Filed 9/22/26 Ogassian v. Ogassian CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
RONALD LEE OGASSIAN, B351445
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STPB10840)
v.
DANIEL OGASSIAN,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephanie C. Santoro, Judge. Affirmed.
Ronald Lee Ogassian, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Daniel Ogassian, in pro. per., for Defendant and
Respondent.
_________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION1
Helen M. Ogassian placed real and personal property into a
trust which was revocable while she was alive but became
irrevocable upon her death. While alive, Helen2 later disposed of
all the property initially placed in the revocable trust such that
the trust had no assets upon her death. After Helen’s death, her
son Ronald filed a petition seeking, in part, an accounting of trust
assets. After holding four evidentiary hearings and receiving
documents, the probate court concluded that Helen had disposed
of all the property held in the trust prior to her death and denied
Ronald’s request for an accounting. Ronald now appeals that
decision, and we affirm.
A. Factual and Procedural Background
On January 21, 2020, Helen executed a trust titled the
Restated Helen M. Ogassian Living Trust (the trust). According
to its terms, Helen could revoke the trust at any time before her
death but it became irrevocable upon her death. Helen was the
trustee with her son Daniel being identified as the successor
trustee and her daughter Nadine Jakovich as an alternate
successor trustee if Daniel did not assume the role.
The trust assets initially included five pieces of Southern
California real estate located on (1) El Caminito in La Crescenta
(El Caminito property), (2) Winchester Avenue in Glendale
1 See California Standards of Judicial Administration
section 8.1.
2 Because they share the same surname, we refer to Helen
M. Ogassian, her children Ronald Lee Ogassian and Daniel
Ogassian, and her grandson Jared Ogassian by their first names
for clarity and the reader’s ease. We intend no disrespect.
2
(Winchester property), (3) N. Louise Street in Glendale (Louise
property), (4) Pioneer Drive in Glendale (Pioneer property), and
(5) Tujunga Canyon in Tujunga (Tujunga property). The assets
also included unspecified accounts, investments, and personal
property. Upon Helen’s death, Ronald was to receive the
Winchester property and the Tujunga property, Daniel the Louise
property, Jakovich the Pioneer property, and Ronald’s son Jared
would receive $50,000. The residue of the trust was to be
distributed “so that each child receives equal net value in respect
to the real estate specifically given.”
On January 16, 2021, Helen executed deeds transferring
the Winchester and Tujunga properties to Ronald, the Pioneer
property to Jakovich, the Louise property to Daniel, and the El
Caminito property to Jakovich and Daniel.
On June 6, 2022, Jakovich, Daniel, and Helen (individually
and as trustee) entered a confidential settlement agreement in a
partition action filed by Jakovich. Ronald was not a party to the
settlement. Under the agreement, the El Caminito property
would be listed for sale with Jakovich as the listing agent, Daniel
would “continue to support Helen” until the El Caminito property
was sold, and the proceeds from the sale would be distributed as
follows: $20,000 to Helen; Jakovich would be reimbursed sales
expenses up to $15,000; 30 percent of the net proceeds would be
reserved to pay taxes (with any excess amount to be divided by
Jakovich and Daniel); Daniel would be reimbursed for mortgage
payments and Helen’s assisted living expenses for the period
March 1, 2022 to the sale date; and the remaining proceeds would
be invested and held for Helen’s benefit, with any amount
remaining at Helen’s death to be divided equally between
Jakovich and Daniel.
3
The El Caminito property was sold in November of 2022;
Jakovich and Daniel each received various reimbursements plus
payouts of approximately $262,000 each; in addition, various bills
were paid from the proceeds, including several from a “[s]enior
[l]iving” facility.
Helen died on August 1, 2023.
