) revise the language of the ballot label so
that it began with “Shall the Measure” and ended with
“Be Adopted.”
The challengers sought to expedite the briefing schedule
given the upcoming election. The Registrar agreed that a
shortened schedule was necessary and that, considering when the
Registrar would have to print election materials before the
November 5, 2024 election, August 29, 2024 was the “[l]ast date
to make changes, additions, or deletions to any measure text.”
The court set a hearing on the petition for August 29, 2024, over
the challengers’ objection the hearing date would “leave no time
whatsoever for appellate review.”
C. The Trial Court Denies the Challengers’ Petition, and
the Voters Approve the Bond Measure
The trial court denied the petition, declining to order the
Registrar or the District to make any changes to the language of
the ballot statement. The court ruled section 9401,
subdivision (c), which states “‘tax rate’ means tax rate per one
6
hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) of assessed valuation on all
property to be taxed,” applied only to the voter information guide
and the tax rate statement mailed to voters, not to the ballot.
The trial court stated that, in the alternative, it “would find
under the circumstances that the ballot question here
substantially complies with the requirements” of section 9401,
subdivision (c), because, the court explained, “the tax rate is also
expressed as a ratio with a denominator of $100,000 in the
accompanying voter information guide.” The court rejected the
challengers’ other requested amendments, ruling that the
grammatical structure of the question complied or substantially
complied with the Elections Code and that the other language the
challengers complained about was not false, misleading, or
prejudicial.
The trial court denied the petition on August 29, 2024 in a
hearing that ended at 3:58 p.m. The Registrar had previously
advised the court that the Registrar needed direction from the
court by 5:00 p.m., August 29, 2024 “to avoid any interference
with the printing and distribution of the ballots and the conduct
of the November 5, 2024” election. The challengers did not file a
petition for writ of mandate with, or a request for an immediate
stay from, this court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.486.)
The trial court entered judgment on September 20, 2024.
The November 5, 2024 election occurred, and the voters approved
Measure US with 68.02 percent of the votes cast. (Los Angeles
County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, “November 5, 2024
General Election Results,” Los Angeles Unified School District
General Election – Measure US, available at
<https://results.lavote.gov/text-results/4324> [as of July 24,
7
2026], archived at <https://perma.cc N2JR-QPHE>.) 2 The
challengers timely appealed from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
A. We Exercise Our Discretion To Consider a Portion of
the Challengers’ Moot Appeal
Courts generally do not render opinions in cases where
subsequent events make it impossible to grant effective relief.
(In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266, 276; San Diego Public Library
Foundation v. Fuentes (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 711, 722; Kunde v.
Seiler (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 518, 527.) The challengers sought
changes to the ballot label for the November 5, 2024 election—
relief that can no longer be granted because the election occurred
almost two years ago. (See Vargas v. Balz (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 1544, 1550 [“Strictly speaking, there is no actual
controversy in this case because the election has been held and
the results have been certified.”].) All parties agree this appeal is
moot.
An exception to the mootness doctrine, however, may apply
when “the issues presented ‘are of general public interest and
2 The Registrar and District cite this result in their briefs.
We take judicial notice of the election results pursuant to
Evidence Code sections 452, subdivision (h), and 459. (See
Edelstein v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 29 Cal.4th
164, 171, fn. 3 [taking judicial notice of election results];
Huntington Beach City Council v. Superior Court (2002)
94 Cal.App.4th 1417, 1424, fn. 2 [same].) We advised the parties
of our intent to take judicial notice of the election results and
afforded them an opportunity to respond. (See Evid. Code,
§§ 452, 455, subd. (a), 459, subd. (c).)
8
likely to recur’” but “evasive of timely appellate review.” (Kunde
v. Seiler, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at pp. 527, 528; see California
Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland (2017) 3 Cal.5th 924, 933;
Edelstein v. City and County of San Francisco (2002) 29 Cal.4th
164, 172; San Diego Public Library Foundation v. Fuentes, supra,
111 Cal.App.5th at pp. 722-723.) “This exception is often applied
in election cases.” (Kunde, at p. 527.) We exercise our discretion
to apply that exception to the tax rate issue.
An initiative authorizing a school district to issue bonds “is
unquestionably a matter of public interest for voters impacted by
district special taxes” (Loeber v. Lakeside Joint School Dist.
