Filed 7/15/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
VAHAN MURADYAN, B346081
Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24STCP02925)
v.
ROB BONTA, as Attorney General,
etc.,
Defendant and Respondent.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James C. Chalfant, Judge. Affirmed.
Wallin & Klarich and Jonathan M. Lynn, for Plaintiff and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Thomas S. Patterson,
Assistant Attorney General, Lara Haddad and Christopher J.
Kissel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendant and
Respondent.
_________________________
Penal Code1 section 290 sets forth a three-tier registration
system for persons convicted of various sexual offenses. Tier
three is reserved for sexual offenders our Legislature has
determined to pose the greatest risk of reoffending. As such, tier
three offenders are subject to lifetime registration, while tier one
and two offenders may petition for termination of registration
after 10 or 20 years, respectively.
Vahan Muradyan was convicted of a sexual offense against
a minor under section 288.4, subdivision (b), an offense that
made him a tier three offender subject to lifetime registration on
the sex offender registry. He petitioned for a writ of mandate in
the trial court to have his name removed from the registry on the
ground that the three-tier system violated his constitutional
guarantees to equal protection. Muradyan specifically argued
that there was no rational basis to impose lifetime registration
for his offense when other, more serious offenses are not subject
to lifetime registration. The trial court denied his petition,
finding that the Legislature had a rational basis for treating a
sex offense under section 288.4—which requires finding that the
defendant lured a minor and was motivated by an unnatural
interest in children—as a tier three offense subject to lifetime sex
offender registration. We affirm the order.
BACKGROUND
In 2009, Muradyan was convicted of violating section 288.4,
subdivision (b), which prohibits arranging and attending a
meeting with a minor with the intent to commit a sexual offense.
The sentencing court suspended imposition of sentence, placed
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
Muradyan on felony probation for five years, and ordered him to
serve 120 days in jail. The court also required Muradyan to
register as a sex offender.
In 2024, Muradyan petitioned for a writ of mandate
seeking removal of his name from the sex offender registry on the
ground that categorization of his crime as a tier three offense
violated his equal protection rights under our state and federal
constitutions. He argued that there was no rational basis to
subject him to lifetime registration when more serious crimes,
such as committing a lewd or lascivious act against a child under
14 years of age, section 288, subdivision (a), do not require
lifetime registration.
The trial court denied the petition. The trial court noted
that Muradyan was convicted under section 288.4, subdivision
(b), which is a luring crime involving predatory behavior and
preparation. The trial court found that the Legislature could
have rationally concluded that persons who commit luring crimes
are more likely to recidivate and should therefore be subject to
lifetime registration. Muradyan identified five offenses that he
argued were “far greater,” yet did not require lifetime
registration. The trial court distinguished each of Muradyan’s
examples, finding that “the Legislature could have reasonably
determined that offenders convicted of [those offenses] do not
present the same risk of harming children in the future because
they lack a necessary element reflecting a predatory mindset
toward minors.” The trial court concluded that “the Legislature’s
different treatment of offenders convicted under section 288.4 of
‘child luring,’ a predatory crime against children, reflects a
rational decision motivated by a legitimate purpose of monitoring
offenders with the highest risk of recidivism against minors” and
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did not violate constitutional equal protection principles under
rational basis review.
DISCUSSION
I. Equal protection principles
Our federal and state constitutions prohibit states from
denying any person the equal protection of the laws. (U.S.
Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. 1, § 7.) The federal and
state equal protection guarantees, although independent, are
substantially equivalent. (People v. I.B. (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th
702, 709.) Equal protection requires similarly situated persons
be treated alike. (People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, 847
(Hardin).) “ ‘At core, the requirement of equal protection ensures
that the government does not treat a group of people unequally
without some justification.’ ” (Ibid.) However, equal protection
does not mean “that different things must be treated as though
they are the same.” (In re C.B. (2018) 6 Cal.5th 118, 134; People
v. Guzman (2005) 35 Cal.4th 577, 591 [equal protection does not
require uniform application of law to persons who are different].)
Recently, our California Supreme Court in Hardin clarified
how the courts should approach an equal protection challenge to
laws drawing distinctions between individuals based on
classifications created by the law itself. (Hardin, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 851.) Prior to Hardin, courts engaged in a two-step
inquiry, first considering the threshold question “ ‘whether the
state adopted a classification affecting two or more groups that
are similarly situated in an unequal manner[, and then] [i]f [the
court] deem[s] the groups at issue similarly situated in all
material respects [it] consider[s] whether the challenged
classification’ is adequately justified.” (Id. at p. 848.)
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Recognizing that the former inquiry was often subsumed within
the latter—or was presumed without analysis so that the court
could proceed to the second step—the Hardin court dispensed
with this two-step approach. Instead, it clarified, “The only
pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged difference in
treatment is adequately justified under the applicable standard
of review.” (Id. at pp. 850–851.)
