Filed 7/30/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
NEW COMMUNE DTLA LLC, B337897
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiff and Appellant, Super. Ct. No. 23STCP00426)
v.
CITY OF REDONDO BEACH et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.
APPEAL from judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
Patterson & O’Neill, Ryan Patterson and Brian O’Neill, for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Joy A. Ford, City Attorney; Richards, Watson & Gershon
and Ginetta L. Giovinco for Defendants and Respondents.
In this appeal, we address two statutory schemes that
promote state policies over the interests of local governments:
the Housing Accountability Act (HAA) (Gov. Code, § 65589.5) and
the California Coastal Act (Coastal Act) (Pub. Resources Code,
§ 30000 et seq.).1 The HAA seeks to increase affordable housing
throughout the state. The Coastal Act aims to protect the
California coast. A statewide agency implements each act. The
California Department of Housing and Community Development
(HCD) reviews and certifies local housing elements, and the
California Coastal Commission (Commission) reviews and
certifies local coastal programs (LCPs). A locality’s housing
element and LCP shape development of real estate within its
boundaries.
New Commune DTLA, LLC (Developer) applied to the City
of Redondo Beach and its Department of Community
Development and City Council (collectively City), for permits to
develop 30 condominium units, six of which would serve as
affordable housing, in the City’s coastal zone. Following the
denial of its application, Developer petitioned for writ of mandate
compelling the City to approve its application under the builder’s
remedy provisions of the HAA. The trial court denied the
petition, finding Developer’s proposed project violated the City’s
LCP. The LCP, as certified by the Commission, designated the
zone in which Developer sought to build residences only for public
access, coastal recreational facilities, and services supporting
boating and fishing.
Developer contends the trial court erred by effectively
overriding the HAA in favor of the Coastal Act and offers a
1 Unless otherwise indicated, unspecified references to statutes
are to the Public Resources Code.
2
proposal for “harmonizing” the two acts. We decline Developer’s
requested construction, which would impose on local
governments the duty to determine whether new and
Commission-uncertified land uses comply with the Coastal Act.
Instead, we assume the HAA’s builder’s remedy applies in this
appeal. One of its provisions, Government Code section 65589.5,
subdivision (d)(3), compels us to consider whether (1) the City’s
denial was required under the Coastal Act as a matter of state
law; and (2) no feasible method existed for the proposed housing
to be compliant. This approach accords deference to the HAA
while upholding Coastal Act requirements and necessary
Commission oversight of coastal land uses. We uphold the City’s
denial and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
A. The Coastal Act
The Coastal Act governs coastal development. It created
the current Commission to oversee “‘the orderly process of
planning for the future development’” of the coastline. (Shear
Development Co., LLC v. California Coastal Com. (2026) 19
Cal.5th 334, 344 (Shear Development).) Its chapters include
general declarations and definitions (Chapters 1–2; §§ 30000–
30122) and address planning and management (Chapter 3;
§§ 30200–30270); creation and powers of the Commission
(Chapters 4–5; §§ 30300–30421); implementation and
development (Chapters 6–7; §§ 30500–30627); ports (Chapter 8;
§§ 30700–30721); and judicial review, penalties, and severability
(Chapters 9–10; §§ 30800–30900). These provisions must be
liberally construed. (§ 30009; Pacific Palisades Bowl Mobile
3
Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783, 793–
794 (Pacific Palisades).)
The Coastal Act’s primary goals include protecting the
coastal zone, conserving its resources, maximizing public access
to the coast and recreational opportunities for the public, and
promoting conservation principles and the constitutional rights of
private property owners. (§ 30001.5, subds. (a)–(c).) Chapter 3
prescribes more than 40 additional policies (hereinafter
Chapter 3 policies) concerning public access and recreation
(§§ 30210–30224), protection of the marine environment
(§§ 30230–30244), and prioritization of private land uses for
public-serving recreational facilities over private residential
development. (See §§ 30221, 30222; see also §§ 30210–30214,
30220, 30223–30265.5.)
As expressly stated in the Coastal Act, the Commission and
local governments “share responsibility for planning coastal
development.” (Shear Development, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 344.)
