Filed 8/6/26 Nguyen v. Han CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
TU A WINN NGUYEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G065197
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-
01387692)
QUANG HAN,
OPINION
Defendant and Respondent.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Deborah C. Servino, Judge. Affirmed.
Tu A Winn Nguyen, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Law Offices of Van Tran and Van Tran for Defendant and
Respondent.
Tu A Winn Nguyen appeals from the trial court’s judgment in
favor of Quang Han. After Han defaulted, the court held a prove-up
evidentiary hearing and determined Nguyen failed to state a cause of action
for defamation and was not entitled to recover any damages. Nguyen argues
the judgment must be reversed because the court improperly ignored
evidence of damages. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Our review is hampered by the sparse record submitted by
Nguyen. The entire record consists of a 27-page clerk’s transcript. In terms of
substantive documents, it includes primarily the judgment and the trial
court’s January 16, 2025 minute order.
Nonetheless, from what we can glean, the complaint in this
action was filed on March 25, 2024. In Nguyen’s opening brief, Nguyen
characterizes this case as “a civil action alleging defamation and related
misconduct” by Han. This description is confirmed by the trial court’s minute
order resolving the claims below, which describes the allegations in the
complaint as follows:1 “The Complaint alleges only that: (1) [Han] ‘sees this
as an opportunity and speaks out defamation, smear and invent many unreal
stories ... aimed at making defamation more effective and valuable.’ [ellipses
in original]; (2) ‘After days of posting on Facebook, many defamation repeated
only defamation and fabrications about the accusation, many advised not to
take a Communist hat or libel, but [Han] continued’; and (3) ‘The defamation
and assertion of [Nguyen] is Communist, in addition to financial matters,
also important for [Nguyen’s] life safety and family’. (Complaint, at ¶¶ 2, 3, &
1 We include the trial court’s description of the allegations
without correcting typographical and grammatical errors in the original
quoted materials.
2
6.)” While we cannot confirm the accuracy of this description, it is the most
detailed account of the allegations in the record.2
From the trial court’s minute order included in the record, it
appears Han did not respond to the complaint and the court entered default.
Nguyen filed a statement of damages, which he failed to include in this
record. The court scheduled a default prove-up hearing. Han did not appear
at the hearing, and the court heard testimony from Nguyen with the aid of a
Vietnamese language interpreter. The court took the matter under
submission and stated it would rule by minute order.
The trial court’s minute order directed that judgment be entered
for Han. The court explained it could not reach the issue of damages unless
the complaint first stated a cause of action. Based on the allegations set forth
above, the court concluded Nguyen failed to state a cause of action because
the allegations “appear[ed]” to be time-barred and the complaint failed to
identify the words constituting the alleged libel. The court focused on the
latter reason and explained, because the complaint did not include the actual
language of the allegedly defamatory statement or statements, Nguyen did
not establish falsity or that the statement or statements were indeed
defamatory. The court did not address damages, or any evidence or testimony
provided by Nguyen.
DISCUSSION
Nguyen argues once the default was entered, liability was
“conclusively” established and the trial court improperly ignored the
2 On this point, the “statement of facts” in Nguyen’s opening brief
lacks record citations and provides in full: “[Nguyen] presented evidence
showing [Han] made false statements that harmed [Nguyen’s] reputation and
business interests. [Nguyen] submitted documents and testimony supporting
falsity, publication, fault, and damages.”
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unrebutted evidence of damages. We conclude otherwise and affirm for two
reasons: (1) the court based its ruling on its analysis of the complaint and did
not need to consider the issue of damages; and (2) Nguyen did not include the
complaint in the record so any argument beyond the record before us is
waived.
I.
NO ERROR IS APPARENT ON THE RECORD SUBMITTED
Contrary to Nguyen’s contention, liability is not established by
the default itself. Rather, a default only confesses properly pleaded facts and
“if the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint do not state any proper cause
of action, the default judgment in the plaintiff’s favor cannot stand.” (Kim v.
Westmoore Partners, Inc. (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 267, 282 (Kim).)
Consequently, the complaint “must be examined.” (Carlsen v. Koivumaki
(2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 879, 900.) In so doing, the court is required to “act as
gatekeeper, ensuring that only the appropriate claims get through.” (Kim, at
p. 272.)3
The trial court applied the appropriate analysis, reviewing the
sufficiency of the complaint before considering the issue of damages. (See
Kim, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at pp. 282–286 [engaging in a detailed analysis
of each cause of action before considering proof of damages].) The elements of
a claim for defamation are: “‘“(a) a publication that is (b) false, (c) defamatory,
and (d) unprivileged, and that (e) has a natural tendency to injure or that
causes special damage.”’” (Sanchez v. Bezos (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 750, 763.)
