Filed 9/24/26 Ngo v. Northrup Grumman Federal Credit Union CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
PHAT NGO, B346588
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCV09785)
v.
NORTHRUP GRUMMAN
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Steve Cochran, Judge. Affirmed.
The Law Offices of Craig T. Byrnes and Craig T. Byrnes for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Fisher & Phillips, Cheryl L. Schreck, Aalia Taufiq and
Danielle S. Zobel for Defendant and Respondent.
_______________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In this employment dispute, plaintiff and appellant Phat
Ngo contends the trial court erred in granting summary
judgment in favor of his former employer, Northrup Grumman
Federal Credit Union (Credit Union). We find this matter
appropriate for disposition by a memorandum opinion in
accordance with the California Standards of Judicial
Administration, section 8.1. (See People v. Garcia (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 847, 850–855 [use of memorandum opinions].)
“ ‘[O]ur review is governed by a fundamental principle of
appellate procedure, namely, that “ ‘[a] judgment or order of the
lower court is presumed correct,’ ” and thus, “ ‘error must be
affirmatively shown.’ ” [Citation.] Under this principle, [the
nonmoving] plaintiff bears the burden of establishing error on
appeal, even though [the moving] defendant[ ] had the burden of
proving [its] right to summary judgment before the trial court.’ ”
(Hodges v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
894, 904.)
Ngo has failed to comply with California Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(2)(C), which requires appellants to include “a
summary of the significant facts limited to matters in the record”
in their opening briefs. (Silva v. See’s Candy Shops, Inc. (2016)
7 Cal.App.5th 235, 260 (Silva), disapproved on another ground in
Donohue v. AMN Services, LLC (2021) 11 Cal.5th 58.) “A
summary judgment motion triggers a procedure in which the
parties pierce the pleadings to determine whether there are
disputed facts and thus whether a trial is necessary to resolve the
dispute. [Citation.] Thus, when a summary judgment is
challenged, a reviewing court must examine the facts presented
by the parties to determine whether summary judgment or
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summary adjudication was warranted.” (Ibid.) Appellants who
“fail[] to describe all of the evidence proffered in the proceedings”
fail to satisfy their appellate burden. (Ibid.)
In his opening brief Ngo made no effort whatsoever to
summarize all the evidence presented to the trial court at
summary judgment. There is no statement of facts. The facts
that are scattered through Ngo’s arguments reflect a wholly one-
sided presentation of the evidence: nearly every record citation in
the opening brief is to evidence Ngo submitted in opposition to
the motion for summary judgment or to his first amended
complaint, and he ignores any evidence presented by the Credit
Union that does not support his position. Because Ngo has failed
to describe all the evidence proffered in the proceedings, he has
not satisfied his burden to establish error on appeal. (See Silva,
supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 260.)
While that deficiency is dispositive of the appeal, it is not
the only problem in the opening brief. “ ‘Though summary
judgment review is de novo, review is limited to issues
adequately raised and supported in the appellant’s brief.’ ”
(Jackson v. Lara (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 337, 343.) Not even the
scope of the appeal is clear from the muddled and inconsistent
opening brief. The trial court separately discussed and
summarily adjudicated each of Ngo’s six causes of action and
granted summary judgment. Ngo repeatedly claims it was error
to grant summary judgment, but then he states that the court’s
rulings as to his claims under the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) “are not on appeal
here.” Despite disavowing challenges to some portions of the
court’s ruling, however, Ngo subsequently reverts to arguing the
trial court erred by granting summary judgment and contending
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the judgment should be reversed in its entirety. Additionally,
Ngo fails to identify with specificity to which of his causes of
action his substantive arguments pertain, and as respondent
notes, he does not appear to include any developed arguments
demonstrating error with respect to causes of action other than
his retaliation claim under the California Family Rights Act
(Gov. Code, § 12945.2) and wrongful termination cause of action
despite claiming summary judgment was granted in error. “ ‘We
are not obliged . . . to speculate about which issues counsel intend
to raise.’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 153.) “ ‘It is the duty of counsel by argument
and citation of authority to show in what manner rulings
complained of are erroneous. We are not obliged to perform the
duty resting on counsel.’ ” (Givens v. Southern Pacific Co. (1961)
194 Cal.App.2d 39, 48.)
Ngo also has violated California Rules of Court, rule
8.204(a)(1)(B) by raising a legal argument in a footnote rather
than under a separate heading summarizing the point. Footnotes
are not the appropriate vehicle for stating contentions on appeal
(West v. Solar Mosaic LLC (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 985, 996), and
points in footnotes “are not headed as arguments and are
waived.” (Western Aggregates, Inc. v. County of Yuba (2002)
101 Cal.App.4th 278, 290.) It is not lost on this court that this
footnote, which asserts it was an abuse of discretion to sustain
the Credit Union’s evidentiary objections to Ngo’s declaration,
does not appear until after the fifth time Ngo relies on and cites
to that declaration in the opening brief—and the first four
references fail to acknowledge this evidence was excluded by the
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trial court.1 “Professional ethics and considerations of credibility
in advocacy require that appellants support their arguments with
fair and accurate representations of trial court proceedings.”
(Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th
735, 745.)
1 To some extent this may be due to the fact that large
swaths of Ngo’s opening brief consist of excerpts from his trial
court opposition to the motion for summary judgment that are
reproduced verbatim or nearly verbatim. Appellate counsel’s
task is not “merely to ‘simply change the trial points and
authorities into an appellate format,’ ” and an appellate brief
should not “rehash” the arguments made below. (In re Marriage
of Shaban (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 398, 410.) “The appellate
practitioner who takes trial level points and authorities and,
without reconsideration or additional research, merely shovels
them in to an appellate brief, is producing a substandard
product.” (Ibid.) It is important for “attorneys who use material
from trial memoranda to take care in adapting the material to
the altered focus of appellate review. Points that are irrelevant
to the appeal should be omitted. Subsequent pertinent legal
authorities should be addressed. Arguments should be tailored
according to the applicable standard of appellate review.”
(Sebago, Inc. v. City of Alameda (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1372,
1387–1388, fn. omitted.)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent shall recover its
costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
VIRAMONTES, J.
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