Filed 11/19/26 Okafor v. Bd. of Registered Nursing CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
MAXINE OKAFOR, B348611
Plaintiff and Appellant,
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCP03471)
v.
BOARD OF REGISTERED NURSING,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Curtis A. Kin, Judge. Affirmed.
Higgs Fletcher & Mack, Steven M. Brunolli for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Carl W. Sonne, Assistant Attorney
General, Thomas L. Rinaldi and Diana Petikyan, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
The Board of Registered Nursing revoked Maxine Okafor’s nurse
practitioner license and related certificates based on findings that she
engaged in grossly negligent and unprofessional conduct. Okafor filed a
petition for a writ of administrative mandamus challenging the Board’s
decision. The trial court denied her petition. Okafor appeals, claiming the
Board’s decision is unsupported by the evidence and is an unconstitutional
infringement on her religion. She also argues that the revocation of her
license was excessive. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Background
In November 2021, Okafor was a licensed nurse practitioner with a
doctorate in nursing practice. She was also qualified as a psychiatric mental
health nurse practitioner and family nurse practitioner. She was working as
an independent contractor at High Desert Psychological Services (HDPS) in
Rancho Cucamonga.
On November 3, 2021, a 13-year-old child identified only as “Patient 1”
entered HDPS with his foster mother, C.F. Patient 1’s medical records show
that he was diagnosed with “[s]chizoaffective disorder, depressive type,” and
“[a]djustment order, unspecified.” In the late afternoon, Patient 1 went with
Okafor into her office at HDPS. The two spent several hours alone together
in Okafor’s office. Patient 1 eventually emerged, looking calm, and in no
apparent distress.
2
What transpired in Okafor’s office that day forms the crux of this case.
Okafor, who identifies as a non-denominational Christian, insisted that she
merely prayed with Patient 1 for an hour or two at C.F.’s request. However,
other individuals present at HDPS that day painted a different picture. They
reported hearing loud, unusual noises coming from Okafor’s office during her
session with Patient 1, which they alternatively described as screaming,
screeching, and growling. According to one witness, Okafor subsequently
asserted that she removed more than 20 demons from Patient 1 during the
November 3 session.
Okafor used her phone to record her session with Patient 1.1 It is
undisputed that Okafor did not obtain written consent from Patient 1 or C.F.
before recording the session.
On November 11, 2021, HDPS terminated Okafor’s contract. In
January 2022, HDPS initiated a formal investigation into the November 3
incident with Patient 1. At the conclusion of that investigation, HDPS filed a
complaint to the Board of Registered Nursing (Board) alleging that Okafor
conducted an “exorcism” on Patient 1 on November 3. The complaint also
alleged that Okafor recorded and shared video of her session with Patient 1
without prior written consent.
From May to June 2022, the Board conducted its own investigation and
spoke to five individuals who were present at HDPS on November 3.
1 The recording of Okafor’s session with Patient 1 is not part of the
record on appeal.
3
II. Disciplinary Proceedings before the Board
In June 2023, the Board filed a formal accusation against Okafor. As
relevant on appeal, the accusation alleged two causes for discipline against
Okafor under Business and Professions Code section 2761: gross negligence
and unprofessional conduct. Both causes were based on allegations that she
conducted a “deliverance” to remove demons from Patient 1 and recorded and
shared her session with Patient 1 without prior written consent to do so.2
The complaint sought the revocation or suspension of Okafor’s nursing
license, nurse practitioner certificate, and nurse practitioner furnishing
certificate.
The matter was tried before an administrative law judge in May 2024.