(2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 552, 574) that often evades review. (See
California Cannabis Coalition v. City of Upland, supra, 3 Cal.5th
at p. 933 [whether the voters must vote on an initiative, which
had the effect of imposing a tax, in a general or special election
“presents important questions of continuing public interest that
may evade review”]; San Diego Public Library Foundation v.
Fuentes, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 724 [petition to confirm
that the proponents of an initiative had sufficient signatures
presented “an issue of public interest on matters requiring
uniform application of the law throughout the state” and was “an
issue that is likely to recur but by its nature will evade review”];
Kunde v. Seiler, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at pp. 527-528 [whether
a sample ballot could include “electioneering materials is a
matter of general public interest that is likely to recur in
subsequent elections”].) And, as reflected in recent legislative
activity, whether the ballot label should express the taxation rate
per $100 or $100,000 of assessed valuation is of particular public
interest. For example, the Legislature amended section 9401,
subdivision (c), to update the tax rate denominator from $100 in
9
assessed valuation to $100,000 in assessed valuation, effective
January 1, 2024. (See Stats. 2023, ch. 720; Sen. Bill No. 798
(2023-2024 Reg. Sess.), § 1.) 3 The Legislature subsequently
enacted statutes that would allow proponents of bond measures
to refer voters to the information materials rather than printing
the tax rate on the ballot label, but the Governor (twice) vetoed
the bills because of concerns that removing the information from
the ballot label would “reduce transparency for local tax and bond
measures.” (Governor’s veto message to Assem. on Assem. Bill
No. 699 (Oct. 1, 2025) Recess J. No. 25 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.)
p. 3552; Governor’s veto message to Sen. on Sen. Bill No. 268
(Oct. 13, 2019) Recess J. (2019-2020 Reg. Sess.) p. 2998; see also
Assem. Bill No. 699 (2025-2026 Reg. Sess.); Sen. Bill No. 268
(2019-2020 Reg. Sess.).)
Not only is the tax rate issue likely to recur in subsequent
elections, it has already recurred. In the June 2026 statewide
primary election, there were seven bond measures presented to
voters in various districts in Los Angeles County; five of them
stated the tax rate per $100,000 in assessed property value, and
two of them stated the tax rate per $100 in value. (Los Angeles
County Registrar-Recorder/County Clerk, Measures Appearing on
the Ballot, Statewide Direct Primary Election (June 2, 2026),
available at
<https://content.lavote.gov/docs/rrcc/documents/measures-
appearing-on-the-ballot-4-9-26-(002).pdf> [as of July 24, 2026],
3 You may ask, does it really make a difference? Well, which
feels more onerous: $25.04 per $100,000 in assessed property
value or 2.5 cents per $100 in assessed value? $25 won’t buy a
tank of gas; a few pennies is nothing.
10
archived at <https://perma.cc/CQ6U-AZWD> 4; see Edelstein v.
City and County of San Francisco, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 172
[case was not moot where the issue was “of broad public interest
and . . . likely to recur, if not in San Francisco elections, then in
elections in other charter cities”]; San Diego Public Library
Foundation v. Fuentes, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 724 [case
was not moot where “the matter is likely to recur, as appellants
may submit a new petition in the future”].)
Thus, how ballots express tax rates is a contemporary issue
of statewide importance that is likely to recur yet often evades
review. Therefore, we exercise our discretion to decide the tax
rate issue in this moot appeal. 5
B. Standard of Review
The parties agree the tax rate issue is a question of
statutory interpretation we review de novo. (People v. Morris
(2026) 19 Cal.5th 671, 682; Kunde v. Seiler, supra,
197 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.) “‘Our fundamental task in
4 We take judicial notice of the official government document
listing the measures that appeared on the June 2026 ballot.
(Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (d), (h), 455, subd. (a), 459, subd. (c);
see Vargas v. City of Salinas (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1, 22, fn. 10
[a ballot pamphlet was “not included in the record on appeal, but,
as an official government document [was] a proper subject of
judicial notice”].) We deny as unnecessary the challengers’
motion for judicial notice of a fact sheet about the District’s 2020
bond measure; the record already establishes the District sought
and received voter approval to issue $7 billion in bonds in
November 2008 and in November 2020.
5 We do not exercise our discretion to decide the challengers’
other arguments.