Local governments with coastal land must submit an LCP to the
Commission for certification. (§ 30500, subd. (a).) An LCP must
include a land use plan—the functional equivalent of a general
plan for property in the coastal zone. The LCP must also include
a local implementation plan that includes zoning, zoning maps,
and other implementing actions for the coastal zone. (§§ 30108.5,
30108.6.) The Chapter 3 policies “constitute the standards by
which” the Commission determines LCP adequacy. (§ 30200.)
Once the Commission certifies an LCP, the local
government is statutorily delegated “issuing authority” over
coastal development permits (CDPs) that are required for coastal
development. (§ 30519, subd. (a).) This authority is limited. The
local government “shall” issue a CDP only if the proposed
4
development conforms to its certified LCP. (§§ 30600, 30600.5,
subd. (c), 30604, subd. (b).) To authorize any use of coastal land
other than that designated in its certified LCP, the local
government must obtain Commission approval through an
amendment process. (§ 30514, subd. (e).)
The Coastal Act also reserves power in “the requirements of
state and federal law with respect to providing low- and
moderate-income housing, . . . or any other obligation related to
housing imposed by existing law or any law hereafter enacted.”
(§ 30007.) This provision preserves some authority in those other
statutory schemes and is to be strictly construed. (See City of
Dana Point v. California Coastal Com. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th
170, 195; Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. County of Orange
(2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1384.)
B. The City’s Certified LCP
It is undisputed that the City had a Commission-certified
LCP at all relevant times in this case. (See Redondo Beach Mun.
Code, §§ 10-5.102, 10-5.200(b), 10-5.201(a)–(b), 10-5.2210(a).)
The LCP designates permitted uses for different coastal zones.
The City’s Coastal Commercial-4 (CC-4) zone is restricted to
public access uses, coastal-related commercial-recreational
facilities, and service facilities supporting pedestrian-oriented
recreational boating and fishing. (See id., §§ 10-5.101, 10-5.800,
10-5.810, 10-5.815, 10-5.2600; see also id., § 10-5.102].)
Residential uses are neither permitted nor conditionally
permitted in this zone. (See id., § 10-5.202(a).)2
2 The City’s portion of the coastal zone is divided into six zoning
districts: residential; commercial; mixed used; public and institutional;
industrial; and overlay. (See Redondo Beach Mun. Code, §§ 10-5.101,
5
The City’s coastal land use implementing ordinances
prescribe mandatory amendment procedures to change any
portion of its coastal zoning regulations or map. (See Redondo
Beach Mun. Code, §§ 10-5.2504–10-5.2505.) These procedures
require public notice, at least one hearing, and if necessary, an
administrative appeal prior to adopting any change. (Ibid.) No
change can “take effect until it has been submitted to and
reviewed and certified by the . . . Commission . . . for consistency
with the City’s certified [LCP].” (Ibid.)
C. Developer’s Application
In July 2022, Developer applied to the City for permission
to build a 141,000 square foot mixed-use project, consisting
mainly of 30 condominiums, six of which would serve as
affordable housing. Throughout its application, Developer
acknowledged residential uses were not permitted but declared
its application must be approved as a “builder’s remedy” project
under the HAA.
D. The Housing Element Law, HAA, and Builder’s
Remedy
Like other local governments, the City must adopt
comprehensive, long-term plans for development within its
jurisdiction. (See California Building Industry Assn. v. City of
San Jose (2015) 61 Cal.4th 435, 444.) Under the Housing
10-5.201(i), 10-5.300.) The CC-4 zone designates limited retail, snack
shops, parks and recreation, and open space as permitted uses; and
designates commercial, recreation, school, and other public facilities as
conditionally permitted uses.
6
Element Law (Gov. Code, §§ 65580–65588), the City’s general
plan must contain a variety of “housing elements” to address its
regional housing needs. (See Gov. Code, §§ 65580, 65582.)
Among other requirements existing at the time Developer
submitted its project for approval, its housing element had to
address the identification, assessment, and analysis of existing
and projected housing needs, as well as a program setting forth a
schedule of actions to achieve housing element objectives through
land use and development controls. (Former Gov. Code, § 65583,
subds. (a), (c)(1), as amended by Stats. 2021, Ch. 358, §§ 1.5, 5.)
