Filed 8/13/26 Nguyen v. Cramer CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
PETER NGUYEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G065995
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2024-
01381650)
RITA CRAMER et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Sheila Recio, Judge. Affirmed. Appellant’s Motion Re Appealability,
Structural Error and Judicial Bias, and Objections to Costs. Denied.
Peter Nguyen, in pro. per., on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Woodruff & Smart, Caroline A. Byrne and Roberta A. Kraus, on
behalf of Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff Peter Nguyen appeals the judgment entered against him
in favor of defendants Rita Cramer, Rafael Avila, Jake Tran, and Lisa L. Kim
(respondents) after the trial court sustained their demurrer to his operative
third amended complaint (TAC) without leave to amend.1 Plaintiff failed to
designate key documents necessary to our review of the trial court’s order
sustaining respondents’ demurrer, including the demurrer papers; failed to
provide record citations to support his assertions; and failed to provide
developed legal argument with citation to authority with respect to his
challenge to key aspects of the trial court’s ruling. We conclude plaintiff has
forfeited his arguments challenging the judgment, which we presume to be
correct. And even assuming plaintiff did not forfeit his arguments on appeal,
we have considered the allegations of the TAC in the light most favorable to
plaintiff and find no error on the face of the order sustaining respondents’
demurrer or the judgment. We affirm.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
During an inspection of solar panels at plaintiff’s residential
property, representatives of the City of Garden Grove (City) noticed several
violations of the Garden Grove Municipal Code. When plaintiff refused the
City’s request to further inspect the property with respect to those violations,
the City obtained an inspection warrant from the Orange County Superior
1
Plaintiff filed this action in Orange County Superior Court
while another case he had filed against the same defendants arising from the
same set of alleged facts was already pending in that court. (See Nguyen v.
Hutchins, Orange County Superior Court case No. 30-2024-01374287.)
Plaintiff’s appeal from a judgment entered against plaintiff in that other case
is also pending before us (case No. G065994). Although related, the cases
have not been consolidated.
2
Court.2 Pursuant to the warrant, the City conducted a second inspection of
the property, which plaintiff alleges was a “forcible entry.”
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in this action on February 28,
2024, and his TAC on August 12, 2024.3 The TAC includes 11 causes of action
against seven defendants, including the four respondents in this appeal, as
well as the City of Garden Grove (City), city attorney Nicholas A. Hutchins,
and chief building official David Dent. The causes of action included
(1) violation of 42 United States Code section 1983,4 (2) perjury, (3) contempt
of court, (4) obstruction of justice, (5) unlawful search, (6) retaliation,
(7) aiding and abetting, (8) malicious prosecution, (9) intentional
misrepresentation, (10) false imprisonment, and (11) intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Among other things, plaintiff alleged defendants caused
damage to portions of his property during the inspection performed pursuant
to the warrant, the inspection warrant was deficient and obtained through
false statements, defendants caused plaintiff and members of his family to
2
Plaintiff alleges defendant Avila told him the warrant was
obtained based on a third party’s complaint about plaintiff’s property.
3
Plaintiff did not designate the TAC as part of the record on
appeal, but instead designated his first amended complaint filed March 14,
2024, which was superseded by the second amended complaint filed August
8, 2025, which in turn was superseded by the TAC filed August 12, 2025.
Respondents added the TAC to the record pursuant to their motion to
augment, which we previously granted.
4
This cause of action was alleged only against the City,
Hutchins, and Dent.
3
stand outside in the rain during the inspection and to suffer distress, and
defendants exceeded the scope of permissible inspections.
On March 28, 2025, before respondents had been served in the
action, the trial court sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the
TAC filed by the City, Hutchins, and Dent. The court determined (1) plaintiff
had failed to allege compliance with the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code,
§ 810 et seq., Tort Claims Act); (2) plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to
show the doctrine of estoppel applied to preclude defendants from invoking
the Tort Claims Act; (3) plaintiff continues to allege causes of action for
perjury, contempt of court, and obstruction of justice, which are not valid
causes of action; (4) the court previously found Hutchins and Dent are
entitled to absolute immunity but plaintiff had failed to address that ruling
in the TAC; and (5) despite having had a prior opportunity to amend and
rectify these deficiencies in his prior pleading, plaintiff failed to do so.5
On April 16, 2025, the court issued a minute order that stated it
was declining to enter judgment because respondents had not been served
and also ordered plaintiff to show cause why the court should not impose
sanctions against him, including dismissal of the action, for failure to serve
respondents and prosecute the case against them.