On September 24, 2024, Ronald filed a petition under
Probate Code3 section 17200 for an order removing Daniel as
trustee and directing Daniel to provide an accounting and other
information about the trust assets. According to the petition, on
July 17, 2024, Ronald’s counsel sent Daniel a letter requesting
“basic information about the . . . [t]rust, an accounting, timeline
for distribution etc.” Ronald and his counsel then spoke with
Daniel by phone and “Daniel explained that he and [Jakovich]
were involved in a lawsuit against . . . Helen . . . a few months
before she passed away. Daniel stated that the three of them
entered into a settlement agreement without [Ronald’s]
knowledge.” Ronald sought orders for Daniel to provide “an
accounting . . . detailing his acts as [t]rustee,” a copy of the
settlement agreement, “and . . . statements for all assets held in
Helen’s [t]rust and [e]state from the time of the alleged
settlement agreement until her passing”; for “a complete
accounting of all rental income from the [Winchester and
Tujunga properties] . . . from the date of transfer until the date
that Ronald learned of the transfer and assumed management
and control over said properties”; and for “the return of all [t]rust
property improperly taken by Daniel and [Jakovich] under . . .
[section] 856, if any is so determined.”
3 Unspecified statutory references are to the Probate Code.
4
On December 12, 2024, the probate court received
testimony and ordered Daniel to provide an accounting of the
trust by March 1, 2025. The hearing was not reported.
On April 8, 2025, Daniel filed a statement indicating that
Helen had revoked the trust on January 16, 2021, and submitted
copies of the deeds of trust dated January 16, 2021, transferring
the Winchester property and Tujunga property to Ronald, the
Pioneer property to Jakovich, the Louise property to Daniel, and
the El Caminito property to Jakovich and Daniel. Daniel also
submitted a copy of the settlement agreement he had entered
with Jakovich and Helen in June of 2022 and the escrow
instructions for the November 2022 sale of the El Caminito
property.
On April 10, 2025, the probate court heard testimony and
ordered Daniel to “file a statement . . . regarding aspects of the
estate that were managed or marshaled while Daniel . . . was
[t]rustee.” The court appointed Ronald as successor trustee,
finding that Daniel had resigned as trustee and Jakovich had
declined to act as successor.4 The hearing was not reported. The
day of the hearing, Daniel filed a statement indicating that “[he]
never marshalled any assets of the . . . trust[]” and “[a]ll of the
assets of the . . . trust were gifted in January of 2021.”
On May 5, 2025, Ronald filed an “[o]bjection” in which he
made claims about the transfers of the real property formerly
subject to the trust and about the settlement agreement among
Jakovich, Daniel, and Helen. Ronald also objected to being
4 The court denied Ronald’s petition to remove Daniel as
trustee as moot.
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named successor trustee because he claimed his attorney failed to
properly inform him about his potential liability as a trustee.
On July 9, 2025, Ronald substituted out his attorney and
began representing himself.
On August 1, 2025, the probate court heard testimony. The
hearing was not reported.
On October 15, 2025, Ronald filed a statement in which he
claimed, “For more than 30 years, my siblings have acted in ways
that concealed assets, diverted income, and failed to provide any
clear record of trust property or income. A proper accounting is
not just a procedural formality—it is the only way to uncover the
truth of decades of financial misconduct.” Ronald requested the
court to reject Daniel’s accounting and “compel him to file a
proper, verified accounting in compliance with the Probate Code.”
On November 10, 2025, after receiving testimony, the
probate court denied Ronald’s petition with prejudice. The court
concluded that Ronald “[had] no right to an accounting from
Daniel . . . or . . . Jakovich, as neither served as trustee while
settlor Helen . . . was alive. Instead, settlor served as trustee
until her death and during her tenure as trustee, she entered into
a settlement agreement by which she distributed the assets of the
trust, including the two pieces of real property.” The court found
that no assets remained in the trust. The hearing was not
reported.
B. Discussion
The trust established by Helen was revocable, meaning it
was “a trust that the person who creates it, generally called the
settlor, can revoke during the person’s lifetime. The
beneficiaries’ interest in the trust is contingent only, and the
settlor can eliminate that interest at any time. . . . When the
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settlor dies, the trust becomes irrevocable, and the beneficiaries’
interest in the trust vests.” (Estate of Giraldin (2012) 55 Cal.4th
1058, 1062, fn. omitted.) During the time such a trust is
revocable, the trustee does not owe any duties to the
beneficiaries. (Ibid.; see § 15800.)