When a local government fails to obtain an HCD-certified
housing element in a timely fashion, the HAA severely constrains
its ability to reject any builder’s remedy project that proposes
affordable housing, even if that project conflicts with local zoning
and general plan standards. (See Gov. Code, § 65589.5,
subds. (a)–(d); Kalnel Gardens, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2016)
3 Cal.App.5th 927, 938–939.)3 During this period of HAA
noncompliance, the local government may not disapprove such
project without making specific written findings. These findings
include, in relevant part, that “denial of the housing development
project or imposition of conditions is required in order to comply
with specific state or federal law, and there is no feasible method
to comply without rendering the development unaffordable to
low- and moderate-income households . . . .” (Gov. Code,
3 The parties dispute the operative versions of the HAA in this
case. Unlike the operative version of the Housing Element Law, the
current version of the HAA applies to this dispute. (See Gov. Code,
§ 65589.5, subd. (f)(7)(A) [builder’s remedy proponent may proceed
under current provisions of Gov. Code, § 65589.5 if its project
application is submitted before January 1, 2025].)
7
§ 65589.5, subd. (d)(3).) Nothing in this provision or the HAA
“shall be construed to relieve” a local government from complying
with the Coastal Act. (Id., § 65589.5, subd. (e).)
E. Application Denial and Underlying Proceedings
The City did not have a substantially compliant housing
element certified by HCD at the time Developer submitted its
project for approval. (See New Commune DTLA LLC v. City of
Redondo Beach (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 111, 126.) The project,
which includes six units of affordable housing, thus constitutes a
“‘builder’s remedy’” project. (See Gov. Code, § 65589.5,
subd. (h)(11).) Two months after HCD certified its housing
element in September 2022, the City notified Developer it was
not processing its project application because it proposed
unpermitted uses under the City’s certified LCP. The notice
informed Developer that if it “wish[ed] to develop residential uses
on this site,” it could submit an application(s) for a general plan
amendment, LCP land use plan amendment, or zoning
amendment. (Redondo Beach Mun. Code, §§ 10-2.2505, 10-5.204,
10-5.2505.)
Following an unsuccessful administrative appeal,
Developer filed a verified petition for writ of mandate compelling
the approval of its application under the HAA and requesting a
declaration finding the City’s decision unlawful. The court
denied the petition following a bench trial. Despite finding the
HAA builder’s remedy provisions applicable to the dispute, the
court found those provisions could not override coastal land
development requirements under the Coastal Act and the City’s
certified LCP.
8
DISCUSSION
Developer contends the trial court erred by prioritizing
Coastal Act provisions over the HAA and offers its own proposal
for “harmonizing” the two acts.
“We apply well-established principles to this question of
statutory interpretation. ‘“‘When we interpret a statute, “[o]ur
fundamental task . . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so
as to effectuate the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory
language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. . . . If the
language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning
unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd
consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory
language permits more than one reasonable interpretation,
courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose,
legislative history, and public policy.” [Citation.] “Furthermore,
we consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire
statute and the statutory scheme of which it is a part, giving
significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in
pursuance of the legislative purpose.”’”’” (Shear Development,
supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 366.)
We address Developer’s proposed harmonization of the
HAA and Coastal Act first before analyzing the statutory
schemes independently.
A. Developer’s Proposed Harmonization
In Developer’s view, the City’s certified LCP contains local
restrictions that can be unmoored from the Coastal Act. Because
its project is a builder’s remedy under Government Code
section 65589.5, Developer argues these local restrictions cannot
be used to override compulsory approval under the HAA.
9
As Developer admits, however, it and the City are bound by
the Coastal Act. To accord significance to both statutory
schemes, Developer argues the City’s approval process for
builder’s remedy projects can be formulated by “harmonizing”
various HAA and Coastal Act provisions. Under this proposed
harmonization, the City must approve any builder’s remedy
project in the coastal zone unless it makes written findings that
disapproval is necessary to comply with specific, objective
resource protection policies prescribed by Chapter 3 of the
Coastal Act.
The standard Developer proposes—compliance with “core,”
“specific,” and “objective” Chapter 3 policies—is unworkable.
