Fear Not Law CA Unpub Decisions

O'Connor v. San Mateo Healthcare & Wellness Center CA1/1

Filed 10/8/26 O’Connor v. San Mateo Healthcare & Wellness Center CA1/1
CA Unpub Decisions

Filed 10/8/26 O’Connor v. San Mateo Healthcare & Wellness Center CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

SEAN O’CONNOR et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
A172069
v.
SAN MATEO HEALTHCARE & (San Francisco City and County
WELLNESS CENTER, LP, et al., Super. Ct. No. CGC-24-613771)
Defendants and Appellants.

Defendants appeal from an order denying their motion to compel
arbitration of this lawsuit, which was brought by a person acting both on
behalf of a decedent and in an individual capacity. They advance one theory
that was raised in the trial court, and one that was not. We reject both
arguments and affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
According to the operative complaint, plaintiff Sean O’Connor died
after a six-month stay at a skilled nursing facility known as Burlingame
Long Term Care (Burlingame). His wife, Michelle O’Connor, sued
Burlingame and related entities and individuals, both as Sean’s successor

1
and in her own personal capacity.1 The complaint alleged eight causes of
action. Five were brought as survival claims on Sean’s behalf: 1) elder
neglect; 2) elder neglect with enhanced remedies; 3) negligence; 4) fraud; and
5) violation of patient’s bill of rights. The other three were brought by
Michelle in her individual capacity: 1) negligent infliction of emotional
distress; 2) wrongful death; and 3) loss of consortium.
Defendants moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the
motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.2, subdivision (c)
(section 1281.2(c)), finding that the “mix of arbitrable and non-arbitrable
claims create[d] a risk of inconsistent findings of fact or law.”
II.
DISCUSSION

Section 1281.2(c) is part of the California Arbitration Act (CAA), and it
gives trial courts discretion to stay or deny arbitration when “[a] party to the
arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action . . . with a
third party” that “aris[es] out of the same transaction or series of related
transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common
issue of law or fact.” The Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1, et. seq.
(FAA)), however, “does not permit a trial court to stay or deny arbitration in

1 Defendants include San Mateo Healthcare & Wellness Centre, LP,

d/b/a Burlingame Long Term Care, LLC; Los Angeles Nursing Homes, LLC
(f/k/a Brius, LLC); Pacific Healthcare Holdings, Inc. (Brius Management Co.);
Rockport Administrative Services, LLC; Rockport Healthcare Support
Services, LLC; San Mateo Wellness GP, LLC; Shlomo Rechnitz; Tom Wood;
Kristine Guillermo; Georgia Otterson; Zoraida Martinez, and Gina Fizulic
(a/k/a Gina Santiago). In addition, Sean’s son, Christopher O’Connor, was
named as an “heir defendant.” A plaintiff asserting a wrongful death claim
may name and serve an heir as a defendant when the heir was estranged or
is otherwise unsuitable for representation by plaintiff’s counsel. (See
Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 808.)

2
those circumstances.” (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 157
(Valencia).) Thus, whether a court can stay or deny arbitration in a
proceeding involving a third party depends on whether the CAA or the FAA
governs the proceeding. A trial court’s determination to stay or deny
arbitration because of a third party is subject to review for abuse of
discretion. (Molecular Analytical Systems v. Ciphergen Biosystems, Inc.
(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 696, 708.)
A. This case involves a third party.
The first question we must resolve is whether this case involves a third
party, i.e., one that was not bound by an arbitration agreement. The parties
dispute the point, but we conclude that Michelle is a third party because she
never agreed to arbitrate claims in her individual capacity by signing the
arbitration agreement in that capacity.
Michelle signed the agreement on a line indicating she was acting as a
“Legal Representative/Agent (if any).” The parties do not dispute that
Michelle had the authority to contract on behalf of Sean, as she was
empowered to do so under a durable power of attorney that Sean had signed
in 2022. Thus, the only question is whether Michelle, by signing the
agreement in such a manner, also agreed to arbitrate her future individual
claims. We conclude she did not.
In Ruiz v. Podolsky (2010) 50 Cal.4th 838, 849, the California Supreme
Court held that Code of Civil Procedure section 1295, which is part of the
Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA), authorizes patients who
consent to arbitration to bind their heirs in actions for wrongful death. The
court has since clarified that patients who consent to arbitration do not bind
their heirs, however, when their wrongful death claims sound in elder abuse,
rather than medical malpractice. (Holland v. Silverscreen Healthcare, Inc.

3
(2025) 18 Cal.5th 364, 384.) Here, the parties do not dispute that the claims
asserted sound in elder abuse, as the phrase “ ‘does not refer to substandard
performance of medical services but rather the failure of those responsible for
attending to the basic needs and comforts of elderly or dependent adults,
regardless of their professional standing, to carry out their custodial
obligations.’ ” (Ibid.)
Holland’s holding applies to wrongful death claims brought by an heir
who may have signed an arbitration agreement as the patient’s agent. In
Avila v. Southern California Specialty Care, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 835,
the decedent’s son had signed an arbitration agreement under a power of
attorney as the decedent’s agent, but “did not sign the agreement in his
individual capacity.” (Id. at p. 841.) The court concluded that the son was
not bound to arbitrate a subsequent wrongful death claim sounding in elder
abuse even though the agreement itself stated it would “bind the patient’s
heirs.” (Id. at p. 842; accord Daniels v. Sunrise Living, Inc. (2013)
212 Cal.App.4th 674, 678.)
We recognize, as defendants point out, that the arbitration agreement
here required the person signing the document to acknowledge “that
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, any claims that I may assert in my
personal capacity that arise out of or relate to [providing or failing] to provide
any services (medical or otherwise) or goods by [Burlingame] to [Sean] . . . are
governed by this Arbitration Agreement.” But the agreement included no
signature line for anyone to agree to this (or any other) provision in their
individual capacity. The only signature line indicated the signer was
entering into the agreement as a “Legal Representative/Agent.” Since
Michelle signed the agreement as Sean’s agent only, she did not sign it in her
individual capacity or agree to arbitrate future claims brought in that

4
capacity. (See Hearden v. Windsor Redding Care Center, LLC (2024)
103 Cal.App.5th 1010, 1020–1021 [family members signing arbitration
agreements as “legal representatives/agents” of the decedent does not
establish they signed in their individual capacities].) As a result, Michelle is
a third party as to her three individual claims.2
B. Defendants forfeited the argument that the FAA preempts
section 1281.2(c).