On September 19, 2025, after respondents were brought into the
action, the trial court entered an order sustaining their demurrer to the TAC
5
The court’s March 28, 2025 order indicated that, although the
court had sustained demurrers to plaintiff’s prior pleadings on the grounds
plaintiff had failed to comply with the Tort Claims Act and Hutchins and
Dent were entitled to absolute immunity, the allegations in plaintiff’s TAC
remained “essentially unchanged.” The court referenced a minute order
issued August 1, 2024, but plaintiff did not include that order as part of the
record on appeal.
4
on the same grounds set forth in its March 28, 2025 minute order. The court
also denied plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2025 order,
noting the order “simply reflect[ed] that (1) the court declined signing a
proposed judgment at that time because the case was not yet resolved as to
[m]oving [d]efendants and (2) the court set an Order to Show [Cause re]
Sanctions for failure to serve and prosecute as to the [m]oving [d]efendants.”6
Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal seeking review of the September
19, 2025 minute order. The court entered judgment on October 10, 2025.7
DISCUSSION
I.
PLAINTIFF FORFEITED HIS ARGUMENTS CHALLENGING THE JUDGMENT
Plaintiff makes multiple arguments on appeal. He contends
(1) the trial court erred in finding the TAC lacked sufficient allegations of
6
Although plaintiff designated the September 19, 2025 order as
part of the record on appeal, he did not designate any of the documents filed
in support of or in opposition to any of the demurrers; nor did he designate
any of the papers filed in support of or in opposition to his motion for
reconsideration of the April 16, 2025 order.
7
We treat plaintiff’s appeal as prematurely taken from the
judgment, which was not entered until October 10, 2025, after plaintiff
initiated this appeal. Plaintiff challenges the September 19, 2025 order and
the judgment only as they relate to the four respondents. Plaintiff does not in
this appeal challenge the judgment as to the City, Hutchins, and Dent, and
we therefore find plaintiff has waived any challenge in this action either to
the judgment as to those three defendants (who have not appeared as
respondents in this appeal) or to the March 28, 2025 order sustaining their
demurrer without leave to amend. Plaintiff made clear the scope of his
intended appeal when he opposed respondents’ motion to augment the record
to include the March 28, 2025 order by insisting the September 19, 2025
order is “the only ruling on appeal” and the March 28, 2025 order is
“irrelevant.” Plaintiff also failed to designate as part of the appellate record
the demurrer filed by the City, Hutchins, and Dent and did not include in his
5
equitable estoppel so as to excuse plaintiff’s failure to comply with the Tort
Claims Act, (2) respondents do not have immunity from claims alleging
federal constitutional violations, (3) the court abused its discretion by
denying plaintiff further leave to amend his pleading and denying plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration, and (4) the trial court violated plaintiff’s due
process and first amendment rights by “disregarding material allegations,
interrupting and cutting off [a]ppellant during oral argument, ignoring his
indigent fee-waiver status, senior status, limited English proficiency, and pro
se protections, failing to consider the merits of his constitutional claims [and]
adopting [r]espondents’ proposed judgments—including an award of
[r]espondents’ legal costs and fees.” (Boldface omitted.)
We begin with the fundamental principle that a judgment of the
trial court is presumed to be correct on appeal. (Denham v. Superior Court
(1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) Accordingly, “the burden is on an appellant to
demonstrate . . . that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment [or order].” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609.) “‘In
reviewing an order sustaining a demurrer, we examine the operative
complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a
cause of action under any legal theory.’ [Citation.] ‘“We treat the demurrer as
admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but not contentions, deductions
or conclusions of fact or law. [Citation.] We also consider matters which may
be judicially noticed.” [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.’” (Chavez
v. Alco Harvesting, LLC (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 866, 870.) The trial court’s
denial of leave to amend is reviewed for abuse of discretion (Kilgore v.
appellate briefing any argument with citations to legal authority addressing
the validity of the March 28, 2025 order.