11
interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s intent so
as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’” (Prang v. Los Angeles County
Assessment Appeals Bd. (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1152, 1170.) “‘“‘“‘We
begin by examining the statute’s words, giving them a plain and
commonsense meaning.’”’”’” (Morris, at p. 682.) “‘“‘We must
harmonize “the various parts of a statutory enactment . . . by
considering the particular clause or section in the context of the
statutory framework as a whole.”’”’” (Ibid.) “‘‘‘‘If the language is
clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a
literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the
Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits
more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider
other aids, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and
public policy.’”’” (Ibid.)
C. The Ballot for Bond Measures Should State the Rate
of the Tax the Same Way the Tax Rate Statement Does
Section 13119, subdivision (b), states: “If the proposed
measure imposes a tax or raises the rate of a tax, the ballot shall
include in the statement of the measure to be voted on the
amount of money to be raised annually and the rate and duration
of the tax to be levied.” The parties dispute how section 13119,
subdivision (b), requires the ballot to state “the rate . . . of the tax
to be levied.” The challengers argue the “rate of the tax” on the
ballot for bond measures under section 13119, subdivision (b),
should be the same “tax rate” disclosed to voters under
section 9401, subdivision (c), which governs the tax rate
statement in the information materials mailed to voters. Thus,
the challengers argue, both the ballot label and the tax rate
statement for Measure US should have expressed the tax rate
12
per $100,000 in assessed property value. The District and
Registrar agree that section 13119, subdivision (b), required the
ballot label to include a tax rate, but they contend that the ballot
does not have to define the rate consistent with section 9401,
subdivision (b) (meaning the ballot, unlike the tax rate
statement, does not have to use the per-$100,000 formula). They
maintain that the ballot only has to state the tax rate accurately
and that the description of the tax rate on the ballot for
Measure US, “approximately 2.5¢ per $100 of assessed
valuation,” was accurate.
Section 13119, subdivision (b), requires the ballot to include
“the rate . . . of the tax” to be imposed. Section 13119 does not
define the term “rate” or state how the ballot should express the
rate of the tax. Because the language of the statute does not
define the term as applied to bond measures, “we consider the
language of the entire scheme and related statutes, harmonizing
the terms when possible. If any ambiguity remains, we may
examine the legislative history and the stated purpose of the
scheme to guide our interpretation.” (Riverside County Sheriff’s
Dept. v. Stiglitz (2014) 60 Cal.4th 624, 632-633; see Copley Press,
Inc. v. Superior Court (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1272, 1288 [where
a statute does not define a term, courts view the “operative
statutory language . . . in the context of the entire statutory
scheme”]; Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com.
(1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 [“words of the statute must be
construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and
statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must
be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent
possible”].)
13
Though section 13119, subdivision (b), does not define “the
rate of the tax” for bond measures, another statute in the
Elections Code, section 9401, defines a bond measure’s “tax rate.”
Section 9401, subdivision (a), states that a tax rate statement
“shall be mailed to the voters with the sample ballot for the bond
election” and that the statement must include the best estimate
“from official sources” of “the average annual tax rate” and a
statement of the “final fiscal year in which the tax is anticipated
to be collected”; the best estimate of “the highest tax rate that
would be required to be levied to fund that bond issue”;
an estimate, based on assessed valuations or “a projection based
on experience within the same jurisdiction,” of what year the
highest rate will apply; and the best estimate of the “total debt
service” required to repay the debt if all bonds are issued and
sold. Section 9401, subdivision (c), defines “tax rate” for purposes
of the bond measure rate disclosures as “tax rate per one hundred
thousand dollars ($100,000) of assessed valuation on all property
to be taxed.”
Though the term “tax rate” in section 9401, subdivision (c),
and the term “the rate of the tax” in section 13119,
subdivision (b), are not identical, they’re very close (pretty much
just the same words in a slightly different sentence structure),
and the contexts in which they appear are related (both govern
a bond measure). The best way to harmonize these two
provisions is to interpret them similarly. (See Ruelas v. County
of Alameda (2024) 15 Cal.5th 968, 974 [statutes that “deal ‘“with
the same subject matter”’ . . . ‘should be accorded the same
interpretation’ in both instances”]; Kaanaana v. Barrett Business
Services, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 158, 175 [“‘Identical language
appearing in separate provisions dealing with the same subject
14
matter should be accorded the same interpretation.’”]; Gund v.