Having found that this case involves a third party, we turn to the
second question, which is whether the FAA applies and preempts
section 1281.2(c). Sean and Michelle argue that arbitration cannot be
compelled for a number of reasons, but they first maintain that the issue of
the FAA’s preemptive effect was forfeited because defendants did not raise it
in the trial court. We agree.3
In opposing defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, Sean and
Michelle specifically argued that the motion should be denied under
section 1281.2(c). As we have said, that section gives trial courts discretion to
stay or deny arbitration when there are arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims
and “there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or
fact.” Sean and Michelle argued that forcing some claims to be arbitrated
while allowing others to be resolved in court would raise “a host of possible
conflicting rulings on commons issues of law and fact. To name but a few
examples, the trial court and arbitrator could disagree on what evidence is
admissible, what law governs, whether regulations establish or inform the

2 The parties do not address, and we therefore do not decide, whether

any other named parties were third parties.
3 As a result, we need not decide whether defendants waived their right

to arbitrate or whether the agreement is unenforceable because it is
unconscionable and was procured through fraud.

5
standard of care, or what level of evidence is sufficient to warrant a directed
verdict.”
In reply to the opposition, defendants did not argue that the FAA
preempted section 1281.2(c). Instead, they argued that they had not waived
enforcement of the arbitration agreement, that arbitration should be
compelled because Michelle “agreed to arbitration of her own claims in
addition to agreeing to arbitrate [Sean’s] claims as his power of attorney”
(italics and bold omitted), and that the agreement was not unconscionable.
These arguments neither mentioned nor analyzed the issue of preemption.
Furthermore, not only were defendants silent about preemption in
their briefing, their litigation activity contradicted any intent to seek to
pursue arbitration under the FAA’s procedural rules. The month before they
filed their motion to compel arbitration, defendants filed a demurrer to all
causes of action and moved to transfer venue to San Mateo County. Two
months after that, they propounded dozens of interrogatories on plaintiffs,
and far more than the 35 that were seemingly permitted under the
arbitration agreement. We need not resolve plaintiffs’ argument that these
actions constituted a waiver of defendants’ arbitration rights (see, e.g.,
Leger v. RAC Rolling Hills LP (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 240, 246), but suffice it
to say the actions reinforce the point that defendants were not pursuing a
preemption strategy.
In their appellate briefing in this court, defendants insist that they
sufficiently preserved the preemption issue because their motion to compel
arbitration was expressly brought under “ ‘9 USC sections 3 and 4’ ” in
addition to California law. And they point out that their memorandum of
points and authorities filed in the trial court “repeatedly referenced federal

6
law and/or the [FAA] throughout in arguing the application of the parties’
valid, fully executed, and enforceable Arbitration Agreement.”
But by merely mentioning the general applicability of the FAA,
defendants did not advance and thereby preserve the specific argument that
section 1281.2(c) was preempted. A “ ‘[f]ailure to raise specific challenges in
the trial court forfeits the claim on appeal.’ ” (Quiles v. Parent (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1013.) The application of the forfeiture doctrine is
largely a matter of fairness to the trial court and the opposing party.
(Velasquez v. Centrome, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1210–1211.)
Defendants’ failure to raise preemption in connection with section 1281.2(c)
left plaintiffs and the trial court unable to either assert or consider counter
arguments, and the issue was left undeveloped by the parties and
unaddressed by the trial court.4 And while we need not wade too deeply into
the issue, it seems to us to cry out for further development. In Volt
Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
University (1989) 489 U.S. 468, 477, the United States Supreme Court
specifically held that the FAA does not preempt section 1281.2(c). At the
same time, however, the law recognizes that parties can contractually agree
to the statute’s inapplicability by agreeing that the FAA’s procedural rules
are to govern disputes. (See Valencia, supra, 185 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.)
Plaintiffs argue that the arbitration agreement was, at best, unclear on this
point because while one provision appeared to make the FAA’s procedural
rules applicable, other provisions appeared to make the CAA’s procedural
rules applicable. The plaintiffs and the trial court had no occasion to consider

4 The defendants know how to specifically argue FAA preemption, and

they did so in successfully arguing that a stay of trial court proceedings was
required by the FAA during the pendency of this appeal.

7
the governing legal principles or to analyze how they might apply to the
specific facts in this case. We decline to resolve them on such a silent record.
(See JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Electric Corp. of America (2004)
115 Cal.App.4th 168, 178 [“Appellate courts are loath to reverse a judgment
on grounds that the opposing party did not have an opportunity to argue and
the trial court did not have an opportunity to consider”].)
III.
DISPOSITION

The trial court’s order denying the request to compel arbitration is
affirmed. Plaintiffs are awarded their appellate costs.

8
_________________________
Humes, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

_________________________
Smiley, J.

O’Connor, et al. v. San Mateo Healthcare & Wellness Center, LP, et al.,
A172069

9

← Back to CA Unpub Decisions · Knowledge Base
Lean view · served in 1 ms · full site view