A. The Board’s Evidence Against Okafor
1. Fact Witnesses
At the hearing, the Board presented testimony from five witnesses who
were present at HDPS on November 3: Norma Zaragoza (HDPS’s office
manager), Monica Garcia (HDPS’s area operations manager), Ashley
Whitehall (HDPS’s patient registration coordinator), licensed therapist Amir
Jaber, and licensed clinical social worker Priscilla Vado. These witnesses
offered similar accounts of what transpired that day. Multiple witnesses said
2 We note that Okafor devotes considerable effort to define and
distinguish between a “deliverance” and an “exorcism.” The record shows
that the charges asserted against Okafor were based on the assertion that
her actions on November 3 went beyond prayer and that she purported to
cast out, expunge, or otherwise remove demons or evil spirits from Patient 1
in a clinical setting. The specific term used to define this act—be it a
“deliverance” or an “exorcism”—is irrelevant to our analysis.
4
they heard loud screaming, growling, and “animal” noises coming from
Okafor’s office while she was with Patient 1. The noises were accompanied
by Okafor purporting to “command” Patient 1 and Patient 1 responding by
stating “guilty” in a deep, “demonic” voice. Multiple witnesses also reported
the noises coming from Okafor’s office were so loud that it drew a crowd of
listeners in the hallway outside her door. They also described the sounds as
unusual, concerning, or disturbing. Garcia and Zaragoza both testified that
they had previously heard Okafor praying with patients, and the sounds
coming from her office on November 3 were different.
Jaber reported the noises coming from Okafor’s office were so loud that
one employee had to move to a different office because it was interfering with
her ability to work. Jaber was so concerned about the situation that he called
Eric Bahra, one of the owners of HDPS, to report what was going on. Garcia
similarly reported the incident to her supervisor at HDPS because she was
concerned about the noises she heard coming from Okafor’s office.
Garcia and Zaragoza also testified that the day after the session with
Patient 1, Okafor showed them the video she recorded and asked them for
their help in sending it to C.F. Garcia said the video showed Okafor kneeling
in front of Patient 1 with her hand on his head as he was twitching,
contorting, and making noises. Garcia only watched 15-20 seconds of the
video because she found it disturbing. Okafor told Garcia that she had
removed about 20 demons from Patient 1 during their session on November
3. Zaragoza similarly reported that the video showed Okafor sitting in front
of Patient 1, commanding a demon to come out of him, and challenging him
5
with Bible verses while Patient 1 contorted his face and made growling
noises.3
2. Medical and Billing Records
The Board presented evidence showing that Okafor entered a patient
consultation note into HDPS’s computer system that described a November 1,
2021, conversation between Okafor and C.F. According to the note, Patient 1
was “seeing black figures and spells and hearing voices.” The note stated
that Patient 1 would come into HDPS on November 3 and would start taking
the medication Abilify.
The Board also produced an unsigned progress note purportedly
entered by Okafor following her November 3 session with Patient 1. That
note changed Patient 1’s medication from Abilify to Wellbutrin. HDPS also
presented Okafor’s billing records, which showed that Patient 1’s November 3
visit was billed with the billing code corresponding to a standard follow-up
visit.
These medical and billing records were accompanied by testimony from
Garcia, Zaragoza, and HDPS’s provider relations director, Leah Tillema.
This included testimony that billing codes were automatically generated by
HDPS’s computer system, but it was Okafor’s responsibility to ensure that
the correct code was used and change it if necessary. Alternatively, Okafor
could have asked a HDPS staff member to change the billing code. Tillema
also discussed Okafor’s unsigned progress note, stating that it was not
unusual for providers to leave notes unsigned for several days.
3 Garcia also testified that when HDPS later asked Okafor for a copy of
the video, she refused to provide it.
6
3. Expert Testimony
The Board presented expert testimony from Registered Nurse Summer
Thompson. Thompson opined that Okafor breached the standard of practice
for nurse practitioners by recording Patient 1 without prior written consent
and by conducting a deliverance to expunge demons or evil spirits from
Patient 1 at a location where she saw patients. According to Thompson, it
was inappropriate to record a minor patient receiving mental health services
without clinical justification. A parent’s request is not sufficient clinical
justification. And even where there is clinical justification to do so, prior
written consent is still needed before recording a patient in a clinical setting.