Here, the parties agree that the applicable standard of
review is rational basis because the registration system does not
implicate a suspect class or fundamental right. (See generally
Legg v. Department of Justice (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 504, 511
(Legg); People v. McKee (2010) 47 Cal.4th 1172, 1211, fn. 14
[mandatory lifetime sex offender registration does not implicate a
fundamental right].) Thus, the court must determine if the
Legislature lacked a rational basis for the difference in treatment
challenged here—i.e. subjecting those convicted of an offense
under 288.4, subdivision (b), to tier three registration
requirements—such that this difference violates Muradyan’s
right to equal protection of the law.
Equal protection “is denied only where there is no ‘rational
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some
legitimate governmental purpose.’ [Citation.] In other words,
the legislation survives constitutional scrutiny as long as there is
‘ “any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.” ’ [Citation.] This standard
of rationality does not depend upon whether lawmakers ever
actually articulated the purpose they sought to achieve. Nor
must the underlying rationale be empirically substantiated.
[Citation.] While the realities of the subject matter cannot be
completely ignored [citation], a court may engage in ‘ “rational
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speculation” ’ as to the justifications for the legislative choice
[citation]. It is immaterial for rational basis review ‘whether or
not’ any such speculation has ‘a foundation in the record.’ ”
(People v. Turnage (2012) 55 Cal.4th 62, 74–75; accord Johnson v.
Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881 (Johnson).)
“This core feature of equal protection sets a high bar before a law
is deemed to lack even the minimal rationality necessary for it to
survive constitutional scrutiny. Coupled with a rebuttable
presumption that legislation is constitutional, this high bar helps
ensure that democratically enacted laws are not invalidated
merely based on a court’s cursory conclusion that a statute’s
tradeoffs seem unwise or unfair.” (People v. Chatman (2018) 4
Cal.5th 277, 289.)
The party challenging the law has the burden of showing
that “ ‘no rational basis for the unequal treatment is reasonably
conceivable.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 852.) This
requires the challenger to “ ‘ “negative every conceivable basis” ’
that might support the disputed statutory disparity.” (Johnson,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 881, quoting Heller v. Doe (1993) 509 U.S.
312, 320.) “ ‘If a plausible basis exists for the disparity, courts
may not second-guess its “ ‘wisdom, fairness, or logic.’ ” ’ ”
(Hardin, at p. 852.)
We review an equal protection claim de novo. (California
Grocers Assn. v. City of Los Angeles (2011) 52 Cal.4th 177, 208.)
II. The sexual offender registry system
The Sex Offender Registration Act, codified in section 290,
“serves ‘an important and vital public purpose by compelling
registration of many serious and violent sex offenders who
require continued public surveillance,’ ” and seeks in particular to
protect children who “ ‘are a class of victims who require
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paramount protection’ from sex offenders.” (Johnson, supra, 60
Cal.4th at p. 877.) As originally enacted, the act required lifetime
registration for all eligible offenses or circumstances. (People v.
Hamilton (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 423, 431–432.) “[I]t is settled
that section 290’s lifetime registration requirement legitimately
intends to ‘promote the “ ‘state interest in controlling crime and
preventing recidivism in sex offenders.’ ” ’ [Citation.] Moreover,
there is no doubt that mandatory registration for sex offenders
who prey on underage victims is rationally related to that
important and vital public purpose.” (Johnson, at pp. 881–882.)
The Legislature modified its all-inclusive approach to the
sex offender registry by eliminating lifetime registration for all
offenders and instituting a three-tiered system requiring lifetime
registration only for offenders meeting certain criteria. Tier one
and two offenders can petition for removal after they complete
their statutorily-required period on the registry, providing that a
court does not find that community safety would be significantly
enhanced by requiring their continued registration. (§ 290.5,
subd. (a)(3).) Tier three offenders, like Muradyan, must remain
on the registry for life. This modification was intended to
distinguish between offenders where the law previously
“ ‘treat[ed] all sex offenders the same, regardless of the person’s
risk of reoffense.’ ” (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses,
3d reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 384 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Sept. 8, 2017, p. 10 [quoting authors’ comments] (Rules
Analysis).) This new distinction, which ultimately lessened the
number of individuals on the registry, was intended in part to
serve overburdened law enforcement agencies, which struggled to
supervise registrants posing the greatest risk to public safety due
to the high number of registrants. (People v. Hamilton, supra,
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108 Cal.App.5th at p. 432; People v. Franco (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
184, 190–191.)
