Filed 7/20/26 Obiora v. PWxyz CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
NOEL A. OBIORA, B349757
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. 24STCV03117)
PWxyz, LLC,
Defendant and
Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County
of Los Angeles, Maureen Duffy-Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
Noel A. Obiora, self-represented litigant, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Milord Law Group, Milord A. Keshishian and Shannon
Skrzynski, for Defendant and Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Noel Obiora appeals from the trial court’s order
awarding attorney fees to defendant PWxyz, LLC (defendant)
after granting its Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 special
motion to strike.1 We affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
On September 9, 2024, plaintiff filed a first amended
complaint (the operative complaint) against Rare Bird Books,
LLC (Rare Bird), Robert Tyson Cornell (Cornell), and defendant.2
On October 11, 2024, defendant filed a demurrer to the first
amended complaint. (§§ 430.10, subd. (e), 1060.) On October 15,
2024, defendant filed a special motion to strike the single cause of
action alleged against it pursuant to section 425.16, the anti-
SLAPP statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).)
On January 29, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing
on the demurrer and special motion to strike. After argument,
the court issued an order granting the special motion to strike
and dismissed the single cause of action against defendant. It
1 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure. We grant plaintiff’s request to take judicial notice of
the appendix plaintiff filed in case No. B345075.
2 Plaintiff designated Cornell, the managing member of Rare
Bird, as a respondent on appeal; and Cornell has filed a joinder to
defendant’s respondent’s brief. The order from which plaintiff
appeals, however, did not award Cornell any attorney fees. We
therefore disregard Cornell’s joinder as having been filed by a
nonparty to the appeal.
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then vacated the hearing on the demurrer as moot. The court
ruled that defendant was entitled to attorney fees and costs in
connection with the successful anti-SLAPP motion.
On April 3, 2025, defendant moved for an award of
$42,205.20 in attorney fees pursuant to the trial court’s earlier
order and section 425.16, subdivision (c). Defendant submitted
the April 3, 2025, supporting declaration of attorney Milord
Keshishian, who testified that the attorney fees and costs
“comprised of (a) 57 hours to bring the anti-SLAPP motion
costing $27,737.95 and (b) 32.9 hours to bring the instant
[m]otion [for attorney fees] costing $14,467.25, an anticipated 20
hours on drafting the [r]eply, and 5 hours in preparing and orally
arguing the [m]otion.” Counsel attached copies of time records
and detailed billing entries for the following persons: Milord
Keshishian, Shirley Matcha, Cassady Meaghan Ekaphan,
Dabrielle Stevens, Marlen Millan-Osuna, and Ling Tang.
Keshishian explained that he had over 26 years of trial
experience in intellectual property matters, with an hourly billing
rate of $700. Matcha was an intellectual property associate with
an hourly rate of $350. Stevens and Ekaphan were intellectual
property paralegals who billed at an hourly rate of $250. The
Keshishian declaration did not include information about Millan-
Osuna and Tang. He testified that the billing records attached to
his declaration were “true and accurate copies of my firm’s time
records and billing entries for drafting the anti-SLAPP motion
and drafting this instant motion.” The combined total billed by
Millan-Osuna and Tang was $945. Defendant later revised its
request to $52,215 to include further costs associated with
litigating the contested fee motion.
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On June 30, 2025, the trial court conducted a hearing on
the attorney fees motion. The record on appeal does not include a
reporter’s transcript of the hearing or a suitable substitute such
as an agreed or settled statement. Following the hearing, the
court issued an order awarding defendant attorney fees. We
recite here the entirety of the minute order as it pertains to the
attorney fee award: “Defendant is entitled to attorney fees. CCP
425.16(c)(1). Ketchum [v.] Moses (2001) 24 Cal.[4th] 1122, 1132,
1137 [(Ketchum)]. The standard of review is reasonableness. [¶]
The Court awards $40,000 as a reasonable amount.”
On August 13, 2025, plaintiff timely filed a notice of appeal.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Principles
A prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike is
entitled to recover attorney fees and costs, including fees and
costs incurred on appeal. (§ 425.16, subd. (c)(1); Area 51
Productions, Inc. v. City of Alameda (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 581,
605.) As the moving party, the prevailing defendant seeking
attorney fees and costs “‘“‘bear[s] the burden of establishing
entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours
expended and hourly rates.’ [Citation.]”’ … (Christian Research
[Institute v. Alnor (2008)] 165 Cal.App.4th [1315,] 1320.) [¶] …
‘[T]he verified time statements of [an] attorney[], as [an] officer[]
of the court, are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear
indication the records are erroneous.’ (Horsford v. Board of
Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th
359, 396.)” (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th
751, 784–785.)
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“The issue of a party’s entitlement to attorney’s fees is a
legal issue which we review de novo. [Citations.] However, the
determination of the amount of fees to be awarded is reviewed for
abuse of discretion.” (Garcia v. Santana (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th
464, 468–469; accord, Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1130.)
“‘“The ‘“experienced trial judge is the best judge of the value of
professional services rendered in his court, and while his
judgment is of course subject to review, it will not be disturbed
unless the appellate court is convinced that it is clearly wrong.”’”
(Ketchum, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.)
“[I]it is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that
a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and
the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the
record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.”
(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608–609 (Jameson);
Rhule v. WaveFront Technology, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 1223,
1228; Vo v. Las Virgenes Municipal Water Dist. (2000) 79
Cal.App.4th 440, 448.) “‘“A necessary corollary to this rule is that
if the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant
defaults and the decision of the trial court should be affirmed.”’
[Citation.] ‘Consequently, [the appellant] has the burden of
providing an adequate record. [Citation.] Failure to provide an
adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved
against [the appellant].’” (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)
B. Analysis
Plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion
when it relied on attorney Keshishian’s declaration and
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supporting exhibits. According to plaintiff, each attorney and
paralegal was obligated to submit a supporting declaration. He
also contends that the court erred in awarding fees for attorney
work conducted, in part, on the demurrer and challenges some of
the billing records as being duplicative of legal work that was
performed on the demurrer.
Plaintiff, however, has failed to provide a reporter’s
transcript or suitable substitute of the hearing on the attorney
fees motion. Accordingly, he has failed to establish error by an
adequate record and we affirm the court’s order on this ground.
(Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)
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IV. DISPOSITION
The order granting defendant’s request for attorney fees
under section 425.16, subdivision (c) is affirmed. Defendant is
awarded costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
KIM (D.), J.
We concur:
BAKER, Acting P. J.
MOOR, J.
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