It was also a departure from the standard of practice to share such a video
with co-workers.
Thompson testified that attempting to expunge or remove demons from
a patient was prohibited in clinical practice. Thompson concluded that
Okafor “failed to adhere to the established standards of practice by practicing
outside of her scope of practice as a Psychiatric Mental Health Nurse
Practitioner at HPS by performing a deliverance on a severely mentally ill
minor with psychosis.” She opined that this departure from the standard of
practice constituted gross negligence. She noted that Patient 1 “was
particularly susceptible to victimization in that he was a minor, a ward of the
foster care system, and suffering from an active psychosis with religious
preoccupation.” Accordingly, Okafor’s actions in purporting to remove
demons or evil spirits from Patient 1 had “the potential to exacerbate
[Patient 1’s] significant mental illness through actively contributing to and
validating his psychotic content.”
7
B. Okafor’s Evidence
Okafor testified at the hearing and offered a significantly different
version of events. According to Okafor, she happened to encounter C.F. and
Patient 1 in the hallway at HDPS as she was leaving for the day on
November 3. C.F. asked Okafor if she would pray with Patient 1 and record
the session. Okafor agreed. According to Okafor, her session with Patient 1
on November 3 lasted one to two hours. She repeatedly denied trying to cast
out, expunge, or otherwise remove demons or evil spirits from Patient 1. She
described herself as a “Christian, non-denomination” and said that dispelling
demons was not part of her religious beliefs.
Okafor denied that Patient 1 made any screaming or growling noises
during their session. Instead, she claimed that she has a loud voice and
previously got complaints about it from coworkers at HDPS.
Okafor also denied that her session with Patient 1 was clinical in
nature. She said she did not ask Patient 1 about his symptoms or manage
his medication. She asserted that her progress note following the November
3 session could not be considered a valid clinical note because it was not
signed. She said the note was automatically populated by HDPS’s computer
system and she did not make any changes to it. Okafor also stated she did
not bill for her session with Patient 1 and generally disputed Tillema’s
testimony regarding the billing process at HDPS.
Okafor also disputed Garcia and Zaragoza’s testimony regarding their
discussion on November 4. Okafor denied telling anyone that she removed
demons from Patient 1. She denied that she volunteered to show the video to
Zaragoza or Garcia and instead said that she simply asked Zaragoza for help
sending the video to C.F. She acknowledged Zaragoza saw a glimpse of the
8
video in the process, but Okafor claimed the video only showed her praying
with Patient 1.
Okafor offered different explanations as to why her version of events
varied so much from the Board’s witnesses. First, she said that she sued
HDPS for religious discrimination after she was terminated and suggested
that HDPS reported her to the Board in retaliation for her lawsuit. Second,
she claimed that the Board’s witnesses were persecuting her for her religious
beliefs, though she also acknowledged she previously prayed with some
HDPS staff members and no one at HDPS ever had a problem with her
praying with patients. Third, she made the vague assertion that the Board’s
witnesses had previously conspired together to “sue somebody for millions of
dollars by calling it child abuse,” and therefore she “kn[e]w something similar
like this has happened” before. However, she also acknowledged these were
“just assumptions.”
Okafor testified that she did not believe she did anything wrong on
November 3, and that she would do the same thing again if given the chance.
Okafor offered testimony from C.F. According to C.F., she accompanied
Patient 1 to an appointment with Jaber on November 3 and they ran into
Okafor in the hallway while leaving the appointment. C.F. asked Okafor to
pray with Patient 1 and record the session. C.F. heard Patient 1 crying
inside Okafor’s office but denied hearing anything “out of the ordinary.” C.F.
did not believe Patient 1 was possessed by demons or that he was delivered
from demons through Okafor’s prayers.
