Filed 9/30/26 Ngue v. Ultimate Security Services CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
SADRACK NGUE NGUE, B346167
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV25667)
v.
ULTIMATE SECURITY
SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Doreen B. Boxer, Judge. Affirmed.
Law Offices of George E. Omoko and George E. Omoko for
Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
______________________________
Plaintiff Sadrack Ngue Ngue brought this action against
his former employer Ultimate Security Services, Inc. (Ultimate
Security). Ultimate Security appeals the trial court’s order
denying its Code of Civil Procedure1 section 425.16 special
motion to strike the complaint. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Ngue was a security guard employed by Ultimate Security.
In 2022, Ngue, then represented by counsel, sued Ultimate
Security, alleging wage and hour violations (First Action). In
January 2024, the First Action settled, and Ngue dismissed it
with prejudice in December 2024.
In October 2024, Ngue, this time representing himself,
commenced the instant action against Ultimate Security. The
complaint did not allege formal causes of action. The cover page
listed the bases of the action as follows: (1) injury; (2) negligence;
(3) fraud; (4) forgery and use of forgery; (5) threat; (6) pain and
suffering; (7) emotional distress; (8) inconvenience; (9) loss of
enjoyment of life, hobbies, and activities; and (10) past and future
medical expenses. In the background section, Ngue alleged,
among other things, that Ultimate Security (1) refused to take
care of an injury he sustained while working; (2) treated certain
employees, including Ngue, like “slaves” by failing to provide
them minimum wage or rest periods; (3) fraudulently obtained
the settlement in the First Action by using forgery to deceive
Ngue’s former lawyer and the judge; (4) provided him with fake
pay stubs; (5) threatened him after he complained of illegal
employer activities; (6) fired him for requesting real pay stubs;
(7) hindered his efforts to apply for naturalization; and
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
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(8) engaged in deceptive practices that prevented him from
obtaining disability benefits. The complaint also contained a
disclaimer stating the First Action was not relevant to this case.
On December 23, 2024, Ultimate Security filed an anti-
SLAPP motion to strike the complaint in its entirety. For the first
step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, Ultimate Security argued “the
gravamen of the present [c]omplaint was Ngue’s unhappiness
that his [First Action] settled . . . .” For the second step, Ultimate
Security argued the litigation privilege and retraxit doctrine
barred this case.
Ngue filed an opposition, in which he represented he was
not suing Ultimate Security for any of the violations alleged in
the First Action. The opposition also reformulated his claims into
formal causes of action alleging violations of various Labor Code
provisions.
After hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion
on the ground that Ultimate Security did not meet its first-step
burden. The court reasoned that because the “overwhelming
content” of the complaint alleged unprotected conduct—
employment violations different from the wage and hour
violations raised in the First Action—Ultimate Security’s
description of the complaint as being “one complaining of
settlement-related conduct” was not “borne out by a careful
reading of the pleading.”
Ultimate Security timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The anti-SLAPP statute “provides a procedure for weeding
out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected
activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384, italics
omitted (Baral); see also § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) A court’s analysis
of an anti-SLAPP motion proceeds in two steps. (Baral, at p. 384.)
“First, the defendant must establish that the challenged claim
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arises from activity protected by section 425.16.” (Ibid.) “[T]he
moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the
challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in
which the defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of
California State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park);
see also § 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
The first step of that test is dispositive of this appeal. As we
explain, Ultimate Security did not meet its burden of showing
Ngue’s claims arose from protected activity. Thus, we need not
and do not consider the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
(See Verceles v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2021)
63 Cal.App.5th 776, 792, fn. 8.)
We express no opinion as to the merits of the case or other
defenses Ultimate Security may have.
I. General Principles and Standard of Review
The first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis requires the
defendant to make “two related showings.” (Wilson v. Cable News
Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 887 (Wilson).) First,
“[c]omparing [the defendant’s] statements and conduct against
the [anti-SLAPP] statute, [the defendant] must demonstrate
activity qualifying for protection.” (Ibid.) The type of activity
protected “include[s] a specified range of statements, writings,
and conduct in connection with official proceedings and matters
of public interest.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1062; see also
§ 425.16, subd. (e).)
Second, “comparing that protected activity against the
complaint, [the defendant] must also demonstrate that the
activity supplies one or more elements of a plaintiff’s claims.”
(Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 887; see also Park, supra,
2 Cal.5th at pp. 1060, 1063.)
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“We review de novo the grant or denial of an anti-SLAPP
motion.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.) “In addition to the
pleadings, we may consider affidavits concerning the facts upon
which liability is based,” but “[w]e do not . . . weigh the evidence.”
(Ibid.) Instead, we “accept plaintiff’s submissions as true and
consider only whether any contrary evidence from the defendant
establishes its entitlement to prevail as a matter of law.” (Ibid.)