Developer jettisons the majority of Chapter 3 policies in favor of
six policies it avers “could potentially form” specific, objective
policies on which disapprovals could be based.4 At oral
argument, developer could not identify which of these policies are
truly “objective.” Instead, it directed us to California Renters
Legal Advocacy & Education Fund v. City of San Mateo (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 820 (California Renters), which defines an “objective”
policy as “‘involving no personal or subjective judgment by a
public official and being uniformly verifiable by reference to an
external and uniform benchmark . . . .’” (Id. at p. 840, quoting
Gov. Code, § 65589.5, former subd. (h)(8).)
Under this standard, almost all the policies Developer
identifies as “potentially” objective are subjective. For example,
one policy restricts areas adjacent to environmentally sensitive
habitat areas and parks and recreation areas to uses that are
4 The City persuasively argues Developer’s proposal would lead to
“cherry-picking” particular Coastal Act policies while reading others
“out of existence.”
10
“compatible with the continuance of those habitat and recreation
areas.” (§ 30240, subd. (b), italics added.) This policy, like the
others identified by Developer, lacks “specificity” and “requires
interpretation and subjective judgment.” (California Renters,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 842.)5 Developer identifies no
external and uniform benchmark to verify uses that are
compatible with coastal habitat and recreation areas. Indeed,
this type of interpretation and judgment is expressly delegated to
the Commission whose “primary responsibility” is implementing
the Coastal Act’s provisions. (§ 30330; see § 30200, subd. (a).)
We discern nothing in the Coastal Act delegating that
responsibility (or expertise) to a local government driven by its
own interests. We may not, under the guise of construction,
delegate or impose upon local governments the responsibility to
determine whether “specific, objective” Coastal Act policies would
be served by projects proposed in their jurisdictions. (See
DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983,
992.)
Instead, we assume without deciding the builder’s remedy
applies in this case and analyze whether, under the builder’s
5 Other policies identified by Developer require the same
interpretation and judgment. (See §§ 30241, subd. (b) [limiting
conversion of agricultural land around the periphery of urban areas
“where the viability of existing agricultural use is already severely
limited . . . or where the conversion of the lands would complete a
logical and viable neighborhood and contribute to the establishment of
a stable limit to urban development”], 30234 [limiting commercial
fishing and recreational boating harbor space “unless the demand for
those facilities no longer exists or adequate substitute space has been
provided”], 30243 [limiting conversion of coastal commercial
timberlands in units of commercial size to “providing for necessary
timber processing and related facilities”].)
11
remedy provisions, specifically Government Code section 65589.5,
subdivision (d)(3), denial of Developer’s builder’s remedy project
is necessary to comply with the Coastal Act. We review the
relevant facts for substantial evidence and the City’s ultimate
decision denying the project for abuse of discretion. (Code Civ.
Proc., §1094.5, subd. (b); see Wall v. California Coastal Com.
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 943, 951 (Wall); Reddell v. California
Coastal Com. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 956, 962.)
B. Application of Government Code Section 65589.5
Government Code section 65589.5, subdivisions (d)(1)
through (d)(5) place conditions on disapproving a builder’s
remedy project. Under subdivision (d)(3), the City may not
disapprove such a project absent written findings supported by
the preponderance of the evidence that (1) disapproval was
required under state law; and (2) no feasible method existed to
comply with state law without rendering the proposed
development unaffordable. As we shall discuss, the City
determined disapproval was required by the Coastal Act and no
feasible method was shown to comply with it.
1. The Coastal Act Required the City’s Disapproval
a. The Certified LCP Embodies Coastal Act
Policies and Law
Contrary to Developer’s construction, the City’s certified
LCP does not solely embody local standards. The LCP was
devised and coordinated with Commission input as required by
the Coastal Act. (McAllister v. California Coastal Com. (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 912, 922 (McAllister).) When reviewing the
City’s LCP, the Commission had to determine whether the
12
“kinds, location, and intensity of land uses” in its land use plan
conformed with Chapter 3 policies. (§§ 30108.5, 30512,
subds. (a)(1), (c), 30512.2, subds. (a), (b).) Such review also
required the Commission’s encouragement of affordable housing
and “the provision of new affordable housing opportunities . . . in
the coastal zone.” (§ 30604, subd. (g).)