Okafor did not present any expert testimony. She did provide
character reference letters, though she acknowledged that none of the
individuals who submitted letters were aware of the allegations against her
or the events that occurred on November 3.
9
C. The Board’s Decision
The administrative law judge issued a proposed decision in July 2024.
In August 2024, the Board formally adopted the administrative law judge’s
proposed decision in its entirety.
The Board found the testimony of Zaragoza, Garcia, Whitehall, Vado,
Jaber, and Tillema to be credible, straightforward, and consistent. It also
found that Okafor and C.F. were not credible, citing inconsistencies in their
testimony and noting conflicts between their testimony and medical records.
The Board noted that Okafor was “less than candid” in her testimony and
that C.F. seemed evasive at the hearing.
Based on these credibility findings, the Board concluded that “it was
established, by clear and convincing evidence,” that Okafor attempted to cast
demons out of Patient 1 in clinical session and billed Patient 1’s insurance for
that session. It also determined that Okafor recorded and shared her clinical
session with Patient 1 without obtaining prior written consent. The Board
concluded these actions constituted gross negligence and unprofessional
conduct under Business and Professions Code section 2761.
In deciding on the level of discipline to impose, the Board relied on its
Recommended Guidelines for Disciplinary Orders and Conditions of
Probation. Under those guidelines, revocation was the recommended
discipline for gross negligence and unprofessional conduct. The Board also
acknowledged that, while there was no evidence that Patient 1 was harmed
by the November 3 session, Okafor’s “deliverance or casting of demons out of
[Patient 1] potentially exacerbated [his] psychiatric condition by contributing
to and validating his delusions.”
10
The Board emphasized that Okafor “expressed no remorse and
conceded no wrongdoing with respect to her treatment of Patient 1.” The
Board concluded that there were no reassurances that similar misconduct
would not re-occur in the future. Accordingly, the Board revoked Okafor’s
registered nursing license as well as her nurse practitioner and nurse
practitioner furnishing certificates, citing concern for public health and
safety.
III. Okafor’s Petition for a Writ of Administrative Mandamus
In October 2024, Okafor filed a verified petition for a writ of
administrative mandamus under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5
challenging the Board’s decision. In the briefing in support of her petition,
Okafor argued that the Board did not meet the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard required to revoke her license. She also claimed the
Board violated her due process rights because it revoked her license “for
reasons unrelated to ‘her fitness or competence to practice that profession.’
[Citations.]” Finally, she argued that revocation was an excessive level of
discipline for the Board to impose.
The trial court denied Okafor’s petition by written order on July 15,
2025. The court determined there was sufficient evidence to support the
findings that Okafor purported to remove demons from Patient 1 during a
clinical session. The court also concluded that due process was satisfied as
long as the conduct that Okafor was disciplined for showed that she was unfit
to practice as a nurse practitioner. The court concluded this bar was met as
Okafor’s conduct could have “aggravated a vulnerable minor’s mental state
11
and was a significant departure from the standard of practice for [a]
psychiatric nurse practitioner.” The trial court also concluded the
punishment of revocation was not excessive as Okafor’s conduct was a “severe
deviation” from professional standards for which she expressed no remorse
and conceded no wrongdoing.
The court subsequently entered a judgment denying Okafor’s petition
for writ of mandate. Okafor timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards
“Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure governs judicial review
by administrative mandate of a final decision or order rendered by an
administrative agency.” (Johnson v. Housing Authority of City of Oakland
(2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 603, 612.) Where, as here, the decision of the
administrative agency affects an individual’s right to practice a trade or
profession, “the trial court not only examines the administrative record for
errors of law but also exercises its independent judgment upon the evidence
disclosed in a limited trial de novo.” (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130,
137, 143.)