II. Ultimate Security Failed to Meet Its First-step
Burden
Ultimate Security bears the burden at the first step of the
anti-SLAPP analysis to demonstrate Ngue’s claims “arise[] from
activity protected by section 425.16.” (Baral, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
p. 384.) Ultimate Security was thus required “to identify what
acts each challenged claim rests on and to show how those acts
are protected under a statutorily defined category of protected
activity.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th
995, 1009 (Bonni); see § 425.16, subd. (e)(1)–(4).) “This is crucial
because complaints frequently include claims arising from
protected activity alongside claims arising from unprotected
activity, as well as ‘so-called “mixed cause[s] of action” that
combine[] allegations of activity protected by the statute with
allegations of unprotected activity.’ ” (Park v. Nazari (2023)
93 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1107 (Nazari).)
“Where a defendant moves to strike the entire complaint
and fails to identify, with reasoned argument, specific claims for
relief that are asserted to arise from protected activity, the
defendant does not carry his or her first-step burden so long as
the complaint presents at least one claim that does not arise from
protected activity.” (Nazari, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1108.)
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In the trial court, Ultimate Security asked the court to
strike the entire complaint. It contended allegations such as
Ultimate Security deceiving Ngue’s former lawyer and the judge
in the First Action “subject[ed] the [c]omplaint” to the anti-
SLAPP statute. In doing so, it overlooked other claims that do not
arise from protected activity. For example, the anti-SLAPP
motion failed to address Ngue’s allegations that Ultimate
Security wrongfully refused to take care of a work injury he
sustained, threatened him after he complained of illegal employer
activities, hindered his efforts to apply for naturalization, and
engaged in deceptive practices that prevented him from obtaining
disability benefits. Because the complaint contains at least one
claim that does not arise from protected activity, the trial court
appropriately concluded Ultimate Security did not satisfy its
first-step burden. (Nazari, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1108; see
also Pechkis v. Trustees of California State University (2026) 119
Cal.App.5th 497, 506 [anti-SLAPP motion insufficient where it
challenged entirety of two causes of action but failed to address
“whether there are other allegations supporting the causes of
action that are not protected conduct”].)
On appeal, Ultimate Security attempts to recharacterize its
anti-SLAPP motion, asserting the “motion was not a wholesale
attack on the complaint as a single undifferentiated pleading”
because it did “identify specific protected allegations.” It is true
Ultimate Security identified some specific allegations, but it did
so merely to argue those allegations establish the entire
complaint should be stricken because the gravamen of the
complaint targeted protected conduct. That was a wholesale
attack on the complaint, and our Supreme Court has disapproved
such a gravamen analysis as it risks “saddling courts with an
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obligation to settle intractable, almost metaphysical problems
about the ‘essence’ of a cause of action.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 1011.) Moreover, even its “gravamen” argument conflated
arguments that Ngue made allegations about conduct during the
First Action, which could be protected activity, with arguments
that his allegations duplicated the prior claims or violated the
settlement agreement—pertaining to other types of defenses. The
trial court did not err in concluding Ultimate Security did not
meet its burden to show the entire complaint arose from
protected activity.
Ultimate Security also argues that, even if the entire
complaint cannot be stricken, the trial court was obligated under
Baral to strike the individual allegations of protected activity.
This contention, made for the first time on appeal, is forfeited.
(See Wisner v. Dignity Health (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 35, 44.)
Even on the merits, the argument fails. The burden was on
Ultimate Security, not the trial court, to provide the analysis
necessary to grant relief. “[W]hile courts may strike less than the
entirety of a complaint or pleaded cause of action, the trial court
is not required to take on the burden of identifying the
allegations susceptible to a special motion to strike. If a
defendant wants the trial court to take a surgical approach,
whether in the alternative or not, the defendant must propose
where to make the incisions. This is done by identifying, in the
initial motion, each numbered paragraph or sentence in the
complaint that comprises a challenged claim and explaining ‘the
claim’s elements, the actions alleged to establish those elements,
and wh[y] those actions are protected.’ ” (Nazari, supra,
93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1109.) At most, Ultimate Security identified
certain allegations in the complaint, but it failed to explain the
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elements of each claim and how those actions were protected. We
recognize the original complaint presented challenges as Ngue
was self-represented and did not divide up his causes of action.
But Ultimate Security only brought an anti-SLAPP motion and
did not challenge the complaint in any other way.
Finally, Ultimate Security argues the trial court erred
because it (1) relied on Ngue’s disclaimers and (2) evaluated the
anti-SLAPP motion against Ngue’s claims as they were
reformulated in his opposition rather than as they were
presented in his complaint. Because our holding does not rest on
the disclaimers or how Ngue presented his claims in his
opposition, we need not address these contentions.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. No costs are awarded.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J.
GOORVITCH, J.
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