Following its certification of the City’s LCP land use plan,
the Commission was required to determine whether the kinds of
uses, locations, and intensities in the land use plan were
adequately carried out by the City’s zoning ordinances, maps, and
other implementing actions. (§§ 30512, subd. (a)(1), 30513,
subd. (b); see also § 30516, subd. (a)). The Commission’s
certification confirms these findings and Coastal Act conformity.
(See McAllister, supra, 169 Cal.App.4th at pp. 922–923; Santa
Barbara County Flower & Nursery Growers Assn. v. County of
Santa Barbara (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 864, 871–872; see also
§§ 30510–30526.)
The substance of these procedures and the Commission’s
involvement in them reflect a “‘fundamental’” Coastal Act
purpose to “‘ensure that state policies prevail over the concerns of
local government.’” (Pacific Palisades, supra, 55 Cal.4th at
p. 794; see also City of Chula Vista v. Superior Court (1982) 133
Cal.App.3d 472, 489 [“Surely the Legislature did not go to all this
trouble to create a statewide rubber stamp agency which does no
more than review local legislation for arbitrary and capricious
enactments”].) As both local and state governments “engage[d] in
extensive work to draft, edit, and enforce” the City’s LCP under
Coastal Act direction, the actions of both are “sufficiently
comparable to authorship.” (Shear Development, supra, 19
Cal.5th at p. 354.) Thus, the City’s certified LCP embody policies
13
that are “‘not solely a matter of local law, but embody state
policy.’” (Pacific Palisades, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 794, quoting
Charles A. Pratt Construction Co., Inc. v. California Coastal Com.
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1075; see Shear Development, at
p. 343 [“An LCP is enacted law”].)
b. The City’s Issuing Authority is Limited to LCP-
Certified Uses or a Commission-Certified
Amendment
Upon LCP certification, the Coastal Act delegated the City
“issuing” authority over CDP applications in its jurisdiction.
(Pacific Palisades, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 794; see Wall, supra, 72
Cal.App.5th at p. 949; see also §§ 30512–30513, 30519, subd. (a),
30600, subd. (a), 30600.5, subd. (b).)6 This authority is expressly
limited: the City must (“shall”) issue CDPs for proposed coastal
developments if the proposed projects are in “conformity” with its
certified LCP. (§ 30604, subd. (b); see Hanks v. State Board of
Equalization (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 427, 434 [“The word ‘conform’
is commonly used as, and is defined [as] ‘to bring into harmony or
agreement’”]; see Black’s Law Dict. (12th ed. 2024) p. 147
[“conforming” defined as “[b]eing in accordance with”].)
Developer acknowledges this “shall issue” authority for
LCP conformity but argues section 30604(b) does not require CDP
disapprovals for LCP land use nonconformity. We are not
persuaded.
The Coastal Act does not grant local governments with
Commission-certified LCPs the authority to approve
unsanctioned uses of coastal land. The Coastal Act amendment
6 None of the exceptions to the delegation of issuing authority
apply in this case. (See §§ 30519, subd. (b), 30603.)
14
procedures, “similar procedures to those for reviewing a new
LCP” (Shear Development, supra, 19 Cal.5th at p. 355), preclude
this type of local approval. An “‘amendment of a certified [LCP]’”
is defined as “any action . . . that authorizes the use of a parcel of
land other than a use that is designated in the certified [LCP] as
a permitted use of the parcel.” (§ 30514, subd. (e), italics added.)
The purpose of this amendment procedure is clear: Any
land use not previously certified in an LCP must be submitted for
Commission certification before it may be approved locally.
Developer’s proposed construction would defeat this manifest
requirement and render various LCP certification, amendment,
and CDP approval procedures ineffective. (See Manufacturers
Life Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, 274
[“Well-established canons of statutory construction preclude a
construction which renders a part of a statute meaningless or
inoperative”].)