When the trial court applies the independent judgment standard in
ruling on a petition, “the standard of review on appeal of the trial court’s
determination is the substantial evidence test.” (Fukuda v. City of Angels
(1999) 20 Cal.4th 805, 824.) “Applying the substantial evidence test on
appeal, we may not reweigh the evidence, but consider that evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court, indulging in every reasonable inference
12
in favor of the trial court’s findings and resolving all conflicts in its favor.”
(Breslin v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1064,
1078.) “We must uphold the court’s findings unless they are so lacking in
evidentiary support as to render them unreasonable.” (Lozano v. City of Los
Angeles (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 711, 723 (Lozano).)
However, we apply a de novo standard of review to questions of law.
(Lozano, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 723.) We also “‘review de novo whether
the agency’s imposition of a particular penalty on the petitioner constituted
an abuse of discretion by the agency. [Citations.] But we will not disturb the
agency’s choice of penalty absent “‘an arbitrary, capricious or patently
abusive exercise of discretion’” by the administrative agency.’ [Citation.]”
(Bedard v. City of Los Angeles (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 442, 454 (Bedard).)
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Okafor argues the trial court’s findings are unsupported by the
evidence. Particularly, she argues there was insufficient evidence that she
attempted to remove demons from Patient 1. She also contends there was
insufficient evidence that her session with Patient 1 on November 3 was
clinical in nature. We disagree.
Okafor’s arguments are premised on misrepresentations of the
evidence. For example, Okafor claims, without any citation to the record,
that “the only real and proper evidence in this case was that some of the
other employees heard a loud prayer through the door.” Not so. As discussed
above, the testimony from the Board’s witnesses went well beyond simply
hearing prayer through Okafor’s door. Okafor ignores the evidence from
Zaragoza and Garcia that Okafor expressly claimed that she had cast demons
out of Patient 1 on November 3. (Thompson v. Asimos (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th
13
970, 981 (Thompson) [“A single witness’s testimony may constitute
substantial evidence to support a finding”].)
Taken together, Okafor’s arguments show only that there was
conflicting evidence presented below regarding what occurred in her office on
November 3. In essence, Okafor argues that the evidence supporting the
findings against her could not have satisfied the clear and convincing
standard simply because it was contradicted by other evidence. This
misapprehends the nature of our review.
Even assuming that the trial court’s findings had to be supported by
clear and convincing evidence,4 our Supreme Court has made it clear that
“[w]hen reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and
convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the
record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact
finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true. In
conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how
the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved
conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the
evidence.” (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011–1012 (O.B.).)
We acknowledge that the trial court’s findings were not based on
undisputed evidence. Rather, they were based on the trial court’s credibility
determinations and resolution of conflicting evidence. Even when reviewing
under the clear and convincing standard, the trial court’s evidentiary and
4 The trial court correctly identified a split of authority on this point.
(Compare Chamberlain v. Ventura County Civil Service Com. (1977) 69
Cal.App.3d 362, 368–369 with Li v. Superior Court (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th
836, 865.) We need not resolve this conflict as we would affirm under either
standard.
14
credibility determinations are afforded considerable deference, and we may
not reverse simply because there was also evidence in the record that would
have supported a contrary conclusion. (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1011–
1012; Schmidt v. Superior Court (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 582; Bloxham v.
Saldinger (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 729, 750.)
Ultimately, we need not dissect every evidentiary conflict identified in
Okafor’s briefing. (See County of Los Angeles v. Civil Service Com. (1995) 39
Cal.App.4th 620, 633-634 (County of Los Angeles).) It is enough to note that
we have examined the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings and
conclude that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it was “highly
probable” that Okafor purported to cast demons out of Patient 1 in a clinical
setting. (O.B., supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 1011.)
III. Revocation Was Not Excessive
Okafor argues that the Board abused its discretion in revoking her
license and certificates. She contends that revocation was excessive as she
had no prior history of disciplinary action and there was no evidence that
Patient 1 was harmed by the session. We find no abuse of discretion in the
Board’s choice of discipline.