County of Trinity (2020) 10 Cal.5th 503, 518 [“‘When a phrase
appears in two statutes dealing with the same subject matter, we
usually interpret the phrase to have the same meaning across the
provisions.’”].)
Interpreting “tax rate” in section 9401, subdivision (c), to
mean the same as “rate of the tax” in section 13119,
subdivision (b), is also consistent with the Legislature’s purpose
in enacting section 9401. (See Sunflower Alliance v. Department
of Conservation (June 25, 2026, S287414) ___ Cal.5th ___, ___
[2026 WL 1830258, p. 7] [“Our core task is ‘“to adopt the
construction that best gives effect to the Legislature’s intended
purpose.”’”]; Iloff v. LaPaille (2025) 18 Cal.5th 551, 560 [“‘When
interpreting any statute, our goal is to determine the
Legislature’s intent and give effect to the statute’s purpose.’”].)
The Legislature’s stated purpose regarding the bond-specific tax
rate disclosure requirements was to “present[ ] to voters the most
accurate available information for their use in effecting
comparisons and exercising judgment in casting their ballots.”
(§ 9404.) “Effecting comparisons” would be difficult if the tax rate
denominators in the ballot label and the information guides were
not the same. Creating such voter confusion would be the
opposite of what the Legislature intended and hoped to
accomplish. (See Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 858-
859 [“our task is to construe the statutory language in a manner
that ‘comports most closely with the apparent intent of the
Legislature, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the
general purpose of the statute, and avoid an interpretation that
would lead to absurd consequences’”]; Steuer v. Franchise Tax Bd.
(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 417, 430 [courts should choose an
15
interpretation of a statute that “effectuates the purpose of the
statute and avoids results that are contrary to legislative
intent”]; Cilibrasi v. Reiter (1951) 103 Cal.App.2d 397, 400
[“[w]hen a statute is susceptible of two constructions, it is the
duty of a court to give it such interpretation as will avoid
confusion and absurdity”].)
The purpose of section 13119, subdivision (b), as stated by
its author, was also to “help voters be better informed.” (Assem.
Com. on Elections & Redistricting, analysis of Assem. Bill No.
809 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 15, 2015, p. 1; see Assem. Com.
on Appropriations, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 809 (2015-2016
Reg. Sess.) May 13, 2015, p. 1; Assem. Floor Analysis, 3d reading
analysis of Assem. Bill No. 809 (2015-2016 Reg. Sess.), as
amended Mar. 26, 2015, p. 1; Sen. Com. on Elections &
Constitutional Amendments, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 809
(2015-2016 Reg. Sess.) July 7, 2015, p. 1; Off. of Sen. Floor
Analyses, 3d reading analysis of Assem. Bill No. 809 (2015-2016
Reg. Sess.) Aug. 18, 2015, p. 2.) 6 It would frustrate, not further,
that purpose for the tax rate for bond measures to be expressed
in one format on the ballot label and a different format in the
related, statutorily required information materials. (See AIDS
Healthcare Foundation v. Bonta (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 73, 95
[courts are “loath to construe [a] statute in a way that would
largely frustrate our Legislature’s purpose”]; Hamilton & High
6 Though the statements of a bill’s author are generally not
cognizable legislative history (Quintano v. Mercury Casualty Co.
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 1049, 1062), the committee and floor analyses
here adopted the author’s statement of the bill’s purpose.
Committee analyses are cognizable legislative history. (Kaufman
& Broad Communities, Inc. v. Performance Plastering, Inc. (2005)
133 Cal.App.4th 26, 32-34.)
16
LLC v. City of Palo Alto (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 528, 571 [courts
“‘will not interpret a statute in a way that frustrates its
fundamental purpose’”]; Bitner v. Department of Corrections
& Rehabilitation (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1062 [“courts
‘should avoid interpreting a statute in a manner which would
both frustrate its purpose and lead to absurd results’”].)
Moreover, when the Legislature amended section 13119,
subdivision (a), in 2017 to add language making clear the statute
applied to “a measure authorizing the issuance of bonds” (Stats.
2017, ch. 105 (Assem. Bill No. 195), § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2018), the
Legislature knew section 9401 already required ballot materials
to express bond tax rates in a particular way. (See In re Greg F.