Other Coastal Act provisions demonstrate the necessity for
Commission approval of coastal land uses. One provision
authorizes Commission review of “minor” amendments or those
requiring “rapid” action. (§ 30514, subds. (c), (d)(1)(B).) This
provision expressly precludes expedited review for “any change in
land use or . . . allowable use of property.” (See ibid.) Another
provision governing affordable housing approvals prohibits the
restriction of residential densities, provided residential uses are
permitted in a certified LCP. (See § 30604, subd. (f) [absent
finding density cannot be accommodated in a manner that
conforms with certified LCP, government may not restrict
densities below local zoning and the Density Bonus Law].)7
7 The Density Bonus Law (Gov. Code, § 65915) governs density
bonuses and incentives. This law “shall not require or be interpreted”
15
As these provisions demonstrate, the City’s ability to
“authorize[ ] a use other than that designated in the LCP as a
permitted use does require certification by the Commission
(§ 30514, subd. (d)).” (Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 573,
fn. 9.) We conclude the City’s disapproval was required under
Government Code section 65589.5, subdivision (d)(3).
c. Developer’s Extratextual Evidence
Developer relies on several cases and various Commission
documents to demonstrate the City’s ability to approve project
applications notwithstanding LCP nonconformity.8 Developer
overstates the impact of these authorities.
The cases on which Developer rely did not involve local
approvals of uncertified land uses. In Hines v. California Coastal
Com. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 830 and Alberstone v. California
Coastal Com. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 859, the courts upheld local
CDP approvals that authorized projects in technical
nonconformity with specific development standards because
those nonconformities were overall compliant with LCP policies
and the land uses at issue were permitted. (See Hines, at
to require an LCP amendment and in no way may “supersede or in any
way alter or lessen the effect or application” of the Coastal Act. (See
Assem. Conc. Sen. Amends. to Assem. Bill No. 2797 (2017–2018 Reg.
Sess.) as amended Aug. 24, 2018, p. 2.)
8 Developer has requested judicial notice of documents marked as
Exhibits A through I and K through O. Despite citing an “Exhibit J,”
Developer’s motion does not attach such document. With the exception
of this exhibit, we grant the motion. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (c), (h).)
We deny the City’s request for judicial notice of former Government
Code sections 65589.5 and 65941.1. (See Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v.
Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6.)
16
pp. 848–850 [reduced buffer width of single-family residence];
Alberstone, at pp. 864–867 [residential lot merger restrictions and
requirements].) As these approvals applied to land already zoned
for residential use, no Commission-certified land use designation
change was required. (See also Conway v. City of Imperial Beach
(1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 78, 89 [upholding modified residential
density because “permitted uses of property in the coastal zone
were not altered”].)
The Commission documents are similarly limited. Several
documents recommend LCP amendments for Density Bonus Law
modifications impacting “community character, visual resources,
public views, sensitive biological resources . . . or public access to
the coast.” (See Cal. Coastal Com., Staff Recommendation on
City of Carlsbad Major Amendment No. LCP-6-CAR-20-0078-2
(2022) pp. 1–3; Cal. Coastal Com., Staff Recommendation on San
Luis Obispo County LCP Amendment No. LCP-3-SLO-21-0025-1-
Part D (2021) p. 1.) These documents underscore the importance
of Commission certification for even modifications compelled by
state law if those modifications potentially impact Coastal Act
policies. (See e.g., §§ 30250 [community character], 30251 [scenic
and visual qualities], 30230 & 30240 [sensitive biological areas
and resources], 30252 [public access].)
Other Commission documents recommend “no substantial
issue” determinations, which the Commission may make to
summarily dismiss a pending administrative appeal. (See
§§ 30603, 30625, subds. (a), (b)(2).) Like the other authorities
discussed, these administrative appeals challenged development
standard conformity. (See Cal. Coastal Com., Combined Staff
Report: Substantial Issue Determination Appeal No. A-3-MRA-
24-0026 (2024) pp. 64–66, 83 [sensitive habitat standards, public
17
access, and recreational opportunities]; Cal. Coastal Com.,
Appeal Staff Rep.: Substantial Issue Determination Appeal
No. A-2-HMB-16-0058 (2016) pp. 1–2 [visual compatibility with
watershed character]). These appeals do support Commission
approval of technical LCP nonconformities in light of additional,
overriding LCP policies, but they do not support a city’s approval
of uncertified land uses.9
d. Conclusion
Under Government Code section 65589.5,
subdivision (d)(3), denial of a builder’s remedy project may be
required as a matter of state law. In this case, compliance with
the Coastal Act required denial of a CDP permit for Developer’s
project. We recognize the friction in this conclusion and the
HAA’s laudable goal of providing affordable housing, but to adopt
the construction proposed by Developer would effectively repeal
Coastal Act procedures mandating Commission oversight. The
9 One report did address the question of nonconforming use but
found the use permitted under the certified LCP. (Cal. Coastal Com.,
Appeal Staff Rep.: Substantial Issue Determination Appeal No. A-2-
MAR-23-0050 (2024) pp. 1–2, 8–9, 13–14 [emergency affordable RV
housing].)