3 We note Nguyen’s reliance on Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999)
72 Cal.App.4th 357 is misplaced. The Johnson court acknowledged a trial
court may not ignore evidence of damages “where a cause of action is stated in
the complaint” and the evidence does not exceed “that demanded in the
complaint.” (Id. at pp. 361–362.)
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As the court explained, “The general rule is that the words constituting an
alleged libel must be specifically identified, if not pleaded verbatim, in the
complaint.” (Kahn v. Bower (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 1599, 1612, fn. 5.) The
statute of limitations for a defamation cause of action is one year. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 340, subd. (c).)
While we do not have the complaint, the trial court explained the
statement or statements at issue were alleged to have been made in August
2020. Nguyen does not argue otherwise. The action was filed in 2024.
Accordingly, on the record before us, the court was correct to note the claims
appeared time-barred. (Code Civ. Proc., § 340, subd. (c).)
The trial court also concluded Nguyen failed to state a claim
sufficient to support an award of damages. Based on the court’s description in
its minute order, it appears the statement or statements at issue implicated
claims Nguyen was “Communist” and other “financial matters.” No other
details are apparent on the record and Nguyen does not set forth the alleged
defamatory statement or statements in any of the briefing.4 Accordingly,
based on our review of the limited record before us, the court was correct to
4 The trial court noted an allegedly defamatory statement does
appear in Nguyen’s statement of damages. We do not have this document in
the record before us, but the court explained the statement was in
Vietnamese and accompanied by a “Google Translate” version in English.
Assuming this to be the case, the court correctly concluded it could not
consider this statement because the translation was not certified under oath
by a qualified interpreter. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1110(g).) Additionally,
the alleged defamatory statement or statements were not set forth in the
complaint. (See Electronic Funds Solutions, LLC v. Murphy (2005)
134 Cal.App.4th 1161, 1182 [the “‘court cannot allow a plaintiff to prove
different claims or different damages at a default hearing than those pled in
the complaint’”].)
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conclude Nguyen did not state a cause of action.5 Because the court’s ruling
was based on its determination that Nguyen did not state a cause of action,
the court properly acted as a “gatekeeper,” and did not reach any issue
beyond the sufficiency of the allegations. (Kim, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at
p. 272.) Thus, Nguyen’s contention the court ignored unrebutted evidence of
damages is irrelevant. (See id. at p. 286 [“Because Kim’s complaint does not
state any cognizable cause of action against defendants, it does not support
any judgment in his favor”].)
II.
ARGUMENTS UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD ARE FORFEITED
Inasmuch as Nguyen intends to argue the trial court’s analysis of
the complaint was incorrect based on allegations or evidence not included in
this record, we consider those arguments waived. It “is a fundamental
principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily
presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on
the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court
committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment.” (L.O. v. Kilrain
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620.) It is the appellant’s burden to provide a
record adequate to assess error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122,
1140–1141.) If “the appellant fails to provide an adequate record of the
challenged proceedings, we must presume that the appealed judgment or
5 While some decisions have noted “that the word ‘Communist’
has some real sting in the Vietnamese community in Orange County,
California,” (Lam v. Ngo (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 832, 850), based on the record
here, the alleged statement regarding communism was not sufficiently set
forth. (See Nguyen-Lam v. Cao (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 858, 868 [“Plaintiff's
original complaint unequivocally asserted defendant’s statement that she
was a ‘Communist’ was ‘false’”].) Additionally, Nguyen does not directly raise
the significance of communism in the local community.
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order is correct, and on that basis, affirm.” (Jade Fashion & Co., Inc. v.
Harkham Industries, Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 635, 644.) These principles
apply equally to attorney and self-represented litigants, and Nguyen is “not
exempt from the foregoing rules.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th
1229, 1246; see also Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 984 [self-
represented litigants are not entitled to “exceptionally lenient treatment”].)
The record does not include the complaint, and our analysis is
based on the court’s discussion of the allegations. In his designation of the
record, Nguyen initially wrote “complaint” as an additional document to be
included with the clerk’s transcript but crossed it out. We can infer that
Nguyen’s decision to cross out “complaint” means Nguyen affirmatively did
not wish to include the complaint as part of the record. Accordingly, any
argument based on allegations or evidence not included in this record is
waived.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. In the interest of justice, no costs are
awarded.
MOTOIKE, P. J.
WE CONCUR:
GOODING, J.
SCOTT, J.
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