6
Younger (1982) 30 Cal.3d 770, 781), as is its denial of plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (2013) 218
Cal.App.4th 96, 106).
We conclude plaintiff has forfeited his arguments challenging the
judgment. First, the appellate record is inadequate to enable us to conduct a
meaningful review of the September 19, 2025 order and the resulting
judgment in favor of respondents. Plaintiff failed to include in the appellate
record respondents’ demurrer and the papers filed in support thereof,
plaintiff’s opposition papers, and plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and
any opposition to it. (See Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609 [“‘“[I]f
the record is inadequate for meaningful review, the appellant defaults and
the decision of the trial court should be affirmed”’”].)
In addition, plaintiff failed to provide citations to the appellate
record in support of the factual assertions in his briefing.8 (See Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [appellant must support all statements of fact in
their briefs with citations to the record]; rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) [appellant must
confine statements “to matters in the record” on appeal]; Hernandez v. First
Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 287 [failure to provide adequate
record citations results in forfeiture of appellant’s claims on appeal]; Nwosu
v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246 [the appellate court has no duty to
“‘search the record on its own seeking error’”].)
8
For instance, plaintiff’s accusations of misconduct against the
trial judge are entirely unsupported by the appellate record, and plaintiff
fails to cite to anything supporting his claims. We admonish plaintiff to
refrain from making unsupported attacks on the integrity of the court.
Judicial bias is a serious matter. To make such an accusation without any
evidence to support it is a grievous misuse of the judicial system and will not
be tolerated. (See In re Koven (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 262, 264–265 [briefs
7
Although we deem plaintiff’s contentions to be forfeited, we have
reviewed the allegations of plaintiff’s TAC and find no error on the face of
either the September 19, 2025 minute order or the judgment. Plaintiff does
not dispute the court’s conclusion that he failed to allege compliance—or even
substantial compliance—with the Tort Claims Act, and we agree with the
court’s conclusion that the TAC allegations do “not establish even a colorable
estoppel claim” under City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th
730, 744, and Castaneda v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation
(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1066. Plaintiff does not allege any affirmative
acts by defendants that advised, dissuaded, or otherwise prevented him from
filing a timely claim.
Plaintiff alleges he failed to comply with the Tort Claims Act
because defendant Dent told him they were photographing plaintiff’s
property to help plaintiff secure permit approval for converting his garage to
an ADU but then failed to respond when plaintiff reached out to Dent for
assistance with the garage conversion. This is insufficient as a matter of law
to constitute equitable estoppel. (City of Stockton v. Superior Court, supra, 42
Cal.4th at p. 744 [plaintiff failed to establish “even a colorable estoppel claim”
based on allegations that defendants had assured plaintiff its interests would
be protected in order to avoid a claim against them, but “allege[d] no conduct
that might have deterred it from presenting a claim after defendants failed to
keep their promises”].) Defendants also had no legal duty to inform plaintiff
of his obligation to file a claim, and mere silence does not establish estoppel.
(Castaneda v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, supra, 212
Cal.App.4th at p. 1066.)
falsely accusing court of deliberate dishonesty resulted in contempt
proceedings and monetary fine].)
8
Plaintiff contends his allegations of equitable estoppel are “nearly
identical to those accepted in J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School Dist. (2014) 232
Cal.App.4th 323, 336–338.” They are not. Indeed, plaintiff’s allegations are a
far cry from those in J.P. v. Carlsbad Unified School District. In that case,
which involved alleged sexual abuse by a third-grade teacher, the evidence
showed the school administrators repeatedly told the parents of the minor
plaintiff not to discuss the molestation with anyone so as not to jeopardize a
future criminal prosecution of the alleged perpetrator, which intimidated
them and caused them to delay speaking to an attorney and filing a
governmental claim within six months of the incident. (Id. at pp. 332, 334–
335.)9
Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in determining Government
Code section 821.6 provides respondents immunity from his cause of action
under 42 United States Code section 1983. As noted above, however, this
claim was not alleged against respondents, but only against the City,
Hutchins, and Dent, who were previously dismissed on demurrer pursuant to
the March 2025 order that plaintiff unequivocally stated is not at issue in
this appeal. Even assuming for the sake of argument (and contrary to
plaintiff’s assertion) that the claim under 42 United States Code section 1983
was also alleged against respondents, it does not appear the court relied
solely on immunity under state law. To the contrary, the court cited Lacey v.