The Legislature accordingly amended section 290 to adopt
a three-tiered scheme that based registration on the offender’s
risk level. Effective January 2021, the act created the three
distinct registration tiers, based upon the Legislature’s
assessment of the likelihood of recidivism. (See generally People
v. Franco, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at pp. 191–192.) In general, tier
one offenses are misdemeanors or nonserious or nonviolent
felonies (§ 290, subds. (c) & (d)(1)(A)), and tier two offenses are
serious or violent felonies and additional specified offenses (§ 290,
subd. (d)(2)(A)). Tier three registration applies to individuals
who meet certain criteria, such as those who have previously
been convicted of certain offenses after prior convictions of
registrable offenses, who have previously been committed to a
state mental hospital as a sexually violent predator, have an
above-average risk level score on the static risk assessment
instrument for sex offenders, have been deemed habitual sex
offenders, or have been convicted in two separate proceedings of
committing lewd and lascivious acts on a child under age 14.
(§ 290, subd. (d)(3).) Tier three also applies to individuals who
have committed specified offenses, including, as relevant here,
section 288.4. (§ 290, subd. (d)(3)(C)(xii).)
III. A rational basis exists for subjecting section 288.4,
subdivision (b), offenders to lifetime sex offender
registration
Muradyan argues that his lifetime registration resulting
from his conviction under section 288.4, subdivision (b), lacks a
rational basis and thus violates his equal protection rights,
because “more serious” offenses do not require lifetime
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registration. In his original petition, Muradyan identified five
offenses that he claimed are more serious than his section 288.4,
subdivision (b), offense and that therefore demonstrate this lack
of rationality. On appeal, he has focused solely on section 288,
subdivision (a), to argue that the Legislature unconstitutionally
differentiated between categories of offenders. This more limited
argument still fails.
A conviction under section 288.4, subdivision (b), requires
satisfaction of each of the following elements: 1) defendant
arranged a meeting with a minor or a person they believed to be
a minor; 2) when they did so, they were motivated by an
unnatural interest in children; 3) at the meeting, they intended
to expose their genitals or pubic or rectal area; and 4) defendant
went to the meeting at the arranged time. (§ 288.4, subd. (b); see
generally People v. Cornett (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1261, 1267
[Legislature created § 288.4 offense and other offenses by urgency
measure “to prevent ‘future victimization’ of the community by
sex offenders”]; People v. Fromuth (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 91, 101–
102, fn. 8 (Fromuth).)
The Legislature described section 288.4 as a “ ‘child
luring’ ” crime. (Fromuth, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 102, fn. 9.)
Child luring crimes are characterized by an adult planning or
cultivating a relationship with a targeted minor. “Luring may be
committed by a ‘contact or communication’ that is preparatory or
indirect,” such as by using an agent. (People v. Medelez (2016) 2
Cal.App.5th 659, 663.) Both the courts and the Legislature have
already recognized luring crimes—and specifically offenses under
section 288.4—as predatory and premeditated, and that a “person
who arranges to have sex with a child when given the
9
opportunity is an opportunistic sexual predator.” (Fromuth, at
p. 111.)
In comparison, section 288, subdivision (a), criminalizes the
willful commission of “any lewd or lascivious act” on a child under
the age of 14 years, “with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or
gratifying the lust, passions, or sexual desires of that person or
the child.” Muradyan attempts to characterize section 288,
subdivision (a), as the more serious offense because it requires
actual contact with a minor, while offenses under section 288.4
often “involve no more than the offender having a long distance
or online chat with a minor who is in reality an undercover agent
and not a minor . . . and there is rarely any physical contact in
such offenses.” He also argues that a violation of section 288,
subdivision (a), may be accomplished by a perpetrator who plans
extensively to commit the crime, and thus in a particular case
may be equally predatory as an offense committed under section
288.4. Muradyan contends that in the absence of a “statistical,
academically supported body of proof” the Legislature’s
determination that a luring offense under section 288.4 is more
likely to involve a potential repeat offender than an offense under
section 288, subdivision (a), it cannot survive rational scrutiny.
Muradyan misapprehends the standard for determining
that a statute violates equal protection under the rational basis
standard. It is not for the law’s proponent to demonstrate that
the Legislature has empirical proof supporting the efficacy of
each provision. To the contrary, the Legislature need not have
any empirical basis at all; a court may uphold the legislative acts
based upon no more than its own rational speculation as to the
Legislature’s motives. Rather, it is Muradyan’s burden to
“negative every conceivable basis” for the Legislature’s
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differential treatment of offenses under section 288.4. (Johnson,
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 881.) He cannot meet this standard.