The remaining Commission document is a 1979 memorandum
from the Executive Director discussing local housing elements and
housing components required for an LCP. While noting some
similarities, the director cautioned that “adoption of a housing element
does not automatically assure that the policies and programs of the
housing element will meet the requirements of the Coastal Act. . . The
reason for this is that there are two quite different standards
established” in both legislative schemes. (Cal. Coastal Com., Exec. Dir.
Memorandum on Use of Housing Elements Local Coastal Programs
(1979) p. 1.)
18
Legislature may choose to curtail Coastal Act requirements after
hearing from interested stakeholders beyond the parties before
us. We may not rewrite the law as Developer requests.
2. Feasible Method to Comply with State Law
We turn now to the second inquiry under Government Code
section 65589.5, subdivision (d)(3), and determine whether any
feasible method existed to comply with the Coastal Act without
rendering Developer’s project unaffordable. “‘Feasible’” is defined
as “capable of being accomplished in a successful manner within
a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic,
environmental, social, and technological factors.” (Id., § 65589.5,
subd. (h)(1).)
The record supports the City’s infeasibility finding in this
case. When notifying Developer its project sought unpermitted
coastal land uses, the City informed Developer that its project
was infeasible as a matter of law. The City’s notice invited
Developer to apply for a changed designation of land to
residential use. (See § 30514; Redondo Beach Mun. Code, §§ 10-
5.2504–10-5.2505.) Developer ignored this invitation. Absent
any input from Developer, the City had no reason to determine,
or a record from which it could determine, legal or economic
feasibility.
Under these circumstances, we find guidance from
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) cases addressing
the very same statutory definition of “feasible” for program
alternatives. (See In re Bay-Delta etc. (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1143,
1163; Uphold Our Heritage v. Town of Woodside (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 587, 597–598 (Woodside) [“[u]nder CEQA ‘feasible’ is
defined as ‘capable of being accomplished in a successful manner
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within a reasonable period of time, taking into account economic,
environmental, social, and technological factors’”]; see also
§ 21061.1.) As these cases demonstrate, legally infeasible
alternatives need not be fully analyzed because there is no
discretion to approve them. (See California Native Plant Society
v. City of Santa Cruz (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 957, 981–982 (Santa
Cruz) [agency needn’t consider “infeasible” alternatives]; Tiburon
Open Space Committee v. County of Marin (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th
700, 732; Woodside, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at p. 602.)
Consistent with these decisions, the Coastal Act, and the
undisputed fact of Developer’s abstention from the City’s
proffered amendment process, we conclude that the City’s
feasibility review in this case was limited. Without Developer’s
participation in the amendment process or any resulting
Commission approval or guidance, the City could not legally
amend its certified LCP to allow residential uses in the CC-4
zone. Where such “alternative is infeasible,” the City’s decision
cannot be “inadequate simply because it failed to include an
analysis of that alternative.” (Sequoyah Hills Homeowners Assn.
v. City of Oakland (1993) 23 Cal.App.4th 704, 715, fn. 3; see also
Santa Cruz, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 981 [project approval
depends on whether “the alternatives are actually feasible”].)
In light of the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion
in the City’s decision disapproving Developer’s builder’s remedy
development application under Government Code
section 65589.5, subdivision (d)(3).10
10 In light of this conclusion, we do not address the City’s
alternative argument that questions whether it “disapproved” the
project application under the HAA.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The parties shall bear their own
costs on appeal.
MORI, Acting P. J.
We concur:
TAMZARIAN, J.
COGLIATI, J. **
** Judge of the Santa Cruz County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to Article VI, section 6, of the California
Constitution.
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