“It bears emphasizing that the Board’s authority to take disciplinary
action against a licensed nurse derives from the state’s inherent power to
regulate the use of property to preserve public health, morals, comfort, order
and safety. [Citation.] ‘Administrative proceedings to revoke, suspend, or
impose discipline on a professional license are noncriminal and nonpenal;
they are not intended to punish the licensee, but rather to protect the public.’
[Citation.]” (Sulla v. Board of Registered Nursing (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th
1195, 1206.) The evidence here supports the Board’s conclusion that the
15
revocation of Okafor’s license and certificates was necessary to preserve
public health and safety.
Okafor’s reliance on Richardson v. Bd. of Supervisors (1988) 203
Cal.App.3d 486 (Richardson) is misplaced. The petitioner in Richardson was
terminated from his position as a deputy sheriff after he got into a heated
argument with a supervisor and briefly left work for about one hour without
being officially relieved of duty. (Id. at pp. 489–491.) On appeal, our
colleagues in the Fifth District concluded that termination was an excessive
penalty given that the petitioner otherwise had an unblemished record of
public service, no harm was posed by his brief, one-hour departure from
work, and “[m]ore importantly,” it was unlikely that the incident would
reoccur in the future. (Id. at pp. 494–495.)
Here, by contrast, there was uncontested expert testimony that
Okafor’s actions presented a risk of harm to Patient 1, who was particularly
vulnerable given his young age and schizoaffective disorder. Moreover,
Okafor expressed no remorse for her actions, maintained that she had done
nothing wrong, and expressly stated that she would do the same thing again
if given the opportunity. There was also evidence that Okafor had previously
purported to cast demons out of another patient at HDPS. It is also
undisputed that under the Board’s Recommended Guidelines, revocation is
the recommended discipline for acts of gross negligence and unprofessional
conduct. On such facts, Richardson carries little weight.
While it is true that Okafor had no prior disciplinary history and there
was no evidence that Patient 1 was harmed by her conduct, this is
insufficient to establish an abuse of discretion in the Board’s choice of
discipline. At most it shows that there was evidence before the Board that
could have supported a lower level of discipline. But “[a]n appellate court is
16
not free to substitute its discretion for that of the administrative agency. ‘If
reasonable minds may differ with regard to the appropriate disciplinary
action, there is no abuse of discretion.’ [Citation.]” (County of Los Angeles,
supra, 39 Cal.App.4th at p. 634.) We therefore find no abuse of discretion in
the Board’s choice of discipline.
IV. Constitutionality
Okafor argues the Board’s decision was an unconstitutional
infringement on her religious freedom. Okafor’s argument is premised on the
false assertion that “it is undeniable that Okafor was disciplined for
practicing her religion.” Not so. The record is clear that Okafor was
disciplined for “cast[ing] demons out of Patient 1,” and for recording and
sharing video of Patient 1 without clinical justification or prior written
consent. Okafor unequivocally testified that casting out or dispelling demons
was not part of her religious beliefs. Accordingly, Okafor has not shown that
she was disciplined for practicing her religion. This alone is fatal to her
argument.
This argument would fail even if Okafor could show that she was
disciplined for practicing her religion. As Okafor acknowledges, the Board
could discipline her for her religious practices if there was a logical
connection between those practices and her fitness or competence to practice
her profession. (See Moustafa v. Board of Registered Nursing (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 1119, 1137–1138; Griffiths v. Superior Court (2002) 96
Cal.App.4th 757, 769.) Such a logical connection exists here as Thompson’s
uncontested expert testimony at the administrative hearing established that
17
Okafor’s actions had the potential to exacerbate Patient 1’s mental illness.
There is no question that placing a patient at risk of harm bears a direct,
logical connection to her fitness to practice as a nurse practitioner. For this
separate reason, Okafor’s argument fails.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Board is awarded its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ZUKIN, P. J.
We concur:
MORI, J.
DAUM, J.
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