It is already “settled that [the] . . . lifetime registration
requirement legitimately intends to ‘promote the “ ‘state interest
in controlling crime and preventing recidivism in sex
offenders.’ ” ’ ” (Johnson, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 882.) It is also
well established that child luring crimes are recognized as
distinct from other types of sex offenses and are viewed as
inherently predatory in nature. (See, e.g., People v. Medelez,
supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 663 [luring requires preparatory
communication].) Muradyan has presented no argument as to
how a statute requiring lifetime registration of individuals the
law recognizes as “opportunistic sexual predators” fails to have a
rational relationship to the legitimate government interest in
preventing sexual abuse of minors. In subjecting persons
convicted of a crime under section 288.4 to lifetime registration,
the Legislature could have rationally and reasonably believed
that a person who arranges a rendezvous with a minor with the
intent of exposing their genitals, and follows through on that
meeting possesses a mindset or proclivity towards the sexual
abuse of a minor that differs from offenders of section 288,
subdivision (a), which does not necessarily require predatory and
planning behavior. In short, the Legislature could rationally find
that a person who commits a preparatory, predatory crime
against a minor is more likely to recidivate than a sex offender
who violates section 288, subdivision (a).
Moreover, section 288, subdivision (a), does not require the
perpetrator to be motivated by an “unnatural or abnormal sexual
interest in children,” as section 288.4 requires. (Italics added.)
Instead, section 288, subdivision (a), can be violated by a young
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adult and a minor involved in a “ ‘teen romance[ ],’ ” which the
Legislature rationally could have found less concerning and less
indicative of a likelihood to reoffend. (Legg, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at pp. 512, 516 [plausible basis exists to require
lifetime registration for violating § 288, subd. (c)(1), but only 20-
year registration for violating § 288, subd. (a)].)2
Muradyan posits that even section 288.4 can be violated by
an 18-year-old arranging to meet his 17-year-old girlfriend for a
movie with the intent to have sex with her after, if a jury believes
his conduct was motivated by an unnatural sexual interest. We
are unpersuaded. “ ‘When conducting rational basis review . . .
[a] plausible reason for distinguishing between [two groups of
individuals] need not exist in every scenario in which the statutes
might apply.’ ” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 863, quoting
People v. Turnage, supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 77–78.) Even if
Muradyan can identify specific circumstances under which an
offense under section 288, subdivision (a), may be more
insidiously perpetrated than an offense under section 288.4, that
does not negate the rational purpose underlying the statute in its
entirety.
2 The Legg court ultimately rejected the equal protection
challenge by concluding that individuals who violated section
288, subdivision (c)(1), are not similarly situated to those who
violated section 288, subdivision (a). (Legg, supra, 81
Cal.App.5th at pp. 514–515.) A more recent challenge to the
same provision, in the wake of Hardin’s directive to focus on
whether the difference in treatment is justified, affirmed the Legg
court’s conclusion. (People v. Molina (2026) 120 Cal.App.5th 846,
856 [“[W]e conclude—as the Legg court did—that a rational basis
exists for the different registration requirements of section
288(c)(1) offenders compared to section 288(a) offenders”].)
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Finally, Muradyan cites a lone article3 to show that the
registration system, and the understanding of recidivism that
underlies it, is based on outdated data. While the article
questions the efficacy of sex offender registries and the data used
to create them, it does not address the equal protection issue
before us: whether our Legislature had a rational basis to
distinguish between different sex offenses in the manner that it
has done here for purposes of the sex offender registry. Not only
does it not answer the pertinent question here, but it is also
rebutted by the legislative record in this case. In creating the
three-tier registry, our Legislature specifically stated that it
relied on “ ‘decades of research’ ” to obtain “ ‘a much better sense
of who is at high risk of reoffending and who is not’ ” and to
determine the “ ‘best practices’ ” to protect the public from sex
offenders. (Sen. Rules Com., Off. of Sen. Floor Analyses, 3d
reading analysis of Sen. Bill No. 384 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) as
amended Sept. 8, 2017, p. 10.) “To strike down an act of the
Legislature as irrational based on a set of untested empirical
findings would be antithetical to multiple settled principles of
judicial review.” (Hardin, supra, 15 Cal. 5th at p. 862.)
Muradyan’s request for the court to find that the Legislature
acted irrationally on the basis of a single law review article
critiquing sex offender registries falls far short of the standard
3 Ellman, When Animus Matters and Sex Crime
Underreporting Does Not: The Problematic Sex Offender Registry
(2021) 7 U. of Pa. J. of Law & Public Affairs 1.
(https://repository.law.upenn.edu/Documents/Detail/when-
animus-matters-and-sex-crime-underreporting-does-not-the-
problematic-sex-offender-registry/96426?item=132938 [as of July
14, 2026], archived at <https://perma.cc/2EMD-EZZV>.)
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required to find that a law violates equal protection under
rational basis review, and we decline to grant this request.
Costs on appeal are awarded to respondent.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
OCHOA, J.*
We concur:
EGERTON, Acting P. J.
HANASONO, J.
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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