Section 17200 authorizes a trust beneficiary to petition the
court “concerning the internal affairs of the trust,” including for
an order “[c]ompelling the trustee to . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . [a]ccount
to the beneficiary.” (Id., subds. (a), b(7)(C).) “Although the
beneficiaries of [an] irrevocable trust have standing to petition
the probate court for an accounting and information after the
settlor dies and the trust or a portion of the trust becomes
irrevocable, the probate court does not have authority to order
the trustee to provide an accounting or information regarding
trust assets and transactions while the trust was still revocable”
where the settlor was the trustee before his or her death and
“there is no claim that the deceased settlor was incapacitated or
subject to undue influence during the period of revocability.”
(Babbitt v. Superior Court (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1139.)5
The probate court found that Helen was the trustee of the
trust until her death and prior to her death disposed of all the
parcels of real estate held in the trust. This finding is supported
by substantial evidence. Daniel adduced evidence that all five
parcels were transferred in January of 2021, during Helen’s
lifetime. Ronald concedes that the two parcels which were to be
distributed to him through the trust were transferred to him in
January of 2021. There is also substantial evidence (including
5 Ronald made no claim that Helen’s disposition of assets
was the result of incapacity or undue influence.
7
the settlement agreement disposing of nonreal property)
supporting the probate court’s finding that Helen disposed of all
other assets in the trust before her death. To the extent Ronald
contends the court’s findings are unsupported, his claim fails
because he failed to provide a record of any of the four hearings
at which the court received testimony. “[A] trial court judgment
is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an
appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to
the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that
justifies reversal of the judgment.” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5
Cal.5th 594, 609.) “ ‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the
record, all presumptions in favor of the trial court’s action will be
made by the appellate court. . . .’ [Citation.] ‘ “A necessary
corollary to this rule is that if the record is inadequate for
meaningful review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the
trial court should be affirmed.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
Based on the probate court’s findings that all the assets in
the trust had been disposed of prior to Helen’s death, it did not
err in denying the accounting requested by Ronald. “Because
assets held in a revocable trust essentially belong to the settlor,
the settlor may dispose of the trust’s assets and effectively
eliminate the beneficiaries’ interest altogether ‘with no need to
justify or explain’ . . . her actions.” (Babbitt v. Superior Court,
supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 1145.) Thus, a would-be beneficiary
such as Ronald cannot petition under section 17200 for an
accounting covering the period when Helen was trustee.
(Babbitt, at p. 1146.)
Ronald contends he adduced evidence of financial
irregularities and that Daniel and Jakovich exercised control over
“trust-related assets and financial matters,” but none of the
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evidence Ronald adduced nor the claims he made about it relate
to conduct occurring after Helen’s death. Daniel could not have
owed any trustee duties to Ronald based on events occurring
before Helen’s death because Helen was the trustee at that time.
Estate of Giraldin, upon which Ronald relies, is distinguishable
because in that case the settlor was not the trustee and the court
only held that after the settlor died, the beneficiaries could sue
the trustee for breaching his duties owed to the settlor while the
settlor was alive. (Estate of Giraldin, supra, 55 Cal.4th at
pp. 1062, 1067-1068.)
Lastly, we reject Ronald’s contention that the probate court
violated his due process rights by initially denying his petition
without prejudice and then later, outside the presence of the
parties, denying the petition with prejudice. The court provided
Ronald with due process by holding an evidentiary hearing.
“[S]ome kind of hearing is required at some time before a person
is finally deprived of his property interests” (Wolff v. McDonnell
(1974) 418 U.S. 539, 557-558 [94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935]),
and the probate court held such a hearing. Nothing required it to
issue its ruling after that hearing in the presence of the parties.
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DISPOSITION
We affirm the probate court’s order denying Ronald’s
petition for an accounting. Daniel is awarded his costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
BENDIX, J.
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