(2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 407 [“The Legislature is presumed to be
aware of all laws in existence when it passes or amends a
statute.”]; Reidy v. City and County of San Francisco (2004)
123 Cal.App.4th 580, 592 [courts “presume the Legislature is
aware of existing law when it amends a statute”].) In fact, the
legislative history for the 2017 amendment reflects that the
Legislature recognized the tax rate information the amendment
would require for the ballot label for bond measures was among
the “important election information” already included “in the
sample ballot or ballot pamphlet.” (See Assem. Com. on Elections
& Redistricting, analysis of Assem. Bill No. 195 (2017-2018 Reg.
Sess.) Mar. 22, 2017, p. 2 [suggesting that adding tax rate
information to ballots may be unnecessary because “important
election information” is already included “in the sample ballot or
ballot pamphlet that is sent to registered voters”]; Sen. Com. on
Elections & Constitutional Amendments, analysis of Assem. Bill
No. 195 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) June 6, 2017, p. 2 [same]; Sen.
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Sen. floor analysis of
17
Assem. Bill No. 195 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) June 27, 2017, p. 3
[same].) The Legislature passed the amendment anyway.
The subsequent legislative history of section 9401,
subdivision (c), confirms the Legislature intended the bond
measure tax rate on ballot labels under section 13119,
subdivision (b), to be expressed in the same terms as the rates
stated in the related information materials. Though subsequent
legislative history “cannot change the meaning” of section 13119,
subdivision (b), it can “supply an indication of the intent behind
the original legislation that may be considered.” (California
Highway Patrol v. Superior Court (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 488,
504, fn. 10; see McClung v. Employment Development Dept.
(2004) 34 Cal.4th 467, 473 [“a declaration of a later Legislature
as to what an earlier Legislature intended is entitled to
consideration”]; People v. Tourville (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 439,
458 [same].) Effective January 1, 2024 the Legislature amended
section 9401, subdivision (c), to change the “tax rate” for bond
measure disclosures to the “tax rate per one hundred thousand
dollars ($100,000).” 7
The Legislature intended the amended section 9401,
subdivision (c), to apply not only to the information materials
governed by section 9401, but also the tax rate expressed on the
ballot. Various committee analyses of the 2024 amendment
discussed interchangeably how to express the tax rate in the
7 The tax rate for bond measures had been measured in
terms of the cost per $100 in assessed property value since the
Legislature first required a tax rate statement disclosure for bond
measures. (Stats. 1968, ch. 813, § 1, p. 1570 [enacting what was
then section 5301, subdivision (c)]; Stats. 1994, ch. 920, § 2,
pp. 4962-4963 [reorganizing the Elections Code].)
18
sample ballot materials and in the ballot, using the same
terminology. (Sen. Com. on Governance & Finance, analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 798 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 29, 2023, pp. 1-2
[describing the tax rate statement, recognizing “the ballot must
also include” the “tax rate,” and stating “the author wants to
change the definition of tax rate to mean the tax rate per
$100,000 of assessed value” in “an effort to make these taxes
easier to understand”]; Sen. Com. on Elections & Constitutional
Amendments, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 798 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.)
Apr. 18, 2023, pp. 2-3 [stating “the ballot must also include” the
“tax rate”].) Some of the committee analyses stated that, if the
amendment to section 9401, subdivision (c), had been enacted
earlier, “the ballot” in an earlier election (not just the ballot
materials) “would have expressed the tax rate” in terms of the tax
“per $100,000 of assessed value.” (Sen. Com. on Governance
& Finance, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 798 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.)
Mar. 29, 2023, p. 3; see Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor
Analyses, Sen. Floor analysis of Sen. Bill No. 798 (2023-2024 Reg.
Sess.) Apr. 21, 2023, p. 3.) The analyses also described the issue
the bill would address as whether the Legislature should “require
all ballots to express tax rates on a per $100,000 basis.” (Sen.
Com. on Governance & Finance, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 798
(2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 29, 2023, p. 3, italics added; see Sen.
Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, Sen. Floor analysis of
Sen. Bill No. 798 (2023-2024 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 21, 2023, p. 3.)
These analyses suggest the Legislature believed the ballot label
tax rate for bond measures was already connected to the rates
stated in the voter information materials governed by
section 9401.