Maricopa County (9th Cir. 2012) 693 F.3d 896, 913, a federal decision, in
ruling respondents are entitled to immunity for the same reasons it found
9
Plaintiff also cites John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist.
(1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 445–446, City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d
462, 489, and Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles (1967) 67 Cal.2d 297, 305. None
of these cases supports plaintiff’s contention that his allegations are
sufficient to overcome a demurrer on the issue of equitable estoppel.
9
Hutchins and Dent were entitled to immunity. Plaintiff does not address that
case or provide developed argument with citation to legal authority regarding
whether federal law might provide immunity to respondents. By failing to do
so, plaintiff has waived any challenge to the judgment with respect to the
court’s finding of immunity as to the individual defendants. (See People v.
Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793 [court may disregard legal arguments not
supported by citations to authority]; Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956 [“‘We are not bound to develop appellants’
arguments for them. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or
citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived’”].)
Plaintiff also failed to show the trial court abused its discretion
by denying him leave to amend his TAC. Among other things, plaintiff
provided no record that he ever asked the court for leave to amend and
demonstrated to it how he could rectify the deficiencies in his pleading. (See
Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [“‘[T]he burden is on the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion. [Citations.]
Plaintiff must show in what manner he can amend his complaint and how
that amendment will change the legal effect of his pleading’”].) Plaintiff also
failed on appeal to demonstrate how he could amend his pleading to state a
claim.10 (See Nealy v. County of Orange (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 594, 608
[although a party may establish for the first time on appeal the ability to
amend a pleading to correct deficiencies, that showing must be made].)
10
Plaintiff contends he “specifically offered to amend to provide
the names and statements of the [c]ity employees who misled him about
claim filing, additional detail supporting equitable estoppel, clarified
constitutional claims, and supporting documentation.” But plaintiff fails to
cite to any portion of the record in which he made such an offer, and on
10
II.
PLAINTIFF’S OCTOBER 27, 2025 MOTION IS DENIED
On October 27, 2025, plaintiff filed a motion asking this court to
(1) recognize the appealability of the September 19, 2025 minute order;
(2) address structural error and judicial bias; and (3) enter a protective
objection to any claim for costs. We deny the motion in its entirety.
First, the issue of the appealability of the September 19, 2025
minute order is moot. Judgment was entered and we are reviewing the order
as part of our review of the judgment in favor of respondents.
Second, as to the portion of plaintiff’s motion in which he seeks to
address asserted structural error and judicial bias, it is unclear what relief
plaintiff seeks separate and apart from his appeal from the judgment. As best
we can determine, this portion of the motion appears to be based on plaintiff’s
contention the trial court (1) refused to sign the September 19, 2025 order so
as to allow for appealability, (2) made “inconsistent rulings,” and (3) engaged
in the “selective entry of judgment.” The trial court’s refusal to sign the order
allowing plaintiff to appeal is moot. And we have considered plaintiff’s other
arguments relating to the rulings and judgment in favor of respondents as
part of this appeal, so no different or further relief is warranted.
Third, in plaintiff’s “protective objection” to costs, he states he
“objects to any memorandum of costs that may be filed” and asks that we
sustain that preemptive objection. (Boldface omitted.) There is no cost award
before us in this appeal, and we do not issue advisory opinions “on
controversies which the parties fear will arise, but which do not presently
exist.” (City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 78.)
appeal, he fails to set forth what additional factual allegations he could add
to his pleading to overcome the deficiencies in his pleading.
11
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover costs on
appeal.
GOODING, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOORE, ACTING P. J.
SERVINO, J.
12