19
The District cites the introductory clause of section 9401,
subdivision (c), which states its definition of “tax rate” for tax
rate statements applies “[f]or purposes of this chapter,” meaning
chapter 5 of division 9 of the Elections Code. The District argues
this language shows section 9401 (and its definition of “tax rate”
as the tax rate per $100,000 of assessed valuation) applies only to
tax rate statements and not to ballots, which are governed by
section 13119, which is not in chapter 5 of division 9 of the
Elections Code (it’s in chapter 2 of division 13). But section 9401,
subdivision (c), does not say its definition of tax rate may only be
used for purposes of chapter 5 of division 9 of the Elections Code,
nor does section 13119, subdivision (b), state courts should not
use the definition of “tax rate” in section 9401, subdivision (c).
Given the absence of a “tax rate” definition in section 13119,
subdivision (b), it is appropriate to use the definition of that term
in another provision in the Elections Code governing ballot
material and information. (See Lee v. Superior Court (2025)
116 Cal.App.5th 776, 784 [“‘We must interpret a statute in
context, examining other legislation on the same or similar
subjects to ascertain the Legislature’s probable intent.’”]; Wendz
v. State Dept. of Education (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 607, 633 [“‘To
understand the intended meaning of a statutory phrase, we may
consider use of the same or similar language in other statutes,
because similar words or phrases in statutes in pari materia
ordinarily will be given the same interpretation.’”] 8; Mitchell v.
United National Ins. Co. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 457, 472
8 Two statutes are “‘“‘in pari materia when they relate to the
same person or thing, to the same class of person[s or] things, or
have the same purpose or object.’”’” (Wendz v. State Dept. of
Education, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 633.)
20
[“Different statutes within the same code should be interpreted to
be consistent.”]; Kern County Employees’ Retirement Assn. v.
Bellino (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 781, 788 [“code provisions relating
to the same subject must be harmonized to the extent possible”];
see also Brown v. City of Inglewood (2025) 18 Cal.5th 33, 44
[“When ‘words themselves provide no definitive answer,’ we look
to other interpretative aids such as legislative history and ‘other
statutes [that] apply to similar or analogous subjects.’”]; In re
Marriage of Colvin (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 1570, 1580 [“statutes
should be construed in harmony with other statutes covering the
same general subject, even when interpreting provisions in
different codes”].)
Interpreting section 13119, subdivision (b), and
section 9401, subdivision (c), to allow the District to state the
bond tax rate one way on the ballot and another way in ballot
information materials would create exactly the kind of voter
confusion the Legislature has sought to avoid. Under the
District’s proposed interpretation, a municipality could state the
tax rate for a bond measure on the ballot per $10, $100, or
$1,000 of assessed valuation, and state the tax rate in entirely
different terms in the voter information materials governing the
same bond measure. And on the same ballot a voter might see
bond measures proposed by different local entities with tax rates
stated in different metrics, making it even harder for voters to
make informed choices and comparisons and to understand the
collective tax consequences of their votes.
Finally, the District argues that, even if “the ballot
question was technically defective for not expressing the tax rate
on a per $100,000 basis,” the ballot question satisfied “the
governing substantial compliance doctrine.” Under that doctrine
21
as applied in the elections context, courts may excuse “relatively
minor departures” from statutory requirements so long as the
departure does not “mislead the public or otherwise frustrate or
undermine” the purpose of the statutory requirement or threaten
the integrity of the electoral process. (Costa v. Superior Court
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 986, 1019, 1028.) “The ‘“doctrine gives effect to
[courts’] preference for substance over form.”’” (Environmental
Health Advocates, Inc. v. Pancho Villa’s Inc. (2026)
118 Cal.App.5th 778, 870.) But here, the substance of the
statutory requirement is the form: how to express the tax rate to
voters. The Legislature adopted section 13119, subdivision (b),
and section 9401, subdivision (c), to require agencies seeking
approval of bond measures to present the tax consequences in a
format voters would understand. A deviation in form—
presenting the tax rate for a bond measure in terms of the cost
per $100 in assessed valuation—frustrates the Legislature’s goal
of ensuring voters understand the effect issuing the bonds will
have on their property taxes.
DISPOSITION
The judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate is
reversed. The trial court is directed to dismiss the petition as
moot. (See Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Bowen (2011)
192 Cal.App.4th 110, 127-128; Gebert v. Patterson (1986)
186 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.) The District’s motion to dismiss the
appeal is denied. The parties are to bear their costs on appeal.
SEGAL